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A N D R Á S S A J Ó * 
Constitutional Sentiments 
A b s t r a c t . The principal claim of the essay is that sentiments and assumptions about senti-
ments 
- have an important role in setting up constitutional designs and interpretation ("evolving 
standards of decency"); 
- constitutional arrangements do have impacts on social emotions; 
- the disregard of the interrelation of emotions and other forms of cognition condemns 
legal theory to one-sidedness and the efforts of behavioral economics seem not to undo this 
one-sidedness. 
For example, fear is present in the making of many constitutions. Constitutions are 
designed to give assurances against fear that stems from, among others, pre-constitutional 
oppression, mob rule and factional passions. Constitutional rights are also structured by 
emotions: Compassion and indignation serve as emotional grounds to accept and claim 
human rights. 
A simplified vision of modernity claims that law and constitutional design is all about 
rationality. Brain imaging studies indicate that moral emotions guide many moral judgments or 
are in competition with reasoning processes. Of course, moral emotions contribute to the 
shaping of law through moral judgments. To the extent law intends to shape behavior, it will 
rely on its legal folk psychology. A theory of constitutional sentiments shall reconstruct 
the assumptions on human nature as emotional nature that shape the constitution and its 
interpretation. 
Historically, constitutional path dependence presupposes emotional choices and emotional 
action tendencies that are institutionalized and 'imposed' on law and society. Paradigmatic 
changes in constitutional law cannot be explained without considering the path-breaking rule 
of emotions. For example, the commitment to abolish slavery cannot be explained without the 
emotional condemnation (based on disgust and resulting in indignation) of the institution. The 
ban on torture is also rooted in sentiments of disgust. Concepts of cruel and unusual punish-
ment are rooted in emotions of disgust. Law is both trying to script emotions (in order to 
prevent challenges to the status quo) and accommodates prevailing (or preferred) emotions 
(hence the difficulty of a non-revenge based criminal policy). 
K e y w o r d s : constitutional design, psychology, enlightenment, militant democracy, politics 
of emotion, social risk evaluation, popul ism 
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30.; Professor, Central European University, Legal Studies. 
E-mail: sajoand@ceu.hu 
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And it is fortunate for men to be in a situation in which, 
though their passions may prompt them to be wicked, 
they have nevertheless an interest in not being so. 
Montesquieu 
It is not obvious that sentiments and assumptions about sentiments are crucial 
in setting up constitutional design or that constitutional arrangements have 
impacts on social emotions. To show that such relations are important I could 
use the genuine indignation that women's rights triggered in Afghanistan among 
the faithful, but I prefer to discuss fear, empathy, and compassion in democratic 
constitutional contexts to illustrate the role of sentiments in limiting govern-
ment power and in accepting or rejecting certain fundamental rights. This 
will be followed by an analysis of political emotionalism and irrational risk 
handling that challenge the institutional design of liberal democracy. 
A discussion of the role of emotions in constitutional law and political 
institution design presents methodological difficulties as well as challenges 
related to the conflicting scientific knowledge that is generated regarding 
emotions. The methodological problem is this: emotions are individual empirical 
phenomena, even if occurring in a social environment in social interaction. 
Institutions, on the other hand, are collective normative expectations and patterns, 
or symbols, or what not. 
Strictly speaking, one can speak about emotions that might have existed in 
individuals who designed institutions. More importantly, in the making of a 
constitution, constitution makers have assumptions about human emotions. But 
these are hardly measurable. Is it relevant in the creation of institutions what 
the related actual individual emotional processes are? How do we observe or 
reconstruct such emotions? After all, it is quite possible that the constitutional 
design is the work of a small drafting elite's false consciousness about emotions. 
It might be the false assumption of judges who redesign the constitution. The 
assumptions on emotions might be wrong: nevertheless the constitution will be 
operative. But at what price? 
My research hypothesis is that emotions, through complicated mechanisms, do 
have an actual impact on constitutional design. By improving our knowledge 
regarding emotions, we can improve constitutional design. 
Such research has to consider many interrelated matters: first, it is about 
the impact of sentiments and assumptions regarding emotions on constitutional 
law; secondly, it is about the effort of constitutional law to handle and shape 
public sentiments; thirdly, it considers the public reactions, including emotional 
reactions, to constitutional arrangements; and finally, it is about the actual 
impact of constitutional and other legal designs on the social construction and 
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use of sentiments. Consideration of these matters will enable the discussion of 
policy issues of how to deal with emotions. 
I am not offering any definition of emotions in the constitutional context. 
Instead, I use the 18th century term sentiment to indicate that in constitutional 
design what matters is the assumption about social emotions. Sentiments refer 
to prevailing language usage regarding the social interpretation of behavior and 
related expectations. I hope that in the long run a closer relationship between 
sentiments, which serve as social-normative shorthand in constitutional and 
political reasoning, and emotions, understood here in a scientific, e.g. 
neurological sense, can be developed. 
The term constitution is used here in a broad sense. It goes beyond consti-
tutional texts and includes various judicial and other legally and socially relevant 
meanings, constitutional conventions, practices and customs that emerge in the 
use of public power. On the other hand, I limit myself to constitutional settings 
that emerge under the paradigm of constitutionalism. Here constitutionalism 
entails democracy and 19lh century liberalism. I understand constitutionalism 
as a crucial part of the reason-based modernity project, something that became 
quite problematic recently, because of, among other things, the mistreatment of 
emotions in favor of distorted reason. 
It is true that in a desiccated tradition political institutions claim legitimacy 
precisely because they are able to operate rationally, hence efficiently. They 
claim to deserve respect and obedience because these constitutional institutions 
enable rational behavior in society. Contemporary constitutional systems are 
typically presented as if they were operating according to rationality, or at least 
as if their problems were related to some problem of bounded rationality, some 
difficulty in intellectual processing. All the above is in line with the centrality 
of reason, the alleged core assumption of modernity. Today people take pride 
in debasing reason-based modernity. At a time when reason is suspicious, 
constitutions join the usual suspects in the academic round up. But the reason-
passion opposition is a gross simplification: the goal of the enlightenment was 
not the oppression of sentiments, but self-control that enables propriety in the 
display of sentiments. The enemy of reason is not passion; it is fanaticism. 
This message of Voltaire is to be remembered in our age of new fanaticism. 
Constitutionalism and the administration of justice are often presented as 
institutions that claim to improve efficiency in human affairs by promising the 
eradication of emotion from the constitutional public sphere. Notwithstanding 
the relevance of sentiments for constitutionalism, constitutional law allegedly 
neglects this relevance. Why is that so? There is a historical path dependence 
here. The paradigm of fundamental rights is provided to the modem world by 
the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. The Declaration 
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offered a rationalistic frame and this is what became prevalent in constitutional 
thinking. But it would be wrong to consider the Declaration to be a pure 
negation of sentiments and an example of the modernist plot of enlightened 
reason. The French revolution was a sentimental revolution. 
Let me quote the Marquis de La Fayette arguing at the National Assembly in 
favor of the Declaration: "Let me call to mind the sentiments which Nature has 
engraved in the heart of every citizen, and which take a new force when they are 
solemnly recognized by all: For a nation to love liberty, it is sufficient that she 
knows it; and to be free, it is sufficient that she wills it."1 In this approach, liberty 
exists in natural sentiments and reason is only there to remind us of our senti-
ments. It is only the result of positivist science and legal positivism that moral 
sentiments are pushed into oblivion in scholarship and positivist ideology. 
While in the Middle Ages behavior was taken to be shaped by certain 
passions, this was gradually replaced by conceptions of interest as the proper 
source of guidance for and basis of explanation of social behavior. It should be 
added that the 18th century cult of sentiments is related to the attempt to use 
them as a crucial technique of social control under Louis XIV. The technique 
faded away in favor of scientific positivism, but it seems to me that it is back 
in the culture of narcissism. In a culture of narcissism, rational arguments are 
replaced by narratives of suffering that are amplified in the hope of manufac-
turing indignation and compassion. 
The dismissal of passions did not result in the annihilation of sentiments in 
some socially construed and institutionalized quarantine of mental asylums, poor 
houses, educational institutions, and correct manners, as one could conclude 
from a superficial reading of Foucault. It is only in the positivism of the 19th 
century that sentiments are neglected in political thinking and in law, with 
some exceptions like crimes of passion. 
Among many others, Hume, Adam Smith, and Rousseau have emphasized 
that sentiments are constitutive to social institutions. Rousseau's crucial senti-
ment in this regard is pity and related empathy or, as it was called, sympathy. 
It is through sympathy, Edmund Burke wrote, "that we enter into the concerns 
of others; that we are moved as they are moved, and are never suffered to be 
indifferent spectators of almost any thing which men can do or suffer."2 
The simplest reference to the foundational tenets of constitutionalism that 
prevailed in the 18th century will suffice to prove that modern constitutional 
design, although it is a rational venture, is intended to handle human sentiments, 
1
 Quoted in Paine, T.: The Rights of Man. Hormondsworth , 1792. 
Burke , E.: A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of Our Ideas of the Sublime 
and Beautiful. Oxford, N e w York, 1757. Sect ion XIII. 
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even beyond constraining passion. True, constitutions are silent about senti-
ments, and modern law is to a great extent a set of decisional norms that tends to 
create barriers to the operation of emotions in legal and judicial decisions. But 
silence is not the sign of indifference. On the contrary, it disguises preoccupation. 
As proof of this claim, let us quote Madison: 
"AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, 
none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break 
and control the violence of faction. [.. .] By a faction, I understand a number 
of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who 
are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, 
adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate 
interests of the community. [Factions bring] instability, injustice, and 
confusion introduced into the public councils [that is, they destroy rational 
deliberation]. In particular this is the source of the tyranny of the majority."3 
In Madison's view the problem is solved by representative government, sepa-
ration of powers, and federalism. These institutions do not allow people to have 
their passions directly operate. This way "the [passionate] majority must be 
rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into 
effect schemes of oppression."4 
Please note that the constitutional plan is not about the prevention of the 
emotionally driven irrationality of factional thinking and action. These cannot 
be prevented. There is no place for pedagogical optimism here. Madison offers 
a purely rational design that limits the success of irrational mass movements 
and the irrationality of all monopolies. Further, Madison, following Montesquieu, 
attributes emotions to the constitutional bodies: 
"[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers 
in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each 
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist 
encroachments of the others. [.. .] Ambition must be made to counteract 
ambition. [...] It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices 
should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is 
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human naturel If 
men were angels, no government would be necessary."5 
3
 Madison, J.: The Federalist, 1787. 
4
 Id. 
5
 Madison, J.: The Federalist, 1788. 
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Constitutions cannot annihilate sentiments. More importantly, they do not intend 
to do so. Constitutional law is not about the annihilation or disregard of moral 
sentiments; it is about the manipulation of sentiments. It offers mechanisms to 
cool down passions that endanger the constitutional system. (This, of course, 
includes oppressive mechanisms that serve the maintenance of the political 
status quo.) Constitutional pre-commitments, the difficulty of constitutional 
amendment, gag rules, etc., are some examples of such mechanisms. Sentiments 
might result in social instability: institutions offer solidarity and permanence 
and these become more and more important to the constitutional designer. 
"The dead weight of institutions, which have a life of their own, then gradually 
tames the impetus" of the original sentiments.6 
It is not by accident that the victorious politics of emotions often pushes for 
constitutional reform or a new constitution. Constitutions are often replaced in 
very emotional social processes. In 1958 General de Gaulle decided to 
disregard the existing rules of constitutional amendment that were available to 
him and preferred to have a new constitution of France via plebiscite. De 
Gaulle's gamble was to generate emotional support for his constitution by 
generating personal sympathy towards his rule. 
Collective political sentiments are decisive in constitutional design. More 
precisely, fear is one of the crucial social experiences that dictate specific 
fundamental constitutional solutions. Fear was important in shaping Madison's 
plan, but here I am referring to a collective emotional experience as the creative 
force shaping the constitution. The 1789 French Declaration, many of the 
solutions that were accepted at Philadelphia in 1787, and the German Basic 
law after WWII were all clearly dictated by considerations of fear. Indeed, fear 
helped to overcome collective and individual resistance to certain solutions. 
In July 1789, the French Constituent Assembly was in the middle of a bitter 
debate about the meaning of the rights of man. Quite a remarkable treat, given 
that the matter was declared to be obvious in the light of reason. It was hotly 
debated, for example, if free exercise of religion would be extended to Protestants. 
It was only thanks to a most emotional speech of a pastor that the Assembly 
considered reason to favor a more equitable position. At the end of July an 
epidemic of hatred raged through the villages of France. Within a fortnight, 
French peasants successfully burned the documents containing feudal privileges 
together with the castles where the documents were held. When the news 
reached the Assembly on the night of August 4, the debate on the Declaration 
came to a sudden halt and in an all-night session the panicked delegates of the 
Assembly one after another voluntarily renounced their feudal privileges, as if 
6
 Canett i , E.: Crowds and Power. New York, 1984. 24. 
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subject to a miraculous act of reason. Two weeks later the abolition of feudal 
privileges was proclaimed by the National Assembly. A couple of days later, 
and without much additional debate, a list of fundamental rights was adopted, 
without the catalogue ever having been finished. 
The works of fear generated by the Shays rebellion and the Philadelphia 
mob rule (or call it premature democracy) had their obvious impact on the US 
Constitution. The American and the 1948 German Constitutions do not allow 
for referenda, because of fear of irrational mob reactions. Other constitutions 
considerably limit the subject matter of referenda. Fear resulting from past 
injustice is expressly present in the German and South African Constitutions, 
and in other post-totalitarian constitutions (see prohibition on totalitarian 
political organizations, the right to resist, etc.) 
While the impact of a fearful consideration of the past is undeniable, the 
methodological problem remains. How did these considerations make their 
way into the constitution, and how do these considerations influence future 
constitutional developments? To what extent do these considerations, which are 
the reconstruction of emotions and shorthand for the scholarly observer, have 
real emotional equivalents? Were the drafters actually afraid? Did they feel 
fear? Did they assume that people or at least their constituency were afraid and 
expected them to alleviate that fear by institutional design that promises 
safety? Does it matter? Assuming that the small elite that actually drafted the 
constitution shared the public fear, or a group dynamics of fear did play a role 
in the negotiations, is this to say that the constitution actually expresses and 
radiates social fear? 
Fundamental rights offer a second illustration of the relationship that exists 
between constitutional institutions and moral sentiments. Rights are hard to 
deny when they meet emotional resonance. 
Torture is rejected because other people's suffering triggers disgust and 
compassion. But torture is culture dependent. The ancestors of the same French-
men who today abhor the death penalty took pleasure in the brutal execution of 
the regicide Damiens in 1757 when he was torn in pieces by horses. By the way, 
Adam Smith was working on the manuscript of his Theory of Moral Senti-
ments that very year. He claims that other people's pain is felt as one's own 
through mechanisms of empathy. I assume that empathy does play a role in the 
contemporary success of socio-economic rights claims, and in humanitarian 
intervention. In a more troubling way, as Nietzsche has indicated, ressentiment, 
this strange marriage of bad consciousness and envy, plays an enormous role here. 
To use a different example, altruism urges us, not always with success, to 
give alms, although we have quite rational strategies to avoid the good deeds of 
the heart. Social welfare is justified in the eyes of the compassionate, although 
8 ANDRÁS SAJÓ 
the socially decisive factor is to whom we feel compassion. (See the social war 
on the construction of the deserving poor.) Given these sentiments, it becomes 
difficult to attack welfare policies. The acceptance of anti-welfare reasons has 
to overcome personal emotional resistance. 
It has to be emphasized that under ordinary circumstances empathy and 
resulting solidarity feelings as such do not result in action. The compassion is 
without a specific object of action and its importance is primarily to facilitate 
the operation of reason, or to offer a predisposition for collective action. How 
this collective action is structured, and what are its norms and objectives, 
cannot be decided on the basis of moral sentiments. Social representations will 
determine with whom and how one should feel solidarity and compassion. 
Gertrude Himmelfarb describes the difficulty of compassion-triggered action: 
"In its sentimental mode, compassion is an exercise in moral indignation, 
in feeling good rather than doing good; this mode recognizes no principle 
of proportion, because feeling, unlike reason, knows no proportion, no limit, 
no respect for the constraints of policy or prudence. In its unsentimental 
mode, compassion seeks above all to do good, and this requires a stem 
sense of proportion, of reason and selfcontrol."7 
There is a long way to go from compassion to social rights, and this is not a 
one-way street. Changes in the social patterns mobilizing compassion might 
result in the reversal of legal arrangements. The object of empathy, like other 
emotional objects, is determined, at least according to sociological and pheno-
menological theories of emotion, in the Lebenswelt. 
Compassion today plays a contradictory role. As Marco Steenbergen states: 
"On first sight there indeed appears to be 'compassion fatigue' (Kozol 1995) in 
American society including the prevailing social indifference in face of the 
dismantling of the social safety net. [. . . But] Americans talk individualism but 
often behave in the spirit of compassion."8 Already Tocqueville noted that 
Americans were quite willing to offer assistance to those in need, in spite of 
their emphasis on the norm of self-reliance. 
This is not to suggest that sentiments can explain constitutional change. 
Abolitionism was not the result of a sudden compassion epidemic: it was the 
result of long-term processes (including economic processes) with group dynamics 
7
 Himmel fa rb , G.: Poverty and Compassion: The Moral Imagination of the Late 
Victorians. New York, 1991. 5. 
8
 Steenbergen, S.: Compass ion & Amer ican Public Opin ion : An Analysis of the 
NES Humanitar ian Scale. NES Pilot Study Report, (1996), 1 - 2 . 
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that sped up certain cognitive changes that then enabled the re-framing of 
slaves as being humans. At this historical point, keeping them in slavery met 
indignation. On the other hand, constitutionalizing the dictates of sentiments 
helps to sustain and extend the cultural environment that provides interpretive 
schemes to sentiments, or, if emotions are cognition dependent, it may shape 
the emotions. Social sentiments become normative patterns through constitu-
tionalisation. The constitutional solution, be it in the text of the constitution or 
in a judicial decision that embodies rights, finds echo in the public sentiment. 
The best-case scenario is that the constitution meets with constitutional 
enthusiasm: the constitution offers values for public identification. Constitutions 
are often acts of nation and state formation and the reception of the constitu-
tion, or its rejection, is part of identity formation. Such identification increases 
both the short-term and long-term success of the constitution. The present 
difficulties of the new European Constitution indicate that lack of enthusiasm 
may result in the failure of the constitution-making exercise. 
Now we have a sketch of how sentiments shape constitutions: public 
sentiments influence constitutional design directly in some of the cases, but 
more importantly, constitutional decisions operate with assumptions about the 
current sentiments and also contain assumptions about emotions that will be 
generated by the constitutional design. Much of the constitutional arrange-
ments is designed to predict, anticipate, and cope with what the drafters or 
judges imagine are popular sentiments. 
To illustrate the complexity of the relation between sentiment and constitu-
tional design, I would like to discuss only the impact emotions have on modem 
democracies. This story indicates how difficult, perhaps impossible, it is to 
keep public sentiments within the boundaries of constitutionalism. I will discuss 
militant democracy that deals with the arguably illicit use of emotions in politics. 
As mentioned above, fear dictates that post-totalitarian constitutions include 
provisions that enable preventive measures against anti-democratic movements 
and actions. This preventive repertoire is called militant democracy. The name 
comes from a 1937 article of the German émigré political scientist, Karl 
Loewenstein.9 He argued that democracies should not stick to formal liberal 
and democratic processes when fascists are abusing these processes. 
According to Loewenstein, authoritarian regimes and movements are held 
together not by violence, but by emotionalism. This is what replaces the rule of 
law. Authoritarian regimes and fascist movements possess an arsenal of 
techniques for emotional mobilization. Nationalist fervor and intimidation, 
9
 Loewenstein, K.: Mil i tant Democracy and Fundamenta l Rights I., II., American 
Political Science Review, 31 (1937)417 , 638. 
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which is conjured up with the image of physical coercion, are the most com-
mon elements of political emotionalism. The only genuine goal of such politics 
is to seize and retain power at all costs. In this, movements may succeed even 
if they operate within the democratic institutional infrastructure. Loewenstein 
talks explicitly about the perfect adaptation of the politics of emotions to 
democracy. An example of this is when new elections or referenda are extorted 
by means of emotional mass politics, including threatening mass demonstra-
tions, strikes, etc., bordering on violence. It is not by accident that reputable 
democracies refrain from having national referenda, or limit the right to 
demonstrate. In direct decision-making methods, the politics of emotional 
manipulation and its momentary considerations prevail at the expense of the 
more or less rational problem-solving methods of constitutional institutions. 
Therefore, a constitutional democracy must be ready and able to confine the 
politics of emotions. 
For militant democracy, decisions based on emotional impulses are suspect. 
Given the fear of the consequences of emotional politics, militant democracy 
becomes risk averse. This is in net opposition to freedom-maximizing constitu-
tionalism that stands for constitutional risk-taking. Risk aversion is troubling 
in a constitutional democracy that stands for liberty. Risk-taking is required 
for liberty, at least according to Justice Brandeis, who gave the following 
justification for not limiting freedom of speech: 
"Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state 
was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government 
the deliberative forces should prevail against the arbitrary. [...] They believed 
[...] courage to be the secret of liberty [.... and] that the greatest menace to 
freedom is an inert people." 
Further, he referred to the negative consequences of preventive oppression: 
"fear breeds repression [...], repression breeds hate."10 
Along these lines of risk-taking for liberty, Brandeis (referring to speech) 
suggested that the seriousness of the evil, the probability of occurrence, and 
the reasonableness of the assumption regarding the probability are to be taken 
into account. The problem is that fear and other emotions, and emotionally 
conditioned perceptions, undermine the probability calculus. 
As mentioned above, if a society operates under the assumption of risk 
aversion in matters of political action, liberty-based reasoning is not attractive. 
The inclination to social risk aversion increases where specific historical 
10
 Whi tney v. Cal ifornia , 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 375. 
CONSTITUTIONAL SENTIMENTS 11 
experiences dictate precaution; once again, constitutions may help to perpetuate 
past experiences of fear. 
In order to counter the politics of emotion one has to rethink the basic risk-
taking position of liberty-enhancing constitutionalism. In practical terms, this 
means that, for example, the authorization of mass demonstrations requires a 
rethinking of arrangements that were considered to be settled under the liberty 
paradigm. See, for example the problems related to the authorization of anti-
globalization demonstrations, like the one at the G-8 Seattle meeting. Authorizing 
demonstrations remains a matter for constitutional rethinking, when certain 
groups make it clear that they cannot achieve their goals without seriously 
burdening other citizens and the public order. 
President Franklin Roosevelt said that the only thing we have to fear is fear 
itself. The intellectual hero of the Hungarian anti-communist movement, István 
Bibó's most often quoted line among dissidents was that "he who is afraid 
cannot be a good democrat." But most political systems do not subscribe to 
this pathos. It remains part of the research agenda to determine to what extent 
and under which circumstances the fearlessness position make sense, in light 
of the decision-shaping capacities of emotions, including fear. 
With increased social fear it is difficult to sustain institutionalized risk-taking. 
Here risk-taking, also known as liberty, is replaced with the precautionary 
principle. 
The politics of emotion remains a fundamental challenge to deliberative 
democracy. Terrorism generates emotional reactions that may preclude reasonable 
reactions. Liberty is curtailed in panic, but such action might be justified by the 
dictates of sentiments. 
The politics of emotion is with us even without terrorism. Ordinary electoral 
processes and referenda are fought and won by mobilizing emotions. Democracy 
understood as popular election is turned into a process of choosing leaders 
from the elite on the basis of unconscious preferences (hardly a robust 
republican theory). This clearly negates the fundamental assumption of consti-
tutional law that democracy is legitimated as a process that enables socially 
optimal decisions through participation and deliberation. The opportunities for 
reasonable arguments are further undermined by the prevailing culture of 
narcissism where victimhood and related suffering become trumps, especially 
where suffering is visualized enough to generate emotions, including indignation 
and sympathy. In this way, politics has become a beauty contest of public 
indignations. 
Of course, the constitutional institutional design contains elements that are 
intended to diminish emotionalism and related populism. An important organi-
zational solution aims at insulating public institutions from the emotional public 
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process. Insulation means that social decisions are taken by experts, instead of 
being decided by politically accountable institutions or directly by the people. 
These allegedly neutral experts deliberate on the basis of allegedly professional 
considerations. Examples range from central banks to constitutional courts as 
policy makers. 
The argument is that these professional bodies will be deliberative. However, 
given well-known organizational interests, actual partisan influences, bounded 
rationality, personal emotions within the organization unchecked by public 
scrutiny and accountability, and other trends like cascades, professional decision-
making might be as emotionally loaded as any plebiscite. 
The ambivalent role of emotions in democracy is well illustrated in the current 
debate between Cass Sunstein of Chicago Law School and his critics regarding 
the proper handling of social risks. The debate centers on those public risks 
that are quintessential for constitutional law: terrorism, nuclear energy, global 
warming, etc. Sunstein claims that humans are irrational risk evaluators. partly 
because of affect that determines risk perception. Scientifically trained experts 
are less vulnerable to cognitive defects originating in emotional distortions. It 
thus makes sense to transfer decision-making in these areas to experts insulated 
from political processes." The opposite view was recently presented by Dan 
Kahan and co-authors. They point to the enormous discrepancies among experts 
in matters of risk perception. Increased government regulation that bypasses 
the democratic process shows shortcomings that are not that different from 
public democratic judgment. In particular, Dan Kahan and colleagues argue 
that the disagreements between lay and expert perceptions of risk are grounded 
on different value choices. These value choices are emotionally grounded, but 
emotions and values cluster in society, as they are culturally shaped. The Dan 
Kahan approach is based on the assumption that "culture is cognitively prior to 
facts in the sense that cultural values shape what individuals believe the 
consequences of such policies to be."12 
One cannot deny the existence of these cultural choices that serve for the 
emotional reactions regarding facts and assumptions. As Martha Nussbaum 
summarized it recently,13 emotions are not thoughtless surges of affect but 
value-laden judgments shaped by social norms. There is a place for democratic 
11
 See Sunstein, C.: Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle. Cambridge , 
2005. 
12
 Kahan, D. et al.: Fear and Democracy or Fear of Democracy? A Cultural Evaluat ion 
of Sunstein on Risk, Yale Law School Public Law Working Paper, (2005), 17-18. 
13
 Nussbaum, M.: Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge , 
2001. 
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political choice that cannot be replaced by expert regulation; it is not an issue 
for expert knowledge which of the following dangers you prefer: gun-induced 
violence under a right to bear arms regime, or the anxiety and the danger of 
being left without personal self-defense in case guns are prohibited. 
The above debate is decided partly on normative grounds, i.e., what follows 
from one or another theory of democracy and theory of the constitution. But 
the formation and acceptance of such theories depends on an underlying, 
emotionally shaped risk preference. It seems risky to leave vital matters to be 
decided by normative considerations only. 
At this point, scientific knowledge regarding the impact of emotions becomes 
decisive. An informed theory of constitutional sentiments should provide enough 
knowledge to enable a critical approach to the assumptions about sentiments 
that prevail in constitutional choices. Are political and legal scholarship and 
practices going to use the lessons emerging f rom behavioral sciences? Law is 
an interest-driven practical activity. It is not out of the question that interests 
will prevail in law in disregard of improved knowledge about emotions. Or, 
perhaps a better understanding of emotions will only add to the repertoire of 
legal manipulation. Feminist and other scholars offered evidence regarding the 
role of emotions in legally relevant behavior, but the legal profession resisted 
the accommodation of that knowledge, because of mental rigidity and special 
interests of domination, among other reasons. 
Lawyers and regulators may distort knowledge but this is not to say that the 
scholarly analysis of constitutional emotions lacks a proper subject. 
These short remarks are certainly far from covering all the important 
relations between emotions and constitutional law. I hope, however, that this 
was sufficient to show that constitutional decisions and critical thinking about 
government requires the taking into consideration of public emotions. 
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Introductory Remarks 
The subject of my presentation1 is both an interesting and a topical one. I say 
'interesting' because, though not unique in this, questions relating to dual 
nationality arise in national law, private international law-or, as the Americans 
say, conflict of laws-and public international law. Public international law 
comes last, but in this questions of nationality touch on the very definition of 
Former Adjunct Professor in Public International Law, Faculty of Law, University 
of Helsinki. 
E-mail: joakim.donner@kolumbus.fi 
1
 This is the written version of a talk given at a Symposium on "Dual Cit izenship as 
a Legal Problem" held at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, on Monday, 3 
October 2005. 
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statehood, the existence of a permanent population being an essential pre-
condition for it. 
And I say 'topical' because whereas when national status was the sole link 
between the individual and international law, and allegiance and protection the 
links between the individual and the ruler, it was for each individual to have one, 
and only one, nationality. At the Hague Conference on the Codification of 
International Law, 1930, there was reference to the 'twin evils' of statelessness 
and dual nationality in connection with the Convention on the Conflict of 
Nationality Laws. In his classic work on Dual Nationality of 1961, Professor 
Bar-Yaacov refers to the 'problems' of dual nationality. 
In recent years, however, it has become more common for countries to 
recognize the status of dual nationality. This is not to say that States create 
dual nationals. On the contrary, it only means that States recognize that their 
nationals may also possess the nationality of another State and that they do not 
lose their nationality by operation of law on acquiring another one, as, for 
example, was common practice when a woman acquired the nationality of her 
husband on marriage. One can mention the recent nationality legislation of 
Spain (2002), Finland (2003) and Ireland (2002). As a matter of policy, the 
Egyptian Minister of the Interior was using his administrative powers in 2004 
to pass Egyptian nationality to children of Egyptian mothers and alien fathers, 
mostly from neighbouring Arab states, pending amended legislation permitting 
married women to retain their nationality. Since 1998, Mexicans naturalized in 
the United States have been able to retain Mexican nationality. 
Acceptance of dual national status in national law has resulted in renewed 
interest in dual nationality as a sociological fact and as a problem in political 
science. Thus the 1997 publication of the British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law entitled, Citizenship. The White Paper lists in Part One eigh-
teen "Hallmarks of Citizenship", of which 14 are rights and 4 duties. 
Also of present concern is the question of how far modem developments in 
human rights law are relevant to our topic. 
Art. 15 of the UN General Assembly's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states that "Everyone has the right to a nationality." Art. 24 (3) of the 
UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, and Art. 7 (9) of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, provide for a child's right to 
citizenship, or nationality. In the International Convention on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination, 1966, Art. 5 (d) (iii) refers to "The right to nationality." 
However, these articles do not amount to a right to a specific nationality, and 
highlight the dysfunctional, or asymmetrical, nature of international human 
rights law. A State, by virtue of its sovereign powers, may divest itself of 
rights in favour of individuals, but it cannot in the same manner pass over its 
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duties and liability for civil wrongs. International criminal courts are another 
matter. A State cannot be sentenced to prison. 
On the other hand, Art. 15 of the 1948 Universal Declaration continues, 
"No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality." Other attempts have 
been made to curb the number of stateless persons. The UN Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, which entered into force in 1975, went further 
than earlier enactments in that it placed an obligation on States. Deprivation of 
nationality is not just condemned when "arbitrary", but when it results in 
statelessness (Art. 8). States parties undertake to grant nationality to persons, 
otherwise stateless, who reside on its territory. 
In November 1999 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
adopted the Charter for European Security at Istanbul. There it was stated that 
"no one should be deprived of his or her nationality arbitrarily... We also 
commit ourselves to further the international protection of stateless persons." 
With the development of human rights law it has become clear that stateless-
ness is a greater "evil" than dual nationality. 
Dual Nationality and International Law 
1. Some basic principles 
The basic principles in public international law as regards this topic-bearing in 
mind that nationality differs from citizenship, which is more relevant in 
national law, and also from "ethnic nationality"-may be listed as follows: 
(a) It is for each State to determine who are its nationals, and if this should 
lead to a person possessing two nationalities it does not mean half of one 
nationality and half of another.2 
(b) A State cannot decide who are the nationals of another State. For example, 
an English court has stated that there is no such thing as a German national by 
English law.3 
And to this one may add: 
(c) There is no such thing as a State's national by virtue of international law. 
I could mention two instances when an international body has been confronted 
with this, though both are concerned with reinstatement of an earlier existing 
nationality. 
Donner, R.: The Regulation of Nationality in International Law. 2nd ed., N e w 
York, 1995. 205. 
3
 Oppenheimer v. Cattermole; Weekly Law Reports (1975), 347. 
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First, the case of Mr Baruch Ivcher Bronstein, a national of Israel by birth, 
who acquired Peruvian nationality by naturalization in 1984 and was deprived 
of it in 1997 following his broadcasts disseminating news on torture committed 
by members of the Peruvian Army Intelligence Service. On March 31, 1999, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights submitted the case to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and requested that the Court order Peru to 
restore and ensure Mr Bronstein's full enjoyment of his rights that had been 
violated, and in particular that he be able to have his Peruvian nationality fully 
and unconditionally recognized.4 
In the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Eritrea requested, inter alia, that 
the Commission order the reinstatement of the Ethiopian nationality of tens of 
thousands of people, referring to Ethiopian nationals of Eritrean "descent, blood 
or affiliation" who were deprived of their Ethiopian nationality during the 
conflict of 1998-2000. The Commission found this to be outside its juris-
diction.5 Further to this, the Commission recognized that some States permit 
their nationals to possess another nationality while others do not: "International 
law prohibits neither position".6 
2. Some landmarks in public international law 
The Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 
Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees1 was the first pronouncement of the 
International Court regarding nationality questions. There Britain had objected 
to French decrees of 1921 granting French nationality also to British nationals 
resident in the French protectorates of Tunisia and the French zone of Morocco, 
without giving such persons an option of nationality, and had finally taken the 
matter to the Council of the League. France, on the other hand, argued that 
nationality questions were solely within the domestic jurisdiction of States, and 
hence outside the competence of the League and the Permanent Court. The 
question of competence was put before the Court by the League, and in its 
Opinion the Court stated, in a famous passage: "The question whether a certain 
matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially 
relative question; it depends upon the development of international relations. 
4
 International Legal Mater ia ls , 125 (2001) , 40. 
5
 Partial Award, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32, December 17, 
2004, Paragraphs 23-25. 
6
 Ibid, paragraph 59. 
7
 Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B, No. 4 (1923) 24. 
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Thus, in the present state of international law questions of nationality are, in the 
opinion of the Court, in principle within the reserved domain." 
This left open the development of international law as regards nationality. 
In the League of Nations codification of international law, the Committee of 
Experts set up by the League in 1924 considered a number of topics as possibly 
ripe for codification, finally settling on three topics for the Codification 
Conference, one of which was Nationality. The resulting Hague Convention on 
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 1930, entered 
into force in 1937 and was, as already mentioned, especially concerned with 
cases of dual nationality. In particular, Art. 4 stated: "A State may not afford 
diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a State whose nationality 
such person also possesses."8 This was so drafted in order to ensure the principle 
of non-responsibility, that a State was not responsible in the international 
sphere for injurious acts against its own subjects. 
On the other hand, dual national status in fact was implicitly recognized in 
the Convention. Where a conflict arose, account should be taken of the person's 
choice. Thus, Art. 5 of the Convention: "Within a third State a person having 
more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one... [A] third 
State shall recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the 
country in which he is habitually and principally resident, or the nationality of 
the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most 
closely connected." 
Similar wording appears in Art. 1 of the Protocol Relating to Military Obli-
gations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality.9 A dual national is liable for 
military service in that country of his nationality where he ordinarily or habitually 
resides. This is a formula applied in treaty law concerning military service of 
dual nationals. So, too, in other connections as, for example, for judges on inter-
national courts or, indeed, international civil servants in general. This was 
applied most recently for judges on the ICTY or the ICTR (the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively) who 
might be nationals of two or more States. Security Council Resolution 1411 of 17 
May 2002 amended Art. 12 of the ICTY statute and Art. 11 of the ICTR statute, 
providing that such judges be regarded as bearing solely the nationality of the 
State in which they "ordinarily exercise civil and political rights." The wording is 
slightly different. 
8
 League Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 179, 9. T h e Preamble stated that every person 
should have "one nationality only." Donner: op. cit. 46, note 47. 
9
 League Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 178. 227. 
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The Nottebohm case before the present International Court of Justice 
further clarified the meaning of a dual national's "close connection" with the 
State of one of his nationalities. The principal facts of this case were as 
follows: Friedrich Nottebohm was born in Hamburg, Germany, in 1881 and 
under German law was a German national. In 1905 he moved to Guatemala 
and resided and worked there until his arrest in 1943. In 1939, shortly before 
the outbreak of the Second World War, Nottebohm went to Liechtenstein and 
there acquired Liechtenstein nationality within a matter of weeks, before 
returning to Guatemala. This was in accordance with the Liechtenstein Law of 
Nationality of 1934, which permitted dispensation from the normal residence 
requirements in special circumstances. He then lost German nationality. After 
the end of the War Liechtenstein, as the country of his nationality, espoused 
Nottebohm's claim and resorted to international judicial proceedings, before 
the International Court of Justice, claiming special and general damages for 
Guatemala's wrongful arrest, detention, and expulsion of Mr Nottebohm (as 
well as) the restitution of property wrongfully seized from him between 1942 
and 1946. Here Liechtenstein exercised its right to diplomatic protection of 
one of its nationals. 
In its 1953 Judgment the Court dismissed Guatemala's preliminary objection 
to jurisdiction on the grounds that the Court was not properly seised of the 
case.10 In its 1955 Judgment,11 on the merits, the Court dismissed Liechtenstein's 
claim as inadmissible on the grounds that the factual connection between 
Nottebohm and Liechtenstein "in the period preceding, contemporaneous with, 
and following his naturalization" was found not to be sufficiently close.12 
Before that, the Court had stated that "nationality is a legal bond having as its 
basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence...".13 But 
the Court here was dealing not so much with the requirement of a genuine link 
for purposes of naturalization but with a question of opposability. This is clear 
in that the Court goes on to state that Liechtenstein was "not entitled to extend 
its protection to Nottebohm vis-à-vis Guatemala."14 The Court did not overrule 
Liechtenstein's conferment of nationality on Nottebohm. It could not do that. 
Nor did it revive his German nationality. Here I do not entirely agree with the 
10
 I.C.J. Reports, 1953. 111. 
11
 I.C.J. Reports, 1955. 4. 
12
 Ibid, a t 2 4 
13
 Ibid, a t 2 2 . 
14
 Ibid, a t 2 6 . 
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Encyclopedia of Public International Law,15 that the Nottebohm case deals 
"only with diplomatic protection as a consequence of conferment of nationality 
by naturalization." 
At the same time, we must remember that Nottebohm had never acquired 
Guatemalan nationality. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, on the other 
hand, deals with claims brought by dual Iranian-United States nationals. 
3. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
This was the first major claims commission to function since those established 
in connection with the peace settlements at the end of World War II. Thirty-four 
volumes of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports have so far been 
published. Volumes 35 and 36 are already referred to as nearing completion. 
The agreement to set up the Tribunal, being the Claims Settlement Decla-
ration of 1981, was negotiated-although not face-to-face-between Iran and the 
United States in the Algerian capital Algiers. Its mandate was "to decide claims 
of nationals of the United States against Iran and the claims of nationals of Iran 
against the United States... [that]... arise out of debts, contracts... expropria-
tions or other measures affecting property rights".16 It has been estimated that 
at the time when the Islamic Revolutionary government was established in 
Teheran, in February 1979, some 40,000 United States nationals were residing 
and working in Iran. This was mostly in connection with what the late Shah's 
widow has recently called "the White Revolution". The Tribunal's function was 
a form of diplomatic protection in that individual claims of U.S. nationals were 
pre-empted, and withdrawn from United States courts. 
The importance of this Claims Tribunal for our topic may be shown in 
three ways. 
Firstly, in case A/18,11 decided on 6 April 1984, the Full Tribunal was 
requested in accordance with its jurisdiction to interpret the meaning of United 
States national in Art. II of the Claims Settlement Declaration for purposes of 
presentation of a claim. This question arose because Iran objected to claims 
brought by naturalized American citizens on the ground that they were Iranian 
nationals by birth and Iran does not in its legislation recognize an individual's 
right to abandon nationality, except under strict conditions. I ran 's argument 
before the Full Tribunal was based principally on Art. 4 of the Hague Con-
15
 Bernhardt, R. (ed.): Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Amsterdam (et 
al.), 3, (1992) 501 at 506. 
16
 Art . II Claims Settlement Declaration, 19 January 1981. 
17
 5 I ran-Uni ted States Claims Tr ibunal Reports (U.S.C.T.R), 251. 
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vention of 1930, mentioned above, as being the expression of the classic rule 
of non-responsibility. The Tribunal dealt at length with Iran's argument and 
then rejected this line of reasoning on the basis of its analysis of historical 
practice, that international tribunals had long experience of dealing with claims 
of dual nationals, the doctrine on the subject, and also on an analysis of Art. 4 
of the Hague Convention. The Full Tribunal held that Art. 4 must be "inter-
preted very cautiously", that not only was it more than 50 years old and much 
had changed since then, but also it was "found in a treaty to which only twenty 
States are parties..." To this I may add here that Habermas has noted that in 
1998 only four member States of the European Community had ratified the 
Convention. 
Taking into account that Art. 4 of the 1930 Convention no longer expresses 
an unambiguous rule, an international court must still consider the factual 
connection, the genuine link, between an individual and his State of nationality 
that would permit that State to grant diplomatic protection against another State 
whose nationality that person also possesses. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal 
provides an abundant jurisprudence dealing with the determination of a dual 
national claimant's dominant and effective nationality. 
Without looking at all aspects of this, I want to refer to one point. In his 
1999 Hague lectures on "Conflits de Nationalités"18 Michel Verwilghen was 
critical of my treatment of the Malek case before the Tribunal.19 I am not sure 
that I follow his argument as to what I "insinuated", but I was indeed wrong in 
questioning the Tribunal's scrutiny of the whole life of the claimant in order to 
determine the dominant and effective nationality during the relevant (for the 
espousal of a claim) period from the date of the alleged injury until the date of 
bringing the claim, that is, the 19 January 1981, the date of the agreement to 
set up the Tribunal. It is general practice that for a dual national, in the "Art. 4" 
sense, a factual assessment must be made to determine the dominant and 
effective nationality during the relevant period, and in this a Tribunal, as the 
International Court in the Nottebohm case, "will consider all relevant factors, 
including habitual residence, center of interests, family ties, participation in 
public life and other evidence of attachment." In Malek the Tribunal then 
continued to elaborate on this, stating that "the entire life of the Claimant, from 
birth, and all the factors which, during this span of time, evidence the reality 
and the sincerity of the choice of national allegiance he claims to have made, 
are relevant."20 The rather curious result is that the entire life of the claimant is 
18
 Vol. 277 Recueil des Cours. 
19
 23 June 1988, 19 I ran-U.S .C.T.R. 48; Donner: op. cit. 89 -104 . 
20
 Ghaffari in 31 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 60 at 65. 
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relevant to determining dominance during the relevant period.21 In this the 
Tribunal shows a steady jurisprudence, in cases both before and after Malek. 
Thirdly, the Iran-U.S. Tribunal has contributed to the development of 
international law regarding dual nationality in its application of the caveat 
contained in case A/18. This provided that, "In cases where the Tribunal finds 
jurisdiction based upon a dominant and effective nationality of the claimant, 
the other nationality may remain relevant to the merits of the claim", and "It is 
also often admitted that no international protection is given to a dual national 
as regards rights acquired by him through the use of his 'other nationality', if 
such rights are validly reserved to its citizens by the other State."22 Although 
the Tribunal has found on numerous occasions that there is no cause for a 
claim to be barred by the caveat (e.g. Ghaffari) it has also found it to be 
applicable as, most recently, in Aryeh (M) v. Iran.23 In particular, the Tribunal 
concluded here that "while the caveat in Case A18 is relevant to this case, its 
application should result not in the barring of the entire claim, but in the 
applying of a discount to the market value of the property". And, "the Tribunal 
must rely on its discretion to quantify a discount that is reasonable and equitable 
taking into account all the circumstances in this case".24 This invoking of equity 
is in line with the early Esphahanian case,25 citing the Flegenheimer case,26 
to the effect that international courts may deny jurisdiction in cases of dual 
nationality "on equitable grounds in cases of fraudulent use of nationality." 
The requirement of bona fides appears also in the United Nations Claims 
Commission. This is a quasi-judicial body, not an arbitral tribunal for traditional 
diplomatic protection and espousal of claims, set up under Security Council 
Resolution 692 of 20 May 1991 to handle the circa 2.6 million claims arising 
out of the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Although eligibility to 
bring a claim is not based on nationality it is stipulated that Iraqi nationals 
may not bring claims. This was further clarified in the Governing Council 
(of the Commission) Decree of 28 November 1991: "Claims will not be 
considered on behalf of Iraqi nationals who do not have bona fide nationality of 
another State."27 
21
 Aldrich, G. H.: The Jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 
1996. 59. 
22
 A/18 at 265 -266 and 274. 
23
 33 I ran-U.S.C.T.R, 368. 
24
 Ibid. 395, paragraphs 85 and 86. 
25
 2 I ran-U.S.C.T.R, 161-162. 
26
 U.S. v. Italy, 14 UN Reports of International Arbitration Awards, 327 at 378. 
27
 See 31 International Legal Materials (1992) 1009. Donner: op. cit. 386. 
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4. "Dormant" nationality 
RUTH DONNER 
One matter not referred to so far, but of contemporary relevance, is the question 
of what I have called "dormant" nationality, where one full nationality exists 
together with a dormant one.28 This phenomenon is not quite the same as dual 
nationality because there are not two, or more, concurrent nationalities of, in 
principle though not necessarily in fact, equal weight. But it also has the 
character of dual nationality in that the dormant nationality may be activated at 
any time, simply on request and following certain formalities. 
An example of this occurred in Germany before reunification.29 Art. 16 of 
the West German Basic Law dealt with nationality of the Federal Republic, while 
Art. 116 covered those persons who possessed German nationality within the 
borders of territory of the German State as it existed on 31 December 1937. 
This was in accordance with Art. 146 of the Basic Law in which the concept 
of a united Germany was reiterated. In the Teso case before the W. German 
Federal Constitutional Court, 1987,30 this same concept of a common German 
nationality was applied in favour of an East German national even though the 
1967 Nationality Law of the Democratic Republic had no equivalent to Art. 116 
of the Federal Republic's Basic Law. Thus when the inhabitants of the former 
East Germany streamed west just before the collapse of that State, West 
German embassies could take them in, in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
The same applies in other divided States. Thus in the 2001 Irish Nationality 
and Citizenship Act, "section 3.6.-(l) Every person born in the island of 
Ireland is entitled to be an Irish citizen." The case of Korea is more complex 
due to the magnitude of the problems involved: the number of inhabitants is 
more evenly divided than in the former two Germanies; the poverty is greater in 
the one half, here the northern; the common border is even more impenetrable; 
and the neighbours less accommodating. Yet even there I understand that 
North Koreans who reach South Korea are given South Korean nationality on 
preferential terms. Citizenship of the European Union adds further interest to 
this question. 
As international law does not prohibit dual nationality, there can be no such 
prohibition on a State, by virtue of its inherent sovereign powers, granting its 
nationality preferentially to whomever it pleases. No conflict of nationalities is 
involved, because the one only becomes active where there is a genuine link 
28
 Donner : op. cit. 204- i .e . in preference to "virtual" nationality. 
29
 Donner: op. cit. 288-291 . 
30
 (91) International Law Reports, 2 1 3 - 2 3 5 . 
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and where the individual invokes his right to it. The nationality is not imposed 
on the individual against his will because it is only dormant. 
Concluding Remarks 
The European Convention on Nationality, 1997,31 is relevant for a number of 
the points discussed here. Although this is a regional treaty it is important 
because there are now forty-six members of the Council of Europe and, in 
addition, States not members of the Council may be parties to its treaties. 
Art. 4 (b) provides: "Statelessness shall be avoided." There is no such 
prohibition of dual nationality. 
On page 16 of the accompanying Explanatory Report it was acknowledged 
that the conflict of laws arising from multiple nationality was the "most important 
area which it has not been possible to include in the Convention... However, a 
growing number of States are making use of the notion of 'habitual residence', 
when persons regularly and effectively live in a particular place." 
Further, the International Law Commission had by August 2004 produced 
one Preliminary and five consequent numbered Reports on Diplomatic Protec-
tion, partly of relevance for our topic today. Thus Art. 6 of the First Report, of 7 
March 2000, states: "Subject to Art. 9, paragraph 4, the State of nationality may 
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of an injured national against a State 
of which the injured person is also a national where the individual's [dominant 
and effective] nationality is that of the former State." A note states that Art. 9, 
paragraph 4, will read: "Diplomatic protection may not be exercised by a new 
state of nationality against a previous State of nationality for injury incurred 
during the period when the person was a national only of the latter State." It is 
not clear what this adds to the present rules on continuity of nationality. 
Finally, and in conclusion, it may be said that the greatest contribution to this 
topic in recent years has been made by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: 
it has improved on the tools for dealing with complex factual situations in the 
determination of dominant nationality, and it has applied equitable principles 
to control the status of dual nationals. This is to say, in international law an 
individual who has dual nationality has a right to choice as in the objective 
determination of his dominant and effective nationality, but, also, he has the 
duty not to abuse this right, as provided in the caveat in the A/18 case. 
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 It means only such parts of treaties are left out which are not effective to the legal 
main figures and as exceptions are not significant either. 
Usage of the Appendix: 
1. Numbering of chapters in the Appendix (after a "A") follows that in the main text. 
2. a) The original text of the treaty can be found in the Appendix if one of its original 
languages is English. In this case the texts stays without quotation marks . 
b) If neither of the treaty's original language is English, and most of them are such, 
the Appendix shows the possibly literally translated text, containing all legally accurate 
and relevant terms (instead of a translation of literature). The translation uses the legally 
relevant terms of the same English equivalent to have the most reliable text as a basis of 
the examination. In this case the texts is put in quotation marks. 
3 .The sign of source, the translation of which can be read next to it, stays in the first 
place on the left side, the rest of them lists the legally equivalent norms. 
4. The structure of signing the sources: Country year/article E.g.: Italy 29/34 = the 34 th 
article of the agreement of Italy of 1929. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Preliminary theoretical and methodological remarks 
It is ascertainable about the legal nature of the material to be examined (Catholic 
Church's international treaties) that they are sources of law of international law. 
We have to set out from this by elaborating the methodology of examination. 
On the one hand, the consensus of the international practice and literature of 
international law claims that the agreements are part of the sources of law and 
even the formal consideration is the reason for it. On the other hand, most of 
the treaties declare themselves as law meaning the Parties consider them as law. 
Further on, from the point of view of the content they establish rights and 
duties between the Parties. The Catholic Church contracts exclusively legally 
good considerable agreements with nations and political communities.3 
As for these treaties, they contain material of law to be examined by a 
methodology of law. A comparative methodology with a positivistic attitude 
is used here starting strictly out of the text of treaties. This still will not lead 
to an exaggerated cardboard and poor result, because the text of treaties are 
amazingly rich in phenomena, from which connections and tendencies can be 
disclosed. 
Catholic church's legal order4 (the canon law) is current around the world5 
while secular sovereigns' law is local. The collisional law relating to a certain 
part of the Catholic Church, which coincides with a certain secular sovereign's 
territory is the concordatarian law, which is obviously local country by country 
as well. However, it is possible to make a comparison among concordatarian 
legal regimes, and this comparative examination has an international public 
nature as well. The scope of the present essay is restricted to the matrimonial 
law parts of concordats exclusively. 
3
 The term is taken over f r o m the 3. canon of the Codex Iuris Canonici (abbr.: C I C 3.) 
4
 Basic sources (fons cognoscendi) : 1. cur ren t from 1983: Codex Iuris Canonici 
auctoritate loannis Pauli PP. II promulgatus. Fontium, annotatione et indice analitico-
alphabetico auctus, Citta del Vaticano 1989. (abbr.: CIC), 2. it was current from 1917 to 
1983: Codex iuris canonici Pii X Pontificis Maximi iussu digestus, Benedicti Papae XV 
auctoritate promulgatus, fontium, annotatione et indice analitico-alphabetico ab E.mo Petro 
Card. Gasparri auctus, Typ. Pol. Vat 1974. (abbr.: CIC'17) . 
5
 Canon law jurists call it as universal law as well. This universality is discernible f rom 
the context of the 3. canon of the current Codex too, which is deal ing with international 
treaties: "Codicis canones initas ab Apostolica Sede cum nationibus aliisque societatibus 
politicis conventiones non abrogant neque iis derogant; eadem idrico perinde ac in praesens 
vigere pergent, contrariis huius Codicis praescriptis minime obstantibus." (CIC 3.) 
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It is worth going over the legal examination and explaining the agreements 
in their broader context. The results of comparative law examination can call the 
attention to the different ways of approach in different countries.6 Besides the 
juridical methodology, the methods of social history and of diplomacy should 
be used. The premise of this stage is that the text put down in treaties is the 
projection of the actual certain age and moment, from which as an indicator, 
the intentions and their backgrounds can be deduced brought into existence by 
the treaty (the principle of the contextuality of the comparative law).7 Putting 
findings together in a broader view, it will outline the Catholic Church's 
concordatarian politics in the field of the matrimonial law. 
1.2. Competence of legal orders and their collision 
If a matrimonial bond comes into being between two parties, its different legal 
effects (sacred and profane) are set up in different fields of the human life. The 
single legal orders are ruling that field of human life, which is in their competence 
by own right. The Church reserves exclusive jurisdiction in the field of sacred 
entities, and the secular state (on a basis of its own principles) does not lay 
claim to it. One can see that the two legal orders (both on a basis of their own 
principles), independently of one another and all by oneselves, subsist and 
succeed. A connection between them is just a possibility and the expressed 
intentions of the Parties bring it into being. 
In the matrimonial law however there is a collision, but just concerning the 
fact of matrimony. In regard to the matrimony of the Catholics, who are obliged 
to the canonical form, the canon law is competent.8 Since the establishment of 
secular matrimonial laws at the end of the 19th century, the secular legal orders 
declared themselves competent in it as well. The canon law however does not 
deal with its consequences9 regarding to property, inheritance, (in case of family 
taxation) taxation,10 etc., but the secular legal orders distinguish them. 
6
 Wienczyslaw, W. J.: Comparative law: its methodology and development in the 
United States. Comparative Law Review (1991), 2, 7. 
7
 Konijnenhelt, W.: Discours de la methode en droit public comparé. In: Comparability 
and Evaluation in Honour of D. Kokkini-Iatridou, Dordrecht, 1994. 125-126. 
8
 Leo XIII., Litt. Enc. Arcanum, 1880. П. 10, in: Acta Sanctae Sedis 12 (1879-1880), 
393 contains that the church in matrimonial cases has juridical power of its own right, and 
not as a result of the local s tate 's concession. 
4
 "Item non ipsa ignorât neque diffitetur sacramentum matrimonii, cum ad conservatio-
nem quoque et incrementum societatis humanae dirigatur, cognat ionem et necessitudinem 
habere cum rebus ipsis humanis, quae matr imonium quidem consequuntur, sed in genere 
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This has multilayer consequences: 
1. Since the secular legal orders are changing in that direction, that the same 
legal effects are attached to the mere cohabitation to the matrimony, Christians 
are less and less interested in the celebration of matrimony according to the 
secular law. Therefore, in countries where the secular legal order does not 
oblige the secular celebration before the ecclesiastical one, the Christians less 
and less get married by secular celebration. As a consequence they can not 
expect without concordatartian law to be regarded by the secular forum as 
living in matrimony." 
2. Other secular legal orders oblige the parties to declare their matrimonial 
consensus in face of the secular registrar before the ecclesiastical matrimony. As 
several secular laws at the end of 19th century went in this direction, a theoretical 
problem arose in the canon law. The canon law thinks from a point of view of 
the natural law and according to the natural law the first declaration of matri-
monial consensus is valid. This was the cause that led to the formation of the 
canonical principle according to which the secular celebration on ecclesiastical 
forum is not an invalid legal act but a non-existing legal act.12 This was 
necessary for re-establishing the normal (initial) position (the two legal orders 
succeed independently and parallelly with each other) after duplicating the 
matrimonial legal regime from the secular Party 's part. 
The canonical legal order (like secular ones) defines its competence on a 
basis of the legal status of legal subjects (persons). Those persons' cases (of 
matrimony bond in canonical form), belong to the canonical matrimonial law's 
competence, where at least one of the parties is catholic. However, the concor-
datarian law never thinks on a basis of the persons' legal status, but always on 
the basis of the form of of a bond coming into existence (we should speak 
about the canonical status of the bond). A collision law starting out of the 
persons' legal status would be impracticably complicated. 
The concordatarian matrimonial law (after the positive law came into being 
by concluding the agreement) deals with the fact of the matrimony and with 
taking on the obligation of the secular Party, it attributes legal effects into its 
own legal order. On the other hand the concordatarian law does not deal with 
civili versantur, de quibus rebus iure decernunt et cognoscunt qui rei publicae praesunt." 
Leo XIII., Litt. Enc. Arcanum, 1880. II. 10. in: Acta Sanctae Sedis, (1879-1880) , 399. 
10
 If, for instance, an intervening decision in an ecclesiastical suit is needed regarding 
such a matter, the ecclesiastical cour t will adopt (receptio iuris) the local secular law, 
current in its territory of competence (cf. CIC 22., 110., etc.). 
11
 Perhaps it can prohibit a marr ied woman using the name of the husband in personal 
papers. 
This means that its nonentity does not need verification. 
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the established legal effects in the canonical and secular legal orders, because 
after their rise they independently succeed in the single legal orders and do not 
have any interference. Therefore connection just comes into existence between 
two legal orders where the concordatarian law positively makes it. 
Summing it up: 
1. The concordatarian intention is directed towards the partial or the whole 
withdrawal of the pressure of the double contract from the part of the secular 
Party, thus the Christians do not have to declare their matrimonial consensus 
twice in favour of legal effects in the secular legal order as well. 
2. Therefore, the concordatarian law always concentrates on one thing: to 
bring into existence the legal link between 
a) - the canonically formed contraction (declaration of matrimonial 
consensus) or 
- the canonical bond (vinculum matrimoniale)13 
b) and its secular consequences (secular legal effects). 
1.3. Essential similarity of fundamental rules 
The canonical main figure has shaped up from the verbal contract inherited 
from the Roman law since the Constantinian age.14 There is a regulation in the 
authentic collection called Liber Extra (promulgated in 1234.) of Gregory the 
IX.,15 but the definitive ruling has been accomplished only by the famous 
decree called Tametsi of the General Council of Trident in the 16th century.16 
Thereto, the concordatarian law is possible, because the main figure of contraction 
a matrimony (the celebration) in secular legal orders did not diverged from that 
of the main figure of the canon law during the evolution of the single national 
matrimonial laws. Without this, it would surely be impossible or at least rather 
difficult for the Parties to condescend. 
During the examination, the ecclesiastical Party is unchanging. It is worth 
summarizing the basic principles of this. There are two fundamental concepts: 
13
 The concept of the matrimonial bond (vinculum matrimoniale) has an important role 
in the canonical legal figure of the marriage. This promotes that the valid marriage would 
be considered in the legal practice as an objective legal fact, which is the consequence of 
the valid contraction. 
14
 Gaudemet, J.: Droit romain et principes canoniques en matière de mariage an Bas-
Empire, in Studi Albertario II., Milano, 1950, 173-196. 
15
 X. 4. 2. 
16
 Concilium Eocumenicum Tridentinum, Canones super reformatione circa matrimonium, 
Tametsi, Sessio XXIV, Caput I, 1563. XI. 11, in: Alberigo, G.-Jouannau, P.-Leonardi , C -
Prodi, P.: Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Décréta, Freiburg, 1962, 731. 
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the form of contracting matrimony (forma celebrationis martrimonii) and the 
matrimonial consent (consensus matrimonialis). 
1. a) The canonical form consists of three elements: 
- two parties 
- to declare his/her matrimonial consensus in the presence of the 
church's authorised representative, 
- two witnesses.17 
b) Here should stay the Hungarian Family Law18 as an example which rules 
the formal properties of binding as: 
- parties to be married are jointly present, 
- the registrar, to declare personally that they intermarry with each other, 
- in the presence of two witnesses, 
+ the registrar publicly registers it.19 
2. The matrimonial consent (inherited from the Roman law) is considered by 
the canon law and secular legal orders as well as a verbal contraction, 
which is its establishing cause. 
a) Its canonical definition consist of three elements: 
- legally able parties, 
- legally declared, 
- conscious act.20 
b) In the Hungarian Family Law the definition of matrimonial consent does 
not exist. 
1.4. Structure of matrimonial parts of the agreements 
All matrimonial chapters consist of two main parts: 
1. They attribute legal effects to the fact of the declaration of matrimonial 
consensus or to the canonical bond.21 With this, the connection comes into 
existence between the two legal orders according to the concordatarian intention. 
2. Further norms are ruling the 
a) conditions (if the secular law considers the elements of the funda-
mental rules otherwise as the canon law), 
b) circumstances, 
c) cessation of the legal effects. 
17
 CIC 1108. 
18
 1952. year IV. law 2 §. 
19
 The canon law doesn't rank the registration in the register of births among the formal 
properties but it is regulated separately (CIC 1121. 1. §, 3. §, 1122. 1. §, 1123.). 
20
 CIC 1057. 
21
 See the explanation in the Examination. 
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2. Examination 
2.1. Attribution of the legal effect 
2.1.1. The establishing norm of the legal effect 
There are 17 agreements all dealing with matrimonial law, as well as protocols, 
which are independent, or the appendixes of the mentioned agreements. All 
agreements start with a norm to establish the legal effects. 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
1. The attributive verb: 
a) Since the Italian Concordat f rom 1929 which was the first one dealing 
with the matter of marriage up to that bond with Malta in 1993, the verb 
"recognises" (riconosce) was used by turns. This idiom suggests as if the 
canonical and the national legal order were not of equal rank, and the secular 
Party would "grant" the validity to the canonical matrimonial bond. This passage 
is a typical one, where the legal principle of states formed during the wave of 
separation, and the claim of the state legal order to exclusiveness can be well 
manifested. From the state Parties thinking in this manner, the ecclesiastical 
Party could receive the civil effects of the bond as a concession. 
b) The "brings about", "produces", "will have", "has the same force", terms 
legally mean the same. The bond established in the canonical legal order by a 
valid contraction, in the same time, produces the equivalent legal effects in the 
secular legal order as well. 
The concept of the matrimonial bond22 (vinculum matrimoniale) has an 
important role in the canonical legal figure of the marriage. This promotes that 
the valid marriage would be considered in the legal practice as an objective 
legal fact, which is the consequence of the valid contraction. 
2. The consideration of the canonical marriage: 
a) To this concept, there are six different idioms in the agreements. The idiom 
"sacrament of marriage" to be found in the Italian agreement of 1929 could seem 
of a bit of pietism in an international agreement, but looking at the even more 
frequently appearing theological matters, it is aftermath less surprising. The 
Austrian agreement of 1933 presses legal approach by the idiom "contracted 
marriage", and it can also be found later in the Italian agreement of 1984. 
22
 CIC 1134. 
34 MIKLÓS RÓNAY 
b) The idiom "marriages celebrated in accordance with the norms of canon 
law"23 was used in the Spanish-Portugal cultural circle and in the southern 
European Malta's agreement as well. The secular Party's affection for the rite as 
an attitude of codification is possible, but 1 consider the cause of this formula is 
the cultural circle's social-psychological character and legal approach in which 
the person to person linkages are very important (in contrast with the Nordic 
institutionalism). 
c) Legally, the "catholic marriage" and the "canonical marriage" forms are 
the most correct ones used by the Polish agreement of 1993, while in the same 
time the not really pleasant idiom of 'contract' is avoided in this topic. 
CONCLUSIONS 
ad 1. Looking at the dates, it is clear that the idiom "recognises" has been 
changed to "produces" after 1993. By this, the first definitive norm is transformed 
in its mechanism: the legal effect in the secular legal order automatically estab-
lishes because of the concordatarian law itself, although the further norms take 
ad validitatem conditions as well. By this, the canonical legal order in this 
respect is tacitly present as an equal legal order. This is part of that process, in 
which after the weakness of the concordatarian law at the turn of the century the 
negotiative force of the ecclesiastical Party is increasingly growing, and as it 
seems, it is able to assert its claims permanently. Shortly, it concludes an 
agreement only with a Party, which is ready to accept this mechanism. 
ad 2. The change of the consideration of the canonical marriage is related 
to the preceeding tendency: 
The idiom "celebration" expresses the event, (declaration of the matrimonial 
consensus), while all the other idioms enumerated in paragraphs a) and c) are 
expressing the matrimonial bond as a legal fact set up in the canonical legal 
order which was established as a consequence of that event. From the point of 
view of the legal practice, as a first approach, it seems to be the same that a 
fact happened in the order of the reality or a fact of canon law which has been 
established as a consequence of the previous, can be taken as a nearer cause 
producing the secular effect, since the canon law ensures the unequivocal cor-
respondence between the declaration of the consensus and the bond. Further 
on, we can see that this is not such a simple thing. 
The explanation based exclusively on the text: 
It seems that the establishing from the event leads to ambiguity. This allows, 
that the declaration of the matrimonial consensus interprets the secular law on 
a basis of its matrimonial law, and it judges it valid or invalid. Moreover it also 
"
3
 Matrimoni celebrati in conformita con le leggi canoniche. 
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means that only so much had been realized from the concordatarian intention 
that there are no two declarations of consensus, but only one, however the 
legal orders are interpreting that one according to its rules. Now, this does not 
mean that canonical bond becomes more effective in the secular sphere, but it 
merely indicates the elimination of the state celebration. 
The intention of avoiding this ambiguity could lead to the later practice. 
These later agreements, using the automatically established form, are always 
establishing the secular effects from the canonical bond (except the Estonian 
agreement of 1998 only) while earlier, in those agreements where the "recog-
nises" formula was used this had happened assortedly either from the event or 
from the canonical legal fact. 
The change of the establishing norm resulting in 1993 means the better 
prevailing of the ecclesiastical Party's concordatarian intention, even though 
that the automatic establishing is coming from the matrimonial bond (vinculum 
matrimoniale). Such a way the canonical conditions of establishing the bond 
(vinculum) are automatically prevailing in the secular legal order as well. 
Hence, the agreement means, in the same time the whole canonical legal 
figure's prevailing in the secular legal order. 
2.1.2. Conditions of the secular legal effects (conditions ad validitatem) 
2.1.2.1. Reasons of the conditions 
In my view, not the appearing of conditions is unusual, but the lack of them in 
the first two agreements (Italy 1929, Austria 1933). It is obvious, that the eccle-
siastical and the secular legislators have other points in definition of conditions 
of validity of marriage (impedimentum). It would be difficult to examine it in 
details, since all national law thinks about it differently to some extent, according 
to their cultural particularity, to the momentary general agreement as well as the 
state of legal development in that country. The canon law however, being a 
sacral law, takes theologically determined points as well into consideration 
beyond the natural law, in other words the revealed law. The certain secular 
legal orders cannot construe these latter ones, and the natural law can differently 
be approached (e.g. in its theory of law it can be disputed that there are such 
norms, etc.), first of all on a basis of the social agreement taking shape on this. 
It is logical in any case that the differences among the legal orders are 
appearing in the concordatarian law as a collision law. It would also be logical 
as well that this concordatarian law was taking shape along the differences of 
the matrimonial impediments used by legal orders. However, this did not 
happen in this way. 
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2.1.2.2. Transcription24 and answering the secular law 
SECTIONING 
Ad validitatem conditions started with the Portuguese agreement of 1940. 
As regards to the transcription and the correspondence of the secular law, the 
turn of the 70 's and 80's was a mile stone. Before this, the transcription was 
the ad validitatem condition, after this the conditions defined in the secular law 
will be mentioned. The Croatian agreement of 1996 brings again something new; 
it leaves out completely the transcription as an ad validitatem condition. These 
two points are dividing the changes in time of the codification's tendency into 
three sections. In the 80's and the first half of 90's, both conditions were used. 
From this main tendency, the Estonian agreement of 1998 is an exception, 
in which the transcription appears again instead of the impediments according to 
the secular law. As it seems, in this agreement the Spanish-Portuguese model 
returns. 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
1. No conditions: 
In the first two agreements, which include matrimonial law as well (Italian 
agreement of 1929 and the Austrian one of 1933), there are not any ad validitatem 
conditions. The Italian concordat-revision already includes certain conditions, 
so this seems now to be the strongest agreement from the ecclesiastical Party's 
point of view (beyond the agreements after 1993, which are on a basis of 
automatic mechanism). 
2. The only condition is the transcription: 
In the Portuguese agreement of 1940, the criterion is the transcription 
into the civil register in a proper sense; namely an administrative work. Taking 
literally the text this means that only the canonical impediments are regulating 
the secular validity of canonical marriages, the secular laws do not effect it. 
This is in all similar facts regarding to all agreements where only the tran-
scription is the condition. As it will be clear, this is only formal. 
3. The transcription and the secular laws: 
The Italian agreement of 1984 is first mentioning the secular laws besides 
the transcription, as an ad validitatem condition, so the canonical marriages 
bond from this time have civil validity under a dual regime. In this agreement, 
24
 This usage of the word is there in the agreement of Malta (1993. Art. 2.). One of the 
languages of this agreement is English and in the Appendix it can be checked (under 
A.2.3.3. deferred transcription). 
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only the transcription is the formal condition, but the correspondence of the 
secular laws is the condition of this. 
In the Maltese agreement, the "handing over" (transmission) of the act is the 
condition, which will (obviously) be examined by the secular registry office 
on the basis of the secular laws. In the Polish agreement of 1993, the secular 
impediments are in the first place, by themselves, as a part of the collision law, 
and not in such a way that the secular registry officer was to apply at the tran-
scription (albeit, the secular officer is clearly applying in practice). From the point 
of view of the codification technique this is clearer than the Maltese agreement. 
4. Only the secular laws: 
Here the transcription became superfluous, as an ad validitatem condition, 
and it will be sufficient to mention it among the further rules of the procedure. 
The Polish agreement of 1993, however still include it, and only from the 
Croatian one of 1996 onwards has been left out, as we can see it in the Latvian, 
Lithuanian and Slovakian agreements of 2000 as well. 
CONCLUSIONS 
ad 2. When the transcription is the only condition, it is not clear, whether 
the civil register's officer was allowed to ponder the transcription on its merits. 
A debate arose about it if the state officer is obliged to ponder it, since he/she 
is allowed to register what answers the conditions defined in the secular law. 
However it is also possible to argue in that case, that if the possibility of 
pondering in merits is not in the concordatarian law, he/she is not allowed to 
do it (stricte interpretatio), since this would restrict the legal claim for the civil 
effects of those who are living in a canonical bond which came into existence 
by the concordatarian law. And a right to be restricted is only possible in an 
explicit way. Such legal disputes are probably resolved by the common inter-
pretation clause which is used in the final provisions, or, tacitly, in the practice. 
ad 3. The matrimonial impediment by the secular law and the transcrip-
tion, as a dually applicated condition, is the strongest legal construction from 
the secular Party's point of view. This practically resolves the dilemma and 
declares that the sate register's officer must ponder in its merit. Therefore, not all 
canonical bonds obtain a transcription. The contributor who makes the exami-
nation of the engages before the contraction, whether he knows that the future 
bond will not gain the secular recognition on the basis of the secular impedi-
ments, he cannot refuse the contribution at the contraction, because the parties 
have a canonical legal claim of taking the sacrament, which is just rejectable 
referring to a legal canonical impediment.25 As it follows from the different 
25
 C I C 1058. 
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matrimonial impediments of the two legal orders (and moreover this difference 
is varies always from country to country), there is a disparity between the bondable 
judged or valid bonds from the part of the two legal orders. Hence, if the civil 
register's officer decides upon the transcription of the bond according to impedi-
ments of the secular law, thus this is a job made as one by the authorities. 
In the Italy 84/826 the civil register's officer examines literally the possibility 
of transcription; according to the Malta 93/1 and the Poland 93/10, it is already 
seen that the national law recognises or do not the canonical bond. This is an 
important change from a formal (codificational) point of view but regarding 
that the transcription is an ad validitatem condition in all these agreements as; 
the civil register's officer always decides as an authority. 
ad 4. The Croatia 96/16 (the Latvia 2000/8, the Lithuania 2000/13 and the 
Slovakia 2000/10) do not show formal development, so up to the Maltese and 
the Polish agreement, the legal figure of the concordatarian law was done. The 
transcription became weightless among the further rules, it is a mere admini-
stration, and is not the decision of the authorities. In this way, the canonical 
matrimonial bond is not on the basis of the discretional right of the civil register's 
officer, but it is qualified as an objective legal basis. 
To sum it up, it is apparent in the concordatarian law of a decade, how the 
collision law between the two legal orders concerning the ad validitatem 
matrimonial conditions shaped up from the practical approach to the clearer, 
legally more correct codification, in other words to the collisionary correspon-
dence between the two legal orders. 
2.1.3. Joint examination of the establishing norm of the legal effect and the 
ad validitatem conditions 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
1. First type: 
a) The so called "recognising " agreements (all the agreements of the Spanish-
Portuguese cultural circle, the Italian agreement of 1984 and the Maltese one 
of 1993) all give a discretional (of the authorities) right to the civil register's 
officer, and the secular legal effects are originating from the event (from the 
declaration of matrimonial consensus). 
b) There is an exception: the system of agreements concluded with Colombia 
(Colombia 42/note, Colombia 73/3). The expressions in these agreements tightly 
interpreting the text, do not fit in the category of conditions ad validitatem, but 
in further rules of transcription (conditio ad liceitatem). These oblige the state 
"
6
 The structure of this shorter way of signing is: Country Year/Article. 
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official to transcript the bond on the basis of the act that had been sent over 
in the required form, which means that, his/her discretional right has been 
limited to the rules of the form of sending over, so he/she does not have any 
discretional right in merit. 
2. Transitional type: 
The Polish agreement of 1993 which is the first of those stating the automati-
cally originating civil effects, establishes the civil effects from the canonical 
bond, while it applies the transcription between the conditions ad validitatem 
as well. With this duality, this is a transitional, and not a clear structure. 
3. Second type: 
The agreements mentioning only the secular matrimonial impediments are 
all composed with an automatic originating rule and they originate from the 
canonical vinculum. 
It is already clear that in the Polish agreement (and the Estonian one which 
is hanging out in a chronological sense as well), which has a mixed construction, 
the originating automatism and the clearly objective legal conditions are going 
together. 
CONCLUSIONS 
As it has been ascertained in both topics, the latter concordatarian legal 
figures, in both cases, were stronger for the ecclesiastical Party than the earlier 
ones. This joint statement is even more obvious. Thus, it is a mistake to see it as 
just a mere extensive growing of the negotiating strength of the ecclesiastical 
Party. Here, the change of the concordatarian system should be caught in act as 
well. 
ad 1. First type: the mechanism using only the secular legal order: 
The earlier 1) bending down verb "recognition", 2) that the civil effect does 
not originate from the canonical legal fact but directly from the fact of the order 
of the reality, 3) this legal effect is attributed and granted by a sate official, so 
all these are manifestations of that approach, that here the state legal order is 
contracting an agreement with a system not qualified as a true, real legal 
order. As it can be seen, in this concordatarian construction, we can reach 
from the fact of the reality to the civil effects exclusively through a mechanism 
originated from the secular legal order, that is to say, we do not need the 
mechanism of the canon law. Therefore, here the canon law does not work as a 
legal order, it does not play any role, the secular law is doing everything. 
ad 2. Transitional type: 
The transitional character of the Polish agreement of 1993 is apparent from 
more facts. As we can see, the Italian agreement and the Maltese one are not 
conspicuous in the Polish agreement, that the state officer decides on the 
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possibility of the transcription. However, from the whole phrase, it is evident 
that the canonical bond becomes effective in the secular legal order by the 
transcription. The composition already points towards the following section, 
while the mechanism of the whole norm works as it was in the earlier one. 
The Estonian agreement of 1998 according to its time, brings the automatic 
legal effect, but to this, it makes the transcription as a condition, while the 
secular norms is not even mentioned. Besides this, it returns to the origin of 
secular effects from the fact of the celebration (declaration). The whole figure, 
as it regards its mechanism, is obviously a construction before the Italian 
agreement of 1984. Here the automatic origination of the civil effects is just a 
question of composition, as "it is automatic if the state official decides so". In 
this case, it is clear now, that the secular Party did not allow the Croatian-
Latvian model. 
The Estonian example shows, that the composition of the ad validitatem 
conditions gives the working mechanism of the legal construction, while the 
norm of the composition of the attribution is just a question of legal-diplomatic 
nature. It is not accidental, that the ecclesiastical Party firstly managed to bring 
the automatism into the agreement, and only afterwards could adjust the 
composition of the ad validitatem conditions, so that the automatism would 
really work as well as the Polish agreement shows. 
ad 3. Second type: the mechanism using both legal orders: 
Whereas, the construction of the Croatian, the Litvánián, the Slovakian 
and the Latvian agreements is 1) a canonical legal fact comes into being 
from a fact in the order of the reality through the mechanism of the canon law, 
2) which (the canonical legal fact) has itself legal effects on a basis of criteria 
of the "input (the canonical) legal order". 
2.2. Further rules concerning the form of the contraction (conditions ad 
liceitatem) 
Until now the examination of the norms focused on the ad validitatem 
conditions of the secular legal effects, and now the ad liceitatem conditions are 
examined. These must be observed during the contraction, however if they are 
not, thereby the secular legal effects come into existence. 
2.2.1. Proclamation of banns 
The aim of the proclamation of banns is to bring the intention of parties to the 
community's knowledge, so that who knows a matrimonial impediment, could 
make it known. In the canon law, the Codex of 1983 does not give any order 
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on a universal level, but it entrusts it to the local bishop's conferences to make 
local norms, considering the circumstances.27 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
1. A rule of proclamation is only in the agreements of the first type, and it 
is not even there in all cases. The last norm of publication is in the Portuguese 
agreement of 1940, as an ad liceitatem condition. Later, it was left out or 
defined as an ad validitatem rule (see above Italy 85/4, Malta 93/1). 
CONCLUSIONS 
ad 1. Ad liceitatem conditions in the cases of the two legal figures: 
a) In the case of the second type, the first, definitive part of the concor-
datarian legal construction (meaning the attributive norm and the conditions ad 
validitatem) the established construction has such a structure, by which the 
mechanism "before" the canonical bond (canonical legal fact) belongs exclu-
sively to the sphere of the authority of the canon law. This means, it is not 
logical to introduce ad liceitatem elements by the concordat in the mechanism 
"before" the canonical bond, since it might worsen the possibility of interpre-
tation. Obviously, both Parties can allow to insert, by international agreement, 
"foreign" elements in that mechanism which is fitted in the authority of its own 
legal order by the main figure, if this does not hurt the principals of its legal 
order. This would be a real compromise. As it seems, in the cases of the 
second type agreements the secular Party did not demand it. 
b) It is easy to understand that this condition occurs in case of the first 
type. In this case, however there is not a real compromise, because the state 
makes the norm of publication obligatory just in its own jurisdiction; the 
ecclesiastical Party allows only that the state could comment an ad liceitatem 
condition on an act in face of the ecclesiastical authority. 
2.2.2. Instruction of engaged couple 
The future spouses must take part in instruction of engaged couple during a 
determined period, with the aim to study and to become aware of the teaching of 
the church upon the marriage.28 There is an other institution in the canon law 
as well, the examination of engages, which is done as a main role by the parish 
priest according to the place of contraction, in which the legal control takes 
27
 CIC 1067. 
28
 CIC 1063/2. 
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place according to the canonical impediments and prohibitions.29 The text of 
agreements does not determine the exact time of statements of the secular law. 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
1. There is not any mentioning, 
2. the collaborator reads from the secular code of law after the contraction, 
3. during the instruction of engaged couple, the one who conducts the 
instruction makes it known. 
CONCLUSION 
ad 1. and 2. First type agreements: 
As it seems clearly from the distribution, in the first type of agreements 
either there is no reference to the information of secular legal effects, or the 
collaborator explains them after the contraction. It is evident, that it is the 
secular Party's interest to be arranged this matter well in the legal construction. 
In the Austrian Agreement of 1933, there is no reference to this, which means 
the state Party applies that principal of law that the ignorance of law does not 
release anybody from its authority. The other one is a resolution of compromise. 
On the one hand the secular norms are made known by the contributor, by a 
person who is a holy service keeper (and not a state official), on the other hand 
he merely has to read the secular code of law, in such a way he does not do 
anything by his own conscious act. By this kind of resolution, the principle 
remains intact, according to which in case of the secular effect originated from 
the event the whole legal mechanism is unfolding in the secular legal order. 
ad 3. Second type agreements: 
a) In case of the agreements fitting in the second type, the situation is 
different. Firstly, the information takes place before the contract, secondly the 
person does the instruction of engaged couple who makes known the related 
secular legal norms as well (and is not simply reading the code of law), i.e. he 
is carrying out a secular function. 
b) One could raise the question, why the secular norm should made known 
before the contract in the second type agreements. One could argue namely, 
that from the declaration of consensus, the marriage to the canonical bond is 
exclusively the canon law active (as it was seen by the publication, in the 
second type agreements case) and the secular law takes the realised canonical 
bond as a basis. Just in this case, the information about the secular norms should 
not be placed before the contraction, since those are not at all effective to this 
section. 
29
 CIC 1067, 1071. 
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The norm of the instruction of engaged couple in a tight sense allows two 
mechanisms: 1) two different effects of the sole declaration of matrimonial 
consensus are originating one at a time in the two legal orders, 2) the originating 
canonical bond has secular legal effects at the same time as well. In any of these 
two cases, the parties to be intermarried have to be aware of the secular effects 
of their legal act. From which of these two is the one (to say the Parties which 
choose of these) is clear from the composition's form of the concordatarian 
main figure. It is discernible that the Estonian agreement has choosen the 1., 
the other three have choosen the 2. And as we see in fact, in the Estonian 
agreement, there isn't any norm of the engaged couple (whereas, all the agree-
ments are less detailed), only in the case of the other three ones. 
Relating to the tactics of the Parties, we can point out that the ecclesiastical 
Party has chosen what we called at the publication's paragraph as a tactics of 
compromise. The former three agreements have permitted namely to fit in 
secular legal elements which sphere makes part unambiguously of the canonical 
legal order. In return for this a valuable gesture has been received: a holy 
service keeper person is doing a secular function. This is not a problem for the 
secular Party, because that person is a citizen of it. 
2.2.3. Invitation of an official of the state 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
1. The Colombia 42/6 shows the whole form, which is explainable on its 
own. To explain the Spain 53 Add. Prot. 23 No. 1. we need the main rule in the 
former agreement of 1941, which still has the authority and the interpretation 
of which is this. 
CONCLUSIONS 
ad 1. 
a) As a requirement, the presence of a state official at the contract is attached 
to the first type structure. This enforces the statement that these agreements are 
really originating the secular legal effects to the event. It is obvious, that in 
case of the other main figure this would not have any reason, because if the 
concordatarian figure attaches the legal effect to the canonical bond, the 
ensuring of the event belongs exclusively to the authority of the canon law. 
b) The aim from the part of the secular Party could be to ensure and control 
the existence of the declaration of the consensus. The interest of the ecclesias-
tical Party is to weaken this element, which presses the omission of the 
consideration of the canonical legal order. Some danger also existed that those, 
who were present at the contract and obviously did not understand the 
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sovereignty (independence) of legal orders, could feel, that the state official 
being present at the contract had some role during the establishing of the 
canonical bond. The ecclesiastical Party had to avoid all sorts of misinter-
pretations, this has a question of principle, and therefore we do not find such a 
role in any of other agreements. This role in this agreement is showing the 
secular Party's force. 
2.3. Rules of administration 
2.3.1. Rules ad liceitatem of transcription 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
The certain agreements attribute different importance to transcription as it 
follows: 
1. it is included in the ad validitatem rules: (see there) 
a) and includes rules that do not touch upon validity as well 
b) there is no further regulation (Polish 1993) 
2. the agreement does not rule it: 
- entrusts it to the secular law (Croatian 1996/13 No 2, Slovakia 
2000/10 No 1, Latvian 2000/8 No 2) 
- appoints a further agreement (Lithuania 2000). 
CONCLUSIONS 
ad 1. First type agreements: 
a) Most of the first type agreements besides the ad validitatem rules of 
transcription include ad liceitatem rules as well. These norms are to be explained 
as they regard the working mechanism of the legal figure like that of procla-
mation, in the first type of agreements. 
By the first type agreements the secular effects were originating by the 
transcription, i.e. it was an interest of the ecclesiastical Party to regulate the 
transcription. The correct ruling of the transcription in the agreement could 
ensure that the contracts would gain their secular effects. It is obvious, the 
interest of the ecclesiastical Party was that the transcription would not be an ad 
validitatem condition (as it was previously seen), however ad liceitatem should 
be regulated in such a detailed manner as it was possible. 
b) The Polish agreement of 1993 does not include such a norm. Therefore it 
may be concluded that it was present in the secular law or it was regulated after 
contracting the agreement. Hereby this agreement is a transitional one between 
the two types. 
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ad 2. Second type agreements: 
In this type, the transcription is regulated out of the agreement, or in the 
secular law, or they promise a future non-international agreement. The importance 
of the question is not so grave for neither Parties to put into the agreement. In 
this type, if a canonical bond does not have the secular registering, it is only a 
registration problem, to be corrected easily afterwards. But if the registration is 
missing in the earlier type, it means that the state has not recognised the bond. 
2.3.2. Coming into force of the secular legal effects 
CONCLUSIONS 
ad 1. "from the date of its celebration": 
During the period of the first type agreements, the evolution of the norm is 
showing that the negotiating power of the ecclesiastical Part is slightly gaining 
strength. The early norms relating the pure rules (which is in the Columbia's 
agreement of 1973 Prot. fin. 4.) are slightly restricting; in the end of the period 
the Italian agreement of 1984 shows extension. 
The structure of the first type agreement shows that if the agreement does 
not say it explicitly that the secular effects are valid from the date of the bond, 
then it can be interpreted that it is valid from the date of the transcription, 
because (in this model) the secular legal effect comes into being by the 
transcription itself, i.e. the appearance of this phrase in the agreement means 
the retroactive extension of the secular legal effect by the period before the 
transcription (to say from the bond). It is palpable from the wording of the 
notes of Columbia agreement of 1942 that it consciously emphasizes the 
retroactive extension of the transcription. 
ad 2. "from the moment of its celebration": 
a) About the end of the period of the first type structure, in the agreements 
of Italy, Malta and Poland not the date but the moment of the bond is fixed in 
the text as a beginning of the terminus. This change of wording has not got any 
legal consequences because whole days are counted in all legal orders. This is 
rather only a wording difference, which just turns the wording style in that 
direction that it more emphasizes the bond itself. Therefore, it is preparing the 
way to that structure, in which the secular legal effect comes from the bond 
itself. It is obious, that this modification has taken place by the proposal of the 
ecclesiastical Party. 
b) In the case of the second type structure (Croatia 96/13, Lithuania 2000/13, 
Latvia 2000/8) the explanation is not easy, because the canonical bond itself is 
empowered by the secular legal effects, which means that the origination of the 
secular legal effects is also bound to the existence of the canonical bond, so the 
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time of secular legal effects automatically derives from this. Thus, it is just 
tautology, in this case the term could be simply omittable. Thus the Slovakian 
agreement of 2000 does not contain it any more. 
2.3.3. Deferred transcription 
The legal reason of presenting the possibility of the deferred transcription in 
agreements is that the concluded canonical marriage, by all means, obtain its 
secular legal effects, i. e. the concordatarian intention would not fail by an 
administrational error. 
CONCLUSIONS 
ad 1. The deferred transcription occurs in the case of the first type agree-
ments (except the Polish agreement of 1993). This is reasonable because in the 
second type legal figure it does not have any grave reason. Seeing that the 
concordatarian law binds the secular legal effects to the existence of the canonical 
bond, so whenever its administration can happen it has not got an effect on the 
force of secular legal effects. 
It is clear that it was the ecclesiastical Parties' interest to present this rule 
in the agreement and in the first type structure (in the weaker for the 
ecclesiastical Part) it indicates its relative force. 
ad 2. In the first agreement among the second type agreements (Poland 
93/10) it is still there, but the criteria are already relatively lax, so the deferred 
transcription is possible practically unlimitedly. Afterwords there is no ruling 
on this. In the case of the marriages bound under the regime of these agree-
ments the interest of the matrimonial parties is that the transcription has been 
done, because this is how one can refer to it in the presence of the secular legal 
forum (albeit the secular legal effects are existing). 
It is worth noticing from a diplomatic point of view that the complex entireties 
of the rules connected to the transcription in the Italian agreement of 1984 are 
the strongest. The fact is surprising because this agreement has been bound 
firstly with Italy, secondly with a Christian democrat government. 
2.3.4. The effect of death to the transcription 
This point can be strange at first sight, since all matrimonial bonds come to an 
end in all legal orders if one of the matrimonial parties dies. So in this case the 
matter in issue is the deferred recognition of a matrimonial bond existed only 
in the canonical legal order. It is true, and it can be explained since there is a 
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legal interest of the living party to the past existence of the past marriage, and 
there is also the right of children (e.g. their legality, right of inheritance, etc). 
Furthermore, in the last case it needs the possibility to make the marriage valid 
in the case of death of any of the parties. 
An other reason, not so much practical rather peculiar to the treating force of 
the representatives of legal orders is, that by including the possibility of the sub-
sequent convalidation the ecclesiastical Party takes an other step towards making 
the bond accepted (more precisely in that time the declaration of matrimonial 
consensus) as a more objective entity and making the way of understanding 
weaker as a "pure ceremony" (which is conspicuously inaccurate). 
2.4. Suit law 
The church's legal claim for judgement in matrimonial cases has been canonised 
firstly on the Council of Trident.30 The legal claim refers here not only to the 
sacramental aspect of the matrimony but generally, as a whole.31 We could 
expect that in the time when the single secular states have created their own 
matrimonial law, those have been competing with the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 
But the church did not consider it in this way. It did not hurt the church's legal 
claim because 1) the marriage bond on the base of the secular state's law is a 
non subsisting legal act from the church's viewpoint, and obviously it does not 
violate the church's legal claim if the state judges upon a legal act constructed 
by itself, 2) when earlier the ecclesiastical court judged on the non-sacramental 
consequences of the bond (inheritance, children's legality, etc.) it came about 
because the profane legal order did not cover the whole issue of human's life, 
so the church did not find the withdrawal from this area injurious. 
It is a general principle and is held by all legal orders that a legal fact is judged 
on the base of the law of that legal order and is judged that a legal forum has to 
come into existence. Interstate agreements take this as an axiom and if they depart 
from it they must be regulated explicitly. The church's above-mentioned behaviour 
shows that the church considers the ecclesiastical and secular matrimonial laws 
living side by side on a base of 1) the legal orders independency and 2) the 
principle that the canonical and the secular legal orders' relationship is ruled 
by international public law. This behaviour made it possible that after the wave 
30
 Concilium Eocumenicum Tridentinum, Canones de sacramento matrimonii , Sessio 
XXIV, canon XII, 1563. XI. 11, in: Alber igo-Jouannau-Leonardi-Prodi : op. cit. 731. 
31
 Repeats the legal claim: Leo XIII., Litt. Enc. Arcanum, 1880. II. 10. in: Acta Sanctae 
Sedis, (1879-1880) , 392. 
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of separation, the question could be easily managed on the base of inter-
national law. 
As we have seen there are two ways to establishing the secular legal effects. 
The first type agreements are recognising the ecclesiastical declaration of 
matrimonial consensus by a legal act in the secular legal order. Therefore, this 
legal act is in the secular legal order and will be judged in that way. In the 
second type agreements the situation is twofold: the canonically formed 
declaration of matrimonial consensus (ecclesiastical celebration) causes the 
canonical matrimonial bond and this causes the secular legal effects as well. 
So it is clear, that the matrimonial bond exists in the canonical legal order 
hence it is to be judged in that way, while its secular legal effects are in the 
secular legal order, and the secular forum is to judge upon them. This principle 
just succeeds in such a clear way in the case of the Polish agreement. 
2.4.1. Theological elements 
In certain agreements some elements of the church's teaching upon the marriage 
appear. In the earlier agreements this has taken place according to a formula, 
and the single agreements hardly differ from each other in the formulation of 
this term. The first phrase of this formula is a self-evident statement, because if 
the parties are contracting the marriage on the base of the canon law, it is 
morally evident that they consider these rules obligatory on settling its further 
legal effects before the secular forum as well. The presentation of the theo-
logical principles in agreements is in the order of the ecclesiastical Party to 
make this evidence more obvious. It is clear that this is related to the order of 
matrimonial suits, so it is worth dealing with it in the part of the suit law. 
CONCLUSIONS 
ad 1. First type agreements: 
a) In this case the situation is complex because of the mechanism. Here 
the secular effect comes into force by the decision of the registrar, so the only 
declaration of the matrimonial consensus causes the canonical bond and its 
analogue appears also in the secular legal order. The secular court has obviously 
an exclusive jurisdiction upon this, while upon the canonical bond the 
ecclesiastical court has the exclusive jurisdiction. This is the reason why the 
ecclesiastical Party has inserted into the agreement a part which reminds the 
parties to be married of their canonical duty. Such a way, it makes a legal 
effect to the canonical norm, which is sensible for the state as well, while this 
effect does not have any enforceability of the secular legal order itself. So this 
norm is rather only a commission without a sanction but the willingness of the 
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ecclesiastical Party is perceptible that upon the marriages bound according to 
the canon law the ecclesiastical forum could judge in an effective way. 
b) From the Spanish agreement on it is not said that the parties to be 
married renounce the right for divorce but with the mentioning of the church's 
teaching in the agreement, the secular Party knows about it. Anyway, it is not 
explicit, and from the Spanish agreement on it is important for the secular Party. 
In this time such a definition appears on the main figure of suit law, which 
does not preclude the possibility of the jurisdiction of the of secular forum upon 
bound marriages according to the canonical form (cf. chapter of Delimitation 
of the jurisdictional competences). 
The above mentioned ambition of the ecclesiastical Party is failed, and it 
does not succeed either afterwards, which shows the secular Party's force in 
these agreements. 
ad 2. Second type agreements: 
The form of the Polish agreement is substantially deferring from the earlier 
ones, because the rule in these is not related to the parties to be married, but 
the contracting Parties incure an obligation which means here the commitment 
of the Polish State. This norm does not strictly create law, it is just a declaration 
of an intention. Nota bene it is a declaration of intention related to a concrete 
ecclesiastical teaching, which is imaginable only in the post-modern time; 
national liberalism in the 19th century would not have had it. Phrases like this 
are even more frequent in the recent agreements. 
2.4.2. Provision of legal force for the adjudication of the ecclesiastical forum 
There are two possibilities for this: the delimitation of the jurisdictional 
competences or the provision of secular legal force for the decisions of the 
ecclesiastical forum. 
2.4.2.1. By delimitation of the jurisdictional competences 
This main figure of the suit law, in chapter 2.4.2.1.1. will demonstrate the transfer 
of the legal effect of the judgement of the ecclesiastical court in the secular 
legal order. 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
1. It compels the contracting Parties: 
a) The most evident way of this approach is, that the Parties declare in the 
agreement: the ecclesiastical court has the jurisdiction to judge upon the fact of 
a canonical marriage, the state by the same time takes on that its court declares 
itself not competent if somebody enters an action by this legal title. 
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b) he above mentioned principle (legal facts are judged in that legal order 
in which they have come into existence) can be found in the clearest form in 
the Polish agreement of 1993. 
2) It compels the matrimonial parties: 
The other way of approach in codification is when not the contracting Parties 
but the matrimonial parties are obliged by the norm. Such shaped norms 
(Spanish 79/6, Malta 93/4 No. 2, Dominica 54/25 No. 2) are all including 
theological elements as well, as it was seen earlier. 
CONCLUSIONS 
ad 1. The "recognise" phrase in the Austrian agreement of 1933 just means 
that the ecclesiastical court is competent, but does not preclude that of the 
secular court. However, the intention of the contracting Parties that the legal 
orders should be clearly distinguished is evident from other parts of the 
agreement, so it is just a lack of precision in wording.32 Agreements after the 
Austrian treaty have already eliminated this possibility of misinterpretation. 
The "exclusive competence" and the "are reserved" phrases are equivalent (only 
the ecclesiastical court is competent to judge upon it), so they are not variations. 
The Maltese agreement of 1993 mentiones the competence of the ecclesias-
tical forum only, and leaves out the exclusivity, and as it will further be evident, 
the Parties do not interpret it exclusively as well. This formula is similar to the 
Austrian one of 1933, but the context interprets it right in the opposite direction. 
ad 2. The conception of structuring the norm which obliges the matrimonial 
parties reinforces and extends the obligations in the canon law such a way that 
these would not be infringable using the other way of thinking of the secular 
law. This confirmation is obtained by mentioning the theological teaching about 
the sacrament of marriage, which makes the base of the canonical matrimonial 
law in the agreement. One can see that the Spanish agreement of 1979 and the 
Dominican one of 1954 which contain the renunciation and the theological 
teaching together are drafting loosely here, and the Maltese agreement of 1993 
makes the parties to be married renounced here, namely written. Now here is 
the reason of legal relevance of mentioning the theological terms. 
The mechanism here is theoretically double: 1 ) the parties to be married by 
the celebration itself (ipso facto) or separately, in a written form renounce the 
right to ask the divorce from the secular court, 2) the state Party is not allowed 
to receive a legal action which is conflicting with the agreement signed by 
32
 "Ecclesiastical and secular courts ought to provide for each other legal aid all on 
its own jurisdiction's field." Austr ia 1933/7. 5. §. 
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itself. In wide sense, this way of approach obligates the secular court as well to 
reject the legal action. 
The situation is not so clear if we have a closer look at it. Among these three 
agreements only the Spanish one of 1979 does not contain either in the theo-
logical part, nor here that the parties take on by the celebration itself they 
will not ask the divorce. The Italian agreement of 1984 belongs to this 
category as well. It does not contain any explicit phrases about the delimitation 
of competences. Both agreements are restricting themselves and refer to the 
catholic teaching, which is laying emphasis on maintaining the jurisdiction 
upon spiritual goods to the ecclesiastical forum. This is, as I see, too lax a role 
to obligate effectively the state Party to reject the legal actions. It seems too lax 
especially looking at the Maltese agreement of 1993. This contains a reference 
to the renunciation of parties in one place, and in an other place, however, it 
refers to an earlier sentence of the secular court based on a caput nullitatis 
(grounds of nullity), which is not opposite to the caput nullitatis of the sentence 
of the ecclesiastical court. Thus such things, in fact, can be found despite of 
the explicit mentioning of the renunciation. Therefore, it does not necessarily 
follow mean that the secular Party would take on the reject of legal action if 
the agreement contains the parties obligating renunciation. 
2.4.2.1.1. Attribution of the secular legal effects 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
1. In the procedure of the first group, the sentence will only be communicated 
and the secular court declares the secular legal effects. This is the same way as 
it was in the case of the automatic method of legal effects (second type). 
2. In the other group, the secular court has a real sphere of authority of 
examination, in merits. This is parallel to the recognisional way of transfer of the 
matrimony. In the Spanish agreement of 1979, the aspects of the examination 
are undefined in detail, in the Italian one of 1984 and in the Maltese one of 
1993, they are all enumerated in a taxative way. 
CONCLUSIONS 
ad 1. The Spanish agreement of 1953 is using a special way of procedure: 
to reach the secular legal effects in the future this role makes it obligatory, that 
during the ecclesiastical suit procedures one of the parties asks the secular 
court to regulate the future secular effects of the ecclesiastical sentence. It is 
disquieting whether the two procedures authority personals mutual influence 
could be eliminated. 
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ad 2. The Spanish agreement of 1979 is the strongest one from the state 
Party's viewpoint. The guidelines are undetermined and it allows the secular 
court to examine the case in a wider scale, since it is possible to rehear the case 
in its merits as well, or, at least, the criticism of the sentence. 
The Italian agreement of 1984 and the Maltese one of 1993 enumerates all 
the competences of the secular court; it cannot examine either less or more. Both 
agreements make sure the right of defence of the parties and the examination 
of the competence of the ecclesiastical court. It is evident, that the secular 
court claims the right of the examination of defence, but the examination of the 
competence of the court could be rather strange. It means namely that the 
secular court demands an account of the application of a canonical norm. This 
can be an interesting precedent under the aspect that the secular forum can 
adopt canonical norms (as it is a practice that the ecclesiastical forum adopts 
the norms of the local secular laws). 
It is furthermore appearing from the detailed enumerations that both the Italian 
agreement of 1984 and the Maltese one of 1993 were discussed for a long time 
and they are results of a compromise. E.g. the Italian agreement deals with the 
decision made by the ecclesiastical court as a foreign sentence, which shows 
the ecclesiastical Party's force. This is albeit a theoretical question, because it 
does not generally cause the secular legal effects of ecclesiastical courts with 
other decisions brought in other cases, it only relates to matrimonial sentences. 
However, it is sure, this term was not used in other agreements before, and this 
is the first appearance of this way of thinking. The Maltese agreement contains 
a phrase, that the secular court cannot examine the sentence in merits, which 
means a relative force in this agreement-group. Re-examination of the merits is 
possible on a basis of the Italian and the Spanish agreements, which show the 
secular Party's force in these agreements. 
The fact that the Maltese agreement is a solution of compromise is apparent 
also from the phenomenon that the validation of the secular effects of resolu-
tions of dispensation (i.e. a decision made by a dicasterium of the Holy See, so 
this is not a local ecclesiastical court's sentence) is reduced to formal, so the 
importance of the diplomatic hierarchy is high in this case.33 In this agreement, 
there is a pair of rules, which is unknown in others. This pair of rules says that 
on the one hand a secular court is not allowed to receive a legal action under 
such a legal title on which ecclesiastical court has already brought definitive 
sentence, on the other hand a secular court of appeal is not allowed to declare 
33
 "The Highest Court orders the recognition of the decree if it is about a matrimony 
bond according to the Catholic Church's canonical norms." Malta, 1993/7. 
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secular legal effects for such a definitive sentence of an ecclesiastical court 
whose legal title was already used by a sentence of a secular court. This pair of 
rules is apparently asymmetrical, since the secular court is not allowed to deal 
with it at all, but the ecclesiastical one can, but it will not have any secular 
legal effect. This sort of solutions shows the ecclesiastical Party's force. 
It is worth mentioning with regard to the Maltese agreement, that its figure 
(structure) uses too much instruments, so it is too complex and rather difficult 
to interpret. This is not conductive to the legal security. In shaping up the 
figure there is a phrase delimitating jurisdictions (obligates the contracting 
Parties), the another one which obligates matrimonial parties, and although 
both (separately as well) are to be interpreted that the secular court does not 
have any jurisdiction, however it takes it into consideration elsewhere. This 
agreement does not seem to be the most excellent one from this point of view, 
but there are shortly drafted, axiomatically formulated phrases, which can help 
the interpretation of other agreements. 
2.4.2.2. Providing secular legal force for the adjudication 
The main figure of the suit law in this group is implicit. There is not any formula 
of recognition, only "the sentences and the decisions are communicated". 
TEXT ANALYSIS 
1. The Maltese agreement of 1993 is a transitional form: beyond the 
delimitation of jurisdiction, there is a new element, the recognition of the 
sentences and of the decisions of dispensation. 
2. In the Croatian, Slovakian and Lithuanian agreements there are not any 
delimitations of jurisdiction, so the question is ruled only by the transcription 
of decisions. 
COCLUSIONS 
ad 1. It would be the ecclesiastical Party's aim to make this rule present, 
and it might want to shift it towards a new structure of agreement. This is 
supported by the tendency that the agreements following it use only the recog-
nition of the decisions. 
ad 2. The new formula is the clearest in the Croatian agreement of 1996. 
The decisions are communicated to the secular Party and are validated by its 
court. There might be some difficulties in the interpretation of their wording. 
The term "put into effect, adempimento" on the one hand stresses that the 
secular court does not have any right of examination, on the other hand the 
"according to the legal norms of the Republic of Croatia" term could mean that 
it has a right of examination, whether the sentence is according to the practice 
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of the secular administration of justice. As I see it is not the point in this case, 
but it has to be interpreted together with the 9§ of the Maltese agreement of 
1993, which contains a more unambiguous rule: on its merits, the secular court 
cannot intervene in the ecclesiastical sentence, but its further secular effects 
(which can be rather complicated) has to shape up according to the law of the 
Republic of Croatia.34 
The formula in the Lithuanian agreement of 2000 is not so clear, because 
instead of the "put into effect" there is the more active "regulates", however 
this activity is to be restricted, according to the above-mentioned things, to the 
further effects of the ecclesiastical sentence. 
The mechanism of the Slovakian agreement of 2000 at the first look seems 
to be the same as that of the Lithuanian one. It can cause some difficulties that 
cannot be found in any of the earlier formulas before the administrational rules 
of transfer by which the Parties attached secular legal force to the ecclesiastical 
sentences and decisions by the agreement. But these phrases, without a main 
figure, can have a totally different meaning. In this form, they mean that the 
sentences are communicated to the Slovakian state and it decides about the 
taking over as it likes. In fact, if an ultrapositivist Slovakian judge looks at this 
text, he/she might easily say this. But why this matter is there in the agreement 
since the Slovakian state, after a legal supervision, can take over whatever decisions 
are made in a foreign legal order without any international agreement. As I see, 
the mere mentioning of the administrational rules of transfer in the text means 
that the concordatarian intention of the Parties was to agree upon the transfer 
of the ecclesiastical sentences. Consequently, there is the earlier main figure 
(implicitly) and in such a way, the whole regulation works in fact as it can be 
seen in the case of the Lithuanian agreement of 2000: the secular judge cannot 
interfere, on its merit, in the decision of the ecclesiastical court, and his/her 
activity is limited to the attachment of secular legal effects to the sentence. 
To sum it up, the following can be ascertained: 
1. the recognition of the decisions of the ecclesiastical forum is clear from 
the concordatarian intention, 
2. this recognition is full-scale, namely it does not only extend over the 
sentences of nullity, but over the peculiar decisions of ecclesiastical suit law 
(like privilégium paulinum, dispensatio super ratum, etc.). This shows the treating 
force of the ecclesiastical Party. 
34
 " . . . the secular legal effects are regulated by secular laws." Malta, 1993/9. 
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3. The secular forum must take over these decisions without a right of 
pondering, on its merit, and it must formulate the legal consequences according 
to its own legal order. This shows the treating force of the ecclesiastical Party. 
4. The lack of the delimitation of jurisdictions, the secular forum (in its own 
order) can divorce married couples (which does not have any interference with 
the ecclesiastical legal order). This shows the treating force of the secular Party. 
2.4.3. Tendencies in the suit law 
Summing up it can be ascertained, that the unequivocal direction cannot 
unambiguously experienced in the suit law which could be seen in the case of 
the secular legal effects validation of the ecclesiastical marriage, namely in the 
rising of the ecclesiastical Party's treating force. 
1. The competence of the secular forum: 
a) Until the Columbian agreement of 1973 the norm shaping up the main 
figure was built on the delimitation of jurisdictions. In that time, all agree-
ments were precluding the jurisdiction of the secular forum, which shows the 
ecclesiastical Party's force. 
b) From the middle of the 1970s, the secular Party insists on the right of 
judgement upon such a matrimonial bonds. Hence, after the Spanish agreement 
of 1979 only the Polish one of 1993 contains exclusive ecclesiastical juris-
diction, in the rest of the agreements the secular courts have jurisdiction as 
well, which signs the secular Party's force. 
2. Concerning the coming into existence of the secular legal effects of the 
sentences of the ecclesiastical court the tendency is complex: 
a) Until the Columbian agreement of 1973, it is practically an administra-
tional procedure after a canonical supervision, which takes place before the 
publication of decisions. 
b) In the middle of the '70s there was a change in this respect as well: the 
secular court received the examinational right. This is the case in the Spanish 
agreement of 1979 (here the secular court can intervene in its merits as well), 
in the Italian one of 1984 and in the Maltese one of 1993 (formal examination 
on the base of canonical and secular law). 
c) In the newest Croatian, Latvian, Slovakian and Lithuanian agreements 
this question is not ruled, because the main figure of suit law is defined such a 
way that the sentence of the ecclesiastical court on base of the agreement itself 
(ipso iure) has secular legal effects, the task of the secular court is only to 
endow it with content (property rights, etc.) according to the secular law. 
It can be seen, that the change of the mechanism occured in the suit law 
approximately at the same time, after the beginning of the '90s, when it was 
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in the matter of the contraction as well. The takeover of the decisions of the 
ecclesiastical forum became automatic too, but the ecclesiastical Party renounced 
the exclusivity of the jurisdiction. 
3. Summary 
In this essay I have set the aim to examine the matrimonial parts in the Holy 
See's international agreements, and to show characteristics and tendencies in 
them. I have chosen from the agreements the parts with the same functions and 
I have compared their legal structure, their legal terms, and their technique of 
codification. The legal analysis can and should be examined in the context of 
history, concerning cultural circles, history of politics, etc. This makes on one 
hand the examining system more compound, on the other hand it helps to find 
the legal characteristics f rom outside of law. 
Norms concerning matrimonial law can be found on the one hand only in a 
smaller part of agreements, on the other hand the relating chapters are generally 
not too long. This provides the possibility for a detailed text analysis, in which 
I practically presented the whole relevant legal material, and I examined it 
entirely and in detail. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. During the examination I came to the conclusion, that in the early and 
late agreements two different main figures (models) were used. In the case of 
the first model, the Parties agreed, that the secular law would attribute to the 
fact of the ecclesiastical matrimonial contraction (celebration) the legal effect 
of the secular matrimony. In the second model, the concordatarian law itself 
attributes secular legal effects to the canonical bond (vinculum matrimoniale) 
which has come into existence in the celebration (declaration of the matrimonial 
consensus). In the first case besides the mechanism of the canon law the 
secular law was working as well (both in their own legal order), in the second 
case the mechanism of the secular law has been built upon the result of the canon 
law's mechanism. By this, not only the canonical contraction is recognised by 
the agreement, but the canonical matrimonial law as well. 
2. This change (after the beginning of 1990s) of the main figure in the suit 
law can be observed as well. The takeover of the decisions in the ecclesiastical 
forum became here automatic as well, and from the sentences of nullity it 
extended to the declarations of dispensatio as well. 
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As it is discernible from the examination, the newer type of the concordatarian 
treaties, containing matrimonial law, was stipulated by turns with the countries 
of Eastern-Central-Europe. The reason for that is that these countries considered 
to re-establish their relations, interrupted after the World War II., with the 
Catholic Church as an important part of their social transition. It is characteristic 
that the matrimonial sections constitute more and more a constant part of the 
treaties stipulated with the Holy See of these transitional countries. A few 
years ago a possible stipulation of a treaty containing such a part regarding 
Hungary came up as well. 
4. Appendix 
Numbering of chapters in the Appendix (after a "A") follows that in the main text. 
A.2.1. The attribution of the legal effect 
A.2.1.1. The legal effect's establishing norm 
FIRST T Y P E agreements: 
Italy 1929/34 "The Italian State recognises the secular legal effects of the 
sacrament of marriage provided by the canon law"  
Austria 1933/7, 
Italy 1984/8 
"The Republic of Austria recognises the secular legal effects of 
marriages contracted in accordance with the canon law." 
Portugal 1940/22, 
Spain 1953/23, 
Colombia 1942/4, 
Dominica 1954/15, 
Spain I. 1979/6, 
Malta 1993/1 
"The Portuguese State recognises the secular legal effects of 
marriages celebrated in accordance with the norms of canon law." 
S E C O N D T Y P E agreements: 
Poland 1993/10 "... the catholic marriage brings about the effects of the marriage 
bond provided by the Polish law." 
Croatia 1996/13, 
Latvia 2000/8 
"The canonical marriage ... produces the legal effects by the law 
of the Republic of Croatia." 
Estonia 1998/8 "Marriages celebrated in the Catholic Church, [...] have civil 
effect." 
Lithuania 2000/13 "A canonical marriage will have civil effects pursuant to the legal 
acts of the Republic of Lithuania" 
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Slovakia 2000/10 "The marriage contracted in accordance with the Canon Law ... 
has on the territory of the Republic of Slovakia the same force and 
the same legal consequences as it has the marriage contracted in 
accordance with civil form." 
A. 2.1.2. Conditions of the secular legal effects (conditions ad validitatem) 
2. just the TRANSCRIPTION: 
Portugal 1940/22 "provided that the act of the marriage is carried over the competent 
authority of the secular state" 
Colombia 1942 notes "... the registration of the competent civil registry office will be a 
necessary condition that the catholic marriage reach civil legal 
effects" 
Spain 1953 Additional 
Protocol 23. 
[to recognise the civil legal effects] "... will be sufficient that the 
contraction of the marriage would be written into the competent 
civil registry" 
Colombia 1973/7 "To the validity of this recognition the competent ecclesiastical 
authority hands the copy of the act over to the competent functionary 
of the State who has to send a note to the civil registry." 
Spain I. 1979/6 "To the complete recognition (of marriage) the registration into 
the civil Registry is necessary ..." 
Estonia 1998/8 "[have civil effect] upon registration and for which a certificate of 
marriage has been issued by the civil registry office [...]" 
3. transcription A N D to meet civil legal requirements as well: 
Italy 1984/8 [are recognised] 
with condition of. 
1. is transcripted, 
2. previous publishing the banns at the local authority, 
the transcription is not possible if. 
1. lack of age according to civil laws, 
2. no remedy impediment according to civil laws. 
Malta 1993/1 1. " [... are recognised ... ] provided that: 
a) it clearly appears from a certificate issued by the Marriage 
Registrar that the banns required by civil law have been published, 
or that a dispensation from the same has been granted; such 
certificate shall constitute definitive and conclusive proof of the 
regularity of the banns or of the dispensation therefrom; 
b) the Parish Priest of the place where the marriage was celebrated 
transmits an original of the act of marriage to the Public Registry 
compiled in the form established by common accord between the 
Parties, and signed by the local Ordinary or the Parish Priest or their 
Delegate, who has officiated at the celebration of the marriage. 
2. The Holy See takes note that the Republic of Malta recognises 
rus MATRIMONIALE CONCORDAT ARIUM 59 
the civil effects of canonical marriages where no spouses and 
impediment exist which can cause the nullity of the marriage and 
that the stated civil law considers it as mandatory or not 
dispensable." 
Poland 1993/10 [brings about the effects] if: 
1. no impediments between the parties according to the Polish law, 
2. "they unanimously manifest their intention willing to trigger 
such effects, 
3. it is transcripted" 
4. just to meet CIVIL L E G A L R E Q U I R E M E N T S : 
Croatia 1996/13 
Latvia 2000/8 
[produces the legal effects] i f . 
"there are no civil impediments between parties to the contract and 
they meet the requirements stated by the laws of the Croatian 
Republic." 
Lithuania 2000/13 
Slovakia 2000/10 
" [will have civil effects ...] provided there are no impediments to 
the requirements of the laws of the Republic of Lithuania." 
A.2.1.3. The joint examination of the establishing norm of the legal effects and the 
conditions ad validitatem 
Colombia 1942 notes "...the State has to write into the civil register that canonical 
marriages, whose act was handed over in the adequate form by the 
competent ecclesiastical authority." 
Colombia 1973/7 "...the competent ecclesiastical authority hands over the authentic 
copy of the Act to the competent official of the State who has to 
transcript it into the civil register." 
A.2.2. Further rules concerning the form of the contraction (conditions ad 
liceitatem) 
A.2.2.1. Publishing of banns 
Italy 1929/34, 
Portugal 1940/22 
"The publishing of banns [...] has to take place beyond the parish 
at the local authority." 
Portugal 1940/22 "It is allowed to contract the marriage without the previous publica-
tion of banns in danger of death, in case of imminent birth and the 
explicit authorisation of the ordinary because of grave moral motive." 
Austria 1933/7 "These marriages (banns) are to be pubished according to the 
canon law. The Republic of Austria reserves the right to order the 
secular publication as well." 
Colombia 1942/4 "The publication of a catholic marriage (banns) will be in the 
form prescribed by the canon law; but the State can order the 
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secular publication as well and, to the same aim, the parties to 
contract are obligated to inform the competent official about their 
intention to contract a catholic marriage."  
A.2.2.2. The instruction of the engaged couple 
Italy 1929/4, 
Colombia 1942/8, 
Italy 1984/8 
"The parish priest immediately after the celebration explanes to 
spouses the secular legal effects, reading the adequate articles to 
the parties treating the rights and obligations of spouses of the 
secular code of law." 
Croatia 1996/13, 
Poland 1993/10 No. 2., 
Lithuania 2000/13 
"The preparation of a canonical marriage includes the explanation 
of the future spouses the teaching of the church about the dignity, 
the unity and the undissolubility of the sacrament of the marriage 
as well as the civil legal effects of the bond of marriage according 
the laws of the Republic of Croatia." 
A.2.2.3. Invitation of an official of the state 
Colombia 1942/6 
1942/7 
"For the effects in the Civil Register the State can order, that one of 
its officials would present at the religious celebration, however in 
no case the presence of the said official is necessary that the 
marriage produces legal effects." 
"Before the celebration the priest who will assist requires authentic 
copy of parties that certifies that the Civil Regiter's authorized 
official is invited to day, hour and place to the ceremony. Forbear 
from requiring inviation of the official is possible in case of 
marriage in articulo mortis, on missionary territory if the place of 
celebration is farther than 20 km from the residence of the 
official." 
Spain 1953 Add. Prot. 23. 
No. 1. 
"In no case the presence of state official to the celebration of 
canonical marriage will be considered as a necessary condition to 
the recognition of civil effects." 
A.2.3. Rules of administration 
A. 2.3.1 Rules ad liceitatem of transcription 
Italy 1929/34 "[The parish priest after the celebration ...] issues the marital act 
whose entire copy in 5 days should be handed over the local 
authority to be transcripted into the civil states's register." 
Colombia 1942/8 "Aftermath the parish priest or his delegate, the parties, the 
witnesses and the state official subscribe the act in 2 copies. 
One of them the parish priest hands over to the authorised state 
official of the Civil Registrar in 6 days after the contraction." 
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Portugal 1940/22, 
Italy 1984/8, 
Malta 1993/2, 
"The parish priest in 3 days hands an entire copy of the act of 
marriage over to the competent office of civil registrar for tran-
scription; the transcription has to be carried out in 2 days and and 
the competent official on the following day of the transcription 
declares it to the parish priest indicating the date of transcription." 
Spain I. 1979/6 "[the recognition of secular effects] ... which is realised by the 
simple presentation of the ecclesiastical certificate of the existence 
of the marriage." 
Croatia 1996/13 No. 2., 
Slovakia 2000/10, 
Latvia 2000/8 
"The way and the until time to be registered in the civil register a 
canonical marriage is prescribed by the adequate law of the 
Republic of Croatia." 
Lithuania 2000/13 No. 2. "The time and manner of recording a canonical marriage in the 
civil register shall be established by the competent authority of the 
Republic of Lithuania, in co-ordination with the Conference of 
Lithuanian Bishops." 
A. 2.3.2. Coming into force of the secular legal effects 
Portugal 1940/23, 
Spain 1953 Add. Prot. 23. 
No. 4. 
"The marriage produces all its civil legal effects from the date of its 
celebration if the transcription takes place within 7 days. If does 
not, it produces effects to a third person only from the date of its 
transcription." 
Colombia 1942 Notes "the catholic marriage does not produce civil legal effects from the 
date of its celebration unless through the writing into the competent 
civil register." 
Colombia 1973 
Add. Prot. 7. 
"The civil effects of the properly transcripted catholic marriage come 
into force from the date of the celebration of the declared marriage." 
Spain I. 1979/6 "The civil effects of the canonical marriage come into existence 
from the moment of the celebration." 
Italy 1984/8 "The marriage has civil effects from the moment of the celebration, 
even if the state official because of whatever cause has been late 
with the implementation of the transcription." 
Mata 1993/1, 
Poland 1993/10 
"[The civil effects are recognised . . .] from the moment of the 
celebration [...]" 
Croatia 1996/13, 
Lithuania 2000/13, 
Latvia 2000/8 
"[The catholic marriage ...]from the moment of its celebration 
[produces the civil effects ...]" 
A.2.3.3. Defered transcription 
Spain 1953 Add. Prot. 23. 
No. 2.. 
"The transcription of a catholic marriage which has not been 
recorded into civil registers immediately after the celebration, 
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Colombia 1973 Add. Prot. 
7. No. 1. 
is possible to be implemented at any time and at the request of 
anybody of parts or who has a legitimate interest." 
"To do this the presentation of an authentic copy of the 
ecclesiastical act will be sufficient." 
Italy 1984/8 The deferred transcription is possible if: 
- at the request of both parties or of one of them with the other's 
knowledge and without his/her opposition, 
- both remain uninterruptedly in independent status since the 
marriage, 
- third party's legally obtained interests are not damaged. 
Malta 1993/2 "Should the transmission of the act of marriage not be effected 
within the established time limit, it shall be the duty of the Parish 
Priest to effect the same as soon as possible. The spouses, or either 
of them, always retain the right to demand such transmission. Late 
transmission shall not be an obstacle to transcription." 
Poland 1993/10 "[in 5 days ...] this deadline becomes extended if has not been 
observed because of a vis maior until its end." 
A.2.3.4. Death's effect to the transcription 
Portugal 1940/23, 
Spain 1953 Add. Prot. 23. 
No. 3., 
Colombia 1973 Add. Prot. 
7. No. 1. 
"Death of one or both of the parties does not hinder the 
transcription." 
A .2.4. Suitlaw 
A.2.4.1. Theological elements 
Portugal 1975 Add. 
Prot. I., 
Portugal 1940/24, 
Dominica 1954/15 
No. 2., 
Spain I. 1979/6 
No. 3., 
Poland 1993/11 
"The spouses with the celebration itself of a catholic marriage 
assume responsibility in face of the Church for adher to the 
regulating canonical norms, particulary to the essential attributes. 
The Holy See reinforces the teaching of the Catholic Church about 
the indissolubility of the bond of the marriage, remind the spouses 
who have contracted a catholic marriage of the heavy duty 
concerning them, not to use their civil faculty of the request of the 
divorce." 
The same without the last clause. 
Italy 1984/8 "[...] the Holy See considers it necessary to reinforce the unaltered 
worth of the catholic teaching about the marriage and the 
encouragement of the Church for the dignity and the worth of the 
family, the basis of the society." 
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Malta 1993/4 No. 2. "The Church shall enlighten prospective spouses about the specific 
nature of canonical marriage and. [ ...]" 
Poland 1993/11, 
Slovakia 2000/11 
"The Contracting Parties manifest they will cooperate for defence 
and to respect the institution of the marriage and the family, basis 
of the society." 
A.2.4.2. The provision of legal force for the decisions of the ecclesiastical forum 
A.2.4.2.1. By delimitat ion of the jur isdict ional competences 
1. Compels the contract ing Parties: 
Colombia 1942/9, 
Colombia 1973 Add. 
Prot. 8. 
The cases of nullity, of dispensation from marriages rato et non 
consummato, of the procedure of privilégium paulinum are in the 
exclusive competence of the ecclesiastical courts and congregations." 
Spain 1953/24 The same and the cases of separation as well. 
Italy 1929/34, 
Portugal 1940/25, 
Dominica 1954/16 No. 1., 
Colombia 1973/8 
"As it concerns the cases of the nullity of the marriages and the 
dispensation from marriages rato et non consummato are reserved 
for ecclesiastical courts and congregations." 
Austria 1933/7 §3. , 
Austria 1933 Add. Prot. 7. 
No. 1. 
"The Republic of Austria recognises the competence of ecclesiasti-
cal courts and congregations in case of the nullity of the marriages 
and the dispensation from marriages rato et non consummato." 
"The Republic of Austria recognises the competence of the 
ecclesiastical Authorities in case of the procedure of privilégium 
paulinum as well." 
Malta 1993/4 No. 2. "[... specific nature of canonical marriage] and, consequently, 
about ecclesiastical jurisdiction concerning the marriage bond." 
Poland 1993/10 No. 3., 
No. 4. 
"It is in the exclusive competence of the ecclesiastical authority to 
judge upon the validity of canonical marriage, and upon the other 
matrimonial cases issued in canon law." 
"To judge upon matrimonial cases concerning the legal effects 
provided in the polish laws is in the exclusive competence of the 
statal coursts." 
2. Compels the parties: 
Spain I. 1979/6 No. 2. "Concordant with the provisions of the canon law the parties can 
appeal to ecclesiastical courts for the declaration of the nullity or 
ask for the pontifical dispensation from marriages ratum et non 
consummatum." 
Malta 1993/4 No. 2. "[... the ecclesiastical jurisdiction concerning the bond of 
marriage.] The prospective spouses shall, by way of acceptance, 
formally take note of this in writing." 
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Dominica 1954/15 
No. 2. 
"[...] by the mere fact of celebrating a canonical marriage the spouses 
renounce the secular faculty of asking for divorce, which therefore 
will not be applicable for canonical marriage by civil courts." 
A.2.4.2.2. Providing secular legal force for the decisions 
Malta 1993/3 "The Republic of Malta recognizes for all civil effects, in terms of 
this Agreement, the judgements of nullity and the decrees of 
ratification of nullity of marriage given by the ecclesiastical 
tribunals and which have become executive." 
Malta 1993/7 "The decrees of the Roman Pontiff super matrimonium ratum et non 
consummatum are recognized, as regards civil effects by the 
Republic of Malta, upon request, accompanied by the authentic copy 
of the pontifical decree, presented to the Court of Appeal by the parties 
or by either of them." 
Croatia 1996/13 "The decisions of ecclesiastical Courts upon nullity of marriage 
and those of the Supreme Authority of the Church upon dispense 
from matrimonial bond are communicated to the competent civil 
Court to put into effect the civil consequences of the measurement, 
according to the legal norms of the Republic of Croatia." 
Slovakia 2000/10 No. 2. "The decisions of the Catholic Church upon nullity of marriage 
and upon dispense from matrimonial bond are communicated to the 
request of one of the interested parties to the Republic of Slovakia. 
The Republic of Slovakia will proceed according to its juridical 
order." 
Lithuania 2000/13 No. 4. "Decisions of ecclesiastical tribunals on the nullity of marriage and 
decrees of the Supreme Authority of the Church on the dissolution of 
the marriage bond are to be reported to the competent authorities 
of the Republic of Lithuania with the aim of regulating legal 
consequences of such decisions in accordance with the legal acts of 
the Republic of Lithuania." 
A.2.4.3. Attribution of the secular legal effects 
Austria 1933/7. § 4., 
Italy 1929/34, 
Colombia 1942/9, 
Spain 1953/24 No. 4. 
"The provisions and the judgements when they are definitive are 
brought to the Supreme Court of the Secretariat which controls if 
the rules of the canon law were observed relating to the judge's 
competence and the summoning and of the representation or 
keeping away of the parties. The declared provisions and definitive 
judgements with the relative decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
Apostolic Secretarial are handed over to the Supreme Court of 
Austria. The civil effects come into force by decision of the 
execution made in secret meeting of the Supreme Court of Austria." 
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Portugal 1940/25, 
Dominica 1954/16 No. 2. 
The same but the handing over is through a diplomatic way. 
Spain 1953/24 No. 3., 
Colombia 1973/8. 
The same, but leaving out the Secretariat, the ecclesiastical court 
communicates the judgement to the secular court. 
Spain 1953/24 No. 2. "[...] is the civil Court's task is to decide at the interested person's 
request about the norms and the precautionary measures regulating 
the civil effects of the case under way." 
Spain I. 1979/6 No. 2. "At request of anybody of the parties the said ecclesiastical 
provisions will have effects in the civil legal order if they are 
declared conform with the State law by a resolution issued by 
the competent civil court." 
Italy 1984/8 No. 2. The same bat the court of appeal decides in judgement with 
conditions: 
" - whether the judge were competent in the case, if the celebration 
took place on the basis of the Agreement, 
- whether in proceedings of the ecclesiastical court the right to act 
and to defend were provided in a way not different from the basic 
principles of the Italian legal order, 
- whether they correspond to the other conditions prescribed in the 
Italian law for the proclamation of effects of foreign judgements. 
The court of appeal can make interim economical measurements, 
in the judgement with which it implements the canonical 
judgement, to the advantage of one of the parties whom marriage 
has been declare null, sending them to the competent judge to 
decide in the matter." 
Malta 1993/5 "[The judgements ... are recognized ...] provided that: 
a) a request is presented, by the parties or either of them, to the Court 
of Appeal together with an authentic copy of the judgement or 
decree, as well as a declaration of its execution according to canon 
law issued by the tribunal that has given the executive decision; 
b) the Court of Appeal ascertains that: 
I. the ecclesiastical tribunal was competent to judge the case of 
nullity of the marriage insofar as the marriage was celebrated 
according to the canonical form of the Catholic Church or with a 
dispensation from it; 
II. during the canonical juridical proceedings the right of action 
and defence was assured to the parties, in a manner substantially 
not dissimilar to the principles of the Constitution of Malta; 
III. in the case of a marriage celebrated in Malta after the 11 
August 1975 the act of marriage laid down by the civil law has 
been delivered or transmitted to the Public Registry; 
IV. no contrary judgement pronounced by the civil tribunals and 
which has become res judicata, based on the same grounds of 
nullity." 
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"In the exercise of its specific functions as regards to the 
recognition of the decrees mentioned in article 7, as well as of the 
judgements of nullity or of the decrees of ratification of nullity of 
marriage mentioned in Article 3, the Court of Appeal does not re-
examine the merits of the case." 
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PÁL BELÉNYESI* 
The Relationship between the EC Competition Rules and 
National Competition Laws 
(A developmental approach with regards to supremacy) 
In the field of Competition Law, the European Union and the Member States 
(MSs) have parallel competencies; this derives from the dualism of Competition 
Law. Nevertheless, EU Competition Law may pre-empt national competition 
laws to a certain extent. 
In the case of a conflict between national and Community competition laws, 
since 1969, the general rule is that Community law should prevail.1 While 
both Community and domestic competition law can apply, domestic law 
cannot be applied in a way which infringes the principle of supremacy of 
Community law.2 
Furthermore, by virtue of the loyalty clause of Art. 10 of the EC Treaty MSs 
have to refrain from taking measures which can jeopardize the application of 
the competition rules, in order to facilitate the achievement of the Community's 
tasks and to abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment 
of the Treaty's objectives. 
Competition rules apply to both private and public undertakings.3 According 
to Art. 86 (1) of the EC Treaty MSs have to refrain from taking measures contrary 
to the competition rules of the EC with regard to public undertakings or 
undertakings to which they have granted special or exclusive rights. The very 
The author is a lawyer, currently researcher at the European University Institute in 
Florence, Italy. 
E-mail: pal.belenyesi@iue.it 
1
 Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm and others v. Bundeskartellamt, European Court Reports 
(1969), 0001. 
2
 Supra, par. 4, 7 and 8; and also in: Case 106/77, Administrazione delle Finanze 
Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, European Court Reports (1978) 629. This is also stressed out in 
Art. 3 of the new regulation on the application of Art. 81 and 82 of the Treaty that puts the 
relationship in question into a normative form. To be detailed later. 
3
 Undertakings controlled by the Member State or the local authority of a Member 
State. 
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narrow limitation to the above follows in Art. 86 (2): in so far as the 
development of trade is not affected to such an extent as would be contrary to 
the interests of the Community.4 
Seeing the ratione materiae and every-day application of the competition 
rules of the EC Treaty, the problem of the relationship of the community laws 
on competition and national antitrust laws becomes rather complex. 
Under the first regulation on the application of Art. 85 and 86 (after the 
Treaty of Amsterdam: 81 and 82),5 Art. 85 (1) and 86 had direct effect and since 
they were also directly applicable, they could be relied upon by private individuals 
and undertakings in national courts. Moreover, like the Treaty itself-ex Arts. 
88 and 89 (now Arts. 84 and 85)-, Regulation No 17 had created a regime of 
shared responsibilities between the Commission and the Member States in 
applying ex Arts. 85 and 86. 
Also, the simultaneous application of national competition laws and Community 
rules on competition was later recognized in the case law of the European Court 
of Justice. 
The Modernization of Competition rules by the European Commission in 
2004 had introduced a few adjustments to the situation. 
The paper introduces the development of the European Court of Justice's 
case law in this field and attempts to identify the novelties established by the 
modernization of the competition rules. 
The Court's case law 
1. The Walt Wilhelm Case, the specified primacy of EC Competition law 
In the Walt Wilhelm6 case, the ECJ had established for the first time the important 
doctrine-of corresponding application-in relation to conflicting competencies. 
The ECJ had recognized that community law and national laws approach 
restrictive practices from different points of view. Therefore it is possible for 
a National Competition Authority (NCA) to take a decision, which is already 
the subject matter of a case before the Commission; however this cannot 
4
 Such limitation benefits the undertakings that are entrusted with the operation of 
services of general economic interest. 
5
 Regulation No 17 of 1962 implementing Art. 85 and 86 of the Treaty, Official Journal P 
13, 21 of February 1962. 0204-0211. 
6
 Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm and others v. Bundeskartellamt, European Court Reports 
(1969), 0001. 
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prejudice the uniform application of the Community law.7 So, the national 
authority is required to take proper account of the possible effects of the 
decision taken by the Commission, and if it appears during the proceedings 
before the national competition authority that the Commission's decision 
will be contrary to the decision to be taken by the national authority, it 
should take all appropriate measures. Such an appropriate measure could be 
the staying of the proceedings. 
The other question that was referred to the ECJ by the Kammergericht, 
concerned the possible risk resulting from the parallel application of 
Community rules and national laws and consequently the possible double 
sanction imposed by the Commission and the national authorities with 
jurisdiction in cartel matters. 
The ECJ had answered this saying that the possibility of concurrent sanctions 
does not mean that the possibility of two parallel proceedings pursuing different 
ends is unacceptable. The Court further stated that the acceptability of a dual 
procedure of this kind follows from the special system of sharing jurisdiction 
between the Community and the Member States with regard to cartels. How-
ever, in these cases the general requirement of natural justice demands that 
every previous punitive sanction is being taken into account in determining 
the sanction to be imposed.8 
In other words, the exclusion of competence of the national authorities-once 
the Commission has initiated proceedings-does not apply when the national 
authorities are acting in pursuance of their national competition laws. 
Under this formulation, it was therefore-in theory-perfectly legitimate for 
national law to prohibit conduct which satisfied the jurisdictional criteria of 
Art. 81(1) but had not received an exemption under Art. 81(3) or, where the 
conduct in question did not infringe Art. 81(1) and therefore did not attract 
the sanction of nullity under Art. 81(2). 
2. The "French perfume" cases 
In the "French perfume cases "9 the ECJ concluded that, in the view of Arts. 2, 6, 
19 (3) and 21 (1) of Regulation No 17, if the required constitutive effect is not 
reached by the publication of the letter as required, the MSs' national courts can 
7
 This is based on the presendece of the Community Law, developed by the Court in 
the Costa v. Enel case. Case 6/64, Costa v. Enel, European Court Reports (1964), 585, also 
see: par. 9 of Walt Wilhelm, cited in 4. 
8
 Cited in 4, par. 11. 
9
 Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, and case 37/79, detailed later. 
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come up with different findings with respect to their national competition 
laws and the facts disposed to them, as a result of the fact that community 
competition law is limited to actions that may affect trade between MSs. 
Second, the Court had found that the initiation of the procedure by the 
Commission-according to Art. 9 (3) of the Regulation No 17-does not 
prevent national courts from adjudicating in matters related to Art. 85 (1) as a 
result of their obligation to guarantee the rights arising from the direct effect 
of the paragraph (1) of Art. 85. Furthermore, these national courts can come 
up with different findings on the basis of the information available to them 
with regard to the application of Art. 85 (1). The prerequisite for the above 
was still that the "initiation of the proceeding" and the "letter" by the 
Commission is purely administrative. 
More specifically, in the Giry, Guerlain cases10 under ex Art. 177 (now 
Art. 234) the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris has submitted questions to 
the Court of Justice on the interpretation of Art. 85 of the Treaty. The questions 
arose during the criminal proceedings brought against several perfumeries 
under the French order No 45-1483 of June 1945 on prices on the charge of 
refusal to sell. 
The claimants-retailers who were not part of the selective distribution 
system-criticized the selective distribution systems on the basis that the 
companies were refusing to sell to certain retailers. These companies referred 
to a letter that each of them had received from the DG Competition of the 
Commission, which stated that on the basis of the facts known to it, there was 
no further need for it to take action under the provision of Art. 85 (1) of the 
Treaty. The accused stated in the procedure that those letters of the Commission 
must be regarded as decisions applying Art. 85 (3) of the Treaty, therefore by 
the reason of pre-eminence of the Community rules, national authorities could 
not prohibit-by applying national law-restrictions on competition if they had 
been recognized as to be lawful from the point of community law. 
The Court first concluded on the nature of the letters. It stated that if the 
Commission wants to give negative clearance pursuant to Art. 2 of Regulation No 
17 or wants to take a decision in application of Art. 85 (3) of the Treaty, it is 
bound by the dispositions of the Regulation 17, in particular Arts. 19 (3) and 
21 (1); so it has to publish the summary of the relevant application of the 
notification or the decision in the case of exemption under Art. 85 (3).11 
10
 Joined cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, Procureur de la République and others v. Bruno 
Giry and Guerlain SA and others, European Court Reports (1980), 02327. 
11
 Supra, par. 11. 
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In conclusion, the Court stated that these letters in question do not constitute 
neither negative clearance nor an exemption under Art. 85 (3) according to 
Arts. 2, 6, 19 (3) and 21 (1) of Regulation No 17.12 
Furthermore, those letters were based solely upon the facts available to the 
Commission, and could not reflect other than the Commission's assessment of 
the case, and so did not prevent the national courts, before which the agree-
ments in question were alleged to be incompatible with Art. 85 of the Treaty, 
from reaching a different finding on the basis of the evidence and infor-
mation available to them. Important however, that although the letters do not 
bind the national courts, they are to be considered as factors for the national 
courts when deciding upon a case.13 
In virtue of the Walt Wilhelm case and the above, the Court concluded its 
reasoning with saying that the ending of procedures by the Commission on 
the basis of the facts available to the it does not however prevent the national 
authorities from applying to those agreements the provisions of national compe-
tition law which may be more rigorous than the community rules. Moreover, if a 
practice has been held by the Commission not to fall within the ambit of the 
prohibition of Art. 85 (1) and (2)-the scope of which is limited to actions capable 
of affecting interstate commerce-, in no way prevents that practice from being 
considered by the national authorities to be incompatible with their respective 
national competition rules if the effects their produce are recognizable on a 
national scale.14 
The second judgment in the "perfumes cases" was delivered on the same 
day. In the Marty v. Estéé Lauder case15 the Tribunal de Commerce had asked 
three questions under Art. 234 of the Treaty. 
The French commercial court was dealing with a case where the claimant-
Marty-was complaining that the defendant had not fulfilled an order given out 
to them by Marty, and this practice was against the provisions of the French 
order on prices which prohibits a refusal to sell. 
Similarly to the Giry and Guerlain cases, the referring court was interested 
in finding out the legal consequences of such "comfort letter"; in other words, 
whether it constitutes a negative clearance under Regulation No 17; and if the 
answer was to be affirmative to this question, could this letter be invoked in 
12
 Supra, par. 12. 
13
 Supra, par. 13. 
14
 Supra, par. 18. 
15
 Case 37/79, Anne Marty SA v. Estéé Lauder SA, European Court Reports (1980) , 
02481. 
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relation to third parties and is binding upon the courts of the Member States of 
the Community? 
Yet, in the present case, the referring court went further and asked the ECJ 
about the effect of the possible negative answers to the first two questions, 
inquiring that which authorities were competent to enforce Art. 85 (1) of the 
Treaty, and subsequently, had there been a procedure initiated under Art. 9 (3) 
of the Regulation No 17? 
The ECJ first concluded that-as in paragraph 11 of the Giry and Guerlain 
cases-the administrative letter stating that the Commission does not consider 
that there is a need for it to take action in respect of the contracts in question, 
and closes the procedure; does not itself mean that it has given negative 
clearance according to Art. 2 of Regulation No 17 or that it has taken a decision 
in application of Art. 85 (3) of the Treaty, since these types of decision must be 
published, as provided for by Art. 21 (1) of Regulation 17/62.16 As the Court 
further evaluated, these letters reflect the Commission's assessment on the case, 
and "do not have the result of preventing national courts before which the 
agreements in question are alleged to be incompatible with Art. 85 from reaching 
a different finding as regards the agreements in question on the basis of the 
information available to them".17 The reasoning continued, that even as the 
letter does not bind national courts, "the opinion transmitted in such letters 
nevertheless constitutes a factor which the national courts may take into account 
in examining whether the agreements ... are in accordance with the provisions 
of Art. 85".1S 
As regard to the third question, the ECJ had referred to its previous decisions 
of Sabam and Haecht19 and stated that the " . . . jurisdiction of national courts 
before which the direct effect of Art. 85 (1) is relied upon is not restricted 
by Art. 9 (3) of Regulation No 17."20 
16
 Supra, par . 8. 
17
 Supra, par . 10. 
18
 Supra. 
10
 Case 127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SV Sabam and N V Fonior, European 
Court Reports (1974), 51; and Case 48/72, SA Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin Janssen, 
European Court Reports (1973), 77. 
20
 Case 37/79, cited in 15, par . 16. 
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3. The Masterfoods case 
In addition, in its Masterfoods judgment,21 the ECJ had gone further. 
In the present case the Irish Supreme Court had referred to the Court of Justice 
for a preliminary ruling under ex Art. 177 of the EC Treaty three questions on 
the interpretation of Arts. 85, 86 and 222 of the EC Treaty; the questions were 
raised in two sets of proceedings between Masterfoods and HB Ice Cream, in 
connection with an exclusivity clause contained in agreements for the supply of 
freezer cabinets concluded between HB and retailers of impulse ice cream. The 
above were adverse parties on the market of ice cream. 
In March 1990 Masterfoods brought an action before the High Court of 
Ireland seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the exclusivity clause by HB-requiring 
its retailers to keep only its products in the freezer cabinets supplied by H B -
was null and void in domestic law and under Arts. 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty. HB brought a separate action for an injunction to restrain Masterfoods 
from inducing retailers to breach the exclusivity clause.22 
On 28 May 1992 the High Court gave judgment in the actions brought by 
Masterfoods and HB respectively, dismissing Masterfoods' claim and granting HB 
a permanent injunction restraining Masterfoods from inducing retailers to store 
its products in freezers belonging to HB. However, HB's claim for damages was 
dismissed. Masterfoods appealed against those judgments to the Supreme Court. 
In parallel with those contentious proceedings, on 18 September 1991 Master-
foods lodged with the Commission of the European Communities a complaint 
against HB under Art. 3 of Council Regulation No 17. The complaint concerned 
the supply by HB, to a large number of retailers, of freezer cabinets to be used 
exclusively for HB products. On 29 July 1993 the Commission, in a statement 
of objections addressed to HB, concluded that the distribution system operated 
by it infringed Arts. 85 and 86 of the Treaty. 
HB later altered his system and applied for exemption under Art. 85 (3), how-
ever the Commission finally found that HB could not be exempted. Consequently, 
HB brought an action under the fourth paragraph of ex Art. 173 of the EC Treaty 
for the annulment of the Commission Decision 98/531. 
Under those circumstances the Irish Supreme Court decided to stay the 
proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a 
preliminary ruling: 
21
 C-344/98, Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd; HB Ice Cream Ltd v Master foods 
Ltd, Common Market Law Review 4 (2001), 14. 
22
 Supra, par. 6. 
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„1. In the light of the judgment and orders of the High Court of Ireland dated 
28 May 1992, the decision of the Commission of the European Communities 
dated 11 March 1998 and the applications by Van den Bergh Foods Ltd 
pursuant to Arts. 173, 185 and 186 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (EC Treaty) to annul and suspend the latter decision: 
(a) Does the obligation of sincere cooperation with the Commission as 
expounded by the Court of Justice require the Supreme Court to stay the 
instant proceedings pending the disposal of the appeal to the Court of First 
Instance against the aforesaid decision of the Commission and any subsequent 
appeal to the Court of Justice? 
(b) Does a decision of the Commission which is addressed to an indi-
vidual party (and which is the subject of an application for annulment and 
suspension by that party) declaring such party's freezer cabinet agreement 
to be contrary to Art. 85(1) and/or Art. 86 of the EC Treaty thereby prevent 
such party from seeking to uphold a contrary judgment of the national court 
in that party's favor on the same or similar issues falling under Arts. 85 and 
86 of the Treaty where that decision of the national court is appealed to 
the national court of final appeal?"23 
In response to the above questions the Court concluded, inter alia, that the 
Commission, entrusted by Art. 89 (1) of the Treaty-now 85 (l)-with the task 
of ensuring application of the principles laid down in Arts. 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty, is responsible for defining and implementing the orientation of Com-
munity competition policy. It is for the Commission to adopt, subject to review 
by the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice, individual decisions 
in accordance with the procedural rules in force and to adopt exemption 
regulations. 
Furthermore, the Commission shares competence to apply Arts. 85 (1) and 
86 of the Treaty with the national courts.24 
„The latter provisions produce direct effects in relations between individuals 
and create direct rights in respect of the individuals concerned which national 
courts must safeguard. The national courts thus continue to have jur is-
diction to apply the provisions of Arts. 85 (1) and 86 of the Treaty even after 
23
 Supra, par. 18. 
24
 Case C-234/89, Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu, European Court Reports (1991), 1935, 
par. 45. 
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the Commission has initiated a procedure in application of Arts. 2, 3 or 6 
of Regulation No 17".25 
The ECJ however found, on the basis of the division of powers, and in order 
to fulfill the role assigned to it by the Treaty, the Commission cannot be 
bound by a decision given by a national court in application of Arts. 85 (1) and 86 
of the Treaty. The Commission is therefore entitled to adopt at any time 
individual decisions under Arts. 85 and 86 of the Treaty, even where an 
agreement or practice has already been the subject of a decision by a national 
court and the decision contemplated by the Commission conflicts with that 
national court's decision.26 
The ECJ continued by referring to its previous case-law, and said that the it is 
the Member States' duty under Art. 5 of the EC Treaty to take all appropriate 
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations 
arising from Community law and to abstain from any measure which could 
jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty; and this obligation is 
binding on all the authorities of Member States respectively. 
It is important to see, that the Court had held previously, in Delimitis,27 
that in order not to breach the general principle of legal certainty, national 
courts must, when ruling on agreements or practices which may subsequently 
be the subject of a decision by the Commission, avoid giving decisions which 
would conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission in the 
implementation of Arts. 85 (1) and 86 and Art. 85 (3) of the Treaty. It is even 
more important that when national courts rule on agreements or practices 
which are already the subject of a Commission decision they cannot take 
decisions running counter to that of the Commission, even if the latter's 
decision conflicts with a decision given by a national court of first instance. 
The Court therefore has concluded, that 
„... when the outcome of the dispute before the national court depends on 
the validity of the Commission decision, it follows from the obligation of 
sincere cooperation that the national court should, in order to avoid reaching a 
decision that runs counter to that of the Commission, stay its proceedings 
pending final judgment in the action for annulment by the Community 
Courts, unless it considers that, in the circumstances of the case, a reference 
25
 Case 344/98, cited in 21, par. 47 . In line with Case 37/79, cited in 15, par. 16. 
26
 Case 344/98, cited in 21, par. 48 . 
27
 Case C-234/89, cited in 24, par. 47 . 
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to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the validity of the Com-
mission decision is warranted."28 
In its final assessment, the ECJ had stated, that 
„where a national court is ruling on an agreement or practice the compatibility 
of which with Arts. 85 (1 ) and 86 of the Treaty is already the subject of a 
Commission decision, it cannot take a decision running counter to that of 
the Commission, even if the latter's decision conflicts with a decision 
given by a national court of first instance. If the addressee of the 
Commission decision has, within the period prescribed in the fifth 
paragraph of Art. 173 of the Treaty, brought an action for annulment of 
that decision, it is for the national court to decide whether to stay 
proceedings pending final judgment in that action for annulment or in 
order to refer a question to the Court for a preliminary ruling."29 
Regulation 1/200330 
Regulation No 1/2003 has been adopted by the Council of Ministers on 16 
December 2002, and took effect on 1 May 2004; by this it replaced Regulation 
No 17/62 and established the procedures governing the enforcement of EC 
Competition Law. Followed by numerous guidelines and notices, this so called 
"modernization package" has brought new developments into the application 
of EC Competition Law.31 
28
 Case 344/98, cited in 21, par. 57. 
24
 Supra, par. 60. 
30
 There are several Arts, on the new regulation. On this issue, see further, for 
example: Garzaniti et al: Dawn of the new era? Powers of investigation and enforcement 
under Regulation 1/2003. Antitrust Law Journal 72 (2004), 159-209 . ; and also in: Müller: 
The New Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the Implementation of the Rules on 
Competition. German Law Journal 5 (2003), 721-740 . 
31
 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, 
Officiai Journal С 101 of 27 April 2004. 43-53 . ; Commission Not ice on the co-operation 
between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of 
Arts. 81 and 82 EC, Officiai Journal С 101, of 27 April 2004, 54 -64 . ; Commission Notice 
on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Arts. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 
Official Journal С 101 of 27 April 2004. 65-77 . ; Commiss ion Notice on informal 
guidance relating to novel questions concerning Arts. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise 
in individual cases (guidance letters), Official Journal С 101 of 27 April 2004. 78-80. ; 
Commission Notice-Guidel ines on the effect on trade concept contained in Arts. 81 and 
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The amendment to the application of the EC Competition Law, which 
turned it into a decentralized application, has placed the member states of the 
Union into the arrangement when they are expected to fully participate in the 
application of the community rules on competition.32 National Competition 
Authorities and the national courts are now unequivocally required to contribute 
to the application of EC rules in this field of law. 
Indeed, as part of the new regulatory package on competition policy, the 
Commission has introduced Regulation 1/2003.33 which has cleared up the pitch 
for the playing partners; however, there might be still some grounds that seem 
to remain obscure.34 
The introduction of the new regime has the added benefit of clarifying the 
supremacy of Community law over national law, as opposed to the tradi-
tional-but vague-formula in the Walt Wilhelm case that national law should 
„not prejudice the uniform application throughout the common market of 
the Community rules on competition law and of the full effect of the measures 
adopted in implementation of those rules".35 
Today, Regulation 1/200336 deals with the relationship between Arts. 81 
and 82 EC Treaty and national competition laws. As it is emphasized in the 
Recitals, " . . . In order to create a level playing field for agreements, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices within the internal market, 
it is also necessary to determine pursuant to Art. 83 (2) (e) of the Treaty the 
82 of the Treaty, Official Journal С lOlof 27 April 2004. 81 -96 . ; Communication f rom 
the Commiss ion-Not ice-Guidel ines on the application of Art. 81(3) of the Treaty, Official 
Journal С 101 of 27 April 2004. 97-118. 
32
 It is well beyond the scope of this study to describe the general alternatives of relations 
between „local and central, federal and state, or regional and sub-regional (and national)" 
laws. For the point of importance further read on the diversions of four types of regulatory 
mechanisms (yardstick competition, international trade, locational cooperation, and choice 
of law) in: Epstein, R. A. and Greve, M. S. (eds.): Competition laws in conflict: antitrust 
jurisdiction in the global economy. Washington, D. C. 2004. 3 1 - 6 6 . 
33
 Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of December 16, 2002, „on the implementation on 
the rules on competition laid down in Arts. 81 and 82 of the Treaty", Official Journal L 1 
of 04 January 2003. 0 1 - 2 5 . 
34
 As Mark Furse has put it „The relationship has been at least clarified by recent 
legislation but the position is not simple although a straightforward statement of basic 
principles may make it seem so.", in. Furse, M.: Competition Law of the EC and UK. 4th 
ed., Oxford, New York, 2004. 43. 
35
 Vert ical restraints: n e w directions in EU policy. Extract f rom The Antitrust 
Review of the Amer icas 2004, avai lable on: h t tp : / /media .g ibsondunn .com/fs to re / 
documents /pubs /Ver t i ca lRes t ra in t s_EAR.pdf , consulted on 9 December 2005. 
36
 Cited in 33. 
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relationship between national laws and the Community competition laws."37 
Hereby, the EC legislator wants to make sure that agreements having a cross-
border effect are treated in the same way across the EU. 
1. The regulation on anti-competitive behavior 
A) To which situations do derogations of Regulation 1/2003 not apply? 
When discussing the relation of community law to national competition laws, 
one need to observe Art. 3 of the above piece of Community legislation, where it 
is unmistakably affirmed to which situations the regulation does not apply. 
It is clearly stated in paragraph 3 of Art. 3, that "without prejudice to general 
principles and other provisions of Community law, paragraphs 1 and 2 do not 
apply when the competition authorities and the courts of the Member States apply 
national merger control laws nor do they preclude the application of provisions 
of national law that predominantly pursue an objective different from that 
pursued by Arts. 81 and 82 of the Treaty."38 
The rationale behind the above rule is explained in Recital 9: 
"Arts. 81 and 82 of the Treaty have as their objective the protection of 
competition on the market. This Regulation, which is adopted for the imple-
mentation of these Treaty provisions, does not preclude Member States from 
implementing on their territory national legislation, which protects other 
legitimate interests provided that such legislation is compatible with general 
principles and other provisions of Community law. In so far as such national 
legislation pursues predominantly an objective different from that of 
protecting competition on the market, the competition authorities and courts 
of the Member States may apply such legislation on their territory... This is 
particularly the case of legislation which prohibits undertakings from 
imposing on their trading partners, obtaining or attempting to obtain from 
them terms and conditions that are unjustified, disproportionate or without 
consideration."39 
37
 Supra, Recital 8. 
38
 Supra, Art. 3 (3). 
39
 Supra, Recital 9. 
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As seen in Art. 3 (3), merger control had also maintained its previous "nature" 
given to it by Regulation 4064/89.40 According to the above paragraph of 
Regulation 1/2003 and also according to Regulation 139/2004,41 when the 
concentration has Community dimension, the Commission pre-empts and bears 
responsibility for the authorization.42 Member States are only concerned so far as 
the planned merger does not reach the threshold of the Regulation and so does not 
qualify to be a merger with community dimension. In these cases the assessment 
of such fusion will be done according to the national laws on merger. 
The other exception to the claimed primacy of the Community law is that 
".. . the regulation does not apply to national laws which impose criminal 
sanctions on natural persons except to the extent that such sanctions are the 
means whereby competition rules applying to undertakings are enforced."43 
40
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, Official Journal L 395 of 30 December 1989. 0 0 0 1 -
0012. 
41
 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control o f 
concentrations between undertakings. Official Journal L 024 of 29 January 2004. 0001— 
0022. 
42
 Supra, Art . 1, which reads: 
„A concentration has a Community dimension where: 
(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is 
more than EUR 5000 million; and 
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned is more than EUR 250 million, 
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its 
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. 
3. A concentration that does not meet the thresholds laid down in paragraph 2 has a 
Community dimension where: 
(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is 
more than EUR 2500 million; 
(b) in each of at least three Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all the 
undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 mil l ion; 
(c) in each of at least three Member States included for the purpose of point (b), the 
aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than E U R 
25 million; and 
(d) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned is more than EUR 100 million, 
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its 
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State." 
43
 Regulation 1/2003, cited in 33., Recital 8. 
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As it is foreseen and explained also in Recital 9: 
". . . Accordingly, Member States may under this Regulation implement on 
their territory national legislation that prohibits or imposes sanctions on acts 
of unfair trading practice, be they unilateral or contractual. Such legislation 
pursues a specific objective, irrespective of the actual or presumed effects 
of such acts on competition on the market."44 
B) The scope of application of Regulation 1/2003 
Recital 8 of the Regulation furthermore provides that 
"the application of national competition laws to agreements, decisions or 
concerted practices within the meaning of Art. 81 (1) of the Treaty may not 
lead to the prohibition of such agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
if they are not also prohibited under Community competition law".45 
According to Art. 3 (1) of Regulation 1/2003 the Commission not only shares 
the competence to apply Arts. 81 and 82 EC Treaty with the national competition 
authorities and national courts, but also "seeks to ensure full primacy of the 
Community's over national antitrust".46 
"Where the competition authorities of the Member States or national courts 
apply national competition law to agreements, decisions by associations 
of undertakings or concerted practices within the meaning of Art. 81 (1) of the 
Treaty which may affect trade between Member States within the 
meaning of that provision, they shall also apply Art. 81 of the Treaty to 
such agreements, decisions or concerted practices."47 
In these situations, national competition law may not prohibit the agreement 
in question, because according to Art. 3 (2): 
„The application of national competition law may not lead to the prohibition 
of agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted 
44
 Supra, Recital 9. 
45
 Supra, Recital 8. 
46
 Ullrich, H.: Anti-Unfair Competition and Anti-Trust Law: a Continental Conundrum? 
EUI Working Paper, Law (2005), 7, www.iue.it , consulted on 16 December 2005. 
47
 Regulation 1/2003, cited in 33, Art. 3 (1). 
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practices which may affect trade between Member States but which do not 
restrict competition within the meaning of Art. 81 (1) of the Treaty, or which 
fulfill the conditions of Art. 81 (3) of the Treaty or which are covered by a 
Regulation for the application of Art. 81 (3) of the Treaty."48 
Thus, it is not possible for national competition authorities to prohibit agree-
ments that do not infringe Art. 81 (1) EC Treaty or the criteria of Art. 81 (3) EC 
Treaty or which are covered by a Community block exemption. 
This appears to resolve the previous doubts as to the possible application 
of national competition law in the situation where there was a finding of non-
applicability under EC Competition law. 
Subsequently, a question could be asked: Since there is practically no more 
room for the independent application of national law in cases where EC 
Competition law also applies, does Art. 3 (2) represent a commanding incentive 
for Member States to harmonize their national competition rules with EC 
competition law? 
The issue of placing the Community law "supra" of the national laws in 
view of interstate commerce, the Regulation is consistent with previous juris-
prudence, but formal findings to this effect by the European Commission, at 
least, are likely to be rare.49 Again, one can see the development of the case 
law of the ECJ from the Walt Wilhelm case, for the reason that by Art. 3 of 
Regulation 1/2003, which Art. excludes all application of stricter national 
law-because both Art. 81 (1) and (3) always take precedence-the relation of 
national and community competition rules had altered. 
In line with the previous jurisprudence, the Member State authorities were 
free to subject restrictive practices to stricter national antitrust law unless the 
Commission, which in that respect had exclusive jurisdiction, had exempted 
the practice from the application of Art. 81 (1) by an affirmative act, which could 
have been either a case specific decision or a regulation exempting certain 
types of agreements.50 Therefore it is no longer possible to see the equivocal 
interpretation by the national authorities and the Commission of the same 
practice with the same effects. This latter is also supported by Art. 10 of the 
48
 It should be noted, however, that the incentive to harmonize in Art. 3 (2) only concerns 
substantive competition rules. The rules of procedure are most likely to remain national 
unless, harmonizing legislation is adopted at Community level. 
44
 Freeman, P.: U K competition law after modernizat ion-Lord Fletcher lectures, 15 
March 2005, http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/our_role/speeches/pdf/freeman_ 
lord_fletcher_lecture_150305.pdf, consulted on 9 December 2005. 
50
 See also in: Ullrich: cited in 46., Footnote 8. 
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new regulation which gives to Commission the power to act on its own 
initiative if the case is related to Community public interest. 51 
In particular, Art. 3 (2) makes no reference to the need for any positive 
Community purpose and it makes no exceptions. The only situation in which 
national law can be applied in this way is where it is held that the agreements 
in question do not affect trade between member states.52 
Of course, with the empowerment of NCAs to apply EC competition law 
in addition to national competition law and the European Commission's giving 
up of its exclusive power to apply Art. 81 (3), possible conflicts between national 
and EC competition law may arise within. 
One of the situations that gives ground for problems is that the national 
authorities have obligation to decide on the basis of the facts whether the case 
effects trade between Member States or not.53 
Therefore, according to the paragraph 1 of Art. 3 of the new regulation, 
the dividing line between the parallel application of the community rules and 
of the national rules is the so called "interstate commerce", and not the scope 
of the national/community laws.54 
51
 This should be read together with Section С of Commission Notice on handling of 
complaints by the Commission under Arts. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Officional Journal 
С 101 of 27 April 2004. 65-77. This section deals with inter alia the situations when the 
Commission wil l deal with the case. Such cases are: when community publ ic interest is 
at stake; competit ion policy on n e w issue arises; etc. 68. 
52
 Is this simply a rule attributing competence in antitrust matters? Does this mean that 
Art. 3 (2) leaves "the 'big' cases for community competition rules, and the 'small ' cases are 
left to control by national competition law, as, indeed control over the exercise of relational 
market power mos t ly (though not necessari ly) is in tended to protect small and medium-
sized enterprises"? See in Ullrich: cited in 43. 7., Also: Can we witness some sort of 
subsidiarity in Art. 3 (2) in leaving the competition policy on small industry to Member 
States? For example, in Hungary, the latest realignment-entry in force: 1 November 2005-of 
Act LVII of 1996 on the prohibition on unfair and restrictive market practices did not 
explicitly prove that the smaller industry is better protected, the harmonization of national 
law on competition directs towards the achievement of the zeal by the provisions on state aid 
which favors small and medium-sized enterprises, which first was introduced already in 
2001. See on: http://www.gvh.hu/index.php?id=2704&l=h, consulted on 12 December 2005. 
53
 The Commission has created guidelines to help the authorities in deciding whether 
the given case has effects on trade between MSs. Cited in 3. 
54
 The Commission, seeing the not easy task of the establishment of the possible effect 
on trade between Member States, introduced a guideline, which was designed to help the 
N C A s to find the path when deciding upon the issue. In: Commission Notice, Guidelines 
on the effect on t rade concept contained in Arts. 81 and 82, Official Journal С 101 of 27 
April 2004. 81 -96 . 
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One could subsequently ask the question, whether there is a need for a 
diverse protection of the conceivably "two markets", such as one with national 
scope and one with community scope, when applying the competition rules to 
anti-competitive measures?55 
C) The principle of subsidiarity in the view of Art. 3 (2) of Regulation 1/2003 
Art. 3 (2) addresses the non-prohibition side of Art. 81 of the Treaty. It does not 
have to contend with the prohibition side of it because it has been dealt with 
in the Court ' s case law. In its Walt Wilhelm decision, the ECJ held that an 
agreement cannot be declared valid under national law if it is prohibited by 
Community rules on competition.56 
However, what the new regulation did by introducing the above Art. is, it 
ensured that national laws cannot prohibit agreements that are not prohibited 
by Community competition rules. In other words, according to the procedural 
rules, when the Commission finds inapplicability under Art. 10 of Regulation 
1/2003, stricter national laws cannot apply.57 
"1. Where the competition authorities of the Member States or national courts 
apply national competition law to agreements, decisions by associations of 
undertakings or concerted practices within the meaning of Art. 81 (1) of 
the Treaty which may affect trade between Member States within the 
meaning of that provision, they shall also apply Art. 81 of the Treaty to 
such agreements, decisions or concerted practices."58 
Indeed, by Art. 3 (2), the Council reinforced the principle of supremacy. 
55
 Perhaps, this could also be pictured as the achievement of the previous National Courts 
Notice. See in: Notice on the cooperation between National Courts and the Commission 
in applying Arts. 85 and 86, Official Journal С 039 of 13 February 1993. 0006-0011. 
56
 See in Walt Wilhelm case, cited in 6. 
57
 Regulation 1/2003, cited in 33. Art. 10 reads: 
„Where the Community publ ic interest relating to the application of Arts. 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty so requires, the Commission, acting on its own initiative, may by decision f ind 
that Art. 81 of the Treaty is not applicable to an agreement, a decision by an association of 
undertakings or a concerted practice, either because the conditions of Art. 81(1) of the 
Treaty are not fulfilled, or because the conditions of Art. 81(3) of the Treaty are satisfied. 
The Commission may l ikewise make such a finding with reference to Art. 82 of the 
Treaty." 
58
 Regulation 1/2003, cited in 33, Art. 3 (2). 
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However, the principle of supremacy in competition law is somewhat 
different that the general rule of supremacy developed by the ECJ, first in the 
Costa v. Enel case.59 
a) The development of the principle of supremacy 
Since the Treaty of Rome remained silent on this issue, in the landmark case 
of Costa v. ENEL case60 the ECJ unequivocally declared the principle of 
supremacy. 
The Court held that unlike other international treaties, the EEC Treaty created 
its own legal system and the Member States thereby limited their sovereign 
rights-albeit within limited fields-, and have created a body of law that binds 
them as well as their nationals. 
Therefore, unilateral actions taken by individual member states cannot super-
sede the Community legal system, nor can they be inconsistent with it. The ECJ 
had 14 years later reemphasized the principle of supremacy in its Simmenthal-
de eis ion,61 where it stated that, 
„...any provision of a national legal system ... which might impair the effec-
tiveness of Community law by withholding from the national court having 
jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the 
moment of its application to set aside national legal provisions which might 
prevent Community rules from having full force and effect is incompatible 
with those requirements which are the very essence of Community law".62 
Again, this theory covers the situations in the areas where the Member States 
have agreed to act as a Community, therefore they limit their own national 
power to act, in other words; this doctrine highlights the priority of the norms 
of the EC law over the norms of the national legislation of Member States, 
i.e., the latter should not contradict the former. 
With the words of the judgment of the Court in the Costa v. ENEL case: 
"The precedence of Community Law is confirmed by Art. 189, whereby a 
Regulation 'shall be binding' and "directly applicable in all member states". 
This provision, which is subject to no reservation, would be quite meaningless 
59
 Case 6/64, Flamino Costa v. ENEL, Judgment of 15 July 1964, European Court 
Reports (1964), 585. 
60
 Case 6/64, cited in 57. 
61
 Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, 
Judgement of 9 March 1978, European Court Reports (1978), 629. 
62
 Supra, par. 20. 
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if a state could unilaterally nullify its effects by means of legislative measure 
which could prevail over community law.63 
Therefore, any conflict between a Community norm and a national norm that 
have the same scope of application should be sorted out by a non-application 
of conflicting national law, or else the claim of unified application of 
European law might be endangered. 
b) The principle of supremacy in Competition law64 
Consequently, it was many years later reiterated in the Michelin / / j udgment 
of the ECJ that Community rules on competition have primacy over national 
competition law,65 on the matter of the direct effectiveness of Art. 82 EC.66 
The supremacy of the Community competition laws is not only that these 
rules advance national laws on competition, but rather it is that the specific 
nature of the laws that define the application of community rules to certain 
practices of undertakings. This dividing line-since 1 May 2004-is the reinforced 
"interstate effect". 
How did the new regulation complete the specific requirement to clear up 
the problem of supremacy in relation to the two laws? 
In the light of Art. 83 (2) (e), the Council was required to determine the 
relationship between national laws and the Treaty provisions on competi-
tion.67 Following the case law of the ECJ in the Walt Wilhelm case-which was 
63
 Case 6/64, Flamino Costa v. ENEL, Judgment of 15 July 1964, European Court 
Reports (1964), 594. 
64
 A detailed explanation of the development of the principle of supremacy in competition 
law is intruduced by Walz, R.: Rethinking Walt Wilhelm, or the Supremacy of Community 
Competi t ion Law over National Law. 21 (1996) European Law Review, 449-464 . 
65
 See also the Cour t ' s findings in case C-344/98, Masterfoods Ltd v. HB Ice Cream Ltd; 
HB Ice Cream Ltd v. Masterfoods Ltd, Common Market Law Review 4 (2001), 14, par. 47. 
66
 Case T-203/01, Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v Commission of 
the European Communit ies , OJ С 304/24 of 13 December 2003, par. 112 and 166; and 
further in: Case 127/73, BRT and Others European Court Reports (1974), 51, paragraphs 15 
and 16; Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Others European Court Reports (1989), 
803, paragraph 23; and Irish Sugar v Commission, Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar v Commission 
European Court Reports (1999), П-2969, paragraph 211. 
67
 Art. 83 of the Treaty reads: 
„1. The appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in 
Arts. 81 and 82 shall be laid down by the Council, acting by a qualified majori ty on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament. 
2. The regulations or directives referred to in paragraph 1 shall be designed in particular: 
... e) to determine the relationship between national laws and the provisions contained 
in this section or adopted pursuant to this Art.." 
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decided by the Court in the historical context of developing Community 
Competition law- , the Michelin II case and the Masterfoods judgment,6 8 the 
Council introduced Art. 3 (2) of Regulation 1/2003, which prohibits national 
laws that are more lenient to be applied when the decision, practice or an 
agreement is prohibited under Art. 81. 
The introduction of such normative rule that guarantees exclusive appli-
cation of Community law abandons the possible jeopardizing effects deriving 
f rom the Walt Wilhelm doctrine.69 
However, the possibility for the Commission to call in a case if it finds 
that the community public interest is at stake, and also its option to define 
community policy70 through the guiding role guaranteed by Arts. 11 and 16 of 
Regulation 1/2003, reflects the view of the Commission to transfer the supremacy 
of the Community rules into a quasi harmonization of national competition 
rules in order to assure the alike application of community competition rules 
across the EU. 
2. The Regulation 1/2003 on abusive behavior of undertakings 
Seeing the new regulation on anti-competitive behavior, it is useful to take a 
look at the relevant derogations on abusive behaviors. Indeed, the attitude 
towards abusive practices under Art. 82 of the Treaty is somewhat different. 
Namely, " . . . where the competition authorities of the Member States or 
national courts apply national competition law to any abuse prohibited by Art. 
82 of the Treaty, they shall also apply Art. 82 of the Treaty."71 
Here, the dividing line of the probable effect on trade between member 
states is unclear. As cited, the disposition applies to any abuse that is prohibited 
by Art. 82. Furthermore, the restrictive pre-emption of the community rules 
expands in stating, that " . . . Member States shall not under this Regulation be 
precluded from adopting and applying on their territory stricter national 
laws which prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by 
undertakings."72 
68
 Cited in 62 and 63. 
69
 That is the „insecure effect" of comfort letters to undertakings. Those undertakings 
that received a comfort letter stating that Art. 81 (1) cannot be applied could not be sure 
that their practices wou ld not be also j udged under national standards. 
70
 This is also shown in the Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the 
Commission under Arts . 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Official Journal С 101 of 27 April 
2004. 65-77. 
71
 Regulation 1/2003, cited in 33, Art. 3 (1). 
72
 Supra, Art. 3 (2). 
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These stricter national laws may also include provisions which prohibit or 
impose sanctions on abusive behavior towards economically dependent under-
takings. 
By contrast to Art. 81 of the Treaty, in the case of abusive behaviors, the 
ability of the Member States to apply stricter national norms did not alter. 
"As a matter of procedural enforcement, Commission decisions refusing to 
apply Art. 82 are not of an affirmative (constitutive) nature, and because as a 
matter of substantive law, Art. 82 prohibits only abuse and, therefore does not 
define or favor any forms of acceptable or desirable practices."73 This is also 
further specified by Art. 3 of Regulation 1/2003, as cited above. 
In other words, stricter national law can be applied to single-firm conduct that 
does not violate Art. 82; for example, in Germany, antitrust law prohibits abusive 
behavior by companies with superior market power that falls short of dominance. 
The substantive change here is reserved, since European law already 
prevails over national law-on the basis of the principle of supremacy-, and 
national competition laws seldom apply stricter rules than the Commission.74 
Conclusion 
The relationship between the EC Competition rules and national competition 
laws has not always been crystal clear and is still not. However, Regulation 
1/2003 with its far-reaching implications for the enforcement of the EC 
Competition rules had somewhat cleared up the ground-if not more, at least 
concerning the anti-competitive behavior of market participants. Indeed, in 
order to spot an even clearer playing field, there is a need to achieve the same 
level of clarity in the field of abusive activities of dominant firms. If this 
cannot be achieved by central regulatory means than it is suggested that the 
national courts to refer questions to the ECJ for preliminary ruling, which via 
Art. 234 will be of assistance to interpret the community competition rules. 
Whether other alternative means of the harmonized procedural rules or a better 
enhanced judicial review of Commission decisions can parallel exist, it is also 
to find out.75 
ъ
 Also in: Ullrich: cited in 46, Footnote 8. 
74
 See also: Falk et al.: An Expanded European Union. Washington Legal Foundation, 
(19), 2004. www.wlf .org, consulted on 12 December 2005. 
75
 On these issues see: Maja Brkan (2005): Procedural aspects of private enforcement 
of EC Antitrust Law: An analysis f rom an evolutionary perspective. 28 W. Comp. 4: 4 7 9 -
507., and Laura Parret (2005): Judicial Protection after Modernisation of Competition 
Law. Legal Issues European Integration 32 (2005), 339 -369 . 

New subject collections available 
Akadémiai Kiadó offers a new suite of electronic-only journals 
collections in Arts & Humanities, Life Sciences, Sciences, 
and Social Sciences w i th significant pricing discounts. 
Akadémiai Journals Collection • Social Sciences 
Acta Ant iqua 
Acta Archaeologica 
Acta Ethnographica Hungarica 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 
Acta Oeconomica 
Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology 
Review of Sociology 
Society and Economy 
For further details please visit our homepage at 
www.akademiaik iado.hu/col lect ions 
iHiiiiumi 
•feaaaaaMl 
AKADÉMIAI KIADO 
VILMOS PESCHKA, 
editor-in-chief 
Professor of Legal 
Philosophy 
Member of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences 
Awardee of the highest 
Hungarian Scientific 
State Order 
(Széchenyi Prize) 
He has published 12 books 
(in Hungarian, English, 
German, Japanese) and 
more than 150 articles 
VANDA LAMM, editor 
Professor of International Law, 
Széchenyi István University 
(Győr) 
Director, Institute for Legal 
Studies, HAS 
Member of the European 
Academy of Arts, Sciences 
and Humanities 
Associate Member of the Institv 
de Droit International 
Research fields: 
public international law, 
nuclear law 
Our online journals are available at our MetaPress-hosted website: www.akademiai.com 
As an added benefit to subscribers, you can now access the electronic version of every 
printed article along wi th exciting enhancements that include: 
• Subscription 
• Free trials to many publications 
• Pay-per-view purchasing of individual articles 
• Enhanced search capabilities such as full-text and abstract searching 
• ActiveSearch (resubmits specified searches and delivers notifications 
when relevant articles are found) 
• E-mail alerting of new issues by title or subject 
• Custom links to your favourite titles 
const i tu t iona l law • a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law • h u m a n r ights • lega l p h i l o s o p h y •  
European l a w • civil law • p e n a l law, p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w • labour law 
oTüme 47 - Number 2 • June 
Editor- in-Chief. VILMOS PESCHKA 
Hungarica 
Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies 
AKADÉMIAI KIADO 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Acta Juridica Hungarica publishes original papers on legal sciences wi th special emphasis on 
Hungarian jurisprudence, legislation and legal literature. The journal accepts articles f rom every 
field of legal sciences. The editors encourage contributions f rom outside Hungary, 
wi th the aim of covering legal sciences in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The articles should be wri t ten in English. 
• 
Abstracted/indexed in 
Information Technology and the Law, International Bibliographies IBZ and IBR, Worldwide 
Political Science Abstracts. 
• 
Manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be addressed to 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
P.O. Box 25, H-1250 Budapest, Hungary 
Phone: (+36 1) 355 7384 
Fax: (+36 1) 375 7858 
• 
Subscription price 
for Volume 47 (2006) in 4 issues EUR 224 + VAT (for North America: USD 280) 
including online access and normal postage; airmail delivery EUR 20 (USD 25). 
• 
Publisher and distributor 
AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ 
Journals Business Centre 
P.O. Box 245, H-1519 Budapest, Hungary 
Phone: (+36 1)464 8222 
Fax: (+36 1)464 8221 
E-mail: journals@akkrt.hu 
www.akademiai.com;www.akademiaikiado.hu 
• 
© Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 2006 
ISSN 1216-2574 
AJur 47 (2006) 2 
Printed in Hungary 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Editor-in-Chief 
VILMOS P E S C H K A 
Editor 
VANDA L A M M 
Editorial Board 
GÉZA HERCZEGH, T I B O R KIRÁLY, 
F E R E N C MÁDL, ATTILA R Á C Z , ANDRÁS SAJÓ, 
T A M Á S S Á R K Ö Z Y 
Volume 47, Number 2, June 2006 
AKADÉMIAI K I A D Ó 
MEMBER OF WOLTERS K L U W E R GROUP 
Cover design: xfer grafikai műhely 
CONTENTS 
STUDIES 
CSABA VARGA 
VANDA LAMM 
TAMÁS NÓTÁRI 
ANDRÁS L. PAP 
Codification on the Threshold of the Third 
Millennium 
Some Remarks on Reservations to Declarations 
of Acceptance 
Comments on the Origin of the Legis Actio 
Sacramento in Rem 
Criminal Justice and Ethnic Data Collection in 
Hungary 
89 
119 
133 
157 
KALEIDOSCOPE 
CSABA FENYVESI The Legal and Criminalistic Aspects of Secret Data 
and Information Collection 183 
BOOK REVIEW 
GÁBOR KARDOS V A N D A LAMM: A Nemzetközi Bíróság kötelező 
joghatósági rendszere [The Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice] 

1216-2574/USD 20.00 
© 2006 Akadémiai Kiadó. Budapest 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
47, No. 2, pp. 89-117 (2006) 
DOl: 10.1556/AJur.47.2006.2.1 
CSABA VARGA* 
Codification on the Threshold of the Third Millennium 
A b s t r a c t . The core of codification is invariably the idea of a system in the law's composition and 
structuring, doctrinal reflection and conceptual building up, including judicial reference to codai 
definitions as well. Or, codification is (1) an exclusive body of law (2) implementing unity in 
its regulatory field (3) with logical coherence and consequentiality. The dream of a common 
European codification penetrates into the very heart of the law. presupposing the unification of all 
the intellectuality and underlying approach that has ever distinguished Civil Law and Common 
Law. The more the advancement of the European unification progresses, the more inverse the 
assessment of European codification becomes, making us its past trends, values and regulatory 
techniques reconsidered. That is, as if we on the Continent had not so much become statal national 
units unified by a sequence of national laws but, being too conceited of our most promising 
collective heritage within the transitory phase of an infantile disorder, became rather fragmented 
in national isolation from one another, which now comes eventually to a final end. 
K e y w o r d s : codification & substitutes; objectification, systemicity, coherence, conceptuality of 
law; tradition, democratism in law; Civil Law & Common Law convergence; European Union 
What are the developments of the past quarter of a century in the field of codifi-
cation?1 The practice appears to have been following the already covered paths 
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1
 As antecedents, cf., from the author, Codification as a Socio-historical Phenomenon 
[in its original version in Hungarian, 1979]. Budapest, 1991. viii + 391 pp. and A 
kodifikáció és határai [Codification and its limits]. Állam és Igazgatás XXVIII (1978) 8 - 9 , 
702-718 as well as, in a recent summary, Codification in The Philosophy of Law An 
Encyclopedia (ed. Gray, Ch. В.). New York & London, 1999. 120-122 [Garland Reference 
Library of the Humanities 1743]. Cf., as reviews on previously published chapters of the 
monograph, Gérard Conac in Revue internationale de Droit comparé 29 (1977) 861-862; 
M. A. Supataev in Sovetskoe gossudarstvo i pravo 1978/12, 148; in An Overview of 
Sociological Research in Hungary (ed. Szentes, T.), Budapest, 1978. 86; in Strane pravne 
zivot [Belgrade] (1978), No. 98, 26-28; Jörgen Dalberg-Larsen in Retfcierd [Copenhagen] 
(1978), No. 8, 86-93; Braun-Otto Bryde in Rabeis Zeitschrift für ausländisches Privatrecht 
42 (1978) 3, 587-588; Heinz, K. E. in Archiv für Rechts- urnl Sozialphilosophie LXV 
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undisturbedly, driven by its own impnlse. At the same time, setting new targets 
by re-dreaming thousand-year-old European and commonly shared dreams in 
response to the present-day policies of the European Union, theory seems to be 
ready to revise, moreover, reverse earlier perspectives apparently thoroughly 
established and conventionalised, hoping to beat new paths now. Debating 
policies and methodologies in terms of codification is fashionable again: it is 
in the focus of discussions and its dilemmas appear as vital as regards our 
decisions on the future. 
Considering the distinctive episodes of the recent past in terms of mere data, 
more than fifty codes have been promulgated since the end of the World War 
Two. The complete re-drafting of the classical civil codes in Portugal (1967), in 
the Netherlands (1992) and in Quebec (1994),2 of the penal codes in Spain 
(1995),3 in France and in Belgium, as well as the civil law re-codification in 
Louisiana, in Germany (for the law of contracts) and, in the Central and Eastern 
(1979) 1, 146-148; Maria del Refugio González in Boletino Mexicano de Derecho 
Comparado XII (1979), 300-302; on the monograph in Hungarian, in Jogtudományi 
Közlöny XXXII (1977) 233-240 ; Rodriguez, F. E. in Boletino Mexicano de Derecho 
Comparado XII (1979) 672-673 ; Malonyai, P. in Magyar Nemzet XXXVI (1980) 199, 4; 
Visegrády, A. in Állam- és Jogtudomány XXII I (1980) 3, 534 -539 , Majoros, F. in Revue 
internationale de Droit comparé 32 (1980) 4, 873-876; Szabó, J. in Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 32 (1981) 1, 123-128; Bianchi, L. in Právny Obzor 
I Bratislava] 64 (1981) 60-63 ; Sipos, S. in Universitate Babey-Boiyai: Iurisprudentia [Cluj] 
26 (1981) 7 6 - 7 8 ; in Referativniy zhurnal po obshestvennie nauki Pravo [Moscow] 1981/4, 
26-29; Bonis, Gy. in Századok CXV (1981) 1325-1327; Nagy, E. in Állam és Igazgatás 
XXXII (1982) 506-514; Bolgár, V. in The American Journal of Comparative Law 30 
(1982), 698 -703 ; Brunner. G. in Rabeis Zeitschrift für ausländisches Privatrecht 4 6 ( 1982) 
579-580; Szabó, I. in Magyar Jog 30 (1983) and in his Ember és jog Jogelméleti 
tanulmányok [Man and law: studies in legal theory] Budapest , 1987. 9 4 - 1 0 6 ; on the 
monograph in English, Talion, D. in Revue internationale de Droit comparé 4 4 (1992) 
740-741 and Legrand, P.: Strange Power of Words: Codification Situated. Titiane 
European & Civil Law Forum 9 (1994), 1 -33 . 
2
 Cf., e.g., Legrand, P.: De la profonde incivilité du Code Civil de Québec. 1 - 1 3 and 
Parent, S.: Le Code civil de Québec: incivilité ou opportunité. 15-25, both in: Revue inter-
disciplinaire d'Études juridiques (1996), No. 36. The fact that the doctrine, masterly 
deepened with exemplary accuracy, of the Civil Code was completed in practically the last 
moment of its effect-Quebec Civil Law An Introduction to Quebec Private Law (ed.: 
Brierley, J. E. C. & Macdonald, R. A.). Toronto, 1993. lviii + 728 pp.- , just to be replaced by 
an utterly new concept of codai implementation, indicates the defencelessness of mere 
theorising at all times. 
' Cf., e.g., Blanco, M. G.: Codification et droit de la postmodernité: La création du 
nouveau Code pénal espagnol de 1995. Droit et Société ( 1998) 509-534. 
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European region, in Russia (1996), and in preparation in Poland and Hungary 
(supplemented also by re-codification of criminal law in the latter), all represent 
developments of the recent past.4 
* 
First, in guise of general observation, a rather striking statement can be made. 
Notably, as the end of the second millennium was approaching, codification 
itself started increasingly to lose in purity and in the consistency of its classical 
ideals that once used to constitute a strict and coherent system. And this holds 
good of more than one aspects. On the one hand, the supremacy of statutory 
law with its function of exhaustively embodying the law gradually shows the 
signs of waning.5 On the other hand (and in result of the above), the requirement 
developed half a century ago as a logical perfection of the European ideal of 
codification, namely that a coclificational determination of the law be main-
tained through re-drafting law-codes periodically recurrently, by keeping pace 
with changing historical, economic and social conditions given at any time, has 
itself weakened. (As is known, it is socialist codification having set itself the 
objective of the codai embodiment of the law that realised this requirement in 
the most principled way, purely and consequently, also as a pattern which later 
became, upon the pressure of the need for modernization, a model enthusiasti-
cally followed by the Afro-Asiatic developing countries as well.) 
For practical considerations, this leap into the opposite extreme can be 
perceived as a pendulum-effect. From now on, it is not re-codification any longer 
but the utter negation of codification itself (i.e., the abandonment of codifi-
4
 Cf., e.g., Renaissance der Idee der Kodifikation Das neue niederländische Bürgerliche 
Gesetzbuch 1992. (hrsg.: Bydlinski, F . -Mayer-Maly, Th.-Pichler, J. W.). W i e n - K ö l n -
Weimar, 1992. 157 pp. [Schriften zur Rechtspolitik 5]; Sacco, R.: Codificare: mode suprato 
di legifare? Rivista di diritto civile XXIX (1983) 1, 1 17 et seq., specia l ly at 120; as well 
as Zweigert , K.-Put t farken, H.-J.; Allgemeines und besonderes zu r Kodifikation. In 
Festschrift für Imre Zajtay (hrsg. Graveson, R. H.). Tübingen, 1982. 569 et seq. 
5
 According to Kühler, F.: Kodifikation und Demokratie. Juristenzeitung (1969), 645 
et seq., especially at 651, the crisis of the law in general is "no th ing but normal in a 
democratic industrial society [where] the fragmentary and periodical character of the statute 
is a part of the ordinary state of affairs". A similar view can be found in, e.g., Esser, J.: 
Gesetzesrationalität im Kodifikationszeitalter und heute. In: 100 Jahre oberste deutsche 
Justizbehörde Vom Reichjustizamt zum Bundesministerium der Justiz (hrsg. Vogel, H. J . -
Esser, J.). Tübingen, 1977. 13 et seq. |Recht und Staat in Geschichte und Gegenwart 470 | . 
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cation in order to reach a state of "de-codification"6) that comes to the 
forefront more and more forcefully as a new landmark. More precisely, the 
emphasis is increasingly shifting from the code itself to the actual filling of one-
time codai functions. In other words, the systemic form of objectivation of the 
law suitable to provide a gapless response to any question at will within its field 
of regulation seems to be eventually substituted by the actuality of whatever 
reply only channelled by the code, maybe by providing nothing but systemic 
or taxonomic loci to which, conceptually or institutionally, the freely 
contextualisable judicial stand may refer.7 According to the new mainstream 
opinion, regarded as exclusively justified by the ideologies of postmodernity, 
the alleged "authoritarianism of codification" of the past will have to yield its 
place (both as an ideal and as the technique of regulatory practice) to a kind of 
"democratic openness"? in pursuance to some development typologies mostly 
rooted in American experience but increasingly generalised so as to include 
European practices as well.4 
6
 Irti, N.: L'età délia decodificazione. 3rd ed. Milano, 1989. 195. 
According to the expression of Sacco, 125, it is no longer the code-form that is 
superior but the idea of its (suit)ability to offer a solution: "Il codice non è [...] superato. È 
superata l'idea che un codice possa nascere privo di lacune, e che la sua sola lettera possa 
offrire une bu one soluzione per tutti i possibili casi del futuro. " 
* According to Kühler, p. 651, there is a "change of the authoritarian codification state 
towards a system aiming at democratic openness where legislation has become a political 
instrument of a permanently required adjustment" in progress. According to Lasserre-
Kiesow, V. : La codification en Allemande au X V I l f siècle: Réf lexions sur la codification 
d'hier et d 'aujourd 'hui . Archives de Philosophie du Droit 42 (1998) , 215-231. quotation 
on 223 and 231, "the future is no longer to be found in the past. [...] [CJodification based 
on paradigms of statism as well as on perfection of form and contents certainly does not 
have any future any longer." 
9
 See, as a first formulation, from the author. Átalakulóban a jog? [Law in trans-
formation?] Állam- és Jogtudomány XXIII (1980) 4, 6 7 0 - 6 8 0 and Logic of Law and 
Judicial Activity: A Gap be tween Ideals, Real i ty, and Future Perspectives. In: Legal 
Development and Comparative Law (ed. Péteri, Z.-Lamm, V.). Budapest, 1981. 4 5 - 7 6 , 
particularly para. 5, as inspired by Wasserstrom, R. A.: The Judicial Decision Toward a 
Theory of Legal Justification. Stanford, 1961. 122 et seq.; Per Olof Bolding Reliance on 
Authorities or Open Debate? T w o Models of Legal Argumentation. Scandinavian Studies 
in Law 13 (Stockholm, 1969), 65 et seq.; Mangabeira Unger, R.: Law in Modern Society 
Toward a Criticism of Social Theory. New York-London, 1976. ch. II; and, especially. 
Nonet, Ph.-Selznick, Ph.: Law and Society in Transition Toward Responsive Law. New 
York, 1978. 
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As a logical consequence to this, present-day legislators tend to leave behind 
all former endeavours for systemic purity and consistency (as if these were 
nothing but instances of a kind of doctrinarian atavism), only to make way for 
the pragmatism of borrowing from just anywhere, and thereby accepting both 
the partialness and fragmentation of results.10 In addition to all these, a new 
kind of localism, transitionalism and pragmatism making headway under the 
aegis of globalism rapidly gaining ground, explain the attempt at absolutising 
currently ongoing endeavours with the wish to also re-write the past (a practice 
far from unfamiliar in France of the earlier days). Notably, a paradigmatic shift 
is at stake as a tendency becoming more and more general, in terms of which 
the codification once completed by Napoleon and also its magnificent and lasting 
type-framing features seem nowadays to be swept out of collective memory 
and taken notice of, if at all, rather as a historically incidental exception in 
the birthplace of classical codification, only to relativise the very term 
'codification' (along with the idea and the historical achievement repre-
sented by its one-time realisation), by reducing its meaning to the practice of 
rationalising one aspect of the mass-scale and all-inclusive management implied 
by today's public administration, that is, to the continuous consolidation of its 
legal normative staff (from statutes to governmental decrees, including also 
administrative regulations)." 
This short-sighted and extreme simplification (forecasting "the end of history" 
with all the a-historical conceptual misrepresentation inherent in Francis 
Fukuyama's contemporary Utopianism)-in addition to its rather controversial 
nature, as such a 'codification', taken as the genuine piece of consolidation, 
10
 According to Bergel, J.-L.: Les méthodes de codification dans les pays de droit mixte. 
In La formation du droit national dans les pays de droit mixte. Aix-Marseille, 1989. 2 1 - 3 4 , 
"from now on, there is nothing but mixed laws" (34), because "the mixed character grows 
widespread by becoming the general rule" (35). 
" As a vice-president of the National Commit tee for Codification, Braibant, G.: 
Codification. In Encyclopaedia Universalis 6, Paris, 1995. 9^12 has visualised today ' s 
practice, drowned in everyday hygiene and poorly lacking any concept, as the great 
universal achievement of mankind. Because, although "codification has been an ancient 
dream of mankind" (39), yet its manifestations "hardly have more value than the texts 
adopted or issued by them". Namely, "codification itself is nothing else than the operation 
or policy of the fabrication of codes, through re-arranging former norms or creating new 
norms" (39). Accordingly, the term 'codification' itself has a twofold meaning. True, there was 
once also "a great work of codification", the Code civil, yet, today also "systematic codes" 
are available to us. For, as he goes on, "the renaissance [of codification] took place af te r 
the [Second World] War" (40). 
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has to first "transcript", then "transgress" the positivated legal staff processed 
by it, tearing this staff out from its original texture, by placing it into another 
context, and thereby finally "transdict" i t l 2-is not only sheer "conceptual 
abuse"13 but is obviously indicative of decline, too.14 All this slowly starts to 
characterise our age to an extent that some observers believe to discover 
exactly opposite, counter-running tendencies among the trends in the United 
States of America and in the European Union, pointing out that while there 
the re-assertion or the launch of codification, here, on our continent, de-
codification has been put on the agenda.15 
A kind of scepticism has become general-first, in the form of disillusion-
ment and then, as a general awakening, due to the vanishing of the myths of 
the European ideal of codification " -which , as extended also to the past, has 
gradually but surely been transferred from the loss of confidence placed in 
the regulatory force of and normative foresight by the law, to the general 
disappointment in codification itself. Some present-day sober explanations 
12
 Terms by Timsit, G.: La codification: transcription ou transgression de la loi? In his 
Archipel de la norme. Paris, 1997. ch. V, 145-159, especially at 151, 155 and also 159. 
Actually, Timsit speaks about consolidation, yet, indicative of uninhibited actualisation, he 
terms it codification all along |as done also by both Catta, E.: Codification et la loi fétiche. 
In Interpréter le droit Le sens, l'interprète, la machine (dir. Thomasset, C.-Bourcier, D.). 
Bruxelles, 1997. 63-69 and de Bèchillon, D.: L'imaginaire d'un code. Droits (1998), No. 
27: La codification 3, 173-184], and blames it basically for "transcendence of the limits of 
the law" (151) and for "a mummification of the law" (159), that is, for the fact that exactly 
this false codification, operating with original sources of the law, falsifies them 
unpronouncedly, because it re-positivates them in a new context and medium. 
13
 This conceptual extension is expressly considered as an abuse by, e.g., Gaurieu, D.: 
La rédaction des normes juridiques, source de la métamorphose du droit? Quelques repères 
historiques pour une réflexion contemporaine. Revue générale de droit 31 (2001 ) 1-85. 
14
 Having apparently passed the great moments of codification once and for all 
(accompanied by the gradual erosion of the belief in rational plannability and in any 
Gesamtplan s logical executability, in addition to the lack of appropriate political and legal 
circumstances) may perhaps account for the fact that "The importance of codes will 
decrease, and the drafting of truly new ones-capturing and organizing new realities-will 
be, at least for the moment, an almost impossible task." Damaska, M.: On Circumstances 
Favoring Codification. Revista Juridica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico LII (1983) 3 5 5 -
371, quotation on 370. 
" Shael H.: The Fate and the Future of Codification in America. In: Essays on 
European Law and Israel (ed. Rabello, A. M.). Jerusalem, 1996. 89-129, especially 124. 
16
 E.g., Arnaud, A.-J.: Pour une pensée juridique européenne. Paris, 1991. 294 [Les 
voies du droit] speaks about "reassuring, alleviating myths of the simplicity, permanence 
and abstract character of the law". 
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trace this back to the expectations over-intensified yet puristic (and, in this regard, 
also doctrinarian), thus excessive all through (and, therefore, impractical, 
consequently proving unsuitable to stand the test of time), fixed back in the 
age of the Enlightenment, of the birth of classical codification.17 This is the 
recognition from which immediately a consequence is also drawn, according to 
which only the kind of codification could prove successful with lasting effects 
and applicable in the long run, where its drafters were the least inclined to 
over-enthusiasm.18 We seem to have left behind once and for all, as the one-
time children's room of our (post)modernity, the claim for codifying the law 
with the intent of "establishing a new unified legal system", and we are going 
only to draw on codification in as much as it is inevitable "to safeguard the 
interests of the community by restricting, as far as possible, the political aspects 
and influence of different lobbyists",19 not excluding out the possibility either 
that the instrument of classical codification will one day be replaced by artificial 
intelligence and its new media technicalities.20 
* 
Well, what is codification like and where is it heading at the threshold of the 
new millennium? Most responses seem to confirm my earlier monographic 
17
 E.g., Schmidt, K.: Die Zukunft der Kodifikationsidee Rechtsprechung, Wissenschaft und 
Gesetzgebung vor den Gesetzeswerken des geltenden Rechts. Heidelberg, 1985. 79. 
[Juristische Studiengesellschaft "Karlsruhe" 167]. 
18
 "The reason why in Countr ies with old Civil Codes the courts are still able to find 
their way lies in the fact that legislators did not attempt too much ." Lorenz, W.: On the 
»Calling« of Our Time for Civil Legislation. In: Questions of Civil Law Codification (ed. 
Harmathy A. -Németh Á.). Budapest , 1990. 128. 
19
 Kötz, H.: SchuldrechtsUberarbeitung und Kodifikationsprinzip. In: Festschrift für 
Wolfram Müller-Freienfels (hrsg. Dieckmann, A. et al.). Baden-Baden, 1986. 97 and, for 
contrasting past and future, cf. also Harmathy, A.: Codification in a Period of Transition. 
U[niversity of]C[alifornia] Davis Law Review 31 (Spring 1998) 783-798, quotation on 
789. It is worthwhile to notice the irony inherent in the fact that the image of the past 
formed by such prominent civil ian authors about codification, taken once as a creative 
power, is nothing else than the image of fu ture major expectations formed within the 
European Union. Or, this is a proof that even if history does not repeat itself, we do 
ourselves. Thanks to our urge to adapt, we again and again draw on the past, its experiences 
and instrumentalities. 
"The arduous road to new integration will probably be paved by artificial intelligence 
better able to detect patterns in the complexity of the modern social l ife." Damaska: ibid. 
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stand,21 which is found by certain dreamers of our future as something hopelessly 
embedded in (as formed by) the ideals of the past, therefore statist, and, as to 
declare what the law is, authoritarian; or, and briefly, atavistic and, as such, 
to be transcended. In sharp contrast with this, there is only an elastic, wishful 
image formed about the character of the future European civil code, vaguely 
sketched with exploratory uncertainty, far from being discernible in any 
aspect. 
According to the theoretical literature (leaving, at the moment, the 
deconstructive reconstructions of the near future out of account), the core of 
codification is still the idea of a system manifested in both its composition 
and structuring, doctrinal reflection and conceptual building up, including the 
judicial practice of referring to codai definitions of institutions, legal constructs 
and dispositions as well:" 
"Putting an end to the rule of the fuzzy and uncertain, wrongly cut boundaries 
and of the only approximate classifications, by applying definite cuts and 
23 
creating sharp boundaries, replacing the former by setting up clear classes." 
Or, codification invariably appears (1) as an exclusive body of law, (2) imple-
menting unity in its regulatory field (3) with logical coherence and 
consequentially;24 or, showing the features of (1) completeness, (2) freedom 
21
 Cf., Varga Codification..., passim. 
22
 See, first of all (though tacitly admitting to be unable to comprehend the entire 
continental approach to law beyond the separation of what is systemic and what is non-
systemic), Freeman, M. D. A.: The Concept of Codification. The Jewish Law Annual 2 
(1979), 168-179, especially at 169. For the development in history of the concepts 'system' 
and 'legal system', see, from Sève, R.: Introduction. 1-10, and, for their analysis by 
example of the Code civil, his Système et code. 22-86, both in Archives de Philosophie du 
Droit 31: Le système juridique (1986). 
22
 Bourdieu, P.: Habitus, code et codification. Actes de la recherche en siences sociales 
(1986), 4-44, quotation on 42, claiming that the "the system is built on [...] cognition as 
universal, through the inseparably logical and ethical necessity of it" (4). 
24
 Humbert, H.: Les XII Tables, une codification? Droits (1998) La codification 3, 8 7 -
112, applies the collective incidence of all these characteristics to qualify the lex duodecim 
fabularum as a code (110-111). According to Arnaud, 135, codification is a "coherent and 
systematic regulation" achieved through "exhaustive totalisation" which, according to R. 
C. van Caenegem An Historical Introduction to Private Law. Cambridge, 1992), especially 
at 12, denotes "a general, exhaustive regulation of a particular area of law", by "involving 
a coherent programme and a consistent logical structure". 
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from contradictions and (3) regulatory economy,' or, furthermore, of a (1) 
comprehensive and (2) systematic (3) enactment by the legislature,26 (4) 
promulgated as a coder1 The theoretical attitude is conservative here: once the 
paths of the mere collection and textual embodiment of laws, once termed by 
me then as the quantitative, and later on, the systemic reshaping of the law 
according to the logical ideal of a system, termed by me then as the qualitative, 
types of codification have started to diverge, also the notion implied by the 
terms 'code' and 'codification' has become reduced to mean just the latter, that 
is, the qualitative type, carrying, as a sine qua non, the criterion of systemicity 
regarding the law processed all through. 
Well, it is exactly this differentiation that seems to be disappearing as an 
outdated past achievement from the postmodernist visions of the political 
voluntarism of the European Union, not yet equipped with any encouraging 
practical experience in an all-comprehensive codificatory regulation. 
The first guinea pig for experimentation in this immense ongoing endeavour 
is the effort at elaborating, one way or another, the codification of private law 
of the European Union. For the time being, we know less about the underlying 
motives and perspectives of common European legislation (including the 
35
 Ost, F.: Le code et le dictionnaire: Acceptabilité linguistique et validité juridique. 
Sociologie et sociétés XVIII (avril 1986) 59-75 . 
26
 Zimmermann, R.: Codification: History and Present Signification of an Idea. European 
Review of Private Law 8 (1995) 95-120, especially 96-97. van Caenegem, R. C.: Judges, 
Legislators & Professors Chapters in European Legal History [Goodhart Lectures 1984-
1985] Cambridge, 1987. on 42 defines the code as a comprehensive and systematic exposition 
replacing all previous laws in a new text promulgated as a law. Dölemayer, В.: 
Zivilrechtliche Kodifikationen in Europa im 19. Jahrhundert. In Evolution of the Judicial 
Law in XlX'h Century ed. Grzegorz Górski {= Law in History [Lublin] 1 (2000)}, 117-130, 
on 118 identifies it simply as the "materially comprehensive, systematic, abstract and rational 
regulation of an entire area of law summarised in a code (codex)" ["materiell umfassenden, 
systematischen, abstrakten und rationalen Regelung eines ganzen Rechtsgebiets in einem 
Gesetzbuch (codex)"]. 
"
7
 Of course, there are softer definitions as well. According to Ascarelli, T.: L ' idea di 
codice nel diritto privato e la funzione dell ' interpretazione. [1955] In his Saggi giuridici 
(Milano, 1949), 48-49 , for instance, "The code is characterised by a claim to construct a 
»new«, »complete«, and »definitive« legal order that includes amongst its formulations 
solutions for all possible cases", and, as stated by Pio Caroni Lecciones catalanas sobre la 
história de la codiflcación [Lezioni catalane sulla storia della codificazione] (Madrid, 
1996), 177, especially at 2 2 - 2 3 (Publicaciones del Seminario de História del Derecho de 
Barcelona 1], the code is a "written presentation aiming at plenitude, with a unificatory 
function". 
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clarification of the theoretical foundations and necessity of a systematic 
codification), reminiscent of the classical period of drafting constitutions and 
law-codes as well, than about the nature of "democratism" characterised by 
constant hesitation and the easy readiness to launch the bureaucratic machinery 
of common legislation in motion. No doubt, the dilemmas regarding the legal 
expression of the foundation of national states in the 18lh to 19th centuries will 
gain new aspects in the current rush for the foundation of a truly inter-national 
state. Therefore, I still find the lessons drawn two centuries ago invariably 
remarkable, according to which "codes and constitutions have performed 
analogous institutional roles" in the legal performance of the political and 
civil foundation of a society, as supporting and complementing one another in 
the historically parallel rush for providing basic chartae and law-books.28 
Well, returning to the issues pertaining to the common European codification, 
all we could experience about its outlines so far is that 
- it does not aim at abstract conceptual clarity, consistence or exclusive 
pursuance of any ideal or actual model:24 it will presumably represent the 
entire European and even all-Atlantic heritage in the tradition of values and 
techniques as a practical whole in a (perhaps even mosaic-like) new quality. 
At the same time, 
- it does not aim at perfection, nor at any exclusive completeness.10 As 
the result of a new definition of the law, it will have to openly accept, in 
the context of constantly changing interests and depending on the institu-
tional moves at any given time, a sheerly temporary and mediatory role. 
Therefore, having drawn the lesson from the failures of codification up to 
now, 
- it can be nothing more than just "creeping".3I As soon as this figurative 
expression has reached consensus among the students of law taking part 
Gambaro, A.: Codes and Constitutions in Civil Law. In: Italian Studies in Law 2, 
(ed.: Pizzorusso, A.). Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1994. 79-104. quotation on 79. 
'
q
 Basedow, J.: Codification of Private Law in the European Union: The Making of a 
Hybrid. European Review of Private Law 9 (2001) 35-49. 
11
 According to Lasserre-Kiesow, what once, in the period of classical codification, 
embodied "the totalisation of knowledge" (221), is nothing else on the final analysis than 
"a patriotic and habitual juridical exaggeration [. . .] which only hinders the ideal of a legal 
Europe" (223). In a similar sense, see also Wiegand, W.: Back to the Future? Rechts-
historisches Journal (1993) 283. 
" T h e term 'to creep' denoting 'to develop slowly and steadily [ . . .] in the hope of 
advancement' was first used by Klaus Peter Berger The Creeping Codification of the Lex 
Mercatoria. The Hague, 1999. 
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in the debate (revealing also the poet, dreamer, innovator and/or social 
revolutionary hidden in each of us even if mostly suppressed by our scholarly 
discipline), the doctrinal (and maybe dry, yet systematic) reasoning of 
treatises in jurisprudence has become substituted (in a way unheard of in 
juridical literature at earlier times) by a rhapsodic subjectivism with lists of 
desires and the boundlessness (almost reminiscent of the ecstasy of the so-
called 'honeymoon-period', characteristic of early modern and modern 
revolutions), even unrestraint and randomness, of a credo of "Anything is 
possible, because by virtue of the power of such a giant club, we are in a 
position to target anything at will!". 
Accordingly, some keep day-dreaming hoping that a kind of the desired 
end-result will after all emerge one way or another, in one form or another, 
upon the pattern and with the automatism of the ' Volksgeisf once active in 
S A V I G N Y ' S thought, due to the emerging clarification of principles through 
their continuous testing in practice, their unfatiguing re-consideration and 
adjustments, combining the effect of scholarship and doctrine with the 
socialising force of living practice and the educational efforts available 
through general and vocational training.12 According to other opinions, the 
desired unity of the European Union can, at most, emerge as the result of 
endeavours, in which the accumulation of principles (to be further shaped, 
re-asserted and represented all through by a truly inter-national European 
legal profession, capable of rising above national fragmentation) will be 
conceived in the womb of common European professional education and 
business practice, with a unifying legal scholarship and doctrine in the 
background. Therefore, it is practicality what the new European creed calls 
for and not pure scientism or self-complacent authorial egoism; for the latter 
can merely lead to selfishness, yielding only unnecessary complexity and 
contradiction, i.e., abstract and doctrinaire conceptuality which, as dried-
out and lifeless fruits, cannot genuinely respond to the present, truly practical 
challenge. Or, new Portalises are needed, since only the humility of traditions 
can provide bases for a codification achieved at the level of foundational 
principles,33 Among the authorial convictions, it seems to be a bit too 
daring to dream farther about (reminiscently, first of all, of the patterns offered 
by the American Restatement of the Law and the uniform legislation) 
32
 Bergerm K. P.: The Principles of European Contract Law and the Concept of 
»Creeping Codification« of Law. European Review of Private Law 9 (2001) 21-34. 
33
 Lando, O.: Some Features of the Law of Contract in the Third Millennium. 
Scandinavian Studies in Law 40, Stockholm, 2000. 343-402, especially 361-363. 
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experimental preparation of such projects as the Principles of European 
Contract Law or of European Civil Procedure, so as to be able to decide, 
given the newly acquired practical experience, how to go on (if one will be 
decided to go further at all);34 or, partly preconceiving the response, leave 
the consummation of the codifying process to legal practice from the 
outset, whose result appearing some time in future can, of course, be 
applied to further refine either the normative material itself or any of its 
official commentaries.35 No matter how the European legal profession may 
decide, we have to be aware of the fact that even in case any codification is 
eventually completed, "It could then take decades before today's level of 
predictability and rationality of decisions would be reached again."36 At the 
same time and in an evident interrelation with this, 
- the question of the future duality and/or eventual convergence of the 
British Common Law and the continental Civil Law is still raised as a vital 
issue.37 This old-new question (earlier only a favourite delicacy for legal 
34
 Hondius, E.: Towards a European Civil Code. In: Towards a European Civil Code 
ed. Arthur Hartkamp, 2nd ed. Nijmegen-The Hague-Boston, 1998. 3 -19 . 
35
 As formulated by Schmid, Ch. U.: Legitimacy Conditions for a European Civil 
Code. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 8 (2001) 277-298, on 296, 
there will be an "integrative Restatement with a common European commentary section", 
onto which-more and more acceptedly anyway in West-European practice [cf., e.g., 
Schulze, R.: Vergleichende Gesetzauslegung und Rechtsangleichung. Zeitschrift für 
Rechtsvergleichung, internationales Privatrecht und Europarecht (1997), 183 et seq. and 
Monateri, G.-Somma, A.: »Alien in Rome«: L 'uso del diritto comparato come inter-
pretazione analogica ex art. 12 preleggi. Ii Eoro Italiano (1999), V47|-a so-called comparative 
interpretation is going to be built. Although this seems to contradict the established practice 
according to which, from the very beginning, a "Cartesian style" has been dominant in the 
exclusive European judicial forum properly designed so far, i.e., the European Court of 
Justice, which is allegedly "inspired by the French tradition, in which judgments are more 
set up as binding conclusions of a quasi-scientific nature than justified argumentatively" 
[cf., e.g., Weiler. J. H. H.: The Function and Future of European Law. In: Function and 
Future of European Law (ed. Heiskanen, V.-Kulovesi, K.). Helsinki, 1999. 17 et seq. and 
Leible, S.: Rolle der Rechtsprechung des EuGH bei der europäischen Privatrechtsent-
wicklung. In: Auf dem Wege zu einem Europäischen Zivilgesetzbuch (hrsg. Martiny, D . -
Witzleb, N.). Berlin, 1999. 55 et seq. and 73 et seq. [Schriftenreihe der Juristischen 
Fakultät der Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt], This is a practice that will, if not 
accompanied by a total shift in character, be downright inoperable in a kind of regulation 
carried out mostly on the level of mere principles. 
36
 Schmid: op. cit. 287. 
37
 The Clifford Chance Millennium Lectures The Coming together of the Common Law 
and the Civil Law (ed. Markesinis, B. S.). Oxford-Portland, 2000. and, in it, especially 
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comparatists in generating intellectual pleasures) has now become, from the 
vague presentiment of the presumable consequences of a political resolution, 
the sine qua non of such a resolution and its feasible future realisation. For 
the common European administration of justice as practised in Luxembourg, 
Strasbourg, etc. for a few decades now has only required the commonality 
of results, with no relevance to the issue how these have been actually 
reached, with which ways and what procedures resorted to and which sources 
referred to in the process. However, a common European codification, 
contemplated now, already penetrates straight into the heart of the law. It 
presupposes the unification of all the intellectuality and underlying approach, 
conceptual thinking, subordination to logical and systemic forms (that is, 
sensitivity, skills and styles) which, on their turn and throughout the sequence 
of centuries, not only offered our continent a scope of law-positivations 
diverging in nature from those on the British Isles but, so to say, embodied 
a route and direction diametrically opposite to the hopes placed in this 
converging European future, both in the historical experiences and their 
scholarly reconstruction, in the conceptual and methodological frameworks 
of political and constitutional thinking, in the stake and nature of philoso-
phising-or, in sum, in taking the choice between the pragmatic reliance on 
human and social experience or the mere pursuance of the barren logic of 
preconceived conceptual schemes, and, thereby, also between the empirical 
(inductive) and the principled and methodical (deductive) ways of construc-
tion-from the one-time accomplishment of the entire revolution in natural 
scientific thought. 
Or, to put it briefly, quite simply and also professionally simplified: those 
of us who, ready for action, await orders to carry them out, or those who, 
attending to each other benevolently, hope the diligent acts of the detail 
work (invisible in the humane everyday responsible practice) to produce 
Markesinis, B. S.: Our Debt to Europe: Past, Present, and Future. 37-66; Crosswald 
Curran, V.: Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the 
Homogenization of the European Union. The Columbia Journal of European Law 7 (2001) 
63-126. One of the authors [Helmholtz, R. H.: Continental Law and Common Law: 
Historical Strangers or Companions? Duke Law Journal (1990) 1207-1228] remarks in 
conclusion (on 1228) that "Common lawyers always wished to avoid some aspects of 
Continental law, but they also habitually regarded it as a companion and resource to be 
called upon in need, not as a stranger." 
38
 For the differing mentality, cf., f rom the author. Lectures on the Paradigms of 
Legal Thinking. Budapest , 1999. and Összehasonlító jogi kultúrák? [Comparative legal 
cultures?]. Jogtudományi Közlöny LVI (2001 ) 409^116. 
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the long desired result one day, can, at the highest, be specialists of 
comparative law in their entrenchment into legal texts, but by no means 
historically and anthropologically sensitive thinkers who have, at the same 
time, to bear in mind the essentials of comparative legal cultures as well. "' 
For the latter are those who already know (or, at least presume at the level 
of hypothesis substantiating their approach and explorations) that law is not 
simply a mechanism built up of interchangeable parts, according to a product-
type and operated as a machine, but an aspect of living human culture, 
separated relatively and only for professional purposes from the other factors 
and bearers of the order in making at a community level, only to be able 
with foreseeable security (as having stepped out from the everyday circulation 
of interests) to direct, influence and control the practice of conflict-resolution 
according to ready-made patterns, as the case may be, thereby also 
rendering it impersonal in the spirit of the ethos of the order itself, that is, an 
external Order which is, like the veil of Justitia, necessarily depersonalised. 
(As a matter of fact, we can by far not be sure whether or not at all, and 
in which sense, the Anglo-American legal mentality may mean indeed 
'rule' by ' law'. For instance, the early failure of the reformist effort by the 
British Law Commission (aimed at considering codification as late as in 
1964) was indicative of an utter confusion as to the generalisability of the 
law as broken into and embodied by a series of concepts, as well as its 
arrangement and ordination according to abstract logical forms, with the 
implied possibility of also subordinating (subsuming) facts to rules.40 For in 
19
 For their conceptual and disciplinary separation and the requirements of the new 
approach, see. from the author. Comparative Legal Cultures: Attempts at Conceptualization. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 38 (1997) 53-63 and Comparative Legal Cultures?, passim, 
pondering upon the topic covered by Comparative Legal Cultures (ed. & introd. Varga, 
Cs.). Hong Kong-Singapore-Sydney-New York, 1992. [The International Library of 
Essays in Law and Legal Theory: Legal Cultures l . | and European Legal Cultures (ed. 
Gessner, V.-Hoeland, A.-Varga, Cs.). Aldershot-Brookfield USA-Singapore-Sydney, 
1996) xviii + 567 pp. [Tempus Textbook Series on European Law and European Legal 
Cultures I]. 
411
 The effort of Jeremy Bentham-"The unity of a law will depend upon the unity of the 
species of the act which is the object of it" [in his Of Laws in General (ed. Hart, H. L. A.). 
London. 1970. 166.1-was reasserted to ordain the proper obligation or empowerment to 
each and every behavioural situation as a ' law/right ' befitting it; Jolowicz' whole venture 
[The Division and Classification of the Law (ed. Jolowicz, J. A.). London, 1970.] set itself 
the aim of replacing this benthamite dependence on acts by a dependence on social facts; 
while Julius Stone pointed out, |in his Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings. London, 
1964. 269.] that even the most elementary natural facts (like, e.g., the rotting scrap of a 
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their codificatory thought, the Britons used to maintain that if law were 
traced back to a (re)posited series of rules at all, that what would be most 
meaningful of all this settlement for the judges could only be the rather 
informal reasoning based upon the travaux préparatoires, indeed worthy of 
the human intellect. And this is exactly what the 19lh-century British-Indian 
codifier wanted to express when he remembered as follows: "we added as 
many illustrations as we thought necessary for the purpose of explaining 
it", and, therefore, it would be most beneficial to include these rules' grounds 
along with the rules themselves into such codes.41 Well, they were actually, 
then and now, trying to beat a path lagging centuries behind Leibniz' age 
and recognitions. Actually, the very idea of codification arises from the 
theoretical understanding that codai law cannot indeed be anything else 
than a sheer sequence of abstract and general rules, while the underlying 
understanding of the common law is still related with the idea of something 
that can exclusively be grasped empirically, placed somewhere between the 
casual decision and the grounds for decision, equally drawn from tradition.) 
Even just a glance through the literature pouring in this topic is enough to see 
that there are already painstaking case studies about the intensifying "Europeani-
sation" of the British jurisprudence42 and all those "myths of codification"-
according to which, to make mention of just one formulation, 
"I. A codification can provide an accessible and complete formulation of the 
law and can enable the development of the law in a planned manner. II. Codai 
snail found in the beverage, as referred to in Donoghue v. Stevenson 11932] A.C. 562), may 
mean "dead snails, or any snails, or any noxious physical foreign body, or any noxious 
foreign element, physical or not, or any noxious element"; as other authors [Twining-
O'Donovan-Pal iwala: Ernie and the Centipede. In: The Division...] have also ventured to 
prove that "a black female poodle puppy can be classified by colour, sex, species or age". 
Freeman: op. cit. 172-173. 
41
 Black v. Clawson [1975] A.C. 591; Macaulay's letter to Lord Auckland, quoted by 
Farrar, J.: Law Reform and the Law Commission. London, 1974. 58-59; F. Vaughan 
Hawkins in Juridical Society Papers 3 (1865), 110 et seq., especially at 112; as well as 
Farrar: 159. Quotation by Freeman: op. cit. 176-177. 
42
 E.g., Zimmermann, R.: Der europäische Charakter des englischen Rechts: Historische 
Verbindungen zwischen civil law and common law. Zeitschrift für Europäisches Recht I 
(1993), 4 et seq.; Levitsky, J.: The Europeanization of the British Legal Style. The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 42 (1994), 347 et seq. 
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regimes are rigid and not adaptable. III. The common law's emphasis on case 
law techniques makes it admirably adaptable to new circumstances."43 
-which, of course, as dreams and Utopian expectations, can be justified neither 
in the domain of Civil Law, nor that of Common Law. It may seem paradoxical, 
yet it is a truth worth considering that even, for instance, French law is more 
flexible, more suitable for practical adaptation and fertilising application from 
many aspects, than case-law directly made by judges. After all, the continental 
law-applying process steps out from general principles calling, by their nature, 
for interpretation, and it may initiate debate on the meaning and applicability 
of rules independently from the question of the very existence and systemically 
co-ordinated arrangement of the same rules, as opposed to English judge-made 
law reduced to an amalgam(ate) of casual decisions, which, like "an amorphous 
mass [...] [in which] there is no organizing principle",4'1 directly carries on 
(because of the undifferentiated unity of the rules and their casual application) 
the legal character and self-identity of the whole, up to its last component as 
well45 Well, expectations linking positive or negative Utopianism to codification 
43
 Markesinis: B. A.: The Destructive and Constructive Role of the Comparative Lawyer, 
[originally in Rabeis Zeitschrift (1993), 438—4481 in his Foreign Law and Comparative 
Methodology A Subject and a Thesis. Oxford. 1997. 36-46. quotation on 37 -38 . 
44
 Watson, A.: The Importance of »Nutshells«. The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 42 (1994), 1 -23 , quotation on 11 and 12. 
45
 See Tunc, A.: Codification: The French Experience. In: Problems of Codification 
(ed.: Stoljar, S. J.). Canberra, 1977. 73-74 , as well as David, R.: French Law Its Structure, 
Sources, and Methodology. Baton Rouge, 1972. xviii + 222 pp., especially at 80 and 83. 
It is to be noted that this is the line by which the question of the general part of civil 
codes becomes directly a regulatory problem of codification-as it defines, in principle, the 
upper layer of normative axiomatism (without which the "lawyer at sea in the law like a 
pilot without a compass" would helplessly roam [cf. Unger System des österreichischen 
allgemeinen Privatrechts I, 5lh ed. (1892), 641, as well as Zweigert, K . -Kötz , H.: Intro-
duction to Comparative Law I: The Framework, 2nd rev. ed. (trans.: Weir, T.). Oxford, 
1987. 167]-, as well as the gap-filling technique of the Swiss Zivilgesetzbuch, commissioning 
the judge to become eventually an accidental substitute to the legislator (§ 1), the specific 
feature of which lays not only in the fact that it can be traced back via Kant even to 
Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, 1137b) but it also reasserts the continental regulatory 
principle (the judicial empowerment notwithstanding), by eventually declaring that "in 
order to be legal a decision must be based on a rule which can be formulated as a general 
one" [Wieacker, F.: A History of Private Law in Europe With Particular Reference to 
Germany {Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, 1952, 2" ed. rev. 1967} (trans. Weir, T.). 
Oxford, 1995. 391]. 
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mostly appear mixed with manifestations of either the euphoric belief in a 
Common Europe46 or, just to the contrary, an extremist rejection of it.47 Any 
analysis of the signs, steps and events of actual rapprochement (or, at least, of 
effective interaction and mutual influence) is relatively rare a phenomenon. 
For instance, in Germany, the jurisprudence of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch has 
arrived from the one-time exegesis reached as a "juristic game of chess" to a 
"case-law revolution",48 while in the English legal thought, there is emerging an 
"increased self-assertion of a kind of doctrinarism" (as a feature indicating that 
46
 Markesinis, В.: The Gradual Convergence Foreign Ideas, Foreign Influences and 
English Law on the Eve of the 21s1 Century. Oxford, 1994.; Gordley, J.: Common Law and 
Civil Law: Eine überholte Unterscheidung. Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 1 
(1993), 498 et seq. 
47
 Cf., e.g., f rom Legrand, P.: Legal Tradition in Western Europe: The Limits of 
Commonality. In Transfrontier Mobility of Law (ed.: Jagtenberg, R. -Örücü, E.-de Roo, 
A.). The Hague-London-Boston, 1995. 63-84 and How to Compare Now. Legal Studies 16 
(1996), 232 et seq.; similarly Paasilehto, S.: Legal Cultural Obstacles to the Harmonisation 
of European Private Law. In: Function and Future of European Law, 99 and Bussani, M.: 
»Integrative« Comparative Law Enterprises and the Inner Stratification of Legal Systems. 
In: Feiden, C. -Schmid (ed.): European Review of Public Law 8 (2000), 57 et seq., 
especially at 85. 
According to several opinions [e.g., Flume, W.: Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung. 
Zeitschrift für Insolvenz- und Wirtschaftsrecht (2000), 1427 et seq., especially at 1429, as 
well as Collins, H.: European Private Law and the Cultural Identity of States. European Review 
of Public Law 3 (1955), 353], national legal arrangements with their codai expression are 
parts of the cultural heritage anyway, whereby they, being cultural monuments, can hardly 
be relinquished by any state without simultaneously giving up something of own statal 
identity. 
For instance, Mengoni, L.: L'Europa dei codici о un codice per /'Europa? (Roma, 
Centra di studi e ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero, 1993), 3 ISaggi, conferenze e 
seminari 7] excludes unification through codification f rom the circle of possible alternatives: 
"reconoscere che l'un codice per l'Europa non è un'alternativa realistica". Legrand, P.: 
Brèves réflexions sur l 'utopie unitaire en droit. Revue de la common law 3 (2000) 1 - 2 , 
111-125 quotes f rom the work of P. d'Oribane Cultures et mondialisation (Paris, 1998), 
324-325, according to which "The reason according to the taste of the French is more 
noble, more devoted to the beauty of theory, more attached to the pure and gratuitous 
things, more based on general systems and ideas, more brilliant, more abundant in elegant 
demonstrations, and more sharing the characteristics of grandeur than the English do". 
48
 Partsch, J.: Vom Beruf des römischen Rechts in der heutigen Universität. Bonn, 
1920. 50 pp. at 39, as well as Dawson, J. Ph.: The Oracles of the Law (Ann Arbor, 1968), 
432, quoted, among others, by Zimmermann, R.: Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European 
Law The Civilian Tradition Today (Oxford, 2001) xx + 197 pp. 
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"these peculiarities and jagged edges, on both sides of the Channel, are in a 
process of being with away"49). Or, what is wanted is a disillusioning cold 
voice that would neither applaud, nor oppose, just remind us that, given the 
second millennium elapsed in European history, what has happened until now 
is not too much and not necessarily new either. Therefore, one can state that 
"To conclude on that basis that the common law is being »Europeanised« is 
probably as rash as to imagine that it was ever isolated in the first place."50 
And indeed, we cannot be so oblivious as to forget that, just a few decades 
ago, the very idea of applying any universal abstract formulation, such as in 
case of the direct and uniform judicial enforcement of transnational human 
rights charters, had filled the House of Lords with dread. Similarly, English 
lawyers have proved to be unable or unwilling to propose (perhaps out of 
pretension) a means more suitable for the internal division of their own law 
than factual classification (i.e., the one arranging facts according to the initials 
of their English names);51 acknowledging with complacency that human mind 
has never produced and could probably never produce anything more fitting 
than the purely alphabetical "chaos with an index"52 of the words identifying 
legal loci and contexts. 
* 
Now, looking back from the coming future to the past, what is codification of 
the various historical epochs like in the mirror of analyses by recent literature? 
As far as the early occurrences preceding the Greek and Roman codai forms 
are concerned, it is ascertained that they were, for the most part, not normative 
49
 Zimmermann, R.: Savigny ' s Legacy: Legal History, Comparative Law, and the 
Emergence of a European Legal Science. The Law Quarterly Review 112 (October 1996), 
576-605, especially at 590 and quotation on 589. 
5,1
 Lewis, X.: The Europeanisation of the Common Law. In: Transfrontier Mobility of 
Law, 47-61, quotation on 61. 
51
 The aim of The Division and Classification of the Law (ed.: Jolowicz, J. A.) is 
admittedly nothing less than "A plea for a factual classification of the law [ . . . ] a factual 
division of the content of the law" (7). The situation has not changed since. As Bernard 
Rudden states in his Torticles. Tulane Civil Law Forum (1991-1992) 105, "the alphabet is 
virtually the only instrument of intellectual order of which the common law makes use" . 
52
 The expression of Sir Thomas Holland is quoted by Marsh, N. in International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 30 (1981), 488. 
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sources of law53 but "pious hopes and moral resolve rather than effective 
law"54 or, at times, simply traditional literary compendia used for the official 
training of clerks,55 which could of course serve also as reference manuals for 
the judges faced with troublesome cases.56 
It is surprising how early the idea of order arose, so to say contemporarily 
with Justinian, but thousands of miles further, also in the West.57 And in 
conceptual arrangement, substantive regulation is the first to get separated 
53
 "Neither in the prologues nor in the epilogues nor elsewhere do the law-codes order 
any one to observe their provisions. Judgments in lawsuites pay no regard to the law-
codes." Walther, A.: Das altbabylonische Gerichtswesen. Leipzig, 1917. 227. Also cf., in 
the same sense, Landsberger, В.: Die babylonischen Termini für Gesetz und Recht. SDIOP 
II, 221-222. 
54
 Finkelstein, J. J.: Ammi-Saduya 's Edict and the Babylonian »Law Codes«. Journal 
of Cuneiform Studies 15 (1961), 91 -104 . "Their primary purpose was to lay before the 
public, posterity, fu ture kings, and, above all, the gods, evidence of the king's execution 
of his divinely ordained mandate." (103) Accordingly [as Oppenheim, A. L.: Ancient 
Mesopotamia Portrait of a Dead Civilization, rev. ed. (1977) states], Hammurapi 's code 
(similarly to all former Accadian and Sumerian codifications) has no connection whatso-
ever with the legal practice of the age. Its contents can, from several main perspectives, be 
regarded rather as a traditional literary formulation of the King's social obligations and as 
the expression of the King's awareness of the differences between the existing and the 
desirable state of affairs. (And it is to be remembered that this edit ion also remarks in 
notes-rather thought-provokingly for the understanding of the all-European development-
that the fatal approach trying to squeeze reality into a series of formal requirements is 
unknown in Mesopotamia and probably also in the entire ancient Near East. It was only a 
later and definitely peripheric development, notably, Judaism [having originated f rom the 
desire to generate, due to certain ideological motives, specific social relationships! that 
managed to bring about such a behavioural pattern.) 
55
 Oppenheim, A. L.: Ancient Mesopotamia. Chicago, 1964. 14-21. 
56
 Westbrook. R.: Biblical and Cuneiform Law Codes. |Revue Biblique 92 (1985), 2 4 7 -
264] In Folk Law Essays in the Theory and Practice of Lex Non Scripta (eds. Dundes 
Renteln, A.-Dundes , A.). New York-London, 1994. 495-511, especially at p. 503. For the 
entirety of these early forms, see also Sealey, R.: The Justice of the Greeks (Ann Arbor, 
1994). 
57
 Notably, it appears already as a programme in title 1 of the book II of the version of 
the unified (Visigothic and Roman) code of Recceswinth (654) as amended by Erwig (681) 
that the law-book has to provide "a clear and honest meaning, expressing clear precepts for 
the doubtful [...] in orderly arrangement [.. .] in ordered titles". Quoted by Fischer Drew, K.: 
The Barbarian Kings as Lawgivers and Judges, in her Law and Society in Early Medieval 
Europe Studies in Legal History. London, 1988. 7 - 2 9 and 15. 
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from procedural and evidentiary rules in early compilations, so that it can 
finally be declared: 
"all questions for which there is no regulation have to be answered upon the 
basis of the regulation given in the law. [...] The law becomes, out of 
something inherent in the things, a kind of order posited above the things, 
»58 
an autonomous power. 
New realisations are now made available about the substitutes for codification 
from antiquity up to the present day. On the one hand, we not only learn how 
widespread it was for official compilations to enter into effect in form of 
manuscripts (either due to lack of printing press or to some local custom), but 
there were even times when they were expressly designed to be made public by 
way of being deposited (for example, at the Town Hall in case of the Coutumes 
de la ville d'Ypres, 1535) as accessible to anyone to ask for a copy on payment 
of a certain amount,59 just as the Icelandic law-speaker [lögsögumaöur] centuries 
earlier (back in the age of the Konungsbók [Codex regius], 930-1262) could be 
approached to reassert occasionally for those who looked after justice, what the 
law was.60 On the other hand, not only revealed holy books (like, e.g., the Bible 
for the first founders of the state of Massachusetts) can provide a rudimentary 
guidance as the law's summation but, at times and for want of anything better, 
58
 [ "alle nichtgeregelten Fragen sich aus der im Gesetz gegebenen Regelung beantworten 
lassen müssen. [...] Das Recht (Gesetz) wird aus einer den Dingen innewohnenden eine über 
die Dinge gesetzte Ordnung, eine autonome Macht"] Ebel, W.: Geschichte der Gesetzgebung 
in Deutschland. Göttingen, 1958. 107 pp. TGöttinger rechtswissenschaftliche Studien 24], on 
75. According to his examples, such is the promulgation of a Gerichtsordnung und 
Landrecht, auch Polizei-, Holz-, Hütten-, Bergordnung und Reformation (1592) on the 
estate of Wildenburg a. d. Sieg or of a Rechtsordnung consisting of 16 titles (1663) as 
based upon the reformation of the Bericht über Erbfälle und über etliche Mißbräucli on the 
estate of Kurköln (1538) (73); and, as a conceptual systématisation, the issuance of a 
Gerichts- und Landordnung (verf. Joh. Fichard, 1571) in the county Solms and, as parts of 
it, a Von den Landrechten (with 32 titles) and a Von Gerichten und gerichtlichem Prozeß 
(with 40 titles) (74). 
59
 E.g., the Statutes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (1529), as well as the Sud'ebniks 
of the Grand Duchy of Moscow (1497 & 1550). Cf. Uruszczak, W.: Les codes de droit en 
Europe à l 'époque de la renaissance. In: La codification européenne du Moyen-Age au 
siècle des Lumières (éd. Salmonowicz, S.). Warszawa. 1997. 69-102, especially at 101. 
6 0Sigurdur L.: Law and Legislation in the Icelandic Commonwealth. Scandinavian 
Studies in Law 37 Stockholm, 1993. 55-92. 
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maybe even practical guidebooks, written originally for didactic purposes to 
students.61 
Well, especially in case of the great oeuvres marking the emergence of the 
classical type of codification (like, e.g., the Allgemeines Landrecht62 and the Code 
civil), despite the former's authoritarian and the latter's revolutionary origin,63 
their one-time embeddedness in traditions64 is increasingly re-discovered and 
emphasised now, especially in the light of today's intellectual and institutional 
61
 The Hexabiblos (1345), compiled by the Thessalonian learned specialist Constantine 
Harmenopoulos and usually referred to as the "miserable epitome of epitomes of the 
epitomes", was applied throughout the late Middle Ages as a substitute source of the law in 
Greece and the entire Balkans. What is more, it was even conf i rmed by an order of 
February 23, 1835, of the Kingdom of Greece so that, in lack of any custom or judicial 
practice to the contrary, it had to be applied as a general source of the law until a civil code 
was finally drafted (which was actually done as late as on February 23, 1946). Or, in 
South-Africa, the Thirty-three Articles that constitutionally established Transvaal had 
stipulated in section 31 that 'hollandsche wet' had to be taken as the basis of the law. The 
new Constitution (Grondwet , September 19, 1859) defined, in Annex [bijlcigej 1, first 
Johannes van der Linden's Rechtsgeleerd practicaal en koopmans Handboek, secondly 
Simon van Leeuwen ' s Het Roomsch-hollandsche recht and thirdly Grot ius Meidinge tot de 
hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid (1631) to serve as its framework. That is, it ordained 
practical handbooks published in a wide circulation during the 17th century as the basic 
reference to law in the second half of the 19lh century despite the fact that the new civil 
code of the Netherlands (Burgerli jk wetboek, 1838) had by then left the old law for decades 
behind, as a sheer preliminary. Watson, 20 and 19. 
" A c c o r d i n g to Stein, P.: Roman Law in European History (Cambridge, 1999), 112, 
the main drafter of the Allgemeines Landrecht was Carl Gottlieb Suarez who shared the 
views of Christian Wolff, in terms of which it is the ruler's duty to guide his subjects to 
lead a perfectly reasonable life. Therefore, the Prussian Code had to have an educational 
purpose and, as addressed to the public, it had to be comprehensive, clear and def in i te as 
well. 
61
 According to the witty remark of Domenico Corradini Garantismo e statualismo Le 
codificazioni civilistiche dell 'Ottocento (Milano, 1971), 12 et seq. |Pubblicazioni délia 
Facoltà di Giurisprudenza délia Università di Pisa 39], the classical codes were originally 
drafted with the purpose of safeguarding either absolutism or basic freedoms. At the same 
time, Halpérin, J.-L.: L'impossible Code civil. Paris, 1992. 309 pp. [Histoires] points out 
that all the natural law, colouring the French Civil code, only served to conceal the novel ty 
of its wording (289), while "the text finally adopted after struggles of nearly one and a 
half decade was the longest a m o n g all the proposals yet at the same time the least 
revolutionary." (287) 
64
 Gordley, J.: Myths of the French Civil Code. The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 42 (1994), 459 et seq. 
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challenges that, as driven by a common "European interest" or under simple 
pressure of time and out of helplessness, look back rather on Savigny instead 
of Thibaut.65 This is all the more remarkable because it appeared as the practical 
correction of the cardinal idea of the Enlightenment (namely, the ideals of 
rationality, logicality and universality66 that once resulted in the emergence of 
the new, quality type of codification and which ideals were once believed to 
have absolute validity) at a time when all these revolutionary illusions, wish-
dreams and incantations had to be put to the test of life by being implemented 
in practice. 
Thus, it is no mere chance that Portalis' personal contribution to the drafting 
of the Code civil has now (in contrast to the disdainful tone once used when 
remembering him67) come to the limelight with the effect of revelation (revoking 
his bitter and disillusioned treatise with a non-mainstream picture of his age, once 
considered worthy of oblivion). Secondly, it is little wonder that it is through the 
inteipretation of the Code Napoléon as a sociological phenomenon that we now 
start collecting the following facts about J. E. M. Portalis (1746-1807) as features 
determining his personality: He fled to Northern Germany during the Revolution, 
where he got into contact with Pietists; his attraction to the oeuvres of Pascal 
and Montesquieu deepened; it was also during that period that he started to 
castigate the one-time misery of his homeland in an essay only posthumously 
published. For in Germany, as he wrote, he had seen the materialisation of the 
good form of what he called esprit philosophique: small universities, closed 
65
 Thibaut. A. F. J.: Über die Notwendigkeit eines allgemeinen bürgerlichen Rechts 
in Deutschland (Heidelberg, 1814) and von Savigny, F. C.: Von Beruf unserer Zeit für 
Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (Heidelberg, 1814), both reprinted in Thibaut und 
Savigny Ihre programmatische Schriften (hrsg.: Hattenhauer. H.). München. 1973. 61 et 
seq. as well as 95 et seq. As to the movement and their debates, cf. Wrobel. H.: Die 
Kontroverse Thibaut-Savigny im Jahre 1814 und ihre Deutung in der Gegenwart [Diss.]. 
(Bremen, 1975) v + 307 pp. 
66
 "A well conducted government must have a system as coherent as a system of 
philosophy, so that finance, police, and the army are coordinated to the same end, namely 
the consolidation of the state and the increase of its power. Such a system can only emanate 
from a single brain, that of the sovereign." Andrews, S.: Eighteenth-century Europe. London, 
1965. 119. And, as Finer, S. E.: The History of Government From the Earliest Times . I—III 
(Oxford, 1997), 1456 continues this line of thought, showing the parallel between the great 
epochs of governmental bureaucracy and codification (1458), all this preconditions "belief 
in uniformities in Nature, the logicality of Reason, and correspondingly, the need to 
rationalize, systematize, and codi fy the laws under which subjects were to live." 
67
 E.g., Planiol. M. : Traité élémentaire de droit civil I. Paris, 1900. § 80: " n ' a point 
dépassé la médiocrité". 
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intellectual circles without any major social or political irradiation, where ideas 
were not driven by the chance of materialisation, thus being unable to become 
directly dangerous either. The French Revolution had, on the other hand, 
originated from the salons of Paris, as launched by the "Sophists". The whole 
atmosphere of the Enlightenment in France with direct irradiation of ideas and 
mobilisation of the political elite itself, focussing on the idea of a mentally 
anticipated conceptual system with the urge of its systemic implementation, was 
suitable to tempt to both irresponsibility and extreme consistency, and, once 
inflicted on the Nation as a living practice, it might also elicit the eventual 
(ill)fortune of a whole country. Well, such a cry in Portalis' complaints68 may 
remind the reader of present-day criticisms of the wantonly useless, bare 
intellectualism marking our modernity.69 Accordingly, 
68
 How much we could have benefited since, if the idea of system had not thrown 
pernicious errors into the most useful truths, and if the wise lessons of experience had not 
been suffocated by exaggerated and absurd theor ies!" "It was the men of genius , of 
character and of vision, and not the Sophists who founded societies, built cities, and taught 
things to peoples. Sophists always appear at t imes when morals are corrupted. They are 
born therefrom and they are hardly suitable to raise, with their miserable influence, those 
spirits and hearts degraded. As soon as they formulate an idea, they believe to have brought 
about a kind of institution. But, as the ideas formulated do not, by themselves, capture people, 
they do neither take roots where they were sown. They just keep multiplying the laws, whereby 
they exactly achieve the debasement of legislation. And meanwhile everything gets lost: 
the false philosophical mind is like a deaf shell enclosing everything." Portalis, J. E. M.: 
De l'usage et de l'abus de l'esprit philosophique durant le XVlit siècle [Paris, 1820] 3e éd. 
(Paris, 1834), 300-301 and 4 0 2 ^ 0 3 , with a selected reprint in Portalis, J. E. M.: Écrits et 
discours juridique et politique. (Aix-Marseille: Presses Universitaires d 'Aix-Marseil le, 
1988), 227 and 398-399. 
69
 For present-day stands about intellectualism, see Kiáltás gyakorlatiasságért a 
jogállami átmenetben [A call for practicality in the transition to rule of law) (ed. Varga , 
Cs.). Budapest, 1998. 122 pp. especially with Kirckpatrick, J. J.: Introduction to her 
Dictatorship and Double Standards Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York , 
1982), 1 -18 and, as a stand taken by the author, A racionális jogszemlélet e r edendő 
ambivalenciája: Emberi teljességünk széttörése a fejlődés áraként? (The inherent 
ambivalence of a rational legal approach: development at the price of the f ragmentat ion 
of our human integrity?) In: A jogtudomány és a büntetőjog dogmatikája, filozófiája 
Tanulmánykönyv Békés Imre születésének 70. évfordulójára [Philosophy of law and penal 
law: Festschrift for Professor Imre Békés] (eds. Busch, B.-Belovics, E.-Tóth, D.). 
Budapest, 2000. 270-277 as well as Önmagát fe lemelő ember? Korunk racionalizmusának 
dilemmái [Man elevating himself? Dilemmas of rationalism in our age]. In: Sodródó 
emberiség [Mankind adrift: on the work of Nándor Várkonyi 's The Fifth Man] ed.: Mezey , 
K. (Budapest, 2000), 61-93. In a philosophical and socio-theoretical context, cf. also 
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"Portalis may have arrived at the philosophical conviction of empiricism 
transformed into philosophy. This knows no system, only adaptation, that 
70 
is, the adaptability of thought to the different requirements of the moment." 
To recognise again the moment of tradition embodied (among others) by the 
French revolutionary breakthrough in codification, as well as that of experience 
indispensable beyond reason and logic in the judicial profession, or to re-
consider the debates revolving around codification having called to life the 
historical school of law in Germany from the second half of the 18lh century 
on, well, all this cannot at all be alone attributed to an immanent interest in the 
history of ideas today. After all, we have to find fixed points that help us 
identify the paths of the future. More precisely, it is exactly the path to be 
followed in the near future about which we think we may ascertain that its 
uniqueness and the unprecedentedness of its venture are nothing but the 
extension, in European dimensions and with an all-European complexity, of 
the difficult and risky decision which had already been faced once at a national 
level in Germany of the 19lh century, and for the intellectual dilemma of which 
perhaps the one-time movement of the German historical school of law can 
now be taken as the best example.71 
Anyway, the recognition according to which the age of the series of pieces 
of national codification was limited in a social and political sense as well, as it 
embodied and emphasised a further stage of universal development, is reflected 
by the historical reconstruction of the birth of the Austrian Allgemeines Bürger-
liches Gesetzbuch. For, according to its monographer, 
"the codification of civil law was an attempt to reconcile the modern notion 
of the state as the supreme public authority holding a monopoly of govern-
ment with the idea of the rule of law as an objective and, indeed, absolute 
category of social cohesion, and as such not subject to the supreme will 
of public authority [.. .]. On the Continent of Europe, codified civil law 
provided the legal basis for the social and political pattern of the nineteenth 
Hayek és a brit felvilágosodás A konstruktivista gondolkodás kritikája [Hayek and the 
British Enlightenment: criticism of the constructivist thought! ed. Ferenc Horkay Horcher. 
Budapest, 2002. [Jogfilozófiák]. 
" Carbonnier, J.: Le Code Napoléon en tant que phénomène sociologique. Revue de la 
Recherche juridique Droit prospectif (1981) 335. 
71
 Cf., especially, Zimmermann: Roman Law..., op. cit. 14-17. 
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and early twentieth centuries: the state of absolute sovereignty which yet 
72 
remained a Rechtsstaat". 
At the time and under the given circumstances, this reconstructive requirement 
of the codai function had completely fulfilled what I had, in the monograph 
referred to above, described as the main (socio-legal) function of the national 
unification of law, on the one hand, and the apparently merely legal-technical 
function of the centralised state domination over the law, on the other, in terms 
of which the state may, in turn, control the entire theoretical and practical staff 
of the law and, thereby, decisively shape its everyday implementation as well.73 
How far has the fulfilment of such major vocations and expectations 
progressed, as assessed by critical retrospection within a present perspective? 
"Obviously, some of the high hopes and expectations entertained at the time 
of the Enlightenment have not been fulfilled: neither have the codifications 
made the learned lawyer redundant, nor have they led to a lasting consoli-
dation (or, to put it negatively: ossification) of private law. Still, however, 
they have significantly contributed towards the national fragmentation of 
the European legal tradition."74 
Well, the realisation above may serve as a typical illustration of how certain 
evaluations can turn into their own opposite, depending on the historical evolution 
and practical developments, for, in the light of the present-day international 
process of unification in European proportions, that what once (just one or two 
centuries ago) was a landmark of the national legal unification is now (and not 
without any foundation) re-formulated as national fragmentation. Just as 
paradoxical is the following statement by the same historian of European law, 
well versed in deepened English legal studies, according to which 
"What German arms had achieved on the battlefields of France-political 
unity-had now also been peacefully accomplished in the area of private 
law: »One People. One Empire. One Law.«"75 
72
 Strakosch, H. E.: State Absolutism and the Rule of Law The Struggle for the 
Codification of Civil Law in Austria, 1753-1811. (Sydney, 1967) vii + 267 pp. 
73
 See Varga Codification..., op. cit. passim. 
74
 Zimmermann: Roman Law..., op. cit. 1. 
75
 Ibid., 53, quoting Zittelmann, E.: Zur Begründung des neuen Gesetzbuches. Deutsche 
Juristenzeitung (1900), 2. Moreover, Windscheid, В.: Das römische Recht in Deutschland. In 
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Indeed, the requirement of both the overall popular knowledge of the law and 
regulatory completeness is not any longer featuring amongst the classical 
dreams and hopes regarding codification, or at least, not in the sense of the 
law's easy accessibility, cognisability and manageability.7'1 Therefore, the 
dream originating from the age of the Enlightenment, postulating that society 
and law have to be established in one consciously planned and realised act 
around which the real life would revolve as planets of the solar system, turned 
out to be quite irrealistic.77 
his Gesammelte Reden und Abhandlungen (hrsg. Oertmann, P.). Le ipz ig-Duncker -
Humblot, 1904. 48 desired the same: to provide "a German law for the German People" by 
building up "a cathedral of national splendour", a wish common to Europe as an objective 
of all the national states from the age of Napoleon. Cf., e.g., von Görres, J. in Rheinisches 
Merkur (April 7, 1815): "Ein Reich, ein Recht!" a quote by Gaudemet , J. in his La 
codification, ses f o rmes et ses f ins . Revue juridique et politique Indépendance et 
coopération 40 (Janvier-Juin 1986) 3^1, 239-260, especially 257. It may seem ironic, yet 
can perhaps be explained by the historical conditions of contemporary criticism that the 
first draft of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (1888) as characterised by Zimmermann: 
ibid.) "was condemned as being too abstract and pedantic, it was denounced as a pandectist 
textbook cast in statutory form and thus as being too unGerman; it was attacked as being 
out of touch with the realities of life and as lacking even a drop of socialist oil." Cf. also 
Varga: Codification..., op. cit. 135. note 84. 
7(1
 "Today, one has given up all hope that the average citizen can be expected to 
comprehend the law. [ . . . ] A code may or may not be desirable: that it fails to promote 
general knowledge of the law cannot be regarded as a decisive argument within this 
debate." Zimmermann: Codification..., op. cit. 108. 
7
 The Hegelian para l le l - 'Never since the sun has stood in the f i rmament and the 
planets revolved around it had it been perceived that m a n ' s existence centres in his head, 
i.e. in thought, inspired by which he builds up the world of reality." Hegel, G. W. F.: The 
Philosophy of History ( Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte [1840] IV 
Berlin, 1970-1976. 926), 447, quoted by Varga: Codification..., op. cit. 302- is translated 
by Gambaro, 81, into a description of the doctrine of legal sources when he recalls: in the 
19th century, "the so-called special statutes [were relegated] to the level of exceptional norms 
which rotated around the code, just as the planets of the solar system move around the sun". 
It is this same sense in which the root of the present decline of codification is seen by Irti, 
27: "The Codice civile cannot be recognised as having [ . . . ] the value of general law, 
the seat of principles that are set forth and »specified« by external laws [. . .] . [For it] 
functions henceforth as a »residual law«, as a discipline for cases not regulated by 
particular provisions." 
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The wish-dream of both total systemicity78 and gaplessness,79 effecting 
comprehensive and exhaustive regulation on principle, has proved to be a 
similarly vain hope, and even more so the attempt at enforcing this through the 
prohibition of judicial interpretation.80 Well, all these new developments are 
definitely meant to reaffirm the trust to be placed necessarily by the legislator 
in those who administer justice,81 as a reminder of the gradual construction of 
the law and the inevitable division of law-making contribution, covering all 
stages of the entire process of the law's formation, by conceptualising them as 
"the two-graded process of the law's establishment" (to use the expression of 
Kelsen having written his second major treatise in 1922),82 on the one hand, 
and they also reaffirm the function of the code which I had earlier characterized 
(in describing the life, posterior to the Second World War, of the Code civil 
and other classical codes) in a way that, in the process of the gradual building 
up of jurisprudence through merely referring to the code-text in the everyday 
practical development of the law, the code's genuine function gets reduced to 
nothing but providing and indicating systemic-taxonomic locuses for the judicial 
solution of the case, that is, to a most relative guidance by far not unambiguous 
or excluding alternatives, on the other.81 
78
 "If you read the proceedings, you may be amused at finding the briskest of all the 
debate took place over the two little words »and hares« in a section relating to damage 
done by wild animals. Powerful language is used, and, for a moment, the given whole of the 
mighty project seem to be endangered by the conflicting interests of sport and agriculture. 
That is the touch of humour, required as a relief for so much civil vir tue."-wrote Maitland, 
F. W.: The Making of the German Civil Code. In: his The Collected Papers (ed. Fisher, H.) 
Ill Cambridge, 1911. 482, declaring thereby that this was nevertheless the victory of the 
whole over each and all its individual components. 
79
 Cf., e.g., Hübner, H.: Kodifikation und Entscheidungsfreiheit des Richters in der 
Geschichte des Privatrechts. Königstein, 1980. 74. [Beiträge zur neueren Privatrechts-
geschichte 8]. 
80
 For Frederick the Great [Publikationspatent (1794), art. XVIII], judges are prohibited 
"to indulge in any arbitrary deviation, however slight, from the clear and express terms of 
the laws, whether on the grounds of some allegedly logical reasoning or under the pretext 
of an interpretation based on the supposed aim and purpose of the statutes". 
81
 The necessary failure that can be traced back throughout our known history is 
described by Becker, H.-J.: Kommentier- und Auslegungsverbot. In: Handwörterbuch zur 
Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (hrsg. Erler, A. -Kaufmann, E . -Stammler , W.) II. Berlin, 
1978. 963 et seq. 
82
 Kelsen, H.: Allgemeine Staatslehre. Wien, 1922. 
83
 And this was already a total shift, equal to giving up the original function which had 
once historically brought the phenomenon known as codification, because thereby the code 
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Thereby, methodologically we have returned to the expectations towards a 
common European codification of private law, to the possible methodology of 
its realisation and to the formulation of the main function to be filled by it. 
Accordingly, 
"a codification [...] provides a system that all those who have to apply and 
interpret the law to see »varitatjesj inter se connexa[e]«M to appreciate 
and pay attention to the normative context within which a specific decision 
has to be seen, to avoid inconsistencies and to arrive at solutions that are 
not only fair and equitable per se but also fit in with the solutions found to 
other problems. [...] It provides a focus which enables him to relate 
seemingly disparate issues to each other and harmoniously to incorporate 
new strands of thought."85 
Everything considered, what underlies the above statement is nothing else than 
the replacement of the idea of a system, closed into its axiomatic self, by the 
idea of a half-open and half-closed autopoietic system that shuts itself back 
and also re-generates itself each time it closes itself, utilising any of its original 
systemic definitions in any way only when it is closed back in practice and, 
therefore, changing its definitions and contextualisations any time it operates, 
depending on its given environment. Methodologically speaking, something 
similar may have been in mind after the Second World War was over, when 
the claim for "a natural law with changing contents" (as formulated by Rudolf 
Stammler after the First World War) became filled with concrete contents. As 
concluded by a contemporary author, 
"The eternal truths to be found in the sphere of the logic of things [.. .] do 
not constitute a closed system as once supposed by natural law, but arrive 
at various aspects through the entire material of the law, connected with 
86 
powerful linkages to the decisions here and now to be made." 
fell back from the codai role of determining the law to the mere role of indicating the mere 
systemic loci of the practical ( judicial) shaping of the law. Cf. Varga: Codification..., op. 
cit. especially ch. V. para. 5. 
84
 Wolff, Ch.: Institutes juris naturae et gentium, S 62. 
85
 Zimmermann: Codification... op. cit. 110. 
86
 Welzel, H.: Naturrecht und materielle Gerechtigkeit. Göttingen, 1951. 198. 
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With this, one has also formulated the new creed of the judicial profession in 
the light of the new, present-day conditions of codification. For 
"difficult problems can simply be wrongly analysed because, without 
conceptual discipline, it is not possible to be sure that previous cases were 
indeed like the one now before the court. The elementary principle of formal 
justice, that like cases be decided alike, is thus offended. Again, whole areas 
of the law can be neglected if in the absence of a map nobody can see that 
they are being insufficiently visited [...]. There is also another kind of 
damage at a higher level, in that, in the absence of a common conceptual 
structure, lawyers loose faith in the rationality of their endeavour [.. .]. It is 
perhaps the most important feature to be kept in mind: a code has to be 
brought to life, and has to be kept in tune with the changing demands of 
time by active and imaginative judicial interpretation and doctrinal elabo-
ration. This requires the legislature to exercise considerable self-restraint."87 
* 
The lesson to be securely drawn is that notwithstanding the untroubled 
pursuance of domestic practice, we are getting closer to a crossroads. The 
perspective of the common codification of private law within the European 
Union not only brings back (breaking through walls of silence of several 
centuries) memories of accomplishments and expectations of a long and distant 
past (once made universally valid in continental dimensions) as actual experience, 
but, at the same time, also refers us back to those points and moments (regarded 
for centuries as buried by the bygone past) from which, upon the basis of the 
joint acquisition of the shared Greek-Roman heritage and its differentiating 
(yet in a way somehow united) re-adaptation, the paths of development 
characteristic of the Civil Law and the Common Law started once to diverge. 
The more the advancement of the European unification progresses, the 
more inverse the assessment of European codification becomes, reconsidering 
past trends, values and regulatory techniques. Thus, it is suggested as if we, on 
the Continent, had not so much become statal national units unified by a sequence 
87
 Zimmermann: op. cit. 114. See also in a similar sense Kötz, H.: Taking Civil Codes 
Less Seriously. Modern Law Review 50 (1987), 13 et seq. and Birk, P.: The Need for the 
Institutes in England. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stifiung fiir Rechtsgeschichte Romanistische 
Abteilung, 108 (1991), 708 et seq. 
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of national laws but, being too conceited of our most promising collective 
heritage within the transitory phase of an infantile disorder, became rather 
fragmented in national isolation from one another. The meaning conveyed by 
our past and the paths actually covered have thereby become dubious again 
with open-ending alternatives. 
The problem of codification in Europe seemed to be more or less settled for 
ever a few decades ago. Now, in the light of the new challenges that are coming 
from the facts of the newest European convergence, we have to resume not 
only our earlier investigations but, at the same time, also repeatedly re-consider 
the foundations and the historical (that is, as directed from the past towards the 
future, perspectivical) presuppositions of our thinking, perhaps not for the last 
time in our ever-changing world. 
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Abstract. The essay concerns the reservations attached to the declarations accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the two International Courts. 
As early as during the 1920s when States consented to the compulsory jurisdicition of 
the first World Court they attached limitations on, conditions or reservations to their 
declarations of acceptance. For these declarations, there were no rules whatever prescribing 
any sort of uniformity or similarity o f content in any aspects, and States formulated more 
and more complicated restrictions to their declarations of acceptance. 
After the International Court of Justice had been established. States continued the practice of 
attaching reservations to declarations of acceptance and, moreover, increased the number thereof, 
"inventing" more and more complicated reservations. Quite a few of such reservations placed 
much more limitations on the Court's compulsory jurisdiction than the interwar declarations of 
acceptance had done and a no small pari of them left loopholes of escape from the jurisdiction 
recognized. 
In analysing the problems of permissible reservations, the author refers to the rules and 
criterias developed in international treaty law on the reservations to multilateral treaties and to the 
jurisprudence of the two Word Courts. She concludes that the declarations of acceptance are 
unilateral acts and the States are free to attach any reservation to their declarations of acceptance. 
Keywords: International Court of Justice, optional clause, declarations of acceptance, 
reservations to declarations of acceptance 
In the law of treaties it is generally accepted that when signing, ratifying, 
approving or acceding to multilateral treaties States, in a formal declaration, 
may limit the effects of a treaty on themselves in relation to the other contracting 
parties as a condition for becoming a party to the particular treaty.1 On the 
analogy of this there has emerged a State practice to include limitations, 
conditions in their declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice. 
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1
 Cf. Lord McNair: The Diw of Treaties. Oxford, 1961. 158. 
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Already the very first declarations of acceptance made after the entry into 
force of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, contained 
some stipulations by which States limited their consent given to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
Both the literature of international law and the practice of the two Courts 
refer to such limitations, conditions, exclusions, exceptions or restrictions etc. as 
"reservations", a term not the most fortunate chiefly because the said clauses are 
not deemed to be real reservations and, as will be discussed later, differ in many 
aspects from reservations to multilateral treaties.2 The appearance of such 
clauses was somewhat "unexpected", for at the time of drafting the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice the Committee of Jurists did not 
anticipate any reservation being made concerning the compulsory jurisdiction 
accepted.1 On the other hand, the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction with 
reservations was not really so "unexpected", since in interstate practice it is by 
no means a novelty that States made subject their consent to arbitration treaties 
to stipulations removing one or more specific issues from settlement by 
arbitration. Thus arbitration treaties frequently included stipulations to the effect 
that arbitration did not operate to issues affecting the "vital interests", the 
"national honour", the "independence" and such like of the given State. At the 
time this was taken for granted so much as to lead some authors to assert that 
"even when not definitely expressed, the stipulation concerning vital interests 
is yet included in all arbitration treaties."4 
1. The Interwar Practice 
In connection with declarations under the optional clause Article 36, of the 
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice provides the following: 
2
 Cf. Maus, В.: Les réserves dans les déclarations d'acceptation obligatoire de la 
Cour international de Justice. Genève. 1959. 94. 
Cf. Oda, S.: Reservations in the Declarations of Acceptance of the Optional Clause 
and the Period of Validity of those Declarations: the Effect of the Schultz Letter. The 
British Yearbook of International Law 1989. 4. 
4
 Cf. Wehberg, H.: Restrictive Clauses in International Arbitration Treaties. American 
Journal of International Law. 1913. 310. 
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"The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on 
condition of reciprocity on the part of several Members or States or for a 
certain time" 
In other words, certain limitations, namely reciprocity and certain limitations 
as to time, are permitted by the Statute itself. Hersch Lauterpacht explains this 
as follows: 
"It is true that the Optional Clause does not provide expressis verbis for the 
possibility of reservations being made, but there is no necessity for any such 
express provision. As a general rule a State may qualify any treaty obligation 
by such reservations as it deems necessary; treaties of arbitration, as their 
history shows, certainly do not constitute an exception in this respect."5 
In the early 1930s Alexander Pandelli Fachiri, writes that "... in the present 
state of international law the language of Article 36, with its reference to certain 
reservations, does not preclude the admissibility of further reservations one 
way or the other."6 
The literature of international law of the interwar period nevertheless contains 
views that-since Article 36, of the Statute refers only to "reciprocity" and "a 
certain time"-a contrario one can come to the conclusion that no other reser-
vations may be attached to declarations accepting the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction.7 That position found few followers, and, so far as we know, Judge 
Levi Carneiro was the only member of the two International Courts to identify 
himself with it.8 As against this, the dominant view was that Article 36, had no 
restrictive character in this respect and that States were free to attach other 
limitations on or reservations to their declarations of acceptance.9 An other 
7
 Lauterpacht, H.: The British reservation to the Optional Clause. Economica. 1930. 
168. 
6
 Cf. Cf. Fachiri, A. P.: The Permanent Court of International Justice. London, [1932] 
1980. 98. 
7
 Cf. Higgins, P. A.: British acceptance of compulsory arbitration under the Optional 
Clause and its implications. Cambridge, 1929. and Brierly: The Times (1929) [1 October]. 
Quot. Maus: op. cit. 85. 
8
 See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Levi Carneiro in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. 
Case. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case. Preliminary Objections. Judgement 2 July 1952. ICJ 
Reports, 1952. 154. 
9
 Cf. Fachiri: op. cit. 98., and Lauterpacht: op. cit. 137., as well as Hudson, M. O.: The 
Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920-1942. New York, 1972. 399. 
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author points out referring to the first Hague Peace Conference that "in the 
effort to reconcile the idea of obligatory arbitration with the possession of 
inalienable sovereign rights, it was natural that the idea of implied reserves 
should be urged ... if a state negotiating an arbitration convention should fail to 
include therein the 'saiving clause' to protect its national honour and vital 
interests, the clause would still be considered by implication."1" Apart from the 
permissibility of reservations, an author argued that if a State is free to accept 
or not to accept the obligations set forth in the clause, then, in the absence of 
contrary provisions, the freedom not to accept the optional clause includes the 
freedom to make acceptance subject to conditions." 
The disputes about the permissibility of limitations on or reservations to 
declarations under the optional clause were rather academic in nature from the 
very outset, for in practice States availed themselves of the possibility to make 
reservations. In the declarations of acceptance there appeared multifarious 
reservations of varying scope and contents besides those mentioned in Article 
36, of the Statute. 
The permissibility of reservations was likewise addressed by the League of 
Nations, its Fifth Assembly entrusting the 1st Committee with studying ways 
and means to clarify and refine the provisions of Article. 36, of the Statute of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice in order to facilitate the widest 
possible acceptance of the clause.12 The question was finally discussed in a 
subcommittee,11 on the proposal of which and of the 1st Committee the Assembly 
of the League of Nations in its resolution of October 1924 expressed the view 
that the terms of the optional clause were broad enough for States to adhere 
to the clause "with the reservations which they regard as indispensable."14 
The 1st Committee of the League of Nations Assembly concurrently con-
cerned itself with the elaboration of a draft protocol on the peaceful settlement 
of international disputes. According to Article. 3, of the draft prepared by the 
Committee, the signatory States recognize as compulsory the jurisdiction of 
10
 Cf. Wilson, R. R.: Reservation c lauses in agreements for obligatory arbitration. 
American Journal of International Law, 1929. 70-71. 
11
 Cf. Williams, J. F.: The Optional Clause, The British Signature and Reservation. The 
British Yearbook of International Law, 1930. 637. 
12
 For the resolution sec League of Nations Official Journal Special Supplement No. 23. 
Records of the Fifth Assembly (Geneva 1924), 77. 
13
 The members of the Subcommittee were Adatci, Apponyi, Loucheur, Erich, Fernandes, 
Sir Cecil Hurst, O'Bryne, Politis. Rolin. Scialoja, Titulesco, De la Torriente, Limburg, 
Unden. Cf. Maus: op. cit. note 35. 17. 
14
 League of Nations Official Journal (Note 12), 225. 
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the Court in respect to the issues mentioned in Article 36, of the Statute, 
without, however, the Court's jurisdiction affecting the right of any State to 
make reservations consistent with the said clause.15 
The limitations on reservations were also addressed by the aforementioned 
Committee. But who is to decide which reservations are consistent with the 
said clause? Scialoja pointed out on this score that the Court was always 
competent in the question of its own jurisdiction and that the problem of 
whether a reservation was consistent with the Statute was one of competence, 
which was therefore solved in that way."' An another view, expressed by 
Loucheur concerning the scope of reservations, a State may accede to the Statute 
including practically "all reservations" in its declaration.17 That position calls 
for explanation today. More accurately, one should say that a State might as 
well include in its declaration all reservations that happened to be made at the 
time. Under present-day conditions, however, such a declaration can only be 
made in theory, considering the wide range of reservations. 
In its report on reservations to declarations of acceptance the Is1 Committee 
of the League of Nations Assembly stated that on the basis a thorough 
examination of the text it can be stated that its flexibility leaves room for any 
kind of reservations. Since State may recognize the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction in some classes of disputes and may not in others, they are all the 
more free to recognize compulsory jurisdiction in only a fraction of one of 
those classes. For that matter, in its report the Committee enumerated the 
conceivable reservations, adding that the reservations attached to the obligations 
mentioned in Article 36, can be of quite a wide scope.18 
During the preparations for the Disarmament Conference held in 1932 
under the auspices of the League of Nations the question of reservations to 
declarations of acceptance was again on on the agenda, since comparatively 
few States had made a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice and a part of the declarations had not 
come into force. The Subcommittee on Arbitration and Security of the 
Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference discussed this question, 
and Assembly's resolution of 26 September 1928 on the General Act for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, dealing also with the optional 
15
 Ibid. 498-499. 
16
 Ibid. No. 24. Annexe 18.37. Quot. Maus: op. cit. 17. 
17
 Ibid. 38. Quot. Maus: op. cit. 18. 
18
 For the reservations see Société des Nations Journal Officiel , Procès verbal de la 'ère 
Commission, 109-110. 
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clause, was adopted as a result of deliberations in the Committee and the 3rd 
Committee of the League of Nations Assembly. In its resolution the Assembly 
stressed its wish to remove the obstacles to the accession of States to the optional 
clause and called their attention to the possibility of making reservations 
limiting their obligations in respect either of time or of scope. It was likewise 
mentioned in the resolution "...that reservations conceivable may relate, either 
generally to certain aspects of any kind of dispute, or specifically to certain 
classes or lists of disputes, and that these different kind of reservation can be 
legitimately combined."19 
Some authors considered that resolution of the League of Nations as an 
interpretation of the Statute, while others definitely rejected that view.20 
Whichever way we look at the resolution, it was unquestionably a political 
declaration without any binding force. At any rate, declarations accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice were 
made by several States after the adoption of the resolution. At the same time, 
however, the cited position of the League of Nations on reservations to decla-
rations of acceptance had certain "negative" effects as well, for afterwards States 
came making more and more complicated declarations and multiplying the 
limitations on the jurisdiction recognized. 
According to Hudson, the tendency for declarations to become more 
complicated was but encouraged by Article 39, of the General Act of Geneva, 
which enoumerated three classes of disputes which might be excluded from the 
operation of a treaty by reservation.21 
The position of the League of Nations on reservations to declarations of 
acceptance is well reflected by the words of Politis at a meeting of the 
Committee on Arbitration and Security of the Preparatory Commission for the 
Disarmament Conference. He stated: a State should choose to accede, rather 
than not to accede, to Article 36, of the Statute with reservations sharply 
19
 For the resolution see League of Nations Official Journal Special Supplement No. 
64. Record of the Ninth Ordinary Session of the Assembly Plenary Meetings, 183. 
2
" Maus argues that the interpretation of the Statute of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice by the Assembly of the League of Nations has no legal force, because the 
Assembly was not empowered to modify and to interpret the Statute. The Statute was a 
separate treaty independent of the Covenant and subject to separate ratification, and the 
Member States of the League were not required to accede to the Statute. In point of fact, 
the Statute was ei ther for the Court itself or for the Conference of States signatory to the 
Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice to 
interpret. Cf. Maus: op. cit. 19. 
21
 Hudson: op. cit. 468. 
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restricting its obligations. Acceptance with reservations, no matter of how little 
import, constitutes a new obligation among the States concerned and is to be 
regarded as a sign of confidence in the Court.22 
The efforts of the League of Nations for the widest possible acceptance of 
the optional clause continued to be a concern of many authors even many 
decades later. At the end of the 1990s Judge Kooijmans observed "... that the 
League of Nations, in its efforts to encourage acceptance of the Court's juris-
diction, endorsed the making of reservations to such acceptance (although Article 
36, paragraph 3, of the Statute does not formally authorize a declarant State 
to make such reservations), but by so doing weakened the system it tried to 
strengthen."23 
2. The Post-World War Two Reservations 
With regard to the question of reservations to declarations under the optional 
clause the San Lrancisco Conference identified itself fully with the practice of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, although ideas pressing for change 
were also voiced. 
During the deliberations in Subcommittee D of Committee IV/1 of the 
Conference Canada proposed that Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute should 
enumerate the conceivable reservations and include a clause allowing States to 
make futher reservations, whereas Australia came forward with the proposal 
that there should be drawn up a list of permissible reservations similar to that of 
the 1928 General Act of Geneva. The Subcommittee rejected both proposals, 
however.24 
In connection with reservations to declarations of acceptance the report of 
Subcommittee D to Committee IV/1 of the Conference noted the following: 
2
~ League of Nations Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament 
Conference, Series IV, Minutes of the Second Session of the Committee on Arbitration and 
Security (Geneva: 1928), 57. 
23
 See the separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans: Fisheries Jurisdiction Case. Jurisdiction 
of the Court. Judgement of 4 December 1998. Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans. ICJ 
Reports (1998), 489. 
~
4
 Report of Subcommittee D to Committee IV/1 on Art. 36 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice. In: UNCIO Documents, vol. XIII, 558. 
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"The question of reservations calls for an explanation. As is well known, 
the article (Article 36, of the Statute) has consistently been interpreted in 
the past as allowing states accepting the jurisdiction of the Court to subject 
their declarations to reservations. The Subcommittee has considered such 
interpretation as being henceforth established. It has therefore been considered 
unnecessary to modify paragraph 3, in order to make express reference to 
the right of the states to make such reservations."25 
After the International Court of Justice had been established, States continued the 
practice of attaching conditions, limitations on or reservations to declarations of 
acceptance and, moreover, increased the number thereof, "inventing" more and 
more complicated reservations. Quite a few of such reservations placed much 
more limitations on the Court's compulsory jurisdiction than the interwar 
declarations of acceptance had done and a no small part of them left loopholes 
of escape from the jurisdiction recognized. 
Incidentally, among the post-1945 declarations of acceptance there is hardly 
any by which, like the interwar declarations of acceptance by the Latin American 
States, a State accepted the Court's jurisdiction without limitations or reser-
vations. 
In connection with the various reservations the question may rightly be 
asked as to what all this can be traced to and what is the reason for the growing 
number of increasingly complex reservations. In our view there are funda-
mentally three grounds for this phenomenon. 
First, as it is very wittily pointed out in the report to the 1964 Tokyo Congress 
of the International Law Association, practically "(A)lmost every State has 
some skeletons in its closets and might not wish to have them exposed before 
the Court."26 The report goes on to say, that "Even if States could avoid some 
difficulties through reservations, they are usually afraid that they might have 
forgotten something important or that some new problems might arise which 
could not have been covered by specific reservations. It is this fear of unforseen 
consequences which has led some States in the past to a refusal to accept the 
jurisdiction of the Court or to its acceptance with sweeping, open-ended 
reservations."27 
The second reason is related to the development of international law. As a 
consequence of the development of science and technology new subjects are 
25
 Ibid. 559. 
2(1
 InternationaI Law Association Report of the Fifty-First Conference, Tokyo, 1964. 87. 
11
 Ibid. 
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emerging to be regulated by international law, issues which are also naturally 
likely to give rise to new and new international disputes, as is exemplified by 
the regime for the continental shelf. After it had become know that the continental 
shelves are rich in oil and gas resources, regulation by international law of these 
areas became inevitable, and a large part of the disputes submitted to the 
International Court of Justice are connected with the jurisdiction on and the 
delimitation of continental shelfs. 
The third reason can be ascribed to the fact that States have learnt from the 
jurisprudence of the Court, in the sense that, relying on the tenets formulated 
in the decisions of the Court, they have "shaping" new reservations in order 
to prevent the occurrence of similar cases. This is best demonstrated by the 
reservations which sought to avoid "surprise applications" and have become very 
common after the Court's decision on the preliminary objections in the Case 
concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory. 
For that matter, the problem of reservations to optional clause declarations 
has been repeatedly addressed by the United Nations as well. Perhaps the most 
important is resolution 3232 (XXIX) on the "International Court of Justice", 
which was adopted by consensus on the motion of the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly. In it the General Assembly recognized the desirability for 
States to study the ways and means of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the International Court of Justice with the least possible reservations in 
accordance with Article 36, of the Statute.28 That appeal and similar ones were 
scarcely heeded, with so many and so diverse reservations placed on some 
declarations that, with some exaggeration, they came to give cause for asking 
which are really the disputes in which the Court has jurisdiction in respect to a 
particular State under Article 36, paragraph. 2, of the Statute. In the Case of 
Certain Norwegian Loans Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in his separate opinon was 
refering that situation by saying: 
„In accepting the jurisdiction of the Court Governments are free to limit its 
jurisdiction in a drastic manner. As a result there may be little left in the 
Acceptance which is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court".29 
On this point see also the debate in the Sixth Committee. General Assembly 29th 
Session Sixth Committee, meetings 1465-1468; 1483-1486; 1490; 1492. Plenary meeting 
2280. 
29
 Case of Certain Norwegian Loans. Judgement of 6 July, 1957. Separate Opinion of 
Judge Sir Lauterpacht, H. ICJ Reports, 1957. 46. 
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The freedom to make reservations is recognized by most authors in the literature 
of international law, but occasionally one can meet with views that according 
to the new Statute no conditions, reservations to or limitations, etc. on decla-
rations of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction other than those relating to "on 
condition of reciprocity" and "for a certain time", namely the ones mentioned in 
the Statute itself, are permissible.30 One author holds that there is one more 
permissible reservation in addition to the limitations mentioned in the Statute, 
notably States may, in line with Article 95 of the Charter, exclude from the 
operation of their optional clause declarations those disputes whose settlement 
they have previously entrusted to another tribunal.31 These positions are based 
on the fact that the wording of the optional clause in the new Statute have been 
slightly amended by omitting from Article 36, paragraph 2, the worlds "or any 
of the classes" in the passage of "in all or any of the classes of legal disputes." It 
seems, however, that in point of fact the said authors misunderstand Article. 36 
paragraph 2, of the Statute, since the amendment of this Article is meant to say 
that States are no more free in their declarations of acceptance to pick and 
choose amongst the four enumerated classes of legal disputes listed in Article 
36, paragraph 2, of the Statute. However, the said amendment did not alter 
the freedom to make reservations to the declarations of acceptance in the same 
way as it existed at the time of the Permanent Court of International Justice. ,3 
The view about the non permissibility of reservations not mentioned in the 
Statute was revived a few years ago in the Case concerning the Aerial Incident 
of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India). Because of the dispute relating to the 
destruction of Pakistani aircraft, Pakistan filed an application against India on the 
basis of Artilce 36, paragraphs I and 2, of the Statute and of the declarations 
of acceptance by the two States. India responded by submitting preliminary 
objections, in which it invoked, inter alia, the Commonwealth reservation of its 
declaration of acceptance. Pakistan argued that no reservations other than those 
mentioned in the Statute may be attached to declarations under the optional 
clause. Limitations not included in the Statute-deemed to be "extra-statutory 
reservations"-exceed the conditions allowed for under Article 36, paragraph 3, 
3,1
 Vulcan, C.: La clause facultative. XVIII Acta Scandinavica Juris Gentium, 1 9 4 7 -
1948. 1,42. 
31
 Thévenaz, H.: La nouvelle Cour international de Justice. Die Friedens-Warte, 1945, 
411. 
32
 Cf. Waldock, C. H. M.: Decline of the Optional Clause. The British Yearbook of 
InternationaI Law, 1955-56. 249. 
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of the Statute. According to Pakistan the Commonwealth reservation is 
inapplicable and not opposable to Pakistan.33 
With regard to extra-statutory reservations the Court stated that paragraph 3 
of Article 36, had never been considered as an exhaustive enumeration of 
conditions under which States' optional clause declarations might be made. For 
this reason the Court dismissed the Pakistani argument that Commonwealth 
reservations were to be seen as "extra-statutory reservation" because it contra-
vened Article 36, paragraph 3, of the Statute.34 
On the basis of the foregoing it can be stated that the views limting the reser-
vations to declarations may be regarded as isolated, the dominant position 
being that according to the generally accepted interpretation of the Statute it 
is an inalienable right of States to attach different reservations, limitations on 
or conditions to their declarations under the optional clause. As regards the 
relationship between the various reservations and the provisions of the Statute, 
Crawford comes to the conclusions that since Article 36, paragraph 3, suggest 
that no other conditions were intended, "(T)he process by which reservations 
came to be accepted is a striking case of interpretative development of Article 
36 by subsequent practice...".35 
The permissibility of reservations attached to the declarations of acceptance 
and the liberty to shape their contents are similarly confirmed by the rarity of 
objections by States against other States' declaration of acceptance or limitations 
contained therein. Such was the case, for instance, in the mid 1950s, when 
Sweden objected against the reservation of the Portuguese declaration of 19 
December 1955 to the effect that Portugal may at any time remove any class of 
dispute from the operation of its declaration of acceptance.36 That objection was 
of little effect, as is best evidenced by the fact that in the Right of Passage case 
the Court did not even pronounce on the Swedish objection to the reservation of 
33
 Case concerning the Aerial Incident of 10th August 1999. Pleadings, Memorial of 
the Government of Pakistan on Jurisdiction, paras. D - E . 
34
 Case concerning the Aerial Incident of 10th August 1999. Jurisdiction of the Court . 
Judgement of 21 June 2000.1С] Reports, 2000. paras. 37, 38. 
35
 Crawford, J.: The Legal Effect of Automatic Reservations to the Jurisdiction of the 
International Court. The British Yearbook of International Law, 1979. 79. 
36
 For the Swedish declaration see ICJ Pleadings Right of Passage over Indian Territory, 
Vol. J. 217. Sweden declared that, in view of the conditions included in the Portuguese 
declaration, Portugal had not in fact accepted the Cour t ' s jurisdiction in respect to any 
dispute or to any class of disputes. That condition nullifies the obligation which the terms 
of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute seek to impose, expressing that the jurisdiction of 
the Court is 'ipso fac to ' compulsory. 
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the Portuguese declaration of acceptance, albeit it had examined the validity of 
the Portuguese declaration. 
An objection by another declarant State to the reservation included in an 
other State's declaration of acceptance is to be found only in concrete disputes 
before the Court in which attempts are made to challenge in the form of 
preliminary objection the reservations invoked by the opponent party. 
3. The Special Feature of Reservations to Declarations of Acceptance 
The freedom to accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction with limitations or 
reservations has been recognized not only by the literature of international, but 
also by the two International Courts. In disputes which involved reservations to 
declarations of acceptance the majority of judges accepted the particular 
condition or reservation and did not consider the question of permissibility; 
they had never denied the permissibility of reservations to declarations of 
acceptance, only analysing the compatibility of a given reservation with the 
Statute and the optional clause system. 
As regards the permissibility of reservations, the position of the International 
Court of Justice is reflected most clearly in its statement made in the Case 
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua: 
"Declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court are 
facultative, unilateral engagements, that States are absolutely free to make 
or not to make. In making the declaration a State is equally free either to do 
so unconditionally and without limit of time for its duration, or to qualify it 
with conditions or reservations."17 
The conditions or reservations to be found in declarations under the optional 
cluse differ from reservations made to multilateral treaties chiefly in that in the 
case of declarations of acceptance there is no text of a treaty agreed upon by 
the contracting parties, one which the State making the reservation wishes to 
depart from, to which it would be necessary to obtain the consent of the other 
parties to the treaty. So what we have here is not exclusion or modification 
the operation of certain provisions of the treaty, originally formulated jointly 
17
 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. 
Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application Judgement of 26 November 
1984. ICJ Reports, 1984.418. 
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with the other contracting parties.18 As is shown by the practice of over eight 
decades, in making declarations under the optional clause States act in full 
freedom, deciding alone the scope of their declarations as well as the conditions 
on which they accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. In connection with 
declarations of acceptance there has arisen no rule to require any uniform text 
or similar content in any aspect. This was reaffirmed by the Court in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Case to the effect that "Conditions or reservations thus do not by 
their terms derogate from a wider acceptance already given. Rather, they operate 
to define the parameters of the State's acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court."39 
Another characteristic of limitations on, conditions or reservations to 
declarations of acceptance is that a limitation, condition or reservation-owing 
to the principle of reciprocity, which can be deemed to be a basic element of 
the optional clause system-operates to modify the commitments not only of 
the declarant State, but also of the other States party to the optional clause 
system, in any case where the Court's jurisdiction was based on optional clause 
declarations. In a given case the limitations, conditions or reservations included 
in the declaration of a party, following from the principle of reciprocity, the 
opponent party may equally be rely upon these limitations, conditions or 
reservations. All this carries in itself the element of uncertainty that a State 
party to the optional clause system cannot know in advance whether in a future 
dispute a limitation, condition or reservation included in the declaration of 
other State parties to the optional clause system may be of advantage or of 
disadvantage to it. 
Thus the limitations, conditions or reservations offer a possibility to exclude 
some unforeseen-or perhaps very likely-disputes, a possibility what could be 
an eventual advantage or disadvantage both to the State formulating the 
limitation, condition or reservation and to the State or States having opposite 
38
 In this context we have in mind acquiescence in reservations and eventual objections 
to reservations. At first sight (mainly if one is not fully aware of the characteristics of the 
optional clause) one might even raise the question whether Article 36, paras. 2 and 3, of the 
Statute, i.e. the optional clause, cannot be seen as a kind of „basic text" which States may 
exclude, modify, etc. by reservations to declarations of acceptance. Such an approach is 
mistaken by all means. Art. 36, paras. 2 and 3, of the Statute as the treaty provision which 
was adopted by the contracting parties and from which a State may depart by a reservation 
could be taken into consideration if the Statute prescribed the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court which States were allowed to „contracting out". 
34
 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case. Jurisdiction of the Court. Judgment 4 December 1998. 
ICJ Report, 1998.453. 
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interests in a later case, depending on the subject matter of concrete disputes. It 
appears that we may not be far from the truth in supposing that what might 
also be lurking behind the rather seldom objections by States party to the 
optional clause system to limitations, conditions or reservations is perhaps the 
belief also of other States party to the system that in the future it could be an 
advantage to themselves to exclude certain disputes from the scope of 
compulsory jurisdiction. It is of course rather difficult to provide an instance of 
all this, but it is easy to suppose that reservations excluding disputes concerning 
certain armed conflicts can be consigned to this category and that exclusion in 
advance of such disputes from the Court's jurisdiction will meet with a kind of 
tacit agreement of all States affected by the given armed conflict. 
In illustration of the later "advantage" or "disadvantage" of a reservation by 
a party to the optional clause system to the other States party to the system we 
could cite various examples, but in reality the question of when a reservation 
in the declaration of a State will become of disadvantage or of advantage to 
another State party the optional clause system is subject to change from case to 
case. The latter is the case whenever the respondent State in its preliminary 
objection invokes the reservation in the declaration of acceptance by the 
applicant State and the objection is uphelded by the Court. The best known 
among such cases is the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, in which Norway 
as the respondent referred to, on the basis of reciprocity, the very controversial 
Connally reservation included in the French declaration of acceptance. The 
Court uphold the Norwegian objection and held that it had no jurisdiction.40 
40
 See the Court 's judgement on the preliminary objections: Case of Certain Norwegian 
Loans Judgement of 6 July 1957. 1С J Reports 1957. 9 -28 . 
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Comments on the Origin of the Legis Actio 
Sacramento in Rem 
Abstract. The legis actio Sacramento in rem belongs to the most debated issues of specialised 
literature on Roman Law up to the present day. The literature on the subject would fill a whole 
library, only its approximative treatment would require a separate monography. When explaining 
the origins of the legis actio Sacramento in rem one can distinguish several, more or less clearly 
isolated trends. The present study will regard the theory of oath and the theory of personal fight as 
the two most important. The fundamentally sacred character of the legis actio sacramento is 
emphasised by the theory of oath, according to which the principal aim of communal control 
could be the expiatio of the divinity retaliating the perjury, the sacramentum of the defeated party. 
This theory is also corroborated by the text of the vindicatio, appearing as the strictly formalised, 
religious-magical carmen. Although it is much older, the theory of personal fight is traced back to 
Jhering, and its essence is that in the beginning the parties actually fought against each other for 
the thing constituting the object of their controversy, but the community (the state), in order to 
preserve internal peace, brought the fight under its own control. Therefore, the fight, in the form 
of the legis actio sacramento in rem, as it is known today was enacted only symbolically, by 
employing the rod (festuca) instead of the spear (hasta). The aim of the present study is merely 
to highlight a possibility-based mainly on the primary sources and partly on the findings of 
the literature on the subject-which will not consider the motifs of sacrality and private fight 
contradictory in the structure of the legis actio sacramento in rem but will mingle them as 
organically complementing components. 
Keywords: legis actio sacramento in rem, vindicatio, hasta, festuca, carmen 
The present study wishes to highlight the following aspects of the description 
of Gaius.1 The sacred character of the leg is actio procedure is proved by the 
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' Gai. inst. 4, 16. Cf. Földi, A.-Hamza, G.: A római jog története és institúciói (History 
and institutions of Roman Law). Budapest, 20051". 167; Zlinszky, J.: Gedanken zur legis 
actio sacramento in rem. Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 106 (1989) 
107. sqq.; Wieacker, F.: lus. Die Entstehung einer archaischen Rechtsordnung. In: Rechts-
wissenschaft und Rechtsentwicklung. Göttingen, 1980. 33. skk.; Käser, M.: Über "relatives 
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almost neurotic adherence to the words to be recited.2 the same phenomenon is 
also exemplified by Pliny's account of the dedicatio of Ops Opifera's temple. (I) 
Traces of private fight and arbitrary action are shown by the origins of the 
expression of vindicatio as well as by the rod, used in the procedure instead 
of a spear. All the more so, as Gaius also explains this with the fact that the 
Romans considered truly their own the goods taken from the enemy, i.e. 
obtained by fight. Besides the connection between the indicium centumvirale 
and the hasta, the close interconnection of the spear and the cult of Mars also 
deserves special attention, as the hasta was also carrying a very important 
semantic load (II) The structure of the ius fetiale, regulating the law of war and 
of peace in the archaic age, a typical example of the intertwining of peaceful and 
martial elements, and the rerum repetitio. as well as the clarigatio show 
remarkable parallel with the legis sacramento in rem. (Ill) In Plautus's comedy, 
Casina, the right to dispose over the protagonist slave girl is decided by way 
of actual fight, followed by divine judgement. This procedure also shows 
remarkable similarities with the vindicatio mentioned by Gaius. (IV) 
I. It is sufficiently well known that the legis actio sacramento is strongly text-
centred because-as Gaius himself emphasizes-the one who had mispronounced 
even one word of the text, lost the case.' In Roman thinking, the belief in the 
reality constituting character of the spoken word was of utmost importance.4 (It 
is also very important that for the Romans, the concept of Fate, the fatum, 
determining human life, originally meant the (divine) word, the declared divine 
decision, thus fate came into being by the expression in words of the decision 
of higher powers.5) "The reason is the firm belief of the Romans in the numinous 
power of the uttered word, their conviction that being was ultimately identical 
1959. 163. sqq.; Käser, M.; Das römische Privatrecht 1-11. München 1971-1975. I. 20. 22; 
Staszków, M.: "Vim dicere" im altrömischen Prozeß. Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung für 
Rechtsgeschichte 80 (1963) 85. sqq.; Jhcring, R.: Der Geist des römischen Rechts. Leipzig, 
1880-1891. 114. 150. 163; Lévy-Bruhl. H.: Le simulacre combat dans le "Sacramentum in 
rem". In: Studi in onore di P. Bonfante. Milano, 1930. III. 83. sqq.; Käser 1971-1975. I. 20. 
2
 Köves-Zulauf. Th.: Bevezetés a római vallás és monda történetébe (Introduction to 
the history of Roman Religion and Myth). Budapest, 1995. 249. 
3
 Gai. inst. 4, 11. 30. 
4
 The importance of the sacral elements is pointed out by Käser, M.: Das altrömische 
ins. Göttingen, 1949. 309. sqq. 
5
 See Pötscher, W.: Der römische fa tum-Begr i f f und Verwendung. In: Hellas und 
Rom. Hildesheim, 1988. 490. sqq. 
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with uttered being, complete reality was only reality expressed in words. "b Let 
us consider an example from the sphere of religious law (the cledicatio was part 
of the ius publicum.) for the case when the validity of the sacred-judicial act did 
not depend only on the precise order of the words to be uttered but also on the 
exact pronuciation of each sound. 
Pliny Maior mentions that Ops Opifera's temple was consecrated by the 
pontifex maximus Metellus, but because of his impediments of speech he had 
to struggle for several months until he was able to pronounce the words of the 
dedicatio.1 The historical background of the story is succintly the following: 
Some time between 123 and 104 ВС a new-the fourth-temple was erected for the 
godess Ops Opfiera,-it cannot be excluded but it seems scarcely probable that 
her temple on the Capitolium was renovated-and this had to be consecrated by 
the pontifex maximus L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus, about whose carreer it 
is only known that he occupied the office of pontifex maximus in 114 BC.X 
Pliny's text mentions Metellus's articulatory difficulties, which do not seem to 
bear much relevance from a historical point of view, yet from the religious 
aspect it highlights a cardinal point in Roman religio, namely, the requirement 
"that the words to be spoken should follow a pre-determined, precisely ordered, 
accurate pattern. "9 Perfect physical integrity was an essential condition for the 
fulfilment of clerical office in Roman religion,10 just as in the case of several 
other religions as well," which does not seem striking, as this requirement was 
observed in the case of sacrificial animals,12 as well as the official participants 
of the sacrifices." The question may arise how it was possible for Metellus to 
act as pontifex maximus, as he is the only pontifex whose congenital disabilty 
is known.14 On the one hand, the increasing rationality of the age-as a result of 
6
 Köves-Zulauf: Reden und Schweigen, op. cit. 312; Köves-Zulauf: Bevezetés a római 
vallás és monda történetébe, op. cit. 207. 
7
 Plin. nat. 11, 174. Metellwn pontificem adeo inexplanatae (sc. \inguae) fuisse accipimus, 
ut multis mensibus tortus credatur, dum mediatur in dedicanda aede Opi Opiferae dicere. 
8
 About the different presumtions of the year of the dedication see Wissowa G.: 
Religion und Kultus der Römer. München, 1912. 203; Latte, K.: Römische Religions-
geschichte. München, 1976. 73; Broughton, T. R. S.: The Magistratures of the Roman 
Republic. New York, 1951/1952. 1960. 532. 
4
 Köves-Zulauf: Bevezetés a római vallás és monda történetébe, op. cit. 71. 
10
 Wissowa: op. cit. 491. 
11
 Plat. leg. 6, 759c; Lev. 21, 17. sqq. 
12
 Sen. contr. 4, 2. 
13
 Plin. nat. 1, 105. 
14
 Cf. Köves-Zulauf: Reden und Schweigen, op. cit. 76. 
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which certain religious prescriptions were not taken so seriously, or were 
somehow evaded-might have played an important role in L. Caecilius Metellus 
Delmaticus's becoming pontifex,15 on the other hand, the other important 
reason might have been the fact that the texts that had to be recited by the 
Roman priesthood were previously-determined, thus even the pontifex afflicted 
with severe articulatory problems could memorize them with long and trouble-
some rehearsal.16 Naturally, this would not have been possible in the case of 
a religion based on spontaneous religious discourse, free preaching, and prophetic 
prayer.17 
It is likely that the text of the dedicatio contained the name of the godess 
Ops Opifera, which probably constituted double challenge for the pontifex's 
cumbrous tongue (inexplanata lingua): the pronunciation of the alliterating 
name was most likely not an easy task for a person with speech impediments, 
who was possibly stuttering as well. In addition, the exact naming of the 
godess was particularly important in the course of the dedicatio, given the fact 
that Ops Opifera was one of the deities of sowing.18 (The importance of the 
godess Ops was never questionable for the Romans because-as her name also 
shows'°-was related to richness, more precisely to the richness of the harvest, 
Ops was the incarnation of the rich yield of land, the helpful feature of Mother 
Earth.20 Naturally, according to the minutious, hair splitting character of Roman 
religion, several different divine aspects of the earth's were differentiated: it 
was generally venerated as Tellus, in its life augmenting aspect as Ceres, and 
in its harvest yielding effect as Ops.21 However, Roman religion distinguished 
even between different aspects of Ops, as it was usual to connect different so 
called Sondergottheiten to chronologically consecutive elements of different 
acts and events.22 On August 25 they celebrated Ops Consiva, the godess who 
performed the gathering of the harvest, two days earlier, on August 23 they 
celebrated Ops Opifera,23 from which it can be clearly inferred that by the 
15
 Latte: op. cit. 276. 
16Latte: op. cit. 198. 392; Wissowa: op. cit. 397; Dumézil, G.: La religion romaine 
archaïque. Paris, 1966. 53. sqq. 
1
 Köves-Zulauf: Reden lind Schweigen, op. cit. 77. 
18
 Ibid. 78. 
19
 Cf. Walde, A . - H o f m a n n , J. В.: Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch I II. 
Heidelberg, 1954 II. 205. sq. 
20
 Radke, G.: Die Götter Altitaliens. Münster, 1965. 238. sqq. 
21
 Köves-Zulauf: Bevezetés a római vallás és monda történetébe, op. cit. 76. 
22
 Latte: op. cit. 51. sqq.; Radke: op. cit. 23. sqq. 
23
 Radke: op. cit. 239. 
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name Ops Opifera-its second particle being related to the verbum "ferre"-
"the godess bringing the richness of harvest" should be understood.24 The 
Volcanalia was also celebrated on August 23, and its logical connection with 
the celebration of Ops Opifera becomes clear if one considers that the grain not 
yet gathered in the granary is the most exposed to the danger of fire and thus 
it is the most in need of Ops Opifera's help against Vulcanus.23) Today it is 
impossible to clarify in every detail why the Romans thought the naming of the 
deities of sowing to be particularly dangereous, but the importance of the 
godess Ops becomes evident from the fact that during the research for Rome's 
secret protective deities-the name was kept secret precisely to prevent the 
evocatio by the enemy-she was also a possible candidate to have fulfilled this 
function.26 
What conclusion can be drawn from all these regarding the present inquiry? 
The words of the vindicatio of the legis actio sacramento in rem, developed 
for real estates, are mentioned as carmen by Cicero as well.27 Inferring from 
the various meanings of the word carmen, the words of the legis actio sacra-
mento in rem qualified as magical, numinous, legal texts.28 
II. The in rem actiones are called vindicationes by Gaius,29 which harmonizes 
with the terminology of the legis actio sacramento in rem, and the in iure cessio, 
as well as the adoptio, the vindicare in libertatem and the vindicare heredi-
tatem.iü From the etymological attempts at defining the origin of the expressions 
~
4
 Köves-Zulauf: Bevezetés a római vallás és monda történetébe, op. cit. 77; Köves-
Zulauf: Reden und Schweigen, op. cit. 79. 
25
 Latte: op. cit. 73. 129; Köves-Zulauf: Reden und Schweigen, op. cit. 79. 
26
 Macr. Sat. 3, 9, 3 -4 . Deum in cuius tutela urbs Roma est ... ignotum alii Iovem 
crediderunt, alii Lunam, sunt qui Ageronam, ... alii autem quorum fides mihi videtur firmier 
Орет Consivam esse dixerunt. 
27
 Cic. Mur. 26. Ehhez lásd Cicero Négy védőbeszéd. Szeged, 2004. 85. 122. 
28
 Szádeczky-Kardoss S.-Tegyey L: Szöveggyűjtemény a régi római irodalomból (Text-
book from the ancient Roman Literature). Debrecen, 1998. 19. sqq. (Quoted among others 
Ov. trist. 4, 1, 1 -14 ; Tib. 2, 6, 12-26; Porphyr, ad Ног. epist. 1, 1, 62; Hor. ars 417; Plaut. 
Trin. 349-352; Hor. epist. 2, 1, 134-155; Macr. Sat. 5, 20, 17-18; Gell. 4, 9, 1-2; Varro 
ling. 6, 21; Plin. nat. 27, 12, 131; Quint, inst. 1, 6, 40; Varro ling. 1, 27; Fest. 325; Cic. div. 
1, 1, 114-115; Fest. 325; Cic. div. 1, 1, 114-115; Paul. Fest. 160; Cic. Brut. 19, 75; Liv. 1, 
32, 5-14; 10, 38, 2 -13 . 
29
 Gai. inst. 4, 5. 
30
 Gai. inst. 4, 16-17; 2, 24; 1, 134; Paul. D. 10, 4, 12 pr.; Gai. inst. 2, 120. Cf. Dull, R.: 
Vom vindex zum iudex. Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 54 (1934) 105. 
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"vindex", "vindicatio", "vindicta" the one proposed by Varro.31 emphasizing the 
characteristic of force, "vim dicere" and relating the verbum "dicere" to the 
core *deik (see also deiknyó, deiknymi) seems the most plausible, even if this 
cannot be undoubtedly demonstrated with modern linguistic evidence.32 The 
word dike is traditionally derived from the root *deik of the verb deiknymi (to 
show, to point at, to explain, to testify); its basic meaning of direction, way, 
custom is completed with the meanings customary procedure, decision, resolu-
tion, trial, and /aw.33 (These two meanings, traditonally derived from each other 
are approached from a new aspect by Palmer, according to whom the meaning 
of signalling, custom, characteristic, particularity and the meaning decision, 
resolution, of the word diké, originally the borderline drawn between two litigant 
parties derived from the root *deik, developed parallelly, independently from each 
other, so neither of these can be considered secondary, derived from the other.34) 
When trying to understand the structure of vindicatio, Varro's traditionally 
Roman etymology is of utmost importance, because it demonstrates the most 
clearly how the Romans themselves experienced and how they subsequently 
interpreted the most basic one of all the procedures termed as vindicatio, the 
legis sacramento in rem.ъ 
It can be rightly assumed that in the beginning-and probably later on as 
well-the spear as weapon was nothing else than a long, sharp rod made of hard 
wood, and hardened in fire.36 If the hasta was the weapon with which in the 
course of the fights they could win loot, recognition, and hence power, it is 
no wonder that shortly it became the symbol of power.37 This is also shown 
by Verrius Festus's definition: "hasta summa armorum et imperii est"3H and 
mentioning the impérium, especially in connection with the spear, one must 
31
 Varro ling. 6, 60. 
32
 Cf. Walde-Hofmann: op. cit. II. 793. sq. 
33
 Gonda, J.: AEIKNYMI: Semantische Studie over den Indo-Germanische Worte! DEIK. 
Paris, 1929. 224-232; Benveniste, E.: Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes. 
Paris, 1969. II. 107-110; Gagarin, M.: "Dike" in the "Works and Days". Classical 
Philology 68 ( 1973) 82. 
34
 Palmer, L. R.: The Indo-European Origins of Greek Justice. Oxford, 1950. 157. sqq. 
35
 Nótári, T.: Festuca autem utebantur quasi hastae loco. AUB 51 (2004) 133. sqq. 
36
 Cic. Verr. 4, 125; Plin. nat. 16, 65; Hdt. 7, 71; Tac. ami. 2, 14; Prop. 4, 1, 28; Amm. 
31, 7, 12. 
37
 Waele, F. J. M. de: The Magic Staff or Rod in Graeco-Italian Antiquity. Gent, 1927. 
172. 
38
 Fest. 55, 3. 
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not forget about its magico-religious character, belonging to the sacred sphere.39 
It is not by chance that the expression subhastatio means-and this is also 
mentioned by Gaius4l,-the selling of loot, especially the selling of captives,41 
obtained from the enemy by way of armed fight,and later meaning any kind of 
auction in general.42 When presenting the institution of decemvri stlitibus 
iudicandis, Pomponius uses the term hastae praeesse,43 which could not mean 
anything else but the leading of iudicium centumvirale. However, the iudicium 
centumvirale came into being only one hundred years after the date assumed 
by Pomponius (242-227 ВС),44 thus the historical credibility of Pomponius's 
report becomes doubtful, but it can be safely stated that only a magistratus 
cum imperio was entitled to decide in the question of legitimum dominium,45 
The insignia of the iudicium centumvirale,46 founded in the 2nd century ВС was 
the so-called has ta centumviralis. By the end of the republic the presidency of 
this court of law was fulfilled by a proquestor, due to the engagement of 
praetors?1 Augustus appointed again a praetor as supervisor at the head of the 
iudicium centumvirale,48 Novellius Torquatus Atticus was the first praetor 
hastarius or praetor ad hastam known by name. With this disposition, Augustus 
probably did not instaurate a new rule but revived an older one.49 If the court 
was sitting in different parts, the man, chosen by the praetor hastarius from 
among the decemvirii to preside the court ad hoc, was using his own spear in 
the iudicium,50 this fact being corroborated by Quintilian's report of duae 
39
 See Pötscher, W.: 'Numen' und 'numen August i ' . In: Hellas und Rom. Hildesheim, 
Olms, 1988. 462; Wagenvoort , H.: Wesenszüge altrömischer Religion. In: Aufstieg und 
Niedergang der römischen Welt. Berl in-New York, 1972. I. 2. 371. sq.; Nótári, T.: On 
Some Aspects of the Roman Concept of Authority. Acta Juridica Hungarica 2005. 95. sqq. 
4
" Gai. inst. 4, 16. quod maxime sua esse credebant quae ex hostibus cepissent. 
41
 Fest. 55, 9. Et captivi sub eadem veneunt.; 90, 19. Hastae subicebant ea, quae publice 
venundabant, quia signum praecipuum est hasta. 
42
 C. 10, 3, 1. 2. 5. 6; Liv. 2, 14, 1-4; Dion. Hal. 5, 34, 4; Val. Max. 3, 2, 2; Cic. o f f . 2, 27. 
83; Phil. 2, 64. 103; Varro rust. 2, 10, 4; Sen. sucis. 6, 3. Vö. Alföldi, A.: Has ta-Summa 
Imperii . The Spear as Embodiment of Sovereignty in Rome. American Journal of 
Archeology 63 (1959) 3. 8; Waele: op. cit. 172. 
43
 Pomp. D. 1 , 2 , 2 , 29. 
44
 Mommsen, Th.: Römisches Staatsrecht t-ilt. Berlin 1887-1888. I. 275. 
45
 Alföldi: op. cit. 9. 
46
 Cf. Mommsen; op. cit. II. 225. 
47
 Suet. Aug. 36, 1; Stat. 4 , 4 , 4 1 . 
48
 Mommsen; op. cit. II. 225; Alföldi: op. cit. 9. 
49
 CIL 6, 1365, 13; 8, 22721, 5; ILS 950; Mon. Ancyr. 8, 5. 
50
 Alföldi: op. cit. 10. 
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hastae in the case when the iudicium centumvirale was functioning divided 
into two parts.51 The iudicium centumvirale, judging cases of inheritance under 
the supervision of the praetor hastarius was usually sitting in four sections in 
the basilica Iulia.52 
In Servius's commentary of Vergil's Aeneid the description of the following 
ceremony can be found: "Is qui belli susceperat curam, sacrarium Martis 
ingressus primo ancilia commovebat, post hastam simulacri ipsius, dicens: 
'Mars vigila!'"55 The picture of the deity could not be too old, because the 
Romans did not represent the image of their gods in the beginning,54 and Servius's 
explanation goes back to Varro, just as Plutarch's similar remark:55 "en de té 
régia dory kathidrymenon Area prosagoeyen."56 Seemingly, Varro gets into 
contradiction with the tradition, which has knowledge of several spears in 
Mars's sacrarium. These must have been the spears of the salius priests, which 
were kept in the sacrarium Martis, together with the shields.57 The plural of 
shields is not surprising because-as it becomes evident from the Aitologian 
myth explaining the institution of the salii-Numa Pompilius ordered the manu-
facturing of another eleven copies of the ancile descending from the sky, in 
order to prevent the stealing of the original one. During their processions the 
salii were carrying the ancile in their left and were beating it with a spear-like 
rod.58 The form of these spears was not identical with the form of those that 
were generaly known and actually used for fighting in the Classical Age but 
they preserved-just like the shields of the salii-their archaic shape: They were 
so-called hasta pura, made exclusively of wood without any iron, and their 
prodigium was shown by their movement without any human agency in the 
sacrarium.54 
51
 Quint, inst. 5, 2, 1; 11, 1, 78. 
52
 Plin. epist. 5, 9, 1 - 2 . 5; 6, 33, 2 -5 ; Quint, inst. 12, 5, 6. 
83
 Serv. ad Verg. Aen. 8, 3. 
54
 August, civ. 4, 31; Plut. Numa 8; Latte: op. cit. 150; Herter, H.: Zum bildlosen 
Kultus der Alten. Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 74 (1925) 164. sqq. 
55
 Norden, E.: Aus altrömischen Priesterbüchern. Leipzig 1939. 173. sqq. 
56
 Plut. Rom. 29, 1. 
57
 Gell. 4, 6, 1-2; Wissowa: op. cit. 556. 
58
 Plut. Numa 13, 7; Dion. Hal. 2, 70. 
Serv. ad Verg. Aen. 6, 760; Liv. 40, 19, 2. pontifices hastas motas nuntiare; Obseq. 
6. (60.) hasta Martis motae; Obseq. 19. (78.) vast о incendio Romae cum regia quoque 
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Nevertheless, the spears of the salii must be distinguished from Mars 's 
spear, which was-as they were venerating Mars's presence in it60-surrounded 
by a cult that was due to a deity,61 as the veneration of gods (e.g. Iuppiter, 
Lapis, Terminus) in some material form was usual for the Romans, which can 
be explained by the concept of the unity of person-authority.62 (The Person-
Bereichdenken, the person-authority way of thinking was a special way of 
experiencing the world for the man of antiquity, in the course of which he 
experienced the material reality, object, process, or state as such, and, at the 
same time, he experienced it as divinity as well. The thing and the divinity is 
often designated with the same word, and sometimes it is considerably difficult 
to decide whether in a particular case themis or Themis, fortuna or Fortuna, 
terminus or Terminus should be written. Naturally, either solution is chosen, 
the other component is tacitly part of the concept and should be taken into 
account as well.6' Designation with the same word seems to suggest juxtaposition 
but in fact it means the unity of the person and his/her function, the sphere of 
authority represented by him/her, in which alternatively one or the other 
aspect comes to the fore.64) Iustinius in his Epitoma Historiarum Pompei 
Trogi mentions that, in the beginning, the spear was surrounded by a divine 
cult.65 Servius, based on Varro, reports that at the beginning of war, after the 
moving of the ancilia, the celebrating priest also moved the hasta, as the image of 
the deity (simulacrum ipsius) and in the course of this he awoke Mars with the 
appeal "Mars vigília!" and by this, if we concieve Mars as a unity of person-
authority, he awoke War itself.66 There is no need of further explication to see 
the manaistic, numinous aspect recognized by Wagenvoort in this religious 
act.67 The derivation of Quirinus's name, meaning "spear" from the word of 
6
" Dumézil, G.: L'héritage indo-européen à Rome. Paris, 1949. 60. 
61
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Sabin origin quiris-curis can be found in several auctores,68 and Iuno's 
name, Quiritis is also explained this way.64 It is not by chance that Thormann 
appositely translates the name "Quirites" of the Roman citizens with the 
expression "Speermänner".70 
Hence it becomes clear that Roman thinking connected somehow the 
concept of the force inherent in the spear, the numen both with Mars and with 
Quirinus, but the exact definition of this connection is encumbered by the fact 
that the existing sources expound on this numinuous force only in the case of 
hasta Martis.7I The question arises why they were using a rod , the festuca 
instead of the spear meaning the iustum dominium, in the course of the 
symbolic fight of the legis actio sacramento in rem. According to Van der 
Brink the festuca and the hasta are parts of two completely different symbolic 
systems.72 He considers the spear to be an Indo-European symbol of power,73 
whereas he regards the rod as part of the Mediterranean culture.74 At the same 
time, he disregards the fact that at the time when these symbols were formed, 
the differences between the spear and the rod most probably had not occurred 
yet, as both were made of wood, the only minor differences could appear in size 
or as the result of the fact that the rod used as a weapon had been hardened in 
fire.75 The fact that in the ceremony of the vindicatio the festuca stood for, i.e. 
represented the hasta can be explained by the disposition which from the 
beginning attempted to restrict the use of the spear within the pomerium and to 
confine it to the sphere of the most necessary rites.76 
III. Comparing the ius fetiale and the ins privatum several valuable parallels 
can be drawn with regard to the structure of the clarigatio, the rerum repetitio, 
68
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and the legis actio sacramento11 The norms with a powerfully religious 
character of the ins fetiale show close connection with several other Roman 
legal institutions, all the more so because for the man of the age it is difficult 
to imagine a bond with more binding power than the oath, including self 
malediction as well.78 (According to Dahlheim, due to its strong superstitious-
religious determination the ius fetiale lacks any kind of moral background.74 
However, his view can be contested because legal formalism and legal ethics 
are not mutually exclusive components.80) In the archaic age, the interstatal 
relationships of Rome were governed by a body of twenty priests, called the 
fetialesf Their tasks included the contracting of alliances, the foedus, the 
establishment of the conditions of armistices, and the declaration of war, given 
the fact that the war could only qualify as bellum pium ac iustum if it was 
declared and started according to the rules of the ius fetiale.82 (It is interesting 
that for the Romans the basic principle of the invulnerability of the envoys was 
indisputable. Whereas in the case of the Greeks the division of the institution 
of the keryx, enjoying sacred protection and the presbeis, invulnerable as a 
result of a political agreement took place very early, in Rome the fetialis and 
later the other envoys-even if they did not belong to the fetiale s™ •-enjoyed 
sacred protection, even in time of war.84) 
The /oei/wx,-etymologicalIy related to the expression fides6^-the Roman 
statal contract implemented observing the required formalities,86 as opposed to 
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the hospitium,87 the amicitia,88 the societas,89 and the p a r does not signify the 
content of the contract but its form, and its most important element is the 
ceremonial oath made by the representative of the populus Romanus.90 The 
ceremony of the foedus is presented by Livy. According to him the priest, chosen 
from among the fetiales, who is consecrated pater patratus by reciting the texts 
selected for the occasion and being touched with a bunch of sacred grass 
(sagmina) takes the oath after reading out the text of the contract. " In the oath 
he calls Iuppiter, the pater patratus of the people making contract with him, 
and the people themselves to witness that the contract that has been read does 
not contain any falsity, and that the Roman people will not deviate from this 
first, and if they did-and here follows the self malediction-then he asks 
Iuppiter to come down on the Roman people the way he is just knocking down 
the sacrificial pig. Moreover, he should strike even more severely, as he is 
more powerful than the priest. Then he stabbed the sacrificial animal.92 Festus 
recounts a somewhat different formula, according to which the pater patratus, 
after knocking down the pig with a stone, asks Iuppiter to throw him out of 
his wealth as he is throwing away the stone if he proceeded falsely, but he 
entreats the god to spare his city.92 Polybos calls Rome's first contract with 
Carthago an agreement per lovem lapidem,94 Cicero ranks the per lovem 
lapidem oath formula to the ins civile.93 
Discussing the ius fetiale it should be pointed out that the Romans were the 
first to interpret war as a legal fact and they created the concept of bellum 
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iustum, influential up to the present day.46 Not all armed conflicts counted as 
war, bellum could only take place between peoples (populi), only the enemy 
possessing an organized state counted as hostis. In accordance with this, 
Cicero can state that only the oath given to the enemy obliges,the one given to 
robbers does not.97 We can depart from Livy's description in the case of the 
declaration of war as well. On the border of that people's land from which he 
demands satisfaction (re rum repetitio, or clarigatio9><) the pater patratus declares 
that he presents his demands as an envoy of the Roman people, observing the 
divine law, and he calls Iuppiter, the borders (fines) and the divine law (fas) to 
witness that if he demanded the delivery of the mentioned people or things 
unrightfully, then Jupiter should not allow him to return to his country. He 
recites this at the crossing of the border, and with slight alterations to the first 
person he encounters, and again, when he enters the town, and finally on the 
main square.99 If they do not deliver the things asked by him within thirty-three 
days-Dionysius Halicarnassensis mentions an interval of thirty days100-, after 
calling Iuppiter, Ianus Quirinius, and all the gods witness, he declares that he 
did not receive what he demanded, and that on returning to Rome, he wishes to 
deliberate about how they could take revenge. This means that he declares the 
possibility of war (testatio, or denuntiatio belli).1(" Arriving in Rome, the envoy 
presented the case to the Fathers and if the majority decided for purum piumque 
duellum, the pater patratus took an iron tipped or fire-hardened spear (hastam 
ferratam aut praeustam sanguineam) to the enemy's border, and there, making 
reference to the unrightfulness of the refusal of his demand, he declared war 
and threw the spear onto the enemy's territory.102 (Thus the direct causa of the 
war was the enemy people's unlawful behaviour, the fact that they did not 
%
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deliver the things or people demanded by the Romans."") Naturally, there was 
no need of such declaration of war if the enemy invaded Roman territory, in 
this case they could immediately and unconditionally begin the counter attack, 
so the declaration of war implemented by the fe t ia les had any significance only 
in the case of offensive warfare, initiated by the Romans. The archaic age 
certainly knew the institution of personal revenge, but the official declaration 
of war was only employed if the war was waged by the entire community, the 
populus, against another people, which was clearly distinguished from armed 
conflict between different groups of the aristocracy."14 In the course of its 
expansion Rome did not always have the opportunity to keep this ritual, there-
fore, the characteristically Roman formal conservativism chose the following 
fiction: The pater patratus threw the spear onto a plot of land declared enemy 
territory near Bellona's temple and the entire ceremony was performed with 
relation to this, but the demands towards the enemy were presented by the 
legati of the senatus, and they were the ones to declare war.105 (Sometimes they 
sent the spear to the people on whom they wanted to declare war."16) However, 
the fetiales's ritual of the declaration of war considerably contributed to the 
observation of the requirement that the war had to possess some kind of iusta 
causa, and it is not by chance that Cicero, formulating the theory of the just 
war under the influence of Stoic philosophy, connects the aequitas belli with 
the ius fetiale.",7 
The hasta ferrata aut praeusta sanguinea, meaning iron tipped or fire 
hardened spear, mentioned by Livy,108 also deserves attention. At the same 
time, it is not known when the iron-tipped spear was substituted for, or when it 
accompanied the wooden spear hardened in fire, as The Iron Age goes back to 
the turn of the 8lh and 9lh century ВС. in Italy. It can be assumed though, that in 
ritual usage the iron-tipped spear could only take the place of the wooden one 
when it came to be exclusively used in everyday life. The expression sanguinea 
103
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is particularly problematic: The word itself can be translated as consecrated in 
blood or coloured with blood. However, if it is taken for the denomination of 
the wooden material, it can mean the branch of the cornel tree, the sanguineae 
virgae, which, being hard wood, constituted a perfectly suitable raw material 
for the spear."" Ammianus Marcellinus mentions in connection with the 
fetiales's spear that besmearing it with blood played an important role in the 
course of its manufacturing.11' The spear of the ius sacrum made of cornel wood 
counted as arbor felix,112 but the spear used for the declaration of war was hasta 
impura, i.e. arbor infelix, dedicated to the forces of the underworld."1 Thus, 
whether the fetiales's spear was coloured with real blood, or made of blood 
coloured cornel wood, the original hasta praeusta sanguinea was later changed 
for hasta ferrata sanguine infecta.114 The fetialis ritually predicts the outcome 
of war at its very beginning because by symbolically taking the enemy territory 
into possession with the hasta impura, dedicated to the gods of the under-
world, he delivers the enemy, the hostis impius, bereaft of the reason for its 
existence, to the forces of destruction."5 (In the light of this, the role of the 
evocatio, performed by the Romans before the attack, by which they intended 
to lure to Rome the gods of the enemy doomed to destruction becomes perfectly 
clear.116) 
The strongly text-centered nature of the ius fetiale and the legis actio Sacra-
mento is sufficiently well-known, we know that whoever missed even one 
word of the text, lost the case.117 Although in the case of the ius fetiale we have 
no expressis verbis knowledge of such consequences, it can be rightly assumed 
that the Romans did not tolerate even the slightest deviation from the text 
because this would have destroyed the effect of the carmen, hence it would 
have endangered the result of the bellum iustum, fought with divine help."8 
The oath is an indispensable part of the ius fetiale. On the one hand the self 
malediction of the pater patratus on the occasion that he presented unrightful 
demands in the name of the Roman people, on the other hand the calling 
the gods to witness the lawful procedure of the Romans and the unlawful 
110
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procedure of the enemy. In the case of the legis actio the sacramentum 
corresponds to this oath."" The oath-like character of the sacramentum is 
clearly shown by the original meaning of the word itself,120 at the same time, it 
also incorporates the circumstance that the statement of the party taking the 
oath-e.g. the plaintiff-is true, and accordingly, the statement of his opponent is 
false. However, if in the end it were proved that the claim of the plaintiff does 
not stand, then it becomes evident that he commited perjury, i.e. he was 
performed his own devotio.n{ (Kaser also suspects that in the beginning the 
sacramentum was connected to the divine judgement, but in his view this 
cannot be sufficiently documented for the period from which written sources 
exist.122 It is still a fact that the character of divine judgement can be traced-by 
way of analogy-also in this part of the legis actio sacramento. References to 
the role played by the oath in the trial can be found not only in literary sources, 
but in traces, in later legal documents as well.123) It seems a further parallel that 
both the rerum repetitio and the legis actio sacramento is originally aimed at 
regaining the things unlawfully posessed by the opposing party in a peaceful 
manner, placing arbitrariness and fight under the control of the state, thus 
limiting their scope and intensity.124 At the same time it is a clear difference 
that whereas in the case of the legis actio sacramento the parties accept the 
control and decision of a judge recognized by both of them, in the case of the 
iusfetiale, this institution is absent. This is demonstrated by the fact that in the 
so-called international affairs they could not agree on the competence of legal 
court-this might be the cause of the absence of the apud iudicem stage of the ius 
fetiale procedure-, it can be rightly assumed though that the Romans found the 
instance entitled to decide in the conflict of two nations exactly in the higher 
powers, who were so often called to witness.125 
The ius fetiale is a clearly religious system of norms and procedures, as this 
is shown by the constant mentioning of the persons and gods acting in it. 
Nevertheless, the legis actio sacramento, considered to be an institution of the 
ius privatum shows close connection with the ius sacrum: In the beginning the 
legis actio was performed in front of the rex, who was present, both in his 
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person and his legitimacy, as a representative of the sphere of the sacred. Then 
the in iure stage of the trial took place in front of the magistratus, then, in 
concreto, it took place in front of the praetor, who from the point of his 
jurisdictional responsibilities, was an inheritor of the rex}2b The oath, stricly 
observing the words of the text, was also addressed to the gods, which 
substantiates the assumption that the legis actio was closely connected to the 
ius sacrum}21 (Certain parallels can be detected between the iusfetiale and the 
Twelve Table Law,128 for example the debtor had thirty days to satisfy the 
demand of the creditor if he admitted his indebtedness, or if the case was settled 
by legal decision, just like the pater patratus had to wait with the denuntiatio 
belli for thirty days after he had announced his demands, according to Dionyssius 
Halicarnassesensis.124 The reason of both decrees was to facilitate the finding 
of a peaceful solution of the conflict within this interval. Just like the relevant 
loci of the Twelve Table Law order the giving into noxa of the person causing 
damage,110 the demands of the ius fetiale also contain the extradition of the 
person commiting a deed injurious to Rome.111) The same intention, meant to 
restrict the uncontrollable arbitrary enforcement of private demands between 
the citizens of a state, or between different nations and states, trying to prevent 
the state of bellum omnium contra omnes by placing the solving of the conflict 
under some kind of commonly accepted higher instance, might have stood at 
the origins of both the iusfetiale and the legis actio sacramento.l32 
IV. It is sufficiently well known that in Homer Zeus decides certain armed 
conflicts with the help of his scales111 by way of the so-called psykhostasia, 
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and Äerox/ax/a " ' - t h i s scene can be found with minor modifications in Virgil as 
well'35-and it is also known that in certain cases the combatants decide by lot 
who should start the fight, thus asking for the help of the gods.1"1 Naturally, 
the drawing of lots by oraculum was known by the Romans as well."7 Most 
often they practiced the version in which the wooden tickets of the persons 
taking part in the draw were placed in an urn, filled with water, the sitella, which 
was bellied but had a narrow neck, and after reciting certain magic words and 
shaking the urn, they drew conclusions regarding the divine will from the 
sinking or the floating on the surface of the sortes, of which only one could 
remain above due to the narrow neck of the urn."x A similar procedure can be 
found in Plautus's comedy, entitled Casina, this being all the more significant 
as Plautus, though he often worked with Greek samples, had to adapt the 
scenes of his comedies to Roman thinking and everyday life, otherwise he could 
not have expected to be succesful. In Casina not merely a common oraculum is 
presented but the decision by single combat-leading to the employment of 
actual violence-of a legal conflict with the help of oraculum. This procedure 
shows a special mixture of the oraculum based on divine decision and the 
archaic vindicatio, requiring the employment of vis, in that it makes steps 
towards the repression of violence by way of the oraculum, based on the decision 
of divine forces.134 
The situation in Casina is the following: The Athenian Cleostrata, wife of 
Lysidamus acquired and brought up the slave girl Casina out of her own 
fortune. Contradiction arises in connection with the right to dispose over 
Casina. On the one hand, Lysidamus wants to aquire her for himself and his 
slave, Olympio, on the other hand, Cleostrata also claims the girl for herself 
and her slave, Chalinus. On behalf of the husband the vilicus, Olympio, on 
behalf of the wife, the armiger Chalinus take part in the actual dispute.140 In 
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Museum (1964) 103. sqq.; Pötscher, W.: Schicksalswägungen. Kairos 15 (1973) 61. sqq.; 
Pötscher, W.: Moira. Themis und timé im homerischen Denken. Wiener Studien 73 (1960) 
15. sqq. 
135
 Verg. Aen. 12, 725-727. 
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 / / .316. sqq.; 7, 170. sqq. 
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 Cf. Cic. inv. 1 , 18 . 
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 Cf. Cic. nat. 1, 106; Corn. fr. 1, 13. 14; Liv. 25, 3. 1. sqq. 
139
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Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 58 (1938) 19. sqq. 
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the course of the dispute physical violence takes place between the slaves 
representing the opposing husband and wife, at the same time, the oraculum 
preceeding actual fight also begins. The two sortes are placed into the sitella 
and the actual fight is simultaneous with the ceremony. Chalinus is defeated in 
the oraculum, Olympio and his master are the winners, and the dispute is decided 
in favour of Cleostrata by the employment of a trick only in the second part of 
the play.141 
At the beginning of the procedure Cleostrata complains that her husband 
restricts her in her freedom to dispose over her slave, constituting her own 
property,142 to which her neighbour, Myrrhina reminds her of the rule of Roman 
matrimonial law, according to which the husband has the right to dispose over 
his wife's entire property.143 In the dispute Lysidamus tries to convince his wife 
to yield to him, but Cleostrata sticks to her claim that she is entitled to provide 
for and dispose over her slave.144 The married couple agree to entrust two slaves 
with the fight over Casina, but both do this, hoping in secret that they can 
force each other's slaves to renounce at Casina.143 The two slaves appear, and 
Lysidamus tells Chalinus that he promised Cassina to his slave, Olympio, to 
which Chalinus responds that Cleostrata promised the girl to him.141' Lysidamus 
offers to eliberate Chalinus if he renounces at Casina, but the slave does not 
accept.147 Lysidamus calls his wife and orders Chalinus to bring a sitella full of 
water and the sortes belonging to it, and anounces that if the negotiations do 
not yield any result he will entrust the oraculum with the decision.148 Meanwhile 
Cleostrata tries to dissuade Olympio from clinging to Cassina, but he says that 
he would not change his mind even at Iuppiter's request.144 There is nothing 
left to do but turning to the sortio, but the oraculum, in which the will of 
the gods concerning the issue is manifested cannot dispense with vis, the actual 
fight.150 When Chalinus appears with the sitella and the sortes, Lysidamus 
announces that the fight must be fought observing the formal requirements of 
141
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the procedure, and that he himself, wants to supervise it.151 However, he makes 
152 
a final attempt at persuading Cleostrata, but she categorically refuses. So 
the ceremony begins, and the fact that everything is performed strictly in 
accordance with the rules receives special emphasis.153 The sortes are marked 
with inscriptions and they check that there is no other sors already in the urn, 
as well as the fact that the two balls are made of the same wood, as the winner 
of the oraculum will be the one whose sors will remain above in the urn.154 
Then the urn is placed in front of Cleostrata, her task being to shake it and to 
draw out the sors.155 The two participants of the oraculum, Olympio and 
Chalinus pray to the gods to help their case and they accurse the adversary.15'1 
After the prayers Lysidamus calls on the parties to begin the actual combat, he 
wishes Olympio good luck, and so does his wife to Chalinus. Olympio asks 
Lysidamus whether he should hit Chalinus with his fist or with his open palm, 
to which his master replies that he should proceed the way he wants. Then 
Olympio, calling in help Iuppiter slaps Chalinus in the face, while Chalinus, 
calling in help luno, hits Olympio with his fist.157 After the outright violence, 
Cleostrata has to draw the sors remaning above in the urn, and the parties are 
asked to cease fighting.'58 Cleostrata draws out Olympio's sors because that one 
was above, and announces that Chalinus is the loser, and Lysidamus announces 
151
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that the gods supported Olympio, fighting on his behalf. Olympio considers his 
victory to be a reward for his own, and for his ancestors' pietas,159 Thus the 
case was settled with Casina having to marry Olympio, while Cleostrata has to 
make preparations for the ceremonial feast, which she begins, having accepted 
the decision of the oraculum.m 
As it becomes evident from the prologue of the play, Plautus modelled his 
comedy on Diphilus's play, Kleroumenoi, and-as it is clearly shown by its 
title-the Greek play is also centred around a kind of sortio, a drawing or 
casting of lots, which is not in the least surprising taking into account that the 
oracula involving drawing of lots constituted an integral part of Greek religious 
thinking and religious practice.161 Plautus is anyway a master of intermingling 
Greek elements with Roman everyday life, customs, religion and law, and he 
explains in the prologue those elements of his play which could be strange for 
the Roman audience. So he does with the motif of the slaves' "marriage",162 
yet he does not consider it necessary to add any explanations to the settling the 
contradiction arising about the right to dispose over a slave by oraculum and 
fight, he is content to mention the perfect righteousness and legality of the 
procedure.163 (The typically Roman character is corroborated by the reference 
to the decree of the Twelve Table Law, the repudium.164) The fight of the 
Horatii and the Curiatii, described by Livy can be mentioned as a parallel to 
the single combat fought under ceremonial circumstances, as well as the form 
of the interstatal contracts, in the course of which they call Iuppiter in help and 
also as witness, the actual fight being signified by the expression manum 
conserere. lw The act of manum conserere can also be encountered in Cicero's 
and Gellius's descriptions of the vindicatio of plots of land. From the 
comparison of these sources it becomes evident that the employment of the vis, 
154
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(1984) 9. sqq. 
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the actual-later symbolic-violence constituted a substantial part of the legis 
actio sacramento.16'1 
The ritual described by Plautus must have constituted a certain intermediary 
stage between the personal fight and the vindicatio, as it is known today because 
in this case the parties agree on the rules of the settlement of the conflict, and 
they accept the control of a third person. The rules to be observed are mainly 
religious in character, and seem to be suitable to impede boundless and un-
restricted violence. Nevertheless, the vis is unquestionably part of the procedure, 
but the winner in the actual fight is decided by a higher, transcendental power, 
thus the fight receives the character of ordeal.167 The conditions of the vindi-
catio in Casino are given: The right to dispose over the slave girl can be regarded 
as a kind of property issue, yet the opposing parties-as taking into account the 
rules of comedy it would not be advisable to put on stage the man and wife, 
Lysidamus and Cleostrata using violence against each other-are substituted by 
their slaves in the procedure. However, the fight is always concerning the rights 
and interests of their owners.16* First the husband announces his claim for the 
right to dispose over Casina, then, in response the wife does the same.164 
Then-after trying in vain to persuade the opponent 's slave to renounce at their 
plans concerning Casina-the couple agree that the decision in the dispute over 
the right of disposal should be reached in a procedure acceptable for both of 
them, and they agree to accept the decision as obligatory even if it happened to 
be unfavourable for them.170 The accepted procedure is the oraculum, calling in 
help the sortio as well, which also included actual fight, as it is clearly shown by 
the expressions "necessumst vorsis gladiis 171 "conlatis signis depugnarier "172 
and "ire obviam ".173 To this extent the procedure is analogous with the vindicatio 
described by Gaius, as the empolyment of vis-in the beginning actual, later 
symbolic-played an important role in this procedure as well.174 The command 
166
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"age" calls for the beginning of the fight,175 which ends with the victory of one 
of the parties, the defeated one is regarded victus, or even mortuus.116 The 
actual fight-armed, as mentioned by the sources but bare handed in practicel77-is 
an essential part of the vindicatio, but the dispute is not decided by the fight 
itself, but by the divine judgement, the oraculum, serving as the frame or 
background of the fight, somehow involving it into the mechanism of decision. 
Numerous parallels can be observed between the vindicatio in Plautus and the 
legis actio sacramento in rem, known from Gaius's Institutiones. The parties 
fight with the same weapons, and they recite the verba sollemnia which calls 
the divinity in help including an oath as well, together with the symbolic 
enactment of violence with the help of the festuca.178 
At the end of this-considering the significance of the issue-brief study, not 
intended to be exhaustive, only wishing to highlight some aspects and associa-
tions, the following conclusions can be drawn: In our view, the opposing 
theories searching for the origin of the legis actio sacramento in rem either in 
personal fight or in the religious sphere can be made to augment each other 
concluding in the same direction, thus being integrated into unified theory. The 
sacred element (by which not only the religious world picture naming divinities is 
understood, but also the magic thinking operating with numinuous forces) can 
be clearly traced both in the requirement of the verbatim recital of the oath, 
the sacramentum and the carmen. The motif of the fight appears both in the 
etymology of the word vindicatio and in the employment of the spear. How-
ever, it is precisely the hasta that carries an religious extra semantic load in 
Roman imagination, (this becomes evident both from its role played in Mars's 
cult as well as in the declaration of war constituting part of the ins sacrum) 
which cannot be disregarded in the case of archaic civil law trial. Adapting to 
the rules of the genre, Plautus presents a quasi-property trial, the result of 
which is decided by restricted and controlled personal fight, employing the 
drawing of lots, thus calling for divine judgement. Based on all these it can be 
rightly assumed that originally the ordalium, fought with weapons, conducted 
the legis actio sacramento in rem to its form known today. 
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Introduction 
This paper will analyze ethnic data collection pertaining to criminal justice in 
Hungary. In most projects scrutinizing ethnic data collection practices, there is 
always a hidden suggestion that ethnic classification by law enforcement 
authorities inevitably invokes suspicion about ethnic profiling or disparate 
treatment based on ethnic identity. This project will not be an exception to this. 
The paper will show that although Hungary's approach to resist ethnic data 
collection by law enforcement authorities seems superficially appealing, in 
fact, it is not a good policy. It will be demonstrated that Hungary is one of the 
(many) countries in which extensive legal restrictions on the collection of non-
anonymous data concerning ethnic, national or religious identity have prompted 
law enforcement authorities to simply deny that ethnicity is of significance in 
their actions. This, however, is no guarantee that there are no misuses of police 
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power or that ethnic profiling does not exist. The only effect of such restrictive 
policies is that claims relating to indirect discrimination become enormously 
difficult to prove. The paper will also show that in Hungary, such a restrictive 
approach to ethno-national data classification also causes severe constitutional 
problems in other, non-criminal legal circumstances, where ethnic data is used 
in the context of additional rights and affirmative protection provided for ethno-
national minorities. 
Traditionally, within Hungary, law enforcement methods based on ethnic 
selection have affected the Roma minority rather than minute other ethnic or 
racial communities. As we shall see, the authorities have virtually unlimited 
discretion when it comes to stops and searches, and as a result, the possibility 
for misuse of power remains unhindered. 
The paper will therefore follow a twofold analysis. First, it will set forth 
general problems relating to the above described approach to ethnic data 
collection. This will include a brief analysis of some controversies and challenges 
to a uniquely Hungarian constitutional institution, the minority self-govern-
ment structure. The focus of scrutiny then shifts to the criminal justice system, 
about which the paper will show that the denial of ethnic data collection is 
not a good policy. This thesis will be supported by two examples: first, the 
analysis of policing of racially motivated crime, and second, the question of 
police ethnic profiling. In reference to the first question, it will be argued that 
law enforcement agents, as well as prosecutors and courts, are very reluctant to 
recognize racial motivation in violent and non-violent crimes, and will only 
qualify such criminal activity as nuisance, assault or mischief. Following 
this, by turning to a more detailed analysis of ethnic profiling, the paper will 
first describe the actual procedure involved in police ethnic data collection. 
The paper will conclude by restating that prohibiting the official recognition 
and collection of data on ethnicity (that is nevertheless present and taken 
into consideration) by criminal justice authorities is a potentially ethnically 
discriminatory practice. 
When Is a Minority a Minority? 
Target groups 
In the Hungarian legal and political jargon the terms "ethnic" and "national" 
minorities (and features) are used instead of "racial". Although there are 
thirteen recognized ethnic and national minorities in Hungary, racial profiling 
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and racial (ethno-national) conflict predominantly refer to the treatment of a 
single visible minority, the Roma. The number of immigrants and foreigners 
with non-European phenotypes is also increasing in recent years, producing a 
new victim group for racial profiling. Recent immigration however, is still of 
relatively small scale and mainly transitory.2 In fact, immigrants make up only 
about 1,5 percent of the Hungarian population and approximately two third are 
ethnic Hungarians from coming from the neighboring states. 
Although profiling and discrimination in the criminal justice system may 
exist against Asian, Muslim or other immigrant population, nevertheless, the 
severity of the disparate treatment of the Roma is exponentially greater. Due to 
the legal ambiguity of ethno-national classification (see below), the size of the 
Roma population is hard to establish. Census and academic estimates range 
between 200 000 and 600 000.3 
Group affiliation 
Data collection aside, ethno-national affiliation in itself is a controversial, 
ardently debated topic in Hungary. Article 68 ( 1 ) of the Constitution states: 
national and ethnic minorities living in the Republic of Hungary participate 
in the sovereign power of the people: they represent a constituent part of the 
State. National and ethnic minorities are specifically protected under the Act 
on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities.4 The Act does not, however, 
define the term 'ethnic' or 'national minority'. As a result of political negotia-
tions, for example Jews are not included among national and ethnic minorities 
for the purposes of the Act, a fact which, however, will not prevent them from 
being covered by the Race Equality Directive5 and general domestic anti-
discrimination legislation/' 
2
 2003 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook Country Data Sheet-Hungary. http://www.unhcr. 
ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/country?iso=hun 
3
 Census data is inaccurate because many Roma are reluctant to identify themselves as 
such. Some improvement is noticeable: whereas in the 1991 census 142 683 persons declared 
themselves Roma, in 2001 this number increased to 190 046. Minority organizations put this 
number somewhere between 400 000 and 500 000. The most reliable number was provided 
by a survey in 1993/1994 estimating 456 000. See UNDP Avoiding the Dependency Trap. 
Bratislava 2002 
4
 Act No. 77 of 1993. 
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 Directive 2000/43 EC, Official Journal of the European Communities 2000, L 180/22. 
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 Farkas, L.: The Monkey that does not see, Roma Rights Quarterly, 2004. No. 2. 
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The 1993 Act defines national and ethnic minorities as groups which have 
been present in the territory of Hungary for over 100 years and „(§ 1.) constitute 
a numerical minority within the population of the country, whose members hold 
Hungarian citizenship and differ from the rest of the population in terms of their 
own tongue, cultures and traditions, and who prove to be aware of the cohesion, 
national or ethnic, which is to aim at preserving all these and at articulating 
and safeguarding the interests of their respective historically developed commu-
nities. " According to the Act, these minorities are: Bulgarian, Roma (Gypsy), 
Greek, Croat, Polish, German, Armenian, Roman, Ruthenian, Serb, Slovak, 
Slovene, and Ukrainian; and in order to register a new minority group, a popular 
initiative signed by 1000 citizens has to be submitted to the Speaker of the 
Parliament. The Act also provides for the (fundamental) right of self identifi-
cation and lays down specific protections for minorities' members, including 
the prohibition of any policy that "persecutes a national or ethnic minority or 
any of its members because of their national status, makes their living conditions 
more difficult, or prevents them from exercising their rights". 
Without going into an in-depth analysis of the Hungarian statutory model, 
two controversies-procedural as well as material-need to be pointed out. Both 
material requirements (100-year presence and 1000 signatures as a special 
popular initiative) for qualifying as an ethnic or national minority seem 
problematic. The Act, besides defining the two group constituting requirements, 
also contains an enumeration of the thirteen minority groups that are recognized 
by the Act, which means that the Parliament will actually need to pass a formal 
amendment to these provisions if a new group would qualify. The House (being 
sovereign) however, is not obliged to vote affirmatively on the question, which 
is in sharp contradiction with the otherwise clearly defined requirements.7 
Another set of issues concern the question of is who is to verify or question 
whether the 100-year requirement has been fulfilled, and when is the clock 
supposed to start ticking. When will the Chinese minority (a considerable 
population since the political transition) be entitled to seek recognition? What 
about the Palestinians, who may claim some 600 hundred years of presence if 
„Ismaelite" merchants are considered?8 
7
 A number of Parliamentary and Constitutional Court decisions have been passed on 
petitions of various ethno-national groups, like the Jews, Aegean Macedons, Russians, the 
Bunyevac, or Huns seeking recognition. 
8
 Both groups have estimated numbers of 10 000. Meanwhile some doubt that certain 
recognized minorities (such as the Ruthenian for example) have fulfilled the statutory 
numerical requirements. (The same doubts were raised on that of the 100-year presence of 
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As a background note, it is important to stress that post-1989 Hungarian 
minority-politics cannot be understood outside the context of the ethnic 
Hungarian Diaspora. (Following the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 two-third of 
Hungary's historic territory (with a corresponding population) had been annexed 
to the neighboring state. Since then, but especially after the 1989 political 
transition, Diaspora politics has been a dominant factor in Hungarian foreign 
and domestic politics.) We can even say that besides classical commitments, 
one of the primary reasons behind constitutional motivations for providing and 
recognizing minority rights had been Article 6 (3) of the constitution, which 
declares that "the Republic of Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for the 
fate of Hungarians living outside its borders and shall promote and foster their 
relations with Hungary." Commentators9 claim that the creation of the above 
described homogenous legislation for national and ethnic minorities may help 
promoting rights of ethnic Hungarians in the neighboring countries; it cannot, 
however, provide an effective institutional framework to deal with the specific 
and robust Roma-problem. Also, this monolithic minority category is inefficient 
in serving the needs of all thirteen official minority groups in Hungary, which 
substantially differ in size and consequent claims and aspirations. Also, critics 
point out10 that the European accession and subsequent changes in the constitu-
tional and socio-political climate will bring challenges that the anachronistic, 
pre-accession minded Diaspora-targeting law cannot cope with. For example, 
the appearance of European or other migrant workers and immigrants will 
bring challenges that the existing legal framework may not be able to handle. 
Newly arriving groups will easily outnumber small traditional national 
minorities (such as the Armenian and Ruthenian), while the current legal frame-
work does not have clear guidelines as to how new groups can seek official 
recognition. 
the Greeks.) The legislator is of course free to recognize any group as a national or ethic 
minority (even lacking the general conditions), yet the statutory language setting forth the 
requirements therefore seems absolute and general, and is thus somewhat misleading. 
9
 See for example, Pap A. L.: Minority Rights and Diaspora Claims: Collision and Inter-
dependence. In: The Status Law Syndrome: Post-Communist Nation-Building or Post-Modem 
Citizenship? Hokkaido University, Sapporo, 2005. (forthcoming). 
10
 See for example. Pap A. L.: Csatlakozás és csalatkozás. A kisebbségi törvény módo-
sításának kihívásai és a kormány modellje (Accession and Disillusionment: Challenges Facing 
the Government 's Model for Amending the Act on Ethnic and National Minorities). 
http://www.nfh.hu/index2.htm?p=2&t=2&i=2967 
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Individual affiliation 
The other, even more controversial element of the Hungarian framework relates 
to the lack of satisfying legal guarantees regarding individuals' minority 
affiliation. Hungarian law allows for the handling of data on racial and ethnic 
origin only with the consent of the person concerned." This gives rise to what 
is commonly known as "ethno-business" or "ethno-corruption", that is, the 
utilization and misusage of remedial measures for private means that are contrary 
to the legislators' intentions. 
In this model, the exercise of minority rights is not dependent on minimal 
affiliation requirements. For example, Stephen Deets documents how school 
officials pressure parents of 'Hungarian' students to declare their children 
'German': „according to Hungarian government statistics, in 1998, almost 45 000 
primary school students were enrolled in German-minority programs, which, 
by the latest census, is about 8000 more than the number of ethnic Germans 
who are even in Hungary."12 
Hungary also established a relatively potent form of autonomous minority 
institution, the 'minority self-government' structure (bodies that co-exist with 
local municipal administration), and the decision to vote at these elections was 
left solely to the political culture and conscience of the majority. Thus, in Hungary, 
citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin, could vote for minority self-govern-
ment candidates. This enabled members of the majority to take advantage of 
the various remedial measures. For example, the wife of the mayor of Jász-
ladány-a village notorious for segregating Roma primary school children from 
non-Roma-held an elected office in the local Roma minority self-government. 
Likewise, non-Romani parents can claim that they are Romani in order to conceal 
racial segregation." 
Hungarian minority representatives repeatedly claim that the fact that some 
candidates ran as 'Gypsies' in one election and then later as Germans in the 
following term (which is permitted by both the law and the ideal of multiple 
" This of course does not prohibit the anonymous collection of census data. In general , 
Articles 2(2) and 3(2) of Act No. 63 of 1992 on the protection of personal data and the 
publicity of public data (Data protection Act). 
'"Deets S. Reconsidering East European Minority Policy: Liberal Theory and European 
Norms. East European Politics and Society 16 (2002) . 
11
 For a detailed case description see Roma Rights 2003. 107-108. In the summer of 
2003 the Roma Press Center 's fact finding revealed that at one point non-Romani parents 
signed a petition in which they too claimed to be Romani. 
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identity-formation) proves the flourishing of local ethno-business.14 Similarly, 
both the President of the National Romanian Minority Self-Government15 
in Hungary and the (Romanian) Secretary for Romanians Living Outside 
Romania16 found it worrisome that the 2002 local elections brought an increasing 
number of candidates for Romanian minority self governments, while the 
number of those identifying themselves as Romanian in the national census is 
decreasing.17 In their view, the answer lies in the fact that "Gypsies" and 
Hungarian immigrants who moved from Romania are running as Romanians. 
In order to demonstrate the fallacies of the legal framework, some Roma 
politicians publicly decided to run under different labels (in most of the reported 
17 cases, Slovakian). Also, there are several municipalities where (according 
to the national census) nobody identified herself as a member of any minority 
group, yet numerous minority candidates were registered.18 
Though there are no exact data on the number of minorities of Hungary, 
based on the number of votes cast at minority-self-government elections it can 
be safely claimed that a significant number of citizens, who are not members 
of any minority, voted for minority candidates.19 (At the 2001 census, 139 763 
persons, that is 1,37% of the population, claimed to have a minority language as 
their mother tongue-the census made it possible for everyone to mark maximum 
three languages. Three answers could be given concerning nationality affiliation 
as well-318 391 persons acknowledged belonging to some minority, consti-
tuting 3,12% of the population. In light of this evidence, it is interesting to note 
that 1 777 299 person in the first election in 1990 and 2 657 722 persons in the 
second one in 1994 cast their vote for some minority candidate.) 
14
 See the minority-ombudsman's annual parliamentary reports or an interview with 
Antal Heizler, President of the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities, Népszabadság 
(the leading Hungarian daily), 2002. 07. 24. 
15
 The President did not predict that more then 7 out of the 17 local self-governments 
running in the 2002 elections in Budapest (and some 30 out of the 48 registered nationally) 
would be "authentic Romanian". Out of the 13 local Romanian minority self-governments 
operating between 1998 and 2002, he estimated that only three have "real Romanian 
blood" running in their veins. See the summary of an interview with Kreszta Trajan, 
Népszabadság, 2002. 08. 21. 
16
 See the statement of Doru Vasile Ionescu in Népszabadság, 2002. 08. 15. 
17
 Only five signatures are needed for the registration of a minority self-government. 
(For which subsequently everybody, including members of the 'majority', may vote.) 
18
 See Népszabadság, 2002. 08. 15. 
19
 Majtényi, В.: Minority Rights in Hungary and the Situation of the Roma. Acta 
Juridica Hungarica 45 (2004) 131-148. 
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The examples of loopholes in the legal regime sometimes result in complete 
absurdity. In order to express their admiration of German football for example, 
a small village's entire football-team registered as German minority-candidates 
for the elections.20 
It should also be noted that the question of ethno-national identity has been 
the focus of other socio-political debates, such as the Hungarian status law, a 
framework legislation that provides for schemes of rights and preferences 
available for ethnic Hungarians living in Diaspora. During the drafting of this 
law,21 an ardent domestic political debate22 arose from the various legislative 
approaches in identifying who would be considered Hungarian (for the purposes 
of the law.) In fact, the contradiction between the basic liberal tenet of the free 
choice of identity and the desire to reduce (the legal) options for both politically 
and financially undesirable misusage was perhaps the most controversial 
aspect of the law. 
In June 2005 the Hungarian Parliament passed21 a comprehensive amend-
ment to the Minorities Act. The legislation made it a point to set forth a plan 
for institutional reorganization of the minority-protection mechanisms. At the 
same time, combating the aforementioned ethno-corruption, it introduced a 
somewhat controversial registration procedure for those who decide to take 
advantage of the various privileges and additional rights set forth by the 
minority law. In order to ensure that only members of the given minority can 
vote and be elected to minority self-government, the law redefines the meaning 
of Article 68. par. (4) of the Hungarian Constitution which stipulates that 
national and ethnic minorities have the right to establish minority self-govern-
ments. The Act thus departs from the preexisting dedication to the free choice 
20
 Interview with Mr. Heizler, Id. 
21
 Act 67 of 2001. 
22
 Two of the three opposition parties in parliament have severely criticized the text, 
claiming first of all that the government is significantly underestimating the cost of the 
law. The Socialist party estimated that as many as one million people would be taking 
advantage of the health care benefit, which alone could cost around 15 billion Forints ($50 
million), and the annual price of the proposed legislation would actually add up to around 
60 billion Forints. Additional conccrns were raised regarding the labor market ' s capacity to 
deal with the estimated additional 700 000 legal laborers. Opposition liberals expressed 
grave misgivings about the overall conception behind the law, claiming that the intricate 
web of preferences and benefits (most of which would be available in Hungary) does not 
support staying but in fact encourages immigration. 
23
 The President vetoed the legislation and the Constitutional Court struck down some 
of its provisions. 
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of identity and by eliminating the explicit provision allowing for the recognition 
of multiple identity, sets forth legal requirements for minority political 
participation. According to the new legislation,24 both the right to vote for and 
to run as candidates at the minority elections would require the registration.25 
The first minority self-government elections under the new regulations will be 
held in autumn 2006. 
Having described general issues relating to ethno-national identity, let us 
now turn to the question of ethnic data collection. 
Ethnicity and Data Collection 
As mentioned previously, data protection laws in Hungary, in particular 
Articles 2(2) and 3(2) of Act No. 63 of 1992 prohibit the handling of sensitive 
data, such as ethnic origin, without the concerned person's explicit permission. 
Sometimes practice in this area appears to be quite illogical. For example, 
officials claim that the recording of racial violence victims would run against 
statutory provisions, even though the Criminal Code acknowledges certain 
racially motivated crimes,26 such as "violence against members of national, 
ethnic or racial minorities and religious groups" or "incitement against 
community", all of which presuppose membership in the given (racially or 
ethno-nationally defined) community. Although on the national level, the 
existence of such statistics is mostly denied, ethnic data is collected by many 
institutions-for administering minority self government elections, affirmative 
action quotas, minority scholarships, etc.27 For some procedures set forth by 
the Minorities Act (seeking minority self-government elections or minority 
language education, registering first names that are not included in the official 
Hungarian register, etc.) one needs to make a formal declaration regarding 
ethno-national affiliation in order to be eligible for the measures or preferences. 
24
 A c t C X I V . of 2005. 
25
 See for example Minelres News, Office for National and Ethnic Minorities, Buda-
pest, Hungary, Selection of news on national and ethnic minorities in Hungary, March 2004, 
http://lists.delfi.lv/pipermail/minelres/2004-March/date.html. 
26
 The Hungarian Criminal Code (Act IV. of 1978) criminalizes four types of behavior 
that may fall under the racially motivated category. These are: genocide (Article 155), 
apartheid (Article 157), violence against members of national, ethnic or racial minorities 
and religious groups (Article 174/B) and incitement against community (Article 269). 
27
 For more, see Farkas: op. cit. 
166 ANDRÁS L. PAP 
It should also be stressed that the anonymous collection of data relating to 
one's perceived ethnic origin for research purposes is not explicitly prohibited 
by the Data Protection Act, since it defines sensitive data as one that relates to 
racial origin, national and ethnic minority affiliation-not perceived racial origin. 
For example, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee's research into discrimination 
against Roma defendants in the criminal justice system (see below) was too 
based on perceived ethnic origin. 
This leads us to the central question within ethno-national data collection 
(and similarly, within racial profiling and discrimination): whether group identity 
should be based on self-identification, or on perception.28 As Lilla Farkas 
(2004)29 claims, 
"Perceived ethnic origin and self-identity are rather different notions, the 
former being an objective category, and the latter a subjective one. Neither 
can be established with indisputable certainty, as there will always be, for 
example, Roma who bear less visible signs of their ethnicity. On the same 
token, persons identified by the majority as being Roma may deny affiliation 
with this ethnic group on account of having lost cultural and language links 
with the group.." 
Curiously, the case law pertaining to penalizing 'violence against a member of 
an ethnic group',30 suggests that Hungarian criminal law recognizes the difference 
between self-identification and perceived ethnic origin and attaches the same 
criminal liability to violence committed on either ground. As Hungarian judges 
seem to understand now, a plaintiff who does not profess herself in court as 
belonging to the Romani minority, can at the same time claim that he was 
discriminated on the ground of her perceived ethnic origin. It is in fact the 
perception of Romani ethnicity and not self-identification that establishes the 
ground of discrimination.31 
In general, as Farkas (2004) points out, with Hungarian law allowing for 
the handling of data on racial and ethnic origin only with the consent of the 
person concerned, the effect is a severe impediment on the prospect of litigation 
28
 Two major camps fight in social sciences, those in favor of self-identity, such as 
János Ladányi and those in favor of perception, such as Gábor Havas, István Kemény and 
Gábor Kertesi. Farkas: op. cit. 
29
 Ici. 
30
 Article 174/B of Act 4 of 1978 on the Criminal Code. 
11
 See Farkas: op. cit. 
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against indirect discrimination or institutional racism. ~ Furthermore, as 
mentioned above, the law gave rise to what is commonly known as "ethno-
business" or "ethno-corruption", especially in relation to participation in minority 
elections and election of minority self-governments. Finally, the law diminishes 
hopes to devise or implement positive action programs. As the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) reported in 1999: "while 
acknowledging the fact that the collection and utilization of data on ethnic 
origin is restricted in Hungary for valid reasons, ECRI is concerned that the 
lack of reliable information about the situation of various minority groups 
living in the country makes evaluation of the extent of possible discrimination 
against them or the effect of the actions intended to fight such discrimination 
difficult."33 
The two aforementioned Acts (on minority rights and data protection) 
created two specialized Commissioners to insure that data protection, infor-
mational privacy and access to public data, as well as minorities' rights are 
respected. The two ombudsmen play a crucial role in framing a workable racial 
profiling policy and safeguarding the handling of ethnicity-related data. 
Criminal Justice and Ethnic Data 
Having demonstrated the controversial nature of the Hungarian legislative 
approach to ethnic data collection in general, in the following sections, the 
paper will scrutinize its consequences with respect to criminal justice. Criminal 
investigation and law enforcement practices provide another source of evidence 
for proving that the denial to recognize ethnicity in a system which never-
theless (formally, or informally) takes it into consideration is not a good policy. 
This thesis will be supported by two examples: first, the analysis of policing 
and indicting racially motivated crime, and second, the question of police ethnic 
profiling. In reference to the first question, the paper will argue that law 
12
 Under Article 19(1) b, of Act No. 125 of 2003 on equal treatment and the promotion 
of equal opportunities the plaintiff must establish his ethnic origin in order for the burden 
of proof to be reversed. In any case, under Article 8 protection is based on ethnicity, thus 
he must clear this issue when bringing a case. In cases of indirect discrimination not only 
the ethnicity of the plaintiff(s) but also of the comparator(s) must be established. The latter 
may prove an insurmountable task. 
33
 Second report on Hungary, Adopted on 18 June 1999 made public on 21 March 
2000, Para. 26. http://www.coe.int/T/E/human_rights/Ecri/5-Archives/l-ECRI's_work/5-
CBC_Second_reports/Hungary_CBC_2.asp 
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enforcement agents, as well as prosecutors and courts, are very reluctant to 
recognize racial motivation in violent and non-violent crimes. 
Ethnic data and race crimes 
Notwithstanding the sweetest sounding constitutional and statutory languages 
on equal treatment, free choice of identity and the protection of sensitive 
data, it is always the discriminatory practice of the majority that will actually 
provide a practical definition for ethnic affiliation. Thus when it comes to 
the maltreatment of members of various ethnic groups, no difficulties in 
definitions arises for the discriminating party. Such conceptual ambiguities 
will only worsen the protections provided for the victimized group. Consider 
for example the case of racially motivated crimes. 
The Hungarian Criminal Code (Act IV. of 1978) criminalizes four types of 
behavior that may fall under the racially motivated category. (Racial motivation 
is implied in the wording of the law.) These are: genocide (Article 155), 
apartheid (Article 157), violence against members of national, ethnic or racial 
minorities and religious groups (Article 174/B) and incitement against 
community (Article 269). Nevertheless, it is safe to say that the first two never, 
and the latter two only very rarely occur in official statistics. 
For example, in the past five years, no investigation was initiated in relation 
of apartheid or genocide, whereas the statistics for Article 269 and 174/B are as 
follows:14 
Table 1. shows the statistics for investigations and charges brought under 
"violence against a member of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group" 
(Penal Code, Article 174/B) offences. 
year cases 
identified 
offenders 
identified 
charges 
brought 
2001 12 9 9 
2002 5 5 5 
2003 11 9 8 
2004 7 6 5 
2005 7 3 2 
34
 Information provided by Chief Prosecutor 's Office to the Hungarian NFP. 
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Table 2. shows the statistics for investigations and charges brought under 
"incitement against community" (Penal Code Article 269) offences. 
year cases 
identified 
offenders 
identified 
charges 
brought 
2000 5 1 1 
2001 10 12 11 
2002 13 11 11 
2003 14 11 11 
2004 17 1 1 
2005 4 1 1 
This should by no means imply that racial crimes and violence are non-
existent in Hungary, but rather that law enforcement agents, as well as prosecu-
tors and courts, are very reluctant to recognize racial motivation in violent 
and non-violent crimes committed against Roma and other minority victims. 
Although officers and off ic ia ls habitually claim that it is because of the lack 
of clear legislative guidelines for the establishment of racial motivation that 
most of such instances will only qualify as nuisance, assault or mischief. On 
the other hand, many politicians and experts argue that criminal legislation in 
force could easily allow for a less narrow, more minority-friendly interpretation. 
In Hungary, in line with the legally articulated declaration to refrain from 
any kind of involuntary official classification of ethnicity, no specific legally 
binding instructions exist for the determination of racially motivated criminal 
activity. Thus, law enforcement officers, who are the prime decision-makers as 
to the legal classification of a given offense will follow the easier way, and 
become very reluctant to classify incidents, conflicts as racially motivated. 
Although it will always be the law-school-graduate prosecutor who will decide 
on what grounds to indict the defendant, she will usually follow the pol ice 's 
determination on the nature of the criminal offense in question. As for the 
police, off icers claim that in determining whether an offense is racially 
motivated, they take notice of an internal guidance issued by the Attorney 
General that directs prosecutors when considering and qualifying the 
indictment. This means that the only legal guidance is an internal policy guide, 
which, needless to say, would not stand very strong against constitutional 
challenges. The outcome is clear: in order to avoid making an uncomfortable 
and (given the widespread anti-Roma or xenophobic sentiments in Hungarian 
society) unpopular decision, and lacking any legally binding guidance, we 
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see a very strong reluctance to recognize racial motivation in violent criminal 
behavior. 
As noted above, this practice also seems quite illogical at times, for example 
in the case of race crime victims. Referring to data protection regulations, official 
statistics have no reliable data on the ethnicity of race crime victims, either, 
which is entirely absurd, given that the existence of racially motivated crimes 
logically presupposes membership in the given (racially or ethno-nationally 
defined) community. Other evidence for demonstrating that such a narrow 
interpretation of a facially minority-friendly principle is actually contrary to the 
victimized groups' interest, is that the above mentioned criminal statistics 
operate with a homogenous victim category, and statistics will not contain 
figures broken up into the various protected categories (racial, national, ethnic, 
religious groups). This will make it very difficult for minority representatives 
or advocacy groups to demonstrate their case. 
Police Profiling and Ethnic Data 
In this section, the paper turns to the assessment of ethnic profiling in police 
work. Scrutiny of ethnic bias in policing and criminal justice should ideally 
include all of the following: stops and searches, detaining, arrest, criminal 
procedure, charging, sentencing, disparity in police brutality, access to counsel, 
law enforcement public employment, ineffective legal remedies, expulsion and 
immigrant treatment. Due to spatial limitations, the analysis of all these issues 
is not possible in this article. Consequently, this last part will only cover ethno-
national data processing in police stop and search, and within that framework, 
vehicle stop and search procedures in particular. The paper's aim is to provide 
an overview of what type of ethno-national (racial) data is and may be 
collected in Hungary, how and where it is stored, and who has access to it. 
This section is based on a field research that was commissioned in 2004 by 
the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and the Open Society Justice Initiative.35 
The research is part of a comparative study that involves a number of countries 
and focuses on 'Addressing Racial Profiling and Discrimination in Policing'. 
35
 See http://www.justiceinitiative.org 
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Stop and search powers 
According to the Hungarian legal framework, the police may stop anyone at 
any time and ask questions it deems necessary.3'1 The vacuous language of 
Article 29 of the Act on Police37 gives full authorization for the police to stop 
and ask for identification 'anyone, whose identity needs to be established.' If 
need comes, because the individual is not willing to cooperate or her identity 
cannot be sufficiently established, she may be searched,38 can be arrested34 and 
be held for eight hours, which, if the process has not been successful, can be 
prolonged for an additional four hours by the chief of the local police unit. 
Should this (maximum 12 hour) arrest not be sufficient, another type of 
detention40 ("public order detention") may be ordered, which (including the 
time spent in arrest) may take as long as twenty-four hours. For these stop and 
search procedures no suspicion whatsoever is needed, no probable cause 
standards are set forth and unsuccessful identification itself may lead to up to 
24 hours of detention. Apart from arrests or detentions, the police are under 
no obligation to provide an explanation-the only exception being when the 
individual herself requests such information.41 The Constitutional Court ruled 
on several challenges to these provisions,42 and has been consistently dismissing 
petitioners' claims, despite dissents pointing to the disproportionate length of 
the detention and the lack of motivation for speedy police procedures involving 
detainees who are being held without having committed anything illegal. 
Another form of stop and search competences comes up in the context of 
vehicle control. According to Article 44 of the Police Act, the police may at 
any time check the legality of vehicle operation and possession. The police may 
therefore randomly stop and check vehicle ownership documents, certificates 
for appropriate carbon-dioxide emission, motorway passes, they may check the 
first-aid kit (a required accessory for all vehicles), the insurance contract 
leaflet of the vehicle, or the condition of the windshield wiper. Critics43 have 
36
 Article 32. of the Police Act. 
37
 Act 34. of 1994. 
38
 Article 29. 
39
 Article 33. 
40
 Article 38. 
41
 Articles 29 and 33. 
42
 Decisions No. 9/2004. and 65/2003. 
43
 See for example, Pap, A. L.: "Street Police Corrupt ion-A Post-communist State of 
the Art", Kokkalis Program on Southeastern and East-Central Europe, Kennedy School of 
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argued that it raises constitutional concerns that a significant part of this type 
of control is actually of an administrative nature and should not be performed 
by the police forces. For instance, in the case of a company car, checking the 
authorization from the manager is not a matter of policing per se, but serves 
social security, tax, and administrative purposes instead. 
Police competences raise another problematic point: the issue of reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause standards. According to the Act on Criminal 
Procedure44 probable cause is needed for the initiation a criminal procedure; 
still, an arrest or the above mentioned "public order detention" does not qualify 
as such. As a result, apart from failure of proper identification, a "simple" 
suspicion (the probability of criminal offence does not exceed 50 percent) also 
suffices for these coercive measures.45 Although the legislator never cared to 
explain what these standards are supposed to mean, the Constitutional Court 
upheld the law,46 precisely on the ground that these measures do not amount to 
criminal procedure and the detained (whose cooperation is crucial in these 
procedures) does not qualify as a defendant under criminal procedures. 
Data processing4 
Turning to the question of actual data processing, based to the field work that 
had been carried under the auspices of the above mentioned research project, 
it may be established that police data collection and reporting is done on two 
levels: paper forms filled out on the spot and the Robocop 2000, an integrated 
computerized system that is only accessible in the police office. Apart from 
Government , Harvard University, h t tp: / /www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkal is /GSW3/Andras_ 
Laszo.pdf 
44
 Act 19 of 1998. 
45
 Article 33. 
46
 Decision no. 65/2003. 
47
 This subsection is based on informal interviews and consultations with the follow-
ing: Captain Tibor Jármy, Ministry of Interior; Szilveszter Póczik, Senior Associate, 
OKRI, National Institute of Criminology; István Vavró, Department Head, Ministry of 
Justice; Ferencné Horváth, Attorney General ' s Office; Klára Csányi, Department Head, 
Ministry of Interior; István Lóczy, Department Head, Ministry of Interior; Major Szabolcs 
Szovics, Budapest Police; Captain László Inárcsi. Department Head, Mezokovesd Police; 
Captain Nagy Zsolt, Department Head, Sátoraljaújhely Police; Liutenant Colonel Zoltán 
Klima, Department Head, National Police; Gábor Tar ján. Associate Professor, Police 
Academy, Budapest; Colonel Mihály Szabó. Director, National Police; Colonel Tivadar 
Dormán, Department Head. National Police; Major Eva Ecet, Ministry of Interior. 
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sporadic usage of computerized vehicle recognition systems (by mostly 
specialized units) in-car computers or other handheld computer devices are 
unknown to Hungarian police officers, thus communication mostly is done via 
radio with the dispatcher.48 
The first type of data gathering is done on the spot, during stops and 
searches. In theory, officers would have to report and register every performed 
activity, regardless of whether they will actually initiate any further criminal or 
other procedures. The somewhat dubious language of Article 32 of the Internal 
Minister's Decree on Police Conduct49 sets forth that the police officer has to fill 
out a registration form (a so called "RK" form-none of the interviewed officers 
knew what the abbreviation stood for) in case of identifying someone, and also 
if further procedures or other circumstances deem it necessary. Data gathering 
thus may be extended to other people, such as passengers of the vehicle. 
Presumably, the mandatory registration of all police stops and activities serves 
internal activity-reporting purposes. From the informal interviews I made, I 
gathered that (although not always) in most cases, the forms are filled out even 
in case nothing extraordinary or illegal has been detected. 
The form, filled out on the spot by the officer, contains the following data: 
name; date of birth; mother's maiden name; address; ID card number, expiration 
date; place, time and reason of stopping; description of the activity that the 
police action follows; name, rank of the officer. In case of vehicle control: 
license plate number, type of vehicle, vehicle registration document number, 
expiration date, owner's name, address. If offenders are being fined on the spot, 
there is no need to fill out the form, penalty-documentations suffice. The actual 
form is somewhat anachronistic, bearing a strong reminiscence to communist 
totalitarianism; it contains several questions that are no longer being asked, 
such as marital status, number of children, workplace, monthly salary. 
The second type of data processing takes the form of a national computerized 
database, the integrated Robocop50 (Robotzsaru) 2000. According to a National 
Police Chief 's Order,51 all relevant data in criminal proceedings need to be 
4K
 Interestingly, the data protection ombudsman expressed concerns about the trans-
mitting of sensitive, personal data via the radio, because it sometimes enables unwarranted 
bystanders to overhear information that should not be disclosed. Therefore the police 
promised to take due care of the situation... 
49
 3/1995 ( l l l . l . ) B M rendelet (Decree of the Internal Minister). 
50
 The program actually bears an image f r o m the 1987 motion picture Robocop. 
51
 Orders of the Chief of the National Pol ice (Orfk intézkedés) 22/2000 (XII 29) and 
1/2003 (II. 12). 
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registered in the database. In Article 5/b, the relevant data category is defined 
to include all data pertaining to stops, searches, arrests, reports, complaints and 
denunciations. This means that all data registered in the "RK" forms will be 
entered into the Robocop and the forms will be destroyed. 
As mentioned above, no police registry contains any ethno-national or 
racial data per se. In official use, such as press releases for example, even 
if the victim or a witness would claim that the offender was, say, Roma, the 
formal suspect description will not use any ethno-national signifiers. The over-
whelming majority of police officers I informally interviewed claimed that 
there is no ethnic data at all in any of the police registries. The commissioned 
research however proves this to be not entirely the case. There are two ways 
ethno-national or racial data may be processed in police documents: within 
testimonies by victim defendant or witness, and in the aforementioned Robocop 
informational network. Curiously, while most high-ranking ministerial officials 
denied it, field officers and detectives admitted that in case the victim, a witness, 
or the offender/defendant in his/her testimony or report will claim someone to 
be, say, Roma, and if they insist on this statement to appear in the records, 
such data will be a registered and filed as part of the case documentation (and 
similarly to all important statements, will be attached to the case-file and 
entered into the Robocop.) 
Therefore if the victim were to state that the offender was "presumably 
Roma", it would actually be part of the case files. Some officials were of the 
opinion that this would only be the case if the person herself had claimed that 
she was a member of the minority. It has been the researchers' overall opinion 
that, although in informal communication anti-Roma racism is almost universal 
within the force, officers are quite uncomfortable using ethno-racial classifi-
cation in any form of formal communication, be it verbal (such as orders given 
by the superiors) or written and (out of fear from political attacks) will tiptoe 
around it and use a (presumably) politically correct meta-language instead. In 
sum, officers are unlikely to ask direct questions pertaining to ethnicity, and as 
far as the records are concerned, may even try to persuade witnesses and 
victims to avoid using, say, the term 'Roma'. 
The other way ethno-racial data may appear in police registries is even 
more intriguing. The aforementioned Robocop is not only an integrated database, 
but it is also the basis for a unified police-prosecutorial statistical database. 
This is a DOS-based computer program where all information is being stored. 
Most of the data is entered through a code-system, thus the officers and the 
detectives are only selecting among pre-established options. The registry has 
chapters on the offense and the offender. The database provides a thorough 
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analysis of the case and the suspects/defendants and also has a detailed listing 
of causal factors which are divided into "objective" and "subjective" ones.52 
"Objective factors" would include "covering for other criminal offenses", 
"problems in the family or school", "low income", "dropping out from school", 
"alcoholic or criminal family background", etc. "Subjective factors" may include 
"lack of driving experience", "tiredness", "emotional distress", "criminal past", 
"bad influence from peers", "antisocial attitudes" and somewhat anachronistic 
concepts like "bad media influence", "selfishness" or "seize the day-attitude".53 
The database has a similarly detailed method for describing the appearance 
of the suspect/defendant. In the codebook we find a set of personal charac-
teristics like the form and size of the ears and the teeth, "hollow cheeks", 
"raspy voice", "tattoos", "meeting eyebrows", "deformity and maiming". Among 
these identifiers I came across two types that contained ethno-racial references. 
The first type I found among the set of options provided for describing facial skin 
and complexion (among others like "blotchy or pockmarked face"): "Roma-
looking", "Creole", and "Arabic, Negro,54 Asian" (sic). Also, among the options 
provided for "accents or dialects" I found the following categories: "with a 
Roma accent" "wailing (sic) like a Roma".55 
These ethno-racial classifications are made by the officer/detective, thus in 
the overwhelming majority of cases, the classification is not based on self-
identification, but on an outsider's perception. Ironically, one of the officers I 
interviewed said that he would actually let the defendant/suspect decide how 
she would be categorized: 'Roma' or 'Creole'. As mentioned above, all these 
factors are listed and the officer can only choose from the pre-established 
options and will only type in the appropriate code number. It is important to 
point out that the officers do not have to fill out all the questions; it is entirely 
up to their discretion. Furthermore, at the end of each section, there is an 
"other" category, where (unlike the previous ones) the officer can type in 
whatever she may consider relevant. In theory, this could even include victims' 
or witnesses' statement regarding the offender's ethnicity. In general, it is safe 
Section 39 of the database is now eliminated; it used to contain the explicit question 
whether or not the defendant/suspect is Roma. 
53
 Officers are very reluctant to find a crime to be racially motivated, even though they 
could do so (see above). 
54
 In the Hungarian socio-linguistic context the term "Negro" is not necessarily 
pejorative. (Legislators, drafters and webmasters of such a database on the other hand 
should have been aware of the international context.. .) 
55
 In Hungarian: "cigányosan sápítozva". 
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to say, that such a scenario is quite unlikely - partly due to the aforementioned 
uneasiness about dealing with ethno-racial data in official communications 
and also in part because of the fact that this would mean additional work. As I 
gathered from the interviews, officers do not like to waste their time thoroughly 
filling out the causal factors section. Access to data depends on the status and 
position of the officers, as well as their standing (level and degree of involve-
ment) in the procedure. One may have the impression, that it is only due to the 
lack of sophistication of the IT-system that ethno-national data is not easily 
accessible or connected to other data. 
Data processing and ethnic profiling 
Intriguing as findings within the previous section were, the consequences are 
dubious. As we have seen, data processing is hardly existent in the procedures 
of the Hungarian police. It would however be an incorrect conclusion to draw 
that consequently no ethnic profiling or discrimination exists in the criminal 
justice system. In fact, academic estimates and NGO reports suggest the 
contrary. Since 1994, maltreatment of the Roma has been widely documented 
by human rights NGOs such as the Legal Defence Bureau for National and 
Ethnic Minorities (NEKI), the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC) and the 
Romani Civil Rights Foundation (RPA). The Parliamentary Commissioner for 
National and Ethnic Minorities has on numerous occasions called attention to 
discriminatory police actions towards the Roma.56 
In 2002-2003, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee carried out research on 
discrimination against Roma in the criminal justice system, finding deep-
running traces of racial profiling by the police within Roma communities. By 
scrutinizing court files, the research focused on how perpetrators were initially 
detected by the authorities. The findings of the survey appeared to be fully in 
line with similar Anglo-American studies that analyze discrimination in the 
criminal justice procedure against visible minorities. The researchers found that 
Roma offenders and suspects were significantly more likely to have been 
56
 For example, in his 2000 report the Minorities Commissioner observed that the high 
level of discretion allowed in actions such as house searches may easily allow for ethnic 
discrimination. In 1999, he reported a complaint filed by a teacher who alleged that his 
Roma students were discriminated in the course of a stop for ID checks. 2004 saw the first 
victory of the Hungarian human rights movement engaged in defense of Roma rights 
before the European Court of Human Rights. For the first t ime since Hungary ratified the 
Convention, in the Balogh judgment, the Court found a violation of Article 3. 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND ETHNIC DATA COLLECTION IN HUNGARY 177 
identified via police stops and searches, whereas in the case of non-minority 
suspects, other investigatory methods-particularly being caught in the act -
were the dominant causes that lead to the suspects' capture.57 
Another empirical comparative research,58 conducted on behalf of the Open 
Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) between 2005 and 2006 indicated that in Hungary 
the Roma are discriminated against in the context of stops and searches by 
the police, especially in the practice of stopping pedestrians.54 There is strong 
statistical evidence that Roma are subject to pedestrian stops more often than 
non-Roma/1" 
Circumstantial evidence from other stages of the criminal procedure also 
indicates the likeliness of ethnic profiling. According to the 2001 EUMAP 
report61 "research indicates that Roma are more likely than non-Roma to be 
reprimanded in pre-trial detention or ill-treated by the police,62 and tend not to 
have legal representation during investigation". ECRI has expressed concern 
57
 See Farkas: op. cit. 
38
 See Pap, A. L.-Simonovits, B.-Balogi, A.-Vargha, L.: Research Report for Hungary, 
Results from the research project " A Comparative Study of Stop and Search Practices in 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Spain", Budapest , 2006. 
59
 The research was aimed at examining stop and search procedures by the police. In 
Hungary, the empirical data collection had four parts: A questionnaire-based public 
opinion poll targeting a representative group within the Hungarian population; a total of six 
focus group discussions in Budapest , Miskolc and Pécs, with peop le -Roma as well as non-
Roma-who have experienced stop and search; a total of 20 community interviews in Buda-
pest, Miskolc and Pécs, with people-Roma as well as non-Roma-who have experienced 
stop and search and a total of 80 interviews in Budapest, Miskolc and Pécs, with off icers 
who conduct stop and search. 
(
'°The research results are based on a survey series conducted during September, 2005 
which shows that over the past year , 23% of the Hungarian adult population was stopped 
by the police. Among the Roma respondents 57 percent were stopped as pedestrians, at 
entertainment venues or some sort of event (a concert, say). By contrast, among non-Roma 
respondents only 22 percent were stopped at such locations.. 
61
 EUMAP Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Minority Protection. OSI EU 
Accession Monitoring Program 2001. 241. 
62
 Hungarian Helsinki Commit tee and OSI-COLPI, Punished Before Sentence, Buda-
pest, 1997. See also UN Committee Against Torture, Conclusions and recommendations 
concerning Hungary 's third per iodic report, November 1998: "The Committee is also 
concerned about the persistent reports that [,..]a disproportionate number of detainees 
and/or prisoners serving their sentences are Roma." 
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"at evidence that severe problems in the administration of justice exist as regards 
discrimination against members of the Roma/Gypsy community [,..]".63 
Policing and minority-awareness 
In general, racial (ethno-national) awareness in policing is not identified in the 
context of minority victimization, but rather as a task to reduce Roma-associated 
criminality. At best, the context of racial (ethno-national) awareness is focused 
on cultural conflict and equal protection rather than 'race crime. In other 
words, the important issue in the eyes of police leadership is how to prepare 
the police force for dealing with the higher criminality rate and cultural 
specificity of the Roma minority. To put it bluntly, ethnicity is dominantly 
seen as a problem arising in connection with the offenders and not the victims. 
Nevertheless, police training encompasses racism in general and racism as a 
specialized police issue. Anti-discrimination and conflict resolution courses 
and training are thus incorporated into all levels of police education, which, 
since 1999 also includes courses in Roma (cultural) studies. We also see a 
number of special programs promoting Roma presence within the force. There 
are some (mostly unsuccessful) recruiting programs for the police in Roma 
high schools, and a number of affirmative action provisions are available for 
Roma working in the police force. The police also developed nationwide scholar-
ship programs as well as Police Academy entrance examination preparation 
programs for prospective Roma students. 
The police also have a reasonably well developed network of cooperation 
with NGOs and minority organizations. Human rights organizations operate 
legal clinics and legal aid programs, and the police organize and participate in 
training programs in affiliation with civil organizations. Following a 1999 
formal agreement between the National Roma Minority Self Government and 
the National Police, formal and informal connections have been established 
between local, regional and national level police and Roma minority self 
governments. 
A network of outreach officers and specialized liaisons operate at all levels 
of police administration, and police leadership annually monitors these 
networks. Outreach officers and Roma policy-coordinators organize training, 
crime prevention forums, and sports events (i.e. Roma-Police football games). 
Although minority self governments are active partners at the level of official 
declarations, commentators claim that in terms of practical co-operation or 
63
 ECR1 (2000) 5, para. 14. 
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conflict-resolution, these political bodies are not always fully capable of 
"representing" the community. In terms of actual policing practice, there are 
no racial profiling policies per se, but there is an official commitment on behalf of 
police leadership for providing strict scrutiny to all reports regarding anti-
Roma discrimination within the force. The Chief of the national police receives 
an annual report on these cases. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing has been an attempt to show one aspect of the legal and social 
context (the long-standing challenges and sensitivities) of ethnic data generation 
and collection. It is my conviction that the core question in the Hungarian saga 
of ethnic profiling and ill-treatment in criminal justice lies in determining 
under what conditions and with what kind of (external or self-identified) 
definitions the legal framework should operate. In other words, what serves the 
minority's interests? 
Two contradicting conclusions can be drawn: a modest and a daring one. 
As for the first, we may confidently state that the Hungarian legislator did not 
err in providing a narrow framework for ethnic data processing, as whatever 
the reasons for ethnic profiling and police ill-treatment may be, it is certainly 
not related to ethno-national data collection. The second conclusion may be 
that it is (at least partly) due to the lack of applicable tools for measurement 
that ethnic discrimination may flourish. In other words, maybe it is also due to 
the superficially satisfying legislative framework for ethnic data collection that 
indirect and direct discrimination in policing can exist. 
The question is far from easy to answer. In fact, it leads us to perplexing 
long-unresolved dilemmas. The establishment and practical application of 
legal definitions to complex and abstract human behavioral phenomena is a 
fundamental and crucial point in the legal hermeneutic process. It is important 
to note that many legal concepts-such as life or family-are by nature ambiguous; 
yet when there is legislative and legal interest in providing (legally compre-
hensible) definitions the legal system is always successful in the creation of 
some form of conceptualizing. We therefore find workable legal definitions for 
such complex and otherwise controversial concepts as the beginning of life, or 
the life of the fetus in relation of inheriting, or family for tax, and civil legal 
purposes. 
The peculiarity of legal conceptualizing lies in the fact that seemingly 
neutral legal concepts can easily be instruments of social conflict and tools for 
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discrimination. For example, a narrow definition of physical disability or mental 
retardation (phrased in the value-neutral language of medicine) can seriously 
limit the scope of application of equal opportunity or affirmative action 
measures,64 excluding thereby certain groups from its application.65 Similarly, 
throughout the world, one of the terrains of homosexual anti-discrimination 
legislative lobbying is to loosen up the generic (civil) legal concept of marriage to 
include same sex partnerships. (Attempts are made at widening the traditional 
legal marriage-definition, which conceptually requires members to be of the 
opposite sex.) Ethnic and racial identities are textbook examples for collective 
representations of socially constructed particular communities. In traditional 
societies, socially relevant identities (such as class) are usually rigid and 
unchangeable; it was not until post-feudal, modern, open societies, that there 
was room left for the individual's free choice of identity and redefined strategic 
behavior. In fact (at least in theory), in contemporary open societies the denial 
of free choice of identity equals the non-recognition of the individual as a 
source of constitutionally protected value, constituting a violation of human 
dignity.66 
There are, however, numerous theoretical and practical problems regarding 
the legal-administrative assessment of ethnic identification. The first inherent 
contradiction is that while it is membership in an ethnic or racial group that 
serves as a basis for constitutional protection, it is always the individual who is 
to be entitled to the special legal regime, benefits or preferential treatment. The 
practical consequence of administrative-legal attempts to resolve this situation 
is that the individual's group affiliation is defined either too loosely and 
ambiguously, or too rigidly. Legislators and the courts are facing at least two 
types of serious and inherent problems when dealing with affiliation-issues. 
The first practical problem of "ethnic cheating" arises in the context of 
ethnic-racial affiliation being too liberally regulated, or not regulated at all. 
So the lack of legal and administrative guarantees and restrictions open the 
64
 Throughout the world, in budget debates there is substantial disagreement about trying 
to define the medical boundaries of the "disabled group." The issues can be as mundane as 
why the blind may receive a special state aid while others do not, or why specific social 
security preferences and benefits do not cover people with diabetes, or nephritis, etc. 
65
 For a discussion on whether infertility should be considered a "disability" for the 
purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act, for example, see Sato Sh.: A little bit 
disabled: Infertility and the Americans with Disabilities Act. New York University Journal 
of Legislative and Public Policy, Vol. 5 No 1. (2001-2002). 
6,1
 For a detailed analysis, see Eisgruber, Ch. L.: The Constitutional Value of 
Assimilation, 96 Columbia La Review (1996) 87. 
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possibilities for intentional misusage of measures, policies, or preferences 
intended for a specific group only. The question arises: what can the state do 
with the individual's arbitrary, random, or even declared malevolent choice of 
identity when he or she is seeking preferential treatment? As a matter of law 
and legal remedies, even if one openly admits to a fraudulent cause for utilizing 
minority preferences (such as enrolling under minority quotas to educational 
institutions), there is no legal, political, or even moral basis for questioning 
such self-identity classification. 
The second affiliation-dilemma that law enforcement and legislators need to 
face is the following phenomenon: notwithstanding constitutional and statutory 
languages on equal treatment and free choice of identity, it is always the 
discriminatory practice of the majority that actually provides for de facto usage 
of affiliation-definition. Thus when it comes to the maltreatment of members 
of various ethnic groups, no serious definitional or recognition difficulties arise 
for the discriminating party. Just as (despite the Census Office's multiracial 
affiliation recognition) a racially profiling American policeman is untroubled 
by identifying minority drivers, a racist East European restaurant waiter has no 
qualms about spotting a Roma customer and denying service to her. When it 
comes to discrimination or ethnic hostility, it is always the daily practice of the 
majority that will define membership in the discrete and insular minority 
group. 
As for practical solutions, the legislator has basically three options: a) 
adopting a formal, in a way exclusive, and to some extent inevitably rigid 
classification, usually accompanied by some form of registration; or b) accepting 
the liberal standpoint and leaving ethnic-affiliation selection to the inner, 
personal and moral decision of the individual; and c) independent of the above 
two, when it better serves the interest of the underprivileged, victimized group 
make all its best effort to refer to the perceived, external classification as a rule 
of thumb. 
As mentioned above, underlying this project there are two key dilemmas. 
The first one regards the question of how ethnicity should be assessed, for 
example, if we were to advocate that the police start compiling ethnic statistics 
regarding their patrolling activities: should they make records about perceived 
or self-claimed identity? The second fundamental question relates to the 
question of which general data privacy policy serves better the interests of the 
underprivileged and discriminated minority. That is, whether or not we should 
encourage a braver and more sincere policy on ethnic data generation or, 
whether we should instead continue to handle ethnicity as a taboo and see our 
goal as giving publicity to the potential dangers of allowing law enforcement 
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agencies to collect any kind of ethno-racial data. Bearing in mind Justice Harry 
Blackmun's separate opinion in the cornerstone American affirmative action 
case Bakke:67 „To get beyond racism, we must take account of race ... and ... to 
treat some persons equally, we must... treat them differently". 
67
 Regents of University of California v. Bakke, (438 US 265, 1978). 
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CSABA FENYYVESI* 
The Legal and Criminalistic Aspects of Secret Data 
and Information Collection 
1. The typology of secret data and information collection 
Bearing in mind current national, European and global crime rates as well as 
the globalizing tendencies of organized crime, we can state for certain that the 
traditional, open methods of investigation are not efficient for successful 
criminal prosecution. Against conspired criminal networks working with 
wide-scale distribution of work, using significant human and material resources, 
one can step up successfully only with secret methods of covering, and an 
extensive spectrum of human and technical devices. The detailed criminal 
tactical and criminal technical methodology of these devices and strategies is 
defined by criminalistics. Criminal procedure law provides the legal framework. 
Act XIX of 1998 on Criminal Procedures (hereinafter the Criminal Procedures 
Law, CPL), form-fitted to Rule of Law requirements, includes the regulations 
for secret data and information collection. This is a novelty in Hungary, as 
there had been no such directions in the criminal procedure codes. The investi-
gating authorities used to act on the basis of secret, internal commands even 
though their operation affected fundamental rights. The breakthrough came 
with Act X of the year 1990 (already annulled by Act CXXV of 1995), which-
at the dawn of the political transition-was the first to regulate secret service 
operations. This was followed by Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police, Act С of 
1995 on Customs law, customs procedures, and customs administration, Act 
CXXV of 1995 on National Security Services, and Act XXXII of 1997, on the 
Border Guard Services, and finally the recent modification of the law on 
prosecutor's office, which gave a detailed authorization for secret information 
collection,. (Altogether, at present there are four agencies performing investiga-
Dr. univ., Ph.D. Associate Professor, Pécs University Law School Criminal Procedure 
Department, H-7622 Pécs, 48-as tér 1. 
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tive tasks, including the prosecutor's office, five secret services, and the interior 
investigation division of the police-all entitled to collect secret information.) 
Nowadays, two methods can be distinguished in a well-confined manner, 
namely: 
- secret collection of information (memo-technically SECOLLINF), and 
- secret obtainment of data (memo-technically SEOBTDAT). 
Their differences can be summed up in the following table: 
The taxonomic distribution of secret means and methods 
S e c r e t co l l e c t i on of i n f o r m a t i o n Sec re t o b t a i n m e n t of 
d a t a 
Requiring an 
authorisation f rom a 
j udge or the Minister of 
Justice 
No judic ia l warrant required Requir ing a court 
order 
Can last until the 
investigation is ordered 
Before and after the investigation 
is ordered (even during the 
investigation!) 
O n l y a f t e r the 
inves t iga t ion is 
o r d e r e d , until 
s h o w i n g the 
d o c u m e n t s 
- secret search and 
technical recording of 
private apartments 
- surveillance and 
recording of private 
apartments 
- getting acquainted with 
and recording mail (K-
check) 
- getting acquainted with 
and technically 
recording long-
distance 
communicat ions 
- getting acquainted with 
and applying the data 
of Internet or other 
computer 
correspondence 
- the use of an informer, 
undercover operation (+ 
prosecutor ' s permit to person 
cooperat ing) 
- informat ion collection by 
scouting or undercover 
investigator (+ prosecutor ' s 
permiss ion) 
- checking data 
- issuing a cover document or 
establ ishing a cover organisation 
- surveil lance of persons, 
premises , buildings, other 
objects , land and vehicles, as 
well as recording sound and 
picture 
- application of traps 
- sample shopping 
- infiltration into conspiracy 
networks 
- technical 
surveil lance of 
private apartments 
- mail 
- te lecommunicat ion 
data 
- data forwarded by 
means of computer 
systems 
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- controlled shipping 
- victim role play by a policeman 
- establishment of information 
systems 
- tapping in addit ion to the cases 
which require a permission, 
recording of da ta discovered 
with technical devices 
- collection of information from 
communicat ion devices and 
other data s torage devices which 
require an off ic ia l permit 
(+prosecutor 's permission) 
First, let us review those specific secret data collection (SEOBTDAT) activities 
which belong under the auspices of the CPL [a)-b)-c) of Paragraph (1) of Section 
200]. This means the following: 
a) surveillance and recording of events taking place in private apartments by 
means of technical devices, 
b) getting acquainted with the contents of letters, other postal matters, as 
well as communications forwarded by means of telephone cable or 
other communication systems, and the recording of these by means of 
technical devices, 
c) getting acquainted with and applying data forwarded and stored by 
computer systems. 
In the first category, the investigating authority surveys and records the events 
taking place in the private apartment by means of video(cameras) and listening 
devices ("bugs", "sound guns") secretly installed in the interior space, or used 
from the outside. In the second category, the "blocking" of communi-cation 
devices takes place, which includes the "tapping" of faxes, telegrams, and all 
kinds of telephones (hard wire, mobile, etc.), the-to use an old phrase-ferreting 
out and recording of data which will be used as evidence later. Finally, the third 
group contains the secret checking and disclosure of computer data, e-mails, 
internet data, and connections. 
As they affect basic human rights (e.g. the privacy of residence or private 
secrets), they can only be applied with a number of restrictions, such as: 
a) the existence of general basic requirements, 
b) for a specific goal, 
c) in relation of special crimes and special circumstances, 
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cl) against particular individuals, 
e) within time constraints, 
f ) according to strict formal requirements, with a judicial warrant. 
Ad a) The application of SEOBTDAT has three general, basic requirements: 
- necessity (there are sufficient grounds to assume that the obtainment of 
the evidence is hopeless in another way) 
- proportionality 
- the likeliness of the result. 
The conditions are conjunctive: all of them need to exist for the application. 
If either one is absent, the secret means cannot be applied. Naturally, this only 
comes up at the point of approving the motion, because afterwards-provided 
that it was successful-it cannot be debated, the absence of any of these does 
not exclude or make the evidence obtained unlawful. 
Ad b) Unlike the means, the aims are not very special, we could say they are 
general. It is not difficult to satisfy this restriction as we can list the same aims 
even in the case of open investigative acts; 
- the establishment of the identity of the perpetrator, 
- the establishment of the place of residence of the perpetrator, 
- arresting the perpetrator, 
- uncovering means of evidence. 
Ad с) Secret devices can be applied only in relation to special (deliberate) 
criminal acts which pose an outstanding danger to society, or have special 
material or personal conditions. It is fair that the law [Paragraph (1) of Section 
201] lists these; 
The crimes or the attempt or the preparation for such crimes need to be 
- deliberate and to be punished with imprisonment of five years or more, 
furthermore 
- related to crime spreading across the country borders, 
- against a minor, 
- committed serially or is performed through organised commission 
(including habitual commission, in conspiracy or criminal organisation 
as well), 
- related to drugs or materials constituting drugs, 
- related to forging banknotes or securities or 
- committed while being armed. 
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Ad d) The secret device cannot be applied against anybody, it can be used only 
in relation of a defined circle. The target person, as the criminalistics term 
goes, is constituted by the following: 
- primarily the suspect (the comprehensive term "accused" cannot be 
applied here as the secret device can exist exclusively in the investigative 
phase of the criminal procedure) 
- against the potential suspect (the person who can be suspected of the 
commission of the criminal act according to the data of the investigation 
so far but he has not been informed of this yet; that is, it can be applied 
in the event of the existence of the simple personal suspicion), 
- it is possible against others as well, if there is information pertaining 
any criminal relationship with individuals of the previous two categories, 
or there are grounds to assume such a relationship (simple suspicion is 
enough for this, too). 
Among "other individuals" it is a further order of limitation that the above-
listed secret means can only be applied against a lawyer acting as defense 
counsel if there is well-founded suspicion of a criminal act against the counsel 
in connection with the case. This restriction-absolutely correctly-extends to 
the private residence, office, all the telephone lines, communication devices, 
postal and electronic correspondence, as well as all the mail of the attorney. 
Another restrictive institution that is meant to protect the client-attorney privacy 
is that this restriction extends to the consulting rooms of the police detention 
facilities and the penitentiary institutions (including the houses of correction). 
As a marginal note, we would like to add that it is not necessary to use secret 
means in the consulting rooms of the police detention facilities which are 
separated with a glass-plexi wall, as the defense counsel and the accused usually 
need to almost shout with each other, but at least are forced to talk loudly, thus-
violating thereby the defense's secret and intimacy-this can be heard within 
ear's reach.' 
In connection with the tapping of the defense counsels' telephone lines, in 
the 1998 case of Kopp vs Switzerland the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter ECHR).established the violation of Article 8 as the Swiss authorities 
violated the right to privacy and family life when they wiretapped the 
applicant's conversations in the attorney's office. (Bírósági Határozatok, 
hereinafter BH 1998/12. 955-957). 
1
 For more see more in Fenyvesi, Cs.: A védőügyvéd (The Defense Counsel). Budapes t -
Pécs, 2002. 
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Ad e) The secret obtainment of data can only take place during the course of 
the investigation: it begins with the ordering of the investigation, and ends with 
the introduction of the documents of the investigation. Within this timeframe it 
can last for 90 days, with one extension for a maximum period of 180 days. 
With the exception of unpostponable cases (periculum in mora), a notice 
ordering investigation is needed, without which the motion for order cannot be 
formally accepted. In establishing the time of the introduction of the documents, 
it is the introduction of the documents to the first accused (if there are more 
than one) that is to be taken into consideration; it is the point until which the secret 
obtainment of data can be performed. If secret means had been used before 
the investigation was ordered, that could be performed lawfully only within 
the framework of secret collection of information (SECOLLINF). If, in the 
meanwhile, the investigation is ordered, the secret collection of information is 
kind of transformed, and only secret obtainment of data (SEOBTDAT) can be 
carried out according to the CPL [Paragraphs (3)-(4) of Section 200]. 
Ad f ) The most important formal requirement is that the secret data collection 
can be authorised by the court, more precisely the investigator judge, upon 
the prosecutor's motion. In his motion, the prosecutor, as the master of the 
investigation (dominus litis) has to detail the following: 
- the name of the prosecutorial body, the investigating authority, 
- the date the investigation was ordered, 
- the number of the case, 
- if there is or has been secret information collection,, who performed it, 
what data has been obtained, 
- the place of the planned performance of secret data collection, in the case 
of telephone tapping, the telephone number (either hard wire or mobile), 
- the name and identification particulars of the person affected (the target 
person), 
- the name of the means and methods, 
- the starting and ending date of the planned period, with the hour and 
day indicated, 
- the existence of the restricting conditions detailed under points a)-b)~ 
c)-d)-e), 
- in case of an unpostponable (emergency) order, its reason and time, 
- the documents providing grounds for the motion attached, 
- upon a motion for extension the documents emerging since the earlier 
authorisation. 
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The investigating judge makes a decision about the motion within 72 hours. 
She/he may reject, fully or partially approve it. In case the motion is approved 
the judge defines what kind of secret means and methods can be used, against 
whom, between what time constraints [Paragraph (4) of Section 203]. 
In unpostponable (emergency) cases, not only the judge but also the 
prosecutor may order secret data collection for a period of 72 hours, however, 
the motion for authorisation is also to be put forward at the same time. If the 
court turns it down, there is no room for unpostponable order on the grounds of 
unchanged factual basis, and-as referred to earlier in connection with legal 
remedies-there lies no appeal. 
If we take a look at the six restrictions listed above, we can see that apart from 
the first two (a-b) posing general specifications, the violation of the other four 
points (c-d-e-f) all make the data obtained thus unlawful (excluding it from the 
chain of evidence), thus they fall into the category of excluded evidence. We 
can conclude this, even though the law will not declare this expressis verbis in 
all cases. 
2. The execution of secret obtainment of data, getting acquainted with 
and using its results 
Secret data collection itself is carried out by the police and the special sub-
units of the national security services, with whom-in ways specified in separate 
legal regulations-the telecommunication, postal, computer network service 
providers are obliged to cooperate with. 
The prosecutor and the head of the investigating authority have several 
obligations in connection with secret data collection. On the one hand, he/she 
has to terminate secret data collection without delay if [Paragraph (3) of 
Section 204] 
a) in the event of unpostponable order, the court rejected the motion, 
b) it has fulfilled its objective determined in the permission or warrant, 
c) the period of time determined in the permission or has lapsed, 
d) the investigation has been terminated, 
e) it is obvious that no result can be expected from its further appli-
cation. 
With respect to these, the law enumerates excluded evidence only in case 
of points a) and e)-in Paragraph (4) of Section 206-however, our opinion is 
that the unlawfulness prevails within the circle of all the obligations described 
here and below. 
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The same individuals also have an obligation to eliminate all data that has 
not importance for the goal, and data recorded in connection with individuals 
who are not involved in the case. An additional requirement in connection 
with the secret data obtained subsequently, not permitted by the judge, in an 
unpostponable manner, is that they are to be destroyed not within 8 days but 
without delay [Paragraph (4) of Section 204j. All these also belong to the 
category of excluded evidence. 
Third, they have continuous data protection and confidentiality obligations, 
according to the regulations of the state secret and service secret law. Upon 
the request of the investigating judge authorizing secret obtainment of data, 
the prosecutor is obligated to present the data obtained so far. As a control of 
legality, she/he examines its application and should it be established that the 
terms of the permission have been transgressed, she/he may terminate i t-with 
a final and binding resolution-and in the case of other violation law, may 
terminate the secret data collection [Paragraph (3) of Section 205]. 
Fourth, it is the obligation of the prosecutor to notify all parties affected 
by the secret data collection provided that no criminal procedure has been 
initiated against them and it would not endanger the success of the criminal 
procedure. The notification is to be made only if both conditions are satisfied. 
The measure often contested in the literature is a constitutional state require-
ment, while we can definitely expect that the person notified about the tapping 
of his phone will fear using the telephone all his life even though he might 
have only been "affected" by the case without committing or even planning 
anything unlawful. Thus we consider the application of the legal requirements 
acceptable only with very serious restrictions. 
It is already the fifth obligation that the head of the prosecutorial or 
investigating authority is to draw up a signed report of the execution of the 
secret obtainment of data, which contains 
- its progress, 
- what means and methods were applied, for how long and where, 
- who was affected by it, 
- the place and time of the source of the data not destroyed 
- the fact of the achievement of the goal, or the reason in case of its 
absencefParagraph (5) of Section 204j. 
The report is unconditionally necessary for the prosecutor if she/he endeavors 
to use the result of secret data collection as documentary evidence in the open 
criminal procedure. Otherwise, it can be made evidence only if it cannot be 
replaced by anything else. I n this case, by its application, the state secret nature 
of the data ceases, except if the data is a state secret regardless of the manner of 
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obtainment. In this case, the cancellation permission of the master of the state 
secret is also required. 
The permission is to be attached to the documents of the investigation to-
gether with the motion for permission and the resolution of the court granting 
permission (the three documents) (Paragraphs (l)-(2) of Section 206]. 
Data obtained during the course of secret data collection, before ordering 
the investigation can also be made into chain of evidence if the master of the 
secret cancels the state secret classification and if it meets the general 
requirements listed under points a-f, and if the purpose of use is the same as 
the original goal of secret obtainment of data or secret collection of information 
[Paragraph (4) of Section 206]. 
Finally, here is a table about the comparison of (the execution) of secret 
collection of information requiring a permit (SECOLLINF) and secret data 
obtainment (SEOBTDAT) activity. 
Secret collection of information 
Secret collection of 
information 
( S E C O L L I N F ) 
Secret obtainment of data 
( S E O B T D A T ) 
Legal basis - Police Act (XXXIV of year 
1994) 
- State Security Services Act 
(CXXV of 1995) 
- Border Guard Act ( X X X I I of 
1997) 
- Customs Law (C of 
- 1995) 
- Act on the public prosecutor (V 
of 1972) 
С PL 
Party ordering Judge and Minister of Just ice Court (investigating judge) 
T ime of 
application 
- before the investigation is 
ordered 
- after the investigation is 
ordered 
- during the investigation 
- until the introduction of 
documents 
Period of t ime of 
application 
90 days that can be ex tended by 90 days 
Method, means - secret search and technical 
recording of private res idence 
- the surveil lance and recording 
of a private residence 
- the technical surveillance of 
a private residence 
- gathering and recording 
mail, te lecommunicat ion 
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- mail (K-check) 
- gather ing and digitally 
recording telecommunicat ion 
messages 
- gathering and using the da ta of 
Internet or other computer 
technical correspondence 
data, and data forwarded by 
compute r systems 
range of criminal 
acts 
- Police L a w Points a)-j) of 
Paragraph (3) and Paragraph 
(4) of Section 69 
- National security interest as 
well 
CPL Points a)-g) of 
Paragraph ( 1) of Section 201 
Against w h o m 
(target person) 
"potential accused" the accused and persons in 
criminal relationship with the 
accused 
General condit ion Hopeless in other ways (necessary) 
+ proport ional (would 
propose disproportional 
diff iculty in another way) 
+ the result is rendered 
probable 
Termination Police Law Paragraph (1 ) of 
Section 73 
C P L Paragraph (3) of 
Section 204 
Ihe achievement of the goal 
(lie expirat ion of the deadl ine 
no result can be expected 
subsequently, the judge did not al low emergency 
+ is un lawful for some reason + the investigation was 
terminated 
Destruction of data data wi thout interest for the goal, and data recorded in connect ion 
with individuals not involved in the case 
Use as ev idence inclusion into report documen t and a t tachment to investigation 
documents 
Subsequent 
notification of the 
party affected 
None the prosecutor notifies the 
affected parties if no cr iminal 
procedure was launched 
against and is not 
endanger ing the success of 
the procedure 
3. Secret collection of information not requiring a judge's permission 
As mentioned above, to prevent, uncover, and interrupt criminal activity, to 
establish the identity of the perpetrator, to locate wanted criminals, to establish 
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their place of residence, and to obtain evidence, the police-within the 
constraints of Act XXXIV of 1994 on the police-can collect secret data. 
During the criminal procedure, the data obtained during the course of secret 
information collection-which is possible-as well as the identity of the person 
cooperating with the police, the mere fact and technical details of information 
collection constitute a secret until used as means of evidence. 
The aim of the application of the secret criminal-technical means is also 
criminal data collection, or we could say, criminal intelligence service. In a 
wider sense, criminal intelligence service is the information collection activity 
carried out under cover, in a hidden manner (conspiring), of an offensive 
nature, within the framework of means and methods defined by law. 
In a narrower sense, criminal intelligence service is the integration of 
official police personnel in criminally significant positions, projects, areas, and 
regard to people in order to obtain data necessary for the investigation). 
The types of secret information collection not requiring a judicial warrant: 
a) the police may employ an informer or a fiduciary person, 
b) may collect information undercover, 
c) to cover the cooperating person, as well as to cover under cover operations 
can issue and use a cover document, can establish and maintain a cover business, 
d) can survey persons who can be suspected of the commission of the 
criminal act as well as persons in relation with the above (so-called target 
persons), as well as the premises, buildings, and other projects, section of 
land or road, vehicles, events that can be associated with the criminal act, can 
collect information about it, and can record the findings with technical devices 
suitable for the recording of sound, picture, other signs or traces, 
e) in order to uncover the perpetrator of a criminal act or in the interest of 
proving, is allowed to apply a trap-that does not cause damage or harm to one's 
health-can perform sample or fake or purchasing, may carry out controlled 
shipment, and can engage in victim role-play by a policeman, 
f ) may establish information systems, 
g) apart from the cases requiring a permission, they can tap and record the 
findings with technical means (e.g. conversation in a park), 
h) may collect information from telecommunication systems requiring 
official permissions and other data storage facilities. 
The police can conclude secret cooperation agreements with natural persons or 
legal entities occurring in the above enumeration, as well as organisations 
194 CSABA FENYVESI 
without a legal entity (in practise, most often with the informer), and can give 
material remuneration-even in foreign currency. 
At the expense of its own budget the police can establish and maintain cover 
businesses indicated under point c) according to the legal regulations with 
respect to business entities or private enterprises.. 
A special combination of secret service devices is the so-called undercover 
agent and his activity. Due to its existence and human nature, it is considered a 
criminal tactical device rather, at the same time, as he is planning to uncover a 
criminal act as a flagrant delict, thus setting a "trap" to the real perpetrator, 
she/he is also in the role of an "agent provocateur". Nowadays, the provocateur 
is used mostly the fight against drug crimes. The reason the provocateur is 
needed in these cases is that drug-related criminal acts typically do not have a 
victim, there is no accuser at the police, no party filing a complaint. Thus 
the undercover agents pose as buyers, uncovering the drug dealers with test 
purchases. 
Notwithstanding its use in criminalistics use, we would like to mention the 
theoretical, ethical and possible criminal law liability misgivings in connection 
with the provocateur. As we have pointed out earlier-in these cases the police 
practically sets a trap for the target person(s). They create a situation in which the 
target person thinks that the provocateur is an accomplice, that is the situation 
is, so to say, "ideal" for the commission of the crime. The classical example of 
the provocateur is the undercover policewoman who poses as a prostitute in 
the street, or an police officer posing as a drug dealer. 
The main ethical problem in connection with the provocateur is posed by 
the possibility that the provocateur might even get the target person to commit 
a criminal act that he would not have committed by himself. In this case, the 
investigation did not uncover but create a criminal act, as the provocateur is 
able to directly influence the target person. The correct attitude is that the 
police should establish the situation favourable for the commission of the criminal 
act, but the decision needs to be made by the target person independently, 
without the influence of the provocateur. 
4. Secret information collection requiring a judicial warrant 
Secret information collection requiring a judicial warrant may have the following 
types: 
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a) searching a private residence in secret (secret house search ), recording 
the findings by technical means, 
b) surveying and recording the events taking place in a private residence 
with technical means, 
c) reading letters, other mail, as well as the contents of communication 
forwarded by means of telephone wire or a telecommunication, and 
recording it that by means of technical devices (e.g. telephone tapping). 
The police can use these special (so-called operative) means only during the 
persecution of crimes of outstanding dangerousness. If they 
a) can be associated with international crime, 
b) are aimed against an child, 
c) are realized serially or by organized commission, 
d) are related to drugs or materials constituting drugs, 
e) are related to forging money or securities, 
f ) are realized by armed commission, 
g) are of terrorist nature, 
h) seriously disturb public safety. 
5. Particular secret criminal technical devices for information collection 
The different secret tapping, surveillance and search activities are carried out 
by the investigating authorities with special criminal technical devices as listed 
in the appendix of 135/1997. Government Decree 135/1997 (VII. 29.) 
They are the following: 
a) tapping devices; 
b) secret visual surveillance devices; 
c) secret entry devices; 
d) other criminal technical devices. 
ad a) Any electronic, mechanical or other device, method, "technology", or 
software can be a tapping device if used to access secret information without 
the knowledge of those taking part in the communication, provided that they 
possess one of the following features: 
aa) It have been designed, or produced for the secret tapping, forwarding, or 
recording of direct speech, or or equipments that can be used for such purposes 
without significant transformation. Thus especially 
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- wall (contact) microphones and stethoscopes provided with electronic 
amplifiers 
- tapping systems using laser or infra red radiation, or based on ultra sound 
principle, 
- miniature transmitters that can be built in or may be remote controlled, 
and their special receivers, 
- small-size transmitters built into different hiding devices or that can be 
hidden under clothing, the receivers and sound recording devices, 
- miniature sound-recording devices with a recording capacity of over 10 
hours, 
- high-sensitivity parabola- and gun microphones, 
- sub-miniature electret microphones and acoustic probes. 
ab) Equipment that has been designed or produced for secret gathering, 
forwarding, or recording of data stored on digital or analogue information 
facilities and/or processing computers, computer or other devices, or information 
carriers used with them, or or equipments that can be used for such purposes 
without significant transformation. 
ac)Equipment that has been designed or produced for secret tapping of 
telecommunication systems forwarding hard-line and/or wireless speech and 
non-speech information or equipments that can be used for such purposes 
without significant transformation.. 
ad b) Any optical, mechanical, electronic and other device or accessory, as 
well as a software operating these can be a secret visual surveillance devices, 
provided that it possesses one of the following features: 
bfljEquipment that have been designed or produced for secret surveillance 
or recording , or for the forwarding and processing of the information obtained 
thereby, or equipments that can be used for such purposes without significant 
transformation. Thus especially: 
- small-sized, high resolution and sensitivity CCD cameras and accessories, 
- miniature cameras and accessories that can be hidden into hiding devices 
or under clothing, 
- video sign forwarding devices operating in micro-wave range, and their 
receivers, 
- video sign forwarding devices using the electric network, and their receivers, 
- fibrescopes with small entry openings, and systems using glass fibre optics 
enabling secret surveillance, and adapters enabling connection to cameras or 
video cameras. 
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b&)Equipments that operate under restricted light conditions (i.e. do not 
require secondary lighting) and contain special photo-multiplying tubes or 
optical elements. Especially light-enhancing devices that can be used for night 
photography and video recording . 
be) Special night vision devices operating in infra red range. 
ad c) Secret entry devices are mechanical, electronic, optical and software 
devices that have been produced for the purpose of secretly entering closed 
premises (enclosed area of land, building, vehicle, etc.), provided that they 
possess one of the following features: 
- devices, "technologies" and accessories that aredesigned and produced 
for the replacement of the proper opening device of locks, padlocks, bolts, 
etc. operating on the basis of mechanical, electronic or other principles, for 
destructive and destruction-free opening, 
- devices and software that is developed to penetrate electronic security 
systems. 
ad d) Other secret service devices include: 
AQcoding or crypting devices, 
z/£)communication systems that can be hidden under clothing, equipped with 
a wireless ear piece, 
dc)miniature transmitters and special receivers that can be used for 
positioning. 
In our opinion, the latter may have a play a significant role in combatting car 
thefts with the use of the so-called "beeper"." 
The head of the investigating authority terminates the use of the special 
devices promptly if the its objective has been accomplished, if the time frame 
within the court order has been transgressed, if no result can be expected 
from its further application, or if the application ordered through preliminary 
emergency procedures was not authorised by the judicial authorities. 
From all secret service expenses, probably, the largest amount is spent on 
Costs may reach, 15-20 billion EUR annually, primarily paid by the USA and 
Great Britain. It was revealed in 1999 that an American tapping system under 
the cover name "Echelon" was able to survey every civilian satellite, every under-
sea cable, as well as Internet mail and sound communication. The American secret 
2
 For more see more Gremela, Z.: A titkos információgyűjtésről (About the secret 
collection of information) . Rendészeti Szemle, 1993. No. 3. 
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service got as far as "convincing" the largest software manufacturers, Microsoft, 
Lotus, and Netscape to harmonize their export Internet products with American 
regulations. Namely, only to use coding that can be decoded and tapped without 
any particular effort. 
As a closing idea 
It is clear both from the above-described criminal procedural legal framework, 
and from the criminalistics arsenal-and within that, criminal-technical and 
tactical means-that the possibilities for secret data collection are given for 
professionals. From this point on the only question is who is going to operate 
them and with what efficiency. 
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Professor Vanda Lamm, Director of the Institute for Legal Studies of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, has published her third book on the problems 
of international adjudication. The volume elaborates on the regime of compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which was set up 
in the wake of World War One, and of the United Nations International Court 
of Justice, which replaced the former after the second conflagration, by 
studying the practice of States, the decisions of the two Courts, and exploring 
and probing into the whole spectrum of the pertinent literature. 
The peaceful relations among States means not simply the lack of the use 
force, as it would be equivalent to a continuous maintenance of the status quo. 
That is impossible, however, for the different economic and social processes 
result in an inevitable transformation of interstate relations. To achieve genuine 
peace, it is necessary to open up a possibility for peaceful change without 
upsetting the legally regulated system of relations between the States concerned, 
Under such circumstances paramount importance is attached to creating a 
delicate balance between the dynamics of change and the need for stability. 
This in turn is hardly conceivable without international legal disputes, the 
settlement of which calls for a relative equilibrium between subordination and 
superordination of States in respect to the settlement of a concrete conflict: 
small and large States may equally advance international legal arguments 
before an independent and impartial forum. Settlement of interstate disputes by 
international judicial fora, primarily the International Court of Justice, is 
therefore a matter of the utmost importance. 
1
 Earlier volumes by the author: Az államok közötti viták rendezésének története 
(History of the Settlement of Interstate Disputes). Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1990.; and A 
Nemzetközi Bíróság ítéletei és tanácsadói véleményei 1945-1993 (Judgements and Advisory 
Opinions of the International Court of Justice 1945-1993). Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi 
Könyvkiadó, 1995. 
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However, as is also stated by Vanda Lamm, States are averse to having 
grave conflicts that affect the core and substance of their sovereignty submitted 
to an international judicial forum. What are the reasons for misgivings about 
independent and impartial fora? The first reason, well illustrated by Vanda 
Lamm, is the fact that surrender of control over decisions is understood by 
States to mean reducing their power, which, if that course is taken, becomes 
objective, incapable of being influenced and impossible to modify or to overbid. 
Since a judicial forum decides according to international law, it takes a dispute 
from the complex system of relations between the States parties, thereby 
failing to consider, e.g., the importance of economic relations between the two 
States, the foreign policy influences on them within an eventual common 
system of alliance, the effects exerted by the two prime ministers belonging to 
a common family of political parties, and so on. Moreover, a forum formally 
functioning as a court is bound to create a winner and a loser, which carries 
domestic policy risks. As against this, in the case of third-party involvement as 
another chief diplomatic way of conflict settlement beside negotiations, a great 
power playing such a middleman role may offer guarantees for bringing about 
a stable settlement and provide services for the parties to the dispute, which 
tend to compensate for any loss that may be associated with the agreement. All 
this is absent from a decision by an international judicial forum. 
Accordingly, in contrast to domestic courts, the jurisdiction of international 
judicial fora is based on the express consent of the disputant States. Such 
was/is also consequently the case when the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice was, or that of the United Nations International Court 
of Justice is, accepted. Under the optional clause contained in the Statute, States 
could or can, by making a unilateral declaration, recognize the jurisdiction of 
these two fora in respect of their disputes with other States having made such a 
declaration. The monograph discusses the optional clause as well as the special 
features, the theoretical and practical issues, and the procedural problems 
connected declarations accepting jurisdiction. 
The first chapter sums up the history of international arbitration, with 
particular attention devoted to the ways and means of attaining compulsory 
international adjudication. At The Hague Second Peace Conference early in 
the 20th century it was believed possible to achieve compulsory international 
adjudication only in legal matters, and not in political issues, with even excep-
tions to be allowed to matters affecting the vital interests, the independence 
and the honour of States. 
The second chapter discusses the history of the elaboration of the optional 
clause and its concept. The members of the 1920 Committee of Jurists entrusted 
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with drawing up the draft on the international judicial forum to be established 
gave different interpretations of Art. XIV of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations as to whether or not that Article provided for compulsory jurisdiction. 
The long-drawnout debate was concluded with the adoption of the Brazilian 
jurist Fernandez's proposal as embodied in Article 36, of the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. Under this Article, States may declare 
that they accept the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning the 
interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of 
any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation, and the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach 
of an international obligation. Such declarations may be made unconditionally 
or on condition of reciprocity, or for a certain time. Two and a half decades 
later, at the San Francisco Conference elaborating the Charter of the United 
Nations, the small and middle powers seemed inclined to establish compulsory 
international adjudication, but it was categorically refused by the United 
States and the Soviet Union. While effecting minor changes and spelling out 
functional continuity between the two Courts, the Conference took over the 
earlier wording of the optional clause for the new Court. The author points 
out that the system constituted by declarations of acceptance of compulsory 
jurisdiction has created a special kind of international adjudication in respect 
of States assuming the extra obligation, with the rules thereof actually evolved 
by over eight decades of State practice and by the decisions of the Courts. 
The third chapter deals with the special features of declarations of acceptance, 
including questions like the freedom of States to make a declaration of accep-
tance, the operation of the autonomy of the will of the parties regarding the 
content of declarations, problems of collective declarations of acceptance, 
problems concerning the ratification and the deposit of declarations, and the 
continuing validity of declarations made during the interwar period. As is 
emphasized by Vanda Lamm, the two Courts prescribed no formalities for 
declarations of acceptance, which, however, must clearly show the clear 
intent to accept jurisdiction. Under the judicial practice, declarations must be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and are to enter 
into force on the day of deposit. The author stresses that insertion as suggested 
of an intervening period between the making and the entry into force of 
declarations of acceptance would not but encourage some States to try to evade 
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by taking advantage of it 
for denouncing or modifying their own declaration. In addition, it would be 
difficult to answer the question of how long the reasonable time as suggested 
by the some authors would exactly be until entry into force. It may be added to 
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the author's latter statement that the International Court of Justice might, in its 
decisions, name the factors of reckoning the reasonable time and might 
specify, following the example of the European Court of Human Rights, the 
length of the period that obviously extends beyond that time. As has been 
graphically demonstrated by Vanda Lamm, in order for a declaration made in 
respect of the Permanent Court of International Justice to remain valid without 
any special act in respect of the United Nations International Court of Justice 
the latter's practice requires that at the time of accession to the Statute of the 
new Court the declaration should be valid and that the State concerned should 
have been continuously a party to the Statutes of both Courts. 
The fact that States attach reservations to their declarations of acceptance, 
while at the same time excluding certain issues from the scope thereof, may 
appear surprising at first sight. In actuality, however, there is no cause for 
surprise, stresses the author, since States make use of that tool even in the case 
of declarations accepting the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals. From the fourth 
chapter on the admissibility of reservations to declarations of acceptance it 
becomes clear that making reservations between the two World Wars was 
just as permissible as it has been after World War Two. Nevertheless, the post-
1945 period has hardly seen any declaration of acceptance that contains no 
reservation. According to Vanda Lamm, the reasons can be summed up as 
follows. Practically every State is confronted with some international problem 
which it would not like to bring before the International Court of Justice. The 
advance of science and technology may give rise to new international disputes 
in respect of which States wish to preserve their right of disposal. Finally, it is 
the earlier decisions of the Court that lead to such a reservation, notably States 
wish to avoid similar situations by the use of that device. Considering that, on 
the basis of the principle of reciprocity, reservations may also be invoked by 
the opponent State and that other States may likewise deem it well advised to 
withdraw a particular issue from the scope of the Court's jurisdiction, few 
objections are raised to reservations, stresses the author. 
As regards the classification of reservations, the study accepts the traditional 
division (ratione personae, ratione materiae, ratione temporis), while renewing 
it by introducing the classes of generally accepted and destructive reservations. 
The first class includes reservations that can be considered as accepted on the 
whole by the community of States, whereas reservations undermining the regime 
of the optional clause and rendering acceptance of the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction illusory are consigned to the second class. As will, be treated in 
detail in the seventh and eighth chapters of this volume, the first class comprises 
reservations like those concerning, e.g., other means of peaceful settlement, 
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hostilities and armed conflicts, or objective domestic jurisdiction, and the other 
consists of reservations relating to subjective domestic jurisdiction (Conally) and 
multilateral treaties (Vandenberg). (I shall return to the question of classification 
at a later stage, after the review of the said chapters.) 
The fifth chapter of the monograph examines the legal nature of the regime 
of the optional clause. In it, the author draws upon State practice and the Court's 
relevant decisions in proving that the system of declarations is not contractual 
in nature. Hence nor are such the relations between States party to the regime. 
The sixth chapter analyzes the operation of the principle of reciprocity with 
regard to declarations. For reciprocity to prevail, namely for suability to be 
ensured, States are required to make a declaration in respect to one and the 
same obligation, yet this does not entail the need to make identical declarations 
in all aspects, but a different wording will do just as well. In the Interhandel 
Case the International Court of Justice pointed up to the limits of reciprocity 
by stating that reciprocity does not entitle a State, namely the United States in 
the case at hand, to invoke a limitation which the other party, Switzerland, did 
not include in its own declaration of acceptance. On the other hand, the principle 
of reciprocity does not preclude, as the Court held in another cases, the possibility 
of the claiming State filing an application just a few days after the deposit of its 
declaration. Nevertheless, reciprocity does not apply to formal questions such as 
the duration and the entry into force of declarations. The author observes that 
reciprocity entails important consequences. The parties are in no position to 
know in the abstract the exact scope of The Court's jurisdiction on the basis of 
declarations of acceptance, because it depends on the line-up of claiming and 
defending States. Since reciprocity prevails in respect of reservations and 
limitations as well, this principle puts States that make such declarations on an 
equal footing with those that refrain from making reservations to or placing 
limitations on their declarations. A reservation may thus be pleaded even by 
the opponent party, so it may prove counterproductive as it is applied against 
the declarant State with a view to avoiding the action brought by that State. 
The seventh chapter on the generally accepted reservations explores the entire 
range thereof along with the aforementioned reservations made with regard to 
other means of peaceful settlement of disputes, hostilities and armed conflicts, 
and objective domestic jurisdiction, discussing reservations relating to territorial 
sovereignty and environmental protection, referring to the existence or lack of 
close relations between States, and excluding the retroactive effect of decla-
rations, and surprise applications. Among the less frequent reservations it deals 
with those affecting constitutional matters, linking the entry into force of a 
declaration to declarations by other States, relating to disputes about a specific 
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treaty or specific treaties, and excluding disputes with regard to foreign debts 
and liabilities. 
The author notes that reservations relating to the means of peaceful settle-
ment of disputes should not be confused with cases where the parties may not 
have recourse to the Court except after having conducted negotiations or 
having employed the conciliation procedure according to the provisions of the 
particular treaty. In the first case a dispute cannot be submitted to the Court on 
the ground of the inapplicability of the optional clause. As concerns reservations 
with regard to hostilities and armed conflicts, the author stresses that the more 
recent reservations of this type exclude disputes about acts of individual and 
collective self-defence and/ against aggression as well as about peace-keeping 
operations of international organizations. Drawing upon the literature on the 
subject, Vanda Lamm underscores the need for a thorough examination of 
whether or not a particular State was involved in the hostilities at the time of 
the events giving rise to the dispute and whether there is a direct or indirect 
causal relationship between the events and the dispute under consideration. 
The more recent reservations relating to territorial sovereignty tend to exclude 
from the scope of the Court 's jurisdiction issues of marine areas and air-space 
along with border disputes. In connection with these two classes of cases it is 
worth observing that the related reservations are a clear indication that a large 
number of States are loath to have their major conflicts settled by decisions of 
a law-enforcing nature handed down by an objective, impartial forum. 
The essence of reservations relating to objective domestic jurisdiction is 
that a State excludes from the scope of the Court's jurisdiction such matters 
which according to international law are belonging to national jurisdiction. The 
author asserts that if such a reservation is relied upon by a State in connection 
with a concrete mater, the Court has the right and the duty to decide up on that 
matter. Reservations intended to prevent surprise applications may be aimed at, 
inter alia, ruling out the possibility of filing an application against the particular 
State immediately upon the entry into forte of its declaration accepting the 
jurisdiction of the Court. In such instance the entry into forte of the declaration 
is suspended for a period of six or twelve months in general, the suspension 
opening up a possibility to denounce or to amend the declaration, too. The 
other type of related reservations is intended to prevent the Court considering a 
legal dispute in cases where a State has expressly made a declaration of 
acceptance for the purpose of submitting a particular matter to the Court. As is 
stated by Vanda Lamm, the question arises whether such a reservation is aimed 
at preventing the given matter from ever being brought before the Court or 
such aim is subject to proof. 
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As noted earlier, destructive reservations are discussed in the seventh 
chapter. The core and substance of a reservation relating to subjective domestic 
jurisdiction, which is associated with the name of the American senator 
Conally, is that the matters coming within domestic jurisdiction and excluded 
from the Court's jurisdiction are unilaterally determined by the declarant State 
itself. Operative for forty years, the original American formula has been adopted 
by a number of States, with minor changes in its wording in this particular 
case. The author points out that the literature on international law is unanimous 
in emphasizing the importance of good faith in the practice of making 
reservations. Since bad faith cannot be presumed, the principle of good faith 
can but provide a weak guarantee in respect of resorting to such reservations. 
Similarly associated with the name of an American senator, Vandenberg,2 
is the type of reservation relating to multilateral treaties. The crucial point in 
the first version of this reservation is the requirement for the States concerned 
to agree in bringing a particular dispute before the Court. The United States 
reservation is vague as it fails to clearly enunciate whether all States involved 
in a dispute or all the contracting parties should be in agreement on having the 
dispute considered by the Court, asserts the author. At any rate, in the Case 
concerning Military and Para-Military Activities in and against Nicaragua, the 
United States opted for a narrower interpretation, while in its judgment the 
Court accepted it, holding that it had jurisdiction to identify the States involved 
in the dispute. The States following the American example have come to use 
another version of the formula which requires all States party to a given multi-
lateral treaty to participate as parties in the proceedings. Furthermore, in dealing 
with this type of reservations, Vanda Lamm emphasizes that it is not clear 
what position will be taken by the rest of the States party to the multilateral 
treaty in question, especially since the position of the intervening State in the 
proceedings before the Court is almost equally unclarified. According to the 
second version of the Vandenberg reservation, in cases where the United States is 
a party to a multilateral treaty the US must expressly consent to the Court's 
jurisdiction, which enables it to block the proceedings unilaterally. By excluding 
the interpretation of multilateral treaties from the scope of the Court's juris-
diction the Vandenberg reservation has a particularly destructive effect on 
international adjudication, because, as is stressed by the author, similar disputes 
tend to arise in a considerable number of cases brought before the Court, let 
:
 Vandenberg is known to have made the proposal on which the American Senate 
authorized the United States to participate in a military all iance, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organizat ion, in time of peace. 
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alone the fart, we may add, that nearly all important fields of international law 
are governed by multilateral treaties to which a large number of States are party. 
Perhaps the most interesting, exposition of the subject is to be found in 
the part of the monograph dealing with the relationship between destructive 
reservations and the Statute of the Court. An invalid reservation is to carry 
implications for the declaration itself, which also becomes invalid, or else it 
would compel the given State to assume an extra obligation by reason of the 
fact that the State should accept the Court 's jurisdiction without making a 
reservation. And those who criticized the International Court of Justice for 
having failed to take a position on the question of contestable reservations are 
but seemingly right, because acceptance of the validity of those reservations 
would have encouraged other States to make similar reservations and would 
have undermined the Court's own authority, as a pronouncement thereon would 
have been tantamount to the Court clearly acknowledging that its right to 
decide on the question of its jurisdiction had greatly narrowed in range. On the 
other hand, however, declaring the invalidity of such reservations would have 
operated to invalidate the declarations themselves, thereby the Court itself 
narrowing the scope of its jurisdiction, for in practice a particular State may 
happen not to invoke its destructive reservation in a given case. 
Returning now to the question of classification of reservations, what is 
certain is that a reservation not belonging to the class of destructive ones does 
not mean its being constructive as it also implies a limit to the acceptance of 
jurisdiction. It is nevertheless undeniable that the reservations consigned by 
the author to the generally accepted category are less destructive with respect 
to the possibility to establish the Court's jurisdiction, the reason being that they 
were formulated with relative precision, so in this sense they have a limited effect, 
whereas the reservations relating to objective domestic jurisdiction preserve the 
Court's discretionary right. Thus, on the whole, they are less arbitrary and less 
questionable. At the same time, however, the reservations relating to hostilities 
and armed conflicts and territorial disputes are the most destructive possible if 
viewed in the context of the significance and actual role of international 
adjudication as a means of peaceful settlement of international disputes. 
The ninth chapter of the monograph is concerned with the termination and 
modification of declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction. The author 
emphasizes that once the proceedings before the Court have been instituted, 
termination or modification has no effect on the matter under consideration. 
Even declarations failing to provide for denunciation, i.e. made for an un-
definited period, may be denounced, practically at any time. By contrast, 
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declarations made for a definite period and fixing no date for denunciation 
cannot be terminated except upon expiry of the period of notice. 
The tenth chapter sums up the author's conclusions, while also discussing 
the prospects for acceptance of jurisdiction and the approach thereto of the 
permanent members of the Security Council. 
The monograph is completed with useful annexes on the cases submitted to 
the two World Courts under the optional clause and on the declarations of 
acceptance. 
It can be stated in summary that this monograph is an excellent work 
discussing fundamental, issues and covering a wealth of related material. 
Hopefully it will be available soon in English for a wider professional 
audience. 
Gábor Kardos 

New subject collections available 
Akadémiai Kiadó offers a new suite of electronic-only journals 
collect ions in Arts & Humanities, Life Sciences, Sciences, 
and Social Sciences w i t h significant pr ic ing discounts. 
Akadémiai Journals Collection • Social Sciences 
Acta Antiqua 
Acta Archaeologica 
Acta Ethnographica Hungarica 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 
Acta Oeconomica 
Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology 
Review of Sociology 
Society and Economy 
For fur ther details please visit our homepage at 
www.akademiaik iado.hu/col lect ions 
VILMOS PESCHKA, 
editor-in-chief 
Professor of Legal 
Philosophy 
Member of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences 
Awardee of the highest 
Hungarian Scientific 
State Order 
(Széchenyi Prize) 
He has published 12 books 
(in Hungarian, English, 
German, Japanese) and 
more than 150 articles 
VANDA LAMM, editor 
Professor of International Law, 
Széchenyi István University 
(Győr) 
Director, Institute for Legal 
Studies, HAS 
Member of the European 
Academy of Arts, Sciences 
and Humanities 
Associate Member of the Institu 
de Droit International 
Research fields: 
public international law, 
nuclear law 
Our online journals are available at our Meta Press-hosted website: www.akademiai.com 
As an added benefit to subscribers, you can now access the electronic version of every 
printed article along wi th exciting enhancements that include: 
• Subscription 
• Free trials to many publications 
• Pay-per-view purchasing of individual articles 
• Enhanced search capabilities such as full-text and abstract searching 
• ActiveSearch (resubmits specified searches and delivers notifications 
when relevant articles are found) 
• E-mail alerting of new issues by title or subject 
• Custom links to your favourite titles 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law • a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l a w • h u m a n r i g h t s • legal p h i l o s o p h y •  
E u r o p e a n law я civil l aw • pena l law, p u b l i c and p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law • l abour l aw 
И 
^ - Number 3 • September 2 
0 
Editor- in-Chief. VILMOS PESCHKA 
S 6 
1 \ tel 
1
 Juridica 
Hungarica 
Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies 
.1828 ^ W
W
W
.A
K
A
D
E
M
IA
I.
C
O
M
 
r— — — — 
AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Acta Juridica Hungarica publishes original papers on legal sciences wi th special emphasis on 
Hungarian jurisprudence, legislation and legal literature. The journal accepts articles f rom every 
field of legal sciences. The editors encourage contributions f rom outside Hungary, 
wi th the aim of covering legal sciences in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The articles should be wr i t ten in English. 
• 
Abstracted/indexed in 
Information Technology and the Law, International Bibliographies IBZ and IBR, Wor ldwide 
Political Science Abstracts. 
• 
Manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be addressed to 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
P.O. Box 25, H-1250 Budapest, Hungary 
Phone: (+36 1) 355 7384 
Fax: (+36 1) 375 7858 
• 
Subscription price 
for Volume 47 (2006) in 4 issues EUR 224 + VAT (for North America: USD 280) 
including online access and normal postage; airmail delivery EUR 20 (USD 25). 
• 
Publisher and distributor 
AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ 
Journals Business Centre 
P.O. Box 245, H- l 519 Budapest, Hungary 
Phone: (+36 1)464 8222 
Fax: (+36 1)464 8221 
E-mail: journals@akkrt.hu 
www.akademiai.com;www.akademiaikiado.hu 
• 
© Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 2006 
ISSN 1216-2574 
AJur 47 (2006) 3 
Printed in Hungary 
Acta Juridica Hungarica 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Editor-in-Chief 
V I L M O S P E S C H K A 
Editor 
V A N D A L A M M 
Editorial Board 
GÉZA HERCZEGH, T I B O R KIRÁLY, 
F E R E N C MÁDL, ATTILA R Á C Z , ANDRÁS SAJÓ, 
T A M Á S S Á R K Ö Z Y 
Volume 47, Number 3, September 2006 
A K A D É M I A I K I A D Ó 
MEMBER OF WOLTERS KLUWER GROUP 

CONTENTS 
STUDIES 
ANDRÁS SAJÓ 
TAMÁS SÁRKÖZY 
PÁL BELÉNYESI 
PETRA B Á R D 
Transnational Networks and Constitutionalism 209 
The Third Act on Business Associations -
Law Conceived in the Spirit of Deliberate Progress 227 
Exclusionary Price Abuses in the EU 
(A developmental approach with regards to 
networks) 249 
The German Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
with a Special Focus on Disability 273 
KALEIDOSCOPE 
ANDREA DOMOKOS The Reform of Hungarian Criminal Policy 303 
MÁRIA KITTI POPOVICS Application of the Concept of Significant Market 
Power in Electronic Communicat ions 314 
BOOK REVIEW 
BALÁZS FEKETE THOMAS G. WEISS-DAVID P. FORSYTHE-ROGER A . 
COATE: The Uni ted Nations and Changing World 
Politics 325 

1216-2574/USD 20.00 
© 2006 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
A C T A J U R I D I C A H U N G A R I C A 
47, No 3, pp. 209-225 (2006) 
DOI: 10.1556/AJur. 4 7.2006.3.1 
ANDRÁS SAJÓ* 
Transnational Networks and Constitutionalism 
Abs t rac t The concept of modern constitutionalism is intimately related to notions of state 
sovereignty. The actual influence of the constitution as a hierarchical tool o f nation-state design 
remains a matter of dubious empirical validity. Today, among the conditions of intergovern-
mentalism and globalization, state centered constitutionalism is confronting governance by 
networks: both private domestic networks and networks of national governmental institutions 
are becoming decision-makers, which cannot be controlled within the concepts of state based 
constitutionalism. Notwithstanding these developments the above difficulties of constitutional 
social steering and determination of the public sphere have not resulted in the dethroning o f 
the paradigm of state centered constitutional law in the constitutional law community. Such 
disregard runs the risk to turn constitutionalism into irrelevant speculat ion in an age of 
globalization. In the globalized world the most important decisions and events affecting society 
escape the control of the sovereign state operating on the principle of territoriality. In this paper 
I consider two structures of polycentric exercise o f public power that are decisive for a new 
paradigm of constitutionalism. The first type of transnational network structure is primarily a 
network of private ordering with the participation of administrative bodies of the desaggregat-
ing state and private entities associated with the administrative entities (transboundary private 
networks). A second kind of transnational networks (transgovernmental networks) originates 
from supranational organizations that operate beyond the nation state. Transgovemmental 
networks take away traditional governmental functions and overwrite/replace the decisions of 
the state organs. The taking of state functions includes regulation, adjudication, enforcement, 
material and other services. The actions of the networks are beyond the control of the constitu-
tionally designated authorities and follow principles, which are unrelated to the otherwise 
pertinent constitutional principles. The article considers the impact of international networks 
on the desaggregation of the constitutional state and the possibility of a new legitimation for 
transnational network-based governance. 
Keywords : constitutionalism, state sovereignty, transgovemmental network, transnational 
network 
The concept of modern constitutionalism is intimately related to notions of state 
sovereignty. The constitution is understood as a self-definition of the sovereign 
state: constitutionalism is the self-restriction of the state. In the concept of the 
Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Professor of Law, Institute for 
Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H-1014, Budapest, Országház u. 
30.; Professor, Central European University Department of Legal Studies. 
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state that is based on state sovereignty it is the constitution that shall determine 
the fundamental arrangements regarding the use of public power and the structure 
and organization of fundamental state institutions. Beginning with Hans 
Kelsen, the prevailing hierarchical understanding of the rule of law based state 
conceived the constitution as the fundamental or decisive element of the legal 
order. Today the constitution and constitutionalism-as a practice organized 
around the constitution-is presented in textbooks as the sum total and explicit 
formation and safeguard of the shared values of society, or at least the sum 
total of the values or practices that enable living together in the given state. 
To what extent these expectations can be met was always a matter of serious 
doubt. The actual influence of the constitution as a hierarchical tool of state 
design remains a matter of empirical validity. One can always contest the 
assumption that the constitution pushes towards constitutionalism the most 
important organizations of the state. 
The lack of sufficient empirical proof to the centrality of the constitution 
thesis has not endangered the legitimacy and therefore normativity of the 
constitution. Nevertheless, the growing importance of private organizations 
beyond the control of the public power created a serious challenge to the 
traditional perspective of constitutionalism. This challenge is made even more 
serious by transnational activities. Of course, constitutional law tried to extend 
its values to the private sphere in the form of state action and third party effect 
doctrines but most of the private power and transgovernmental phenomena 
remained under the radar of constitutional law.1 This is quite stunning given 
that the dislocation challenges the role of the modern state constitution as "a 
central mechanism which enabled the recognition, coordination, assimilation 
and self-legitimation of the legal and political systems".2 
Today, among the conditions of intergovernmentalism and globalization, 
state centered constitutionalism is confronting governance by networks: both 
private domestic networks and networks of national governmental institutions 
are becoming decision-makers, which cannot be controlled within the concepts 
1
 See Walker, N.: The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism. Modern Law Review 65 (2002) 
317-359, text accompanying note 89. The chal lenge to state-centered theories originates in 
the new institutional perception of the European Union. Integration is a "polity creat ing 
process in which authority and policy-making are shared across multiple levels of govern-
ment-subnational, national and supranational." See Marks, G. et al.: European Integration 
from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multiple-Level Governance. Journal of Common Market 
Studies 34 (1996) 341-378, 342. For a review of the debate see Craig, P.: The Communi ty 
Political Order. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 10 (2003) 79-124. 
2
 Chalmers, D.: Post-Nationalism and the Quest for Constitutional Substitutes. Journal 
of Law and Society 27 (2000) 187-217, 179. 
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of state based constitutionalism. Arguably, transnational^ networked private 
and governmental organizations become more and more decisive in the 
organization of social life and what used to be called the public sphere. Trans-
governmental networks increasingly take over governmental decision-making. 
In the definition of "transgovernmental networks" I follow Kal Raustiala: "Trans-
governmentality refers to the involvement of specialized domestic officials who 
directly interact with each other, often with minimal supervision by foreign 
ministries: They are 'networks' because this cooperation is based on loosely-
structured, peer-to-peer ties developed through frequent interaction rather 
than formal negotiation. Thus defined, the phrase 'transgovernmental net-
works' captures a strikingly wide array of contemporary cooperation."3 Note that 
although networks do have important power elements and do serve interstate 
and other (corporate) domination, the networks operate primarily as epistemic 
communities. This will be crucial in their indifference to constitutional con-
siderations. 
Even without the recent developments in transgovernmental networking, 
the centrality of constitutional law and its ability to steer social relations 
towards constitutional values has been very stressed. To some extent the limits 
to constitutional steering are built into the very concept of constitutionalism, 
namely in the various precepts and principles protecting private life. Tradi-
tional programs of constitutionalism, like the American one, were restricted 
to the sphere of governmental action. It is also obvious that irrespective the 
aspirations of constitutionalism to shape society and impose its own model of 
fairness and justice, the attempts to create a constitutional society remain 
somewhat futile because of the limited penetration of law into society. 
In all forms of constitutionalism, irrespective of the assumptions constitu-
tional law makes regarding its power to control other parts of the legal system, 
there is a principal assumption regarding a rather neat separation of the public 
and private spheres. It is the intent of constitutional law to determine the 
boundaries of these two spheres. The point is that the two spheres are subject 
to external normative boundary setting only to a limited extent. On the long 
run the constitutionally carved out divide has to take into consideration the 
social construction of these boundaries (see e.g. the case of abortion that was 
3
 Raustiala, K.: The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental 
Networks and the Future of International Law. Virginia Journal of International Law 43 
(2002) 1-92, 5. Consider also Risse-Kappen, T.: Cooperation Among Democracies: The 
European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton, 1995. 38. (defining "transgovern-
mental coalitions" as "transboundary networks among subunits of national governments 
forming in the absence of central and authoritative national decisions"). 
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gradually accepted to be a private matter). Moreover, the dynamics of shaping 
the public and private spheres has changed considerably in a world where 
globalizing private networks are increasingly capable to shape what remains in 
the public sphere. In particular, these networks are capable to replace the state 
law with their own system of norms. In many regards transnational governmental 
networks are also able to determine what is "private", enabling the self-regu-
lation that they have sanctioned to remain beyond the reach of constitutional 
law and constitutionalism. 
Notwithstanding these developments the above difficulties of constitutional 
social steering and determination of the public sphere have not resulted in the 
dethroning of the paradigm of state centered constitutional law in the constitu-
tional law community. Such disregard runs the risk to turn constitutionalism 
into irrelevant speculation in an age of globalization. In the globalized world 
the most important decisions and events affecting society escape the control of 
the sovereign state operating on the principle of territoriality. Once the state 
looses control, there seems to be no social actor interested to impose values of 
constitutionalism into social ordering. 
The transnational networks challenge the state's monopoly over the public 
sphere that is exercised through its administrative machinery. The state looses 
control over the sphere that it assigned to be under its supervision. This means 
that to the extent the state operated according to constitutional values this opera-
tions will cease to be decisive. The basic assumptions of constitutionalism 
embedded into the constitution become of questionable relevance. 
Constitutional relations of the state were already under stress given the 
internationalization of many domestic relations. Moreover, the internationali-
zation resulted in a change in the balance of powers, with increased powers 
granted to the executive. To a considerable extent the execut ive escapes the 
control of the other branches in the generation of international norms applicable 
to the state. Many areas of regulation that earlier were at least supervised by 
the legislative and judicial branches, are now presented as activities fall ing 
within foreign policy, a matter traditionally reserved to a great extent to the 
executive. The transnational networking contributes to a polycentric (non-state 
centered) exercise of public power (including the removal of the exercise of 
power from the public sphere). By polycentricity I mean that the state cannot 
decide alone in matters traditionally reserved to sovereign power, at least the 
decisions are consensual with other states and international organizations, or, 
the decisions emerge without the participation of traditional holders of state 
sovereignty. 
In this paper I consider two structures of polycentric exercise of public 
power that are decisive for a new paradigm of constitutionalism. The first type 
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of transnational network structure is primarily a network of private ordering 
with the participation of administrative bodies of the desaggregating state and 
private entities associated with the administrative entities (hereinafter trans-
boundary private networks). A second type of transnational networks originates 
from supranational organizations that operate beyond the nation state (like 
the European Union or the WHO; hereinafter transgovernmental networks). 
The participants of the transgovernmental network are components of the 
desaggregated state. 
The first and primary form of transnational networks is modeled upon 
networks emerging in production and distribution in the corporate world. 
Nokia serves as a good example. Here the economic actors (owned by an 
unidentifiable international network of owners) turned into an international 
network. Other actors are related to the network in more loosely connected 
ways (suppliers, etc.). The identifiable ownership elements that are traditionally 
accessible to national regulators and domestic law more or less disappear or at 
least are too diffuse for successful control. The labor force to be regulated is 
to be found under a jurisdiction (or jurisdictions) that is different from the 
jurisdiction that seems to apply on grounds of ownership or incorporation. 
Management is not only international but also physically hard to locate. As to 
capital, especially when it comes to taxation, this is certainly located "else-
where", in a hard to reach jurisdiction, or in permanent movement. Private 
networks are often enormous and exercise control over their member organi-
zations, employees and partners in competition with the state. Given that the 
private power remains diffuse and hard to reach for the state, it is nearly 
impossible for constitutional values to penetrate the network that operates 
under its own 'constitution'. A private business network like Nokia operates 
according to its corporate ethics, internal professional standards, codes. These 
codes, or the communication community that exists on the basis of shared 
codes, keep the network together (see for example the strictly censorial and 
privacy disregarding private internet system). Many scholars are inclined to 
believe that such private ordering that follows market logic makes the efforts 
of state centered constitutional law irrelevant as the constitutional law is 
unable to penetrate the private constitutions. 
While the above mentioned transboundary ownership networks slip out of 
the territorially and personally organized constitutional supervision, the trans-
governmental networks directly challenge the state. These transgovernmental 
networks take away traditional governmental functions and overwrite/replace 
the decisions of the state organs. The taking of state functions includes regulation, 
adjudication, enforcement, material and other services. The transgovernmental 
networks are often based on public-private partnership with private actors 
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having the decisive say in the network.4 (It should be added that in the process 
of reshaping the public-private divide hybrid organizations are created and 
this poses problems to public law partly unrelated to networking.)5 In other 
instances the desaggregated national governmental bodies operate under the 
umbrella of international organizations but private actors may also participate 
in the network. The distinction is a matter of degree and the composition of the 
networks changes with increased private participation. A typical process in the 
making of the transgovernmental network is that first a traditional international 
organization is created that has decision-making powers under its constitutive 
treaty only with the consent of the participating states represented by govern-
mental agents of the executive power acting on behalf of the sovereign state. 
Decisions are taken by state representatives perhaps on the basis of the prepara-
tory work of an international secretariat. Any amendment to the constitutive 
treaty requires unanimity, in full respect of national sovereignty. Substantive 
decisions, however, are generally not made by the state representatives: in the 
specialized organizations it is the national professional bureaucracy that 
participates in the preparatory work. Here we notice the beginnings of trans-
governmental networking. The professional bureaucrats of the state partici-
pating at the preparatory and decision-making sessions are contacting their peers 
in the other countries; their partners are not anymore their domestic superiors, 
other organs of their state, and even less the constitutional bodies that are 
supposed to control the professional bureaucracy. Perhaps the comitology system 
of the European Union is the best example of this trend. Here the national 
professional bureaucracies are appointing national members to subcommittees 
ad hoc or permanent mandate. The subcommittees very often create additional 
sub-sub committees where national members are appointed in their personal, 
private capacity. The national professional authority has no power to control the 
private experts who sit in the sub-sub committees (where most of the professional 
and policy-implementing work takes place). Moreover, international organi-
zations, at least at the level of operative subcommittees increasingly invite 
private parties with full participatory rights in the deliberation. The International 
4
 Aman, A. C. Jr.: Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative 
Law. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 10 (2003) 109-137, 125. 
5
 The divide is crucial as the "private" restricts the applicability of constitutional 
principles. Turning a sphere ' p r ' v a t e ' used to be a privilege of the public power. Obviously 
the transgovernmental networking and other phenomena of globalization radically curtail 
that power. For the consequences of the shift f rom public to private in terms of consti tu-
tional rights see e.g. Oliver, D.: The Frontiers of the State: Public Authorities and Public 
Functions under the Human Rights Act. Public Law 476 (2000) 481 -486 . 
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Telecommunications Union has panels where global telecommunication 
companies are present, and also provide expertise to governmental actors who 
lack sufficient expertise. In the case of the Basel Committee experts are provided 
by major banks, etc. Human rights intergovernmental organizations admit 
human rights NGOs to their decision-making bodies (which are often composed 
of government appointed but independent private experts). Of course, in all 
these cases the selection of the network participants follows its own, non-
transparent and biased logic. Quite often the sub-sub-committees composed of 
independent experts are acting in their own capacity and not under the 
authority that is delegated to them by the national authority or the sub-
committee for whom they are supposed to work (see in particular the Codex 
Alimentarius food safety decisions.) 
The decisions and actions of these transnational networks raise constitutional 
issues. The decisions deprive constitutionally designated actors of their power 
to take sovereign decisions, even if the decision applicable in a given country 
formally originates from the constitutionally designated organ. The actions of 
the networks are beyond the control of the constitutionally designated authorities 
and follow principles, which are unrelated to the otherwise pertinent consti-
tutional principles. 
From a constitutional perspective the following constitutional questions 
emerge in relation to the above developments: Are these decisions legitimate? 
In particular, do they satisfy expectations of democratic participation, or 
democratic deliberation? If not so, do they offer alternative legitimation? Does 
this alternative legitimacy fit into traditional constitutional theory? In case the 
legitimation is incompatible with constitutional values does it make sense to 
talk about constitutionalism in a transnational, networks-operated world? After 
all, it is not evident that traditional constitutional values (rule of law, fairness, 
participatory decision-making, judicial review, political accountability, etc) 
are applicable to, or make sense in regard to transnational networks. If the 
operations of transnational networks present a challenge to constitutionalism, are 
there new devices to counter these trends? Is it possible to devise constitutional 
or international law schemes that will counter these trends providing for fairness, 
accountability, responsiveness in the use of public power increasingly dominated 
by transnational networks? Is such design feasible in an increasingly globalized 
world that, for reasons of efficiency, seems to favor increased networking? 
Supranational and international organizations work under the assumption 
of state sovereignty. Even in the European Union the states are the masters of 
the Treaty. A sovereign state is generally taking into consideration the decisions 
adopted by the international organizations, but such decisions are in principle 
preconditioned on the consent of the sovereign state. Such consent as well as 
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the disregard of the international decision follow constitutionally determined 
patterns and values. The decisions or co-decisions are taken by constitutionally 
authorized domestic agents who are under constitutional and democratic 
control (at least at the black letter level). The development of the last twenty 
years shows that in the process of globalization governance is becoming more 
and more prominent to the detriment of government.'1 It is one of the char-
acteristics of governance that instead of politically accountable government 
agencies private actors (including NGOs) exercise public authority, or at least 
have decisive influence on public determination. 
The erosion ("hollowing out") of the sovereignty conscious state has its 
domestic foundations that, at least originally, were unrelated to globalization. 
As Karl-Heinz Ladeur has pointed out, the erosion of the nation state had to do 
with changes in the production processes and commercial dealings and were 
related to scientific uncertainty. Decision-making becomes a cooperative 
process. Norms are not prepackaged knowledge but a matter to be negotiated.7 
Private organizations may live in symbiosis with public entities or public 
entities are privatized. Whichever be the case private entities become the norm 
generators. The privately generated norms not only encompass spheres of life 
that otherwise might be public but are capable to impose their internal norms 
on those who enter into contact with the norm-generating entity. Further, the 
private codes become standards for the state regulators who quite often simply 
underwrite what was developed privately or even delegate authority to private 
code makers. Government as a transparent form of social control that it subject 
to political supervision and control in a democracy has little control over 
governance, including governance that occurs with the participation of public 
administration. At least this is the assumption of governance theorists, while 
the constitutional lawyer is little interested in these developments. For the 
constitutional lawyer the working hypothesis is that whatever is politically 
relevant for the public good is/shall be conceptually embraced in constitutional 
6
 For an early recognition in the international context see some essays in James N. 
Rosenau, J. N . -Czempie l , E.-O. (eds.): Governance without Government: Order and 
Change in World Politics. Cambridge, 1992. See further Rhodes, R. A. W.: The New 
Governance: Governing without Government. Political Studies 44 (1996) 662-667. for a 
review of different meanings of governance. One of the definions that are in use reads: 
"Governance is about managing networks" at 658. In this article governance is primarily 
management by networks. Rhodes also points to the hollowing out of the state as the source 
of (domestic networks) governance. The hollowing out of the state results in reduced 
control over implementation. 
7
 Cf. Ladeur, K. H.: Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationali ty-The Viability of the 
Network Concept. European Law Journal. 3 (1997) 33-54 . at 34. 
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law. The background assumption is that in a modern democracy only a 
constitutionally viable policy is capable of long term political existence. 
Governance exists in many forms. Increasingly governance is the result of 
(regulatory) networks. A closely related form of governance is the neo-corporatist 
one. Neo-corporatist governance is highly problematic for democratic constitu-
tionalism. Neo-corporatist governance structures, like tripartite labor govern-
ance dealing with wage setting is often legally formalized. Governments may 
have important role in setting up such schemes and it is government regulation 
that determines the formal role for the participating parties. 
The new development that makes governance networks so problematic for 
constitutional government is that by joining transnational networks domestic 
actors escape even the theoretical possibility of government control. Govern-
ance networks increasingly shape themselves and operate in the vacuum of the 
international setting where the sovereign nation state has limited access. 
It is in this regard that the most visible leak to constitutional arrangements 
is noticeable. Independent national regulatory agencies, and to a lesser extent 
other non-political government branches like courts, have created their own 
networks with different degrees of competence. The forum that originally might 
have served simply as a venue for the exchange of ideas ('co-operation 
tourism') rapidly develops into a point of reference and authority. The network 
operates as international pressure group supporting its members against other 
branches of domestic power. At a next stage these networks will provide 
expertise to international organizations in charge of providing harmonized 
regulatory schemes, international law, or other cooperation. Finally, the net-
work of independent agencies becomes a self-relying, recognized body that 
imposes its will on the participating states, and at the same time exempts the 
national regulator from state control in the sense that policies, professional 
standards, including conditions of work, and even dismissals are dependent 
upon the network and not on the political branches that are supposed to exercise 
a level of control that is compatible with the independence of the agency. In 
other words, the independent agencies through their network membership 
develop a new transnational network identity and change their point of reference 
from a national one to an international professional one. 
The independent telecommunications regulatory agencies of the member 
states of the European Union offer a telling example of the process. In a number 
of EU member states there were no independent regulators. Traditionally 
telecommunications was an area of governmental regulation carried out partly in 
a ministerial department and partly by the Post Service that was a government 
service. It was only under the pressure of the EU directives that some member 
states abandoned this model. Interestingly the concerned ministerial departments 
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and postal services were resistant to this change that was the result of the 
decision of the political branch, i.e. the executive that did not share the 
institutional interests of its telecommunications bureaucracy and was ready to 
accept business pressure and general deregulatory ideology. However, shortly 
after the reorganization took place the independent regulatory agencies have 
created their informal network and started to coordinate their policies in order 
to come up with a unified professional position. This was more than welcome 
from Brussels as it offered a regulatory relief to the Commission generalists. 
The Commission readily accepted that the still informal network of the tele-
communications regulators will take the initiative (in collaboration with 
industry that had its equivalent networks) in European telecommunications 
policy setting. As a result, the formation of telecommunications policy shifted 
from the national political executive to the national regulators, but not in their 
national agency capacity, but in their capacity of network members. Hence the 
policy was created as a network policy. The national regulatory agency became 
able to formulate its policies against its own national government relying on 
the network and claiming that the national government has no authority to 
intervene in the policy that was developed as an all-European policy. The 
European telecommunications policy is primarily developed by the network, 
and the Commission's role is primarily to transpose that policy into directives. 
In 2002 the new telecommunications directives further increased the national 
power of the national regulatory agency: the initiative came from the network 
members and served their interests vis a vis the national governments. The 
directives granted additional powers to the network within the Union vis a vis 
the political institutions of the Union. One may wonder how and why the 
national governments accepted such reduction of their constitutional power. 
They were advised to do so by their independent expert agencies, which had 
the strong self-interest in the emerging solution against the weak interest of 
other domestic players-all that in accordance with the logic of collective 
action. The new directives recognize the formal policy-making powers of the 
regulatory network. 
The emergence of transgovernmental regulatory networks that desaggregate 
the state are the continuation of a trend related to the emergence of neutral 
institutions. I am not claiming that transgovernmental networking is primarily 
among neutral institutions. In fact we notice transgovernmental networking 
amongst all regulatory agencies. However, state desaggregation means that the 
regulatory agencies and public administration in general is becoming less and 
less dependent on the political branches, moreover this is legitimized. Regulators 
increasingly construe themselves (are designed as) neutral institutions in the 
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last thirty years.8 Neutral institutions always had their constitutional problems, 
as the whole idea to have neutral institutions reflects mistrust in democratic 
politics and is also poses a challenge to traditional concepts of checks and 
balances as understood in a tripartite division of powers. 
The modern state (as a network of organizations) pretends to be non-partisan 
or neutral in an increasing number of instances. Institutional arrangements are 
developed to make that claim credible. 
The modern state is identified not only with representative institutions but 
also with administrative structures operated as public bureaucracies.9 Public 
bureaucracies offer a degree of neutrality in the sense of not necessarily being 
politically partisan. However, the depoliticization of public administration 
remains incomplete. The social desire for a non-partisan state machinery can 
not be entirely satisfied through the establishment of a civil service. Rather, in 
order to further isolate some parts of the civil service from partisan politics, 
neutral regulatory institutions emerged early in the 20lh century. (See the creation 
of federal and state agencies to regulate railroads and public utilities in the 
United States.) In complex societies, many traditional governmental functions 
were transferred to independent organizations, which were legitimated in terms 
of their professional expertise.10 In principle, these neutral institutions are to a 
8
 See the increasing number of independent regulators in utilities, media, banking, 
health etc. that are designed to operate in isolation from daily partisan politics. 
4
 Impartial institutions (like courts, and constitutional courts in particular) also contribute 
to the neutralization of the state. Contrary to institutions like independent agencies, courts 
stand above identifiable contests. They are impartial in the sense that they don ' t follow 
independent professional policy goals other than that related to self-preservation. See Sajó 
A.: The Concepts of Neutrality and the State. In: Dworkin, R. et al. (eds.): From Liberal 
Values to Democratic Transition. New York-Budapest , 2003. 107-144. 
U. S. independent agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, were originally 
designed to be exempt f rom executive control. See Humphrey's Executor v. U.S. 295 U.S. 
602 (1935). This understanding differs markedly from the one voiced by the Council of 
Europe (below), which denies legislative oversight. Note further that the characterization 
of agencies as "executive" or "independent" is the result of ad hoc political decisions. 
Strauss, P. L.: The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth 
Branch. Columbia Law Review 84 (1984) 573-669. 
10
 Broadcasting regulation by independent regulatory agencies exemplifies a relatively 
recent world-wide attempt to neutralize oversight of the communicative sphere. Here, 
various institutional solutions guarantee the independence of the regulated media and the 
neutral handling of broadcasting-related matters. This is done "officially" in order to avoid 
politicization or because the public interest cannot be served well in a partisan manner. The 
contemporary solutions range from quasi self-regulation by those concerned to regulation 
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great extent autonomous and independent of political bodies or democratic 
politics. The analysis of the actual institutions indicates how limited such 
independence and autonomy actually was. Nevertheless, they often have enough 
autonomy to remain independent from the political branches if they really 
wish to do so. Autonomous bodies may be biased but, in principle, are beyond 
partisan politics and, therefore, their rule-making and decisions are deemed to 
be neutral in the sense of non-political. This trend is rooted in the growth of 
independent expert bodies. Neutralization relies on a specific form of authority 
derived from the professionalism and expertise enabled by neutral institutional 
settings. 
The transfer of decision-making to neutral public institutions remains 
problematic. Policy-making institutions that are insulated from the democratic 
process are not necessarily fully neutralized in the sense of being exempt from 
political influence, but, at least, they are insulated vis-a-vis the democratic 
process. Of course, such insulation may also allow elected officials, government 
bureaucracies and interest groups to exercise even more political influence 
than in a transparent democratic setting. Neutralization has very often been a 
way to protect particular groups by excluding contrary political influences. 
The design of insulated public institutions is, after all, left overwhelmingly to 
legislation that often follows a logic completely alien to institutional neutrality. 
The withdrawal of the state from certain public domains is often determined by 
major performance failures accompanied by successful resistance to govern-
ment by the regulated. Quite often politicians seek to avoid responsibility, and 
independent agencies allow politicians to avoid responsibility. Note that most 
of the independent state agencies which were created to enhance credibility 
serve special interest groups and only indirectly the general public: it is the 
trust of these special interests that is at stake. (Central banks directly serve the 
financial community; the media regulatory agency is catering to broadcasters, 
etc.). The constitutional problem with transgovernmental networks of neutral 
institutions is that these problematic features become even more acute. 
Even where professionalism prevails, neutrality may suffer from insularity. 
If insularity means non-interference it may result in a lack of social res-
ponsiveness. If the performance of the neutral institution follows the dictates 
of the internal self-interest of the organization, it will undermine trust in the 
institution, notwithstanding the formal fairness of its procedures. Moreover, 
these institutions tend to keep their decision-making process non-transparent. 
by non-governmental bodies as decision-makers, and to insulated independent govern-
mental bodies. 
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What are the implications of these trends to the prevailing constitutional 
arrangement? The national executive power must reckon with the operations 
of transgovernmental networks, including the possibility of additional, non-
government induced privatization and also with further desaggregation of the 
state in the sense that national governmental entities, and independent agencies 
and other elements of the 'neutral power' turn against the executive and 
become unreachable for the other branches. It follows that decisions that affect 
the general public are not generated in the public sphere as it is assumed in 
constitutional law. Given that governance follows from transgovernmental 
policies, it is highly questionable to what extent the legality of such measures 
can be controlled by organs of supervision. Beyond the problem resulting from 
the desaggregation of the state, private systems cause additional problems 
for constitutionalism. The social sphere of the constitutionally controlled is 
shrinking. It is not any more up to constitutional law to determine what pertains 
to the public domain, and, consequently what is subject to constitutional values. 
The problem is aggravated by practical difficulties: the shrinking state simply 
has no resources to patrol the vast territories of the private. The pluralism of 
the legal system undermines law itself. 
National Parliaments loose legislative and supervisory powers. The executive 
gets new opportunities to bypass legislation by allowing transgovernmental 
networks to come up with legislative solutions. Legislation becomes less trans-
parent. On the other hand the executive that creates opportunities to present its 
own politically unacceptable dreams as international dictates of expert 
compromise, looses control over its own professional bureaucracies. Finally, at 
least in Europe, the national administration of justice is loosing ground to 
international courts." These international courts operate in a network with 
the national courts (undermining to some extent the traditional hierarchical 
structure of the domestic system) creating a form of transnational cooperative 
constitutionalism. 
Obviously, network governance is not the end of politics in the sense that 
neutral institutions still enable domination that remains the goal and result of 
political games. One should keep in mind the advantages of transgovernmental 
networks before condemning the inevitable. After all, irrespective of deontolo-
gical considerations that echo liberal constitutionalism, independent agencies, 
11
 This is quite problematic for the sovereignty concerned, but not necessarily for the 
constitutionalism concerned, as the international courts, which are relieved of local political 
considerations and loyalties of the national courts, seem to contribute to constitutionalism, 
and national administration of justice to the extent it has to cooperate with the international 
instances seems to be liberated of parochial interests. 
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both at national and Union levels were created not only because of the 
advantages the regulatory network systems offered to interest groups politics. 
These professional, beyond-the-reach of-ordinary-politics networks are also 
devices of quasi-constitutional pre-commitment.12 Such pre-commitments are 
crucial for the stability and sustainability of any constitutional system, 
particularly in democracies, where democracy, as Juan Linz has often stated, is 
about the non-perpetuation of the regime. Without such arm's length operating 
agencies the democratic welfare redistribution would have become unsustainable. 
Democratic politics is too responsive to short term constituency interests 
pushing the responsive welfare state to unsustainable largesse. It was for such 
reasons that regulation through independent agencies (and in a way the whole 
concept of neutral powers) emerged.11 Independent agencies protect established 
interest groups against newcomers who would use parties through parliament 
and the executive; and protect these established interests against politically 
induced redistributive policies. The autonomous independent regulatory agencies 
are created in the name of the needs of the socio-economic regime (or the whole 
polity) to protect the regime against its own self-destructive mechanisms. The 
independent central bank is built to resist the welfarist inflationary policies of 
elected governments, etc. 
12
 Moravcsik and Majone argue that states accept transfer of their power to networks as 
an act of irrevocable precommitment. 
13
 For a study of the constitutional relevance of independent agencies and their 
networking, Sajó: op. cit.; Sajó A.: Neutral Institutions: Implications for Government 
Trustworthiness in East European Democracies. In: Kornai J .-Rose-Ackerman, S. (eds.): 
Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition. New York, 2004.; on networking 
in international relations Slaughter, A.-M.: Global Government Networks, Global 
Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy. Michigan Journal of International 
Law 24 (2003) 1041-1075; on European networks Dehousse, R.: Regulation by Networks 
in the European Community: the Role of European Agencies. Journal of European Public 
Policy (1997) 246-261. In 2002 Majone found that although political compromise resulted 
in institutional designs with ambiguous responsibilities and uncertain competencies, "the 
issue of independent and credible European agencies is still very much alive". Majone, G.: 
Functional Interests: European Agencies. In: Peterson, J . -Shackleton, M. (eds.): The 
Institutions of the European Union. Oxford, 2002. 322. 
Any discussion of democratic accountability in the network age should start from 
Slaughter ' s warning: " the impossibility of ful ly "reaggregat ing" the state in a tidy 
democratic package will ultimately require a much more sophisticated understanding of 
networks and the interaction of nodes in a network with each other, whether individual or 
institutional." op. cit. 1068. 
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Beyond their contribution to pre-commitment, the relative success of net-
works14 may also indicate that traditional values represented in constitutionalism 
do not represent any more the shared political values of the community. Alter-
natively, the nation-state as a political community is loosing its attractiveness 
as people turn to communities that are offered by virtual and actual networks. 
Perhaps the efficiency based credibility of the network is more attractive 
than the norms and values of constitutionalism. After all, transgovernmental 
networks are more successful in knowledge management than traditional state 
bureaucracies. Besides "as public policy becomes increasingly influenced by 
global conditions, formal policy-making institutions - national legislatures, 
government agencies, and multilateral institutions, among others - often lack 
the scope, speed, and contacts to acquire and use crucial information needed to 
formulate effective policy."15 
Constitutions are understood as taking "stock of the values that comprise 
the preferred forms of life of a given community (and are compatible with 
universal constitutional values).""' But perhaps the values with universal 
aspirations are not the preferred set for people inhabiting the networks. Instead 
of the normative validity based on value legitimacy there is a trend towards 
efficiency/interest maximization as a source of legitimacy: in this regard 
traditional rule of law bound constitutional solutions cannot compete with what 
the professional networks promise to achieve. Or, perhaps, global networks are 
successful because states cannot match the normative expectations of their own 
professed constitutionalism.17 Perhaps the sovereign state is not the democratic 
14
 Once again, transgovernmental networks emerge only in case there is a fundamental 
epistemic agreement among the participants and even in this case the network might run 
into the successful resistance of the nation-state. For an example of lack of value agree-
ment and consequently little networking in the context of European privacy regulators, 
see Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: The Case of the 
European Information Privacy Network, Michigan Journal of International Law 26 (2005) 
807-868. 
15
 Reinecke, W. H.: The Other World Wide Web: Global Policy Networks. Foreign 
Policy (1999-2000) 44-57. 45. For a recent critique of the deliberation within professional 
networks see Shapiro, M.: "Deliberative," "Independent" Technocracy v. Democratic 
Politics: Will the Globe Echo the E. U.? IILJ Working Paper 2004/5. Global Administrative 
Law Series. New York University Law School. 
16
 Closa, C.: Deliberative Constitutional Politics and the Turn Towards a Norms-Based 
Legitimacy of the EU Constitution. European Law Journal 11 (2005) 411-431 . at 419. 
17
 On the performance deficit of constitutionalism see Grimm, D.: Die Zukunft der 
Verfassung. In: Preuss, U. K. (ed.): Zum Begriff der Verfassung. Frankfurt, 1994. 227. 
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expression of the political community. Or the political community is simply a 
marriage of convenience. 
On the other hand it is not necessarily the case that all the above develop-
ments are contrary to values embedded in national constitutions. The network 
'constitutions' do not replace or overwrite national constitutions. The content 
of the national constitution, however, changes. (This development is beyond 
the loss of relevance problem). The transgovernmental norms represent a 
different logic, mostly that of expert knowledge that disregards rule of law 
logic and follows efficiency considerations dictated by the bounded rationality 
of the professions. International courts, on the other hand, emphasize values 
that are perhaps not alien to constitutional values but have different accents.18 
Once again, I have to emphasize that the transgovernmental networks effect 
is countered in many instances. Network power is a function of the existing 
power of the nation state (i.e. it could not happen if the states were able 
to/interested in stopping these developments). It is not by accident that the 
Supreme Court of the United States is committed to a defense of the national 
constitution against internationalization.19 But smaller, weaker states are/have 
to be more opportunistic. At least neo-realists suggest that a weak state would 
sign to the internationally developed normative expectations to ensure its 
existence (bandwagoning).2" 
Are these developments lamentable from a constitutionalist perspective? 
Certainly the lack of accountability and the democratic deficit (that cannot be 
undone by deliberative democracy of the select and invited network participants 
and token representatives of "society") makes one very unconfortable. Trans-
governmental networks are even less concerned about human rights than 
judicially controlled traditional executice bureaucracies were.21 After all, the 
democratic ideal requires "that politically responsible institutions should 
determine the direction of government policy."22 
18
 See the tensions between the ECJ and national courts in matters of rule of law, where 
the ECJ is primarily concerned with the efficient application of a harmonized European legal 
system and is ready to read the requirements of the rule of law in that context. See Alcan. 
19
 For a systematic attack on globalism from an Americanist perspective see John 
Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously? Chicago Journal of Internationa! 
Law 1 (2000) 205. 
20
 Walt, S. M.: Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning. In: Art R.-Jervis, R. (eds.): 
International Politics. New York, 1992. 71. 
21
 Bignami: op. cit. o f fers an empirical example: The administrative practice of the 
European privacy network. . . alters substantially the rights calculus. 810. 
" Sandalow, T.: Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and 
the Judicial Role. University of Chicago Law Review 42 (1975) 653-704, 695 and 700. 
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This is not to exclude the possibility of the evolution of a new constitu-
tionalism that reflects network based operations. After all, transgovernmental 
networks prevent the concentration of power: in that regard they have a strong 
constitutional potential in times of cabinet dictatorship. Networks are by 
definition pluricentric. However, so far there is very little in the network world 
that would point towards the affirmation of traditional constitutional values of 
freedom. Moreover, professional considerations in networks make conflict of 
interest and rule of law considerations irrelevant or even unacceptable. 
To end on an optimistic note: the network phenomena "are rooted in the 
information-technology revolution ... that simultaneously empowers individuals 
and groups [while] diminishfing] traditional authority."21 To the extent the 
empowerment element will prevail the concern with freedom will resurface. 
Although the transgovernmental networks raise issues of democratic deficit, 
it is not out of question that networks themselves will offer legitimate alternatives 
to the constitutionally and democratically problematic official government 
structure of the nation state. After all, there are important arguments in favor of 
transgovernmental networks: "the transgovernmental cooperation is a significant 
development in international law, but it is likely to bolster liberal inter-
nationalism as much-or more-than it will undermine or displace it."24 Perhaps, 
alternative forms of control (supervision) and self-referential accountability 
might ease the challenge that traditional constitutional structures could not 
handle so far. After all, as Majone has pointed out, the credibility of the 
members of the network depends on each other's reputation, hence they will 
monitor each other-are in a way accountable to each other.25 Besides, there are 
a number of forms of accountability that are not based on the political 
process.26 These elements point to a socially acceptable transgovernmental 
governance that will not rely on constitutionalism. 
Michelman finds these positions to be two distant or different positions. Michelman, F. 1.: 
Terry Firma: Background Democracy and Constitutional Foundations. Michigan Law 
Review 99 (2001) 1827-1851, 1839. 
23
 Slaughter, A.-M.: Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic 
Order. In: Fox, G. H - Roth, B. R. (eds.): Democratic Governance And International Law. 
Cambridge, 2000. 199, 200. 
~
4
 Raustiala. op. cit. 
25
 Majone, G.: The New European Agencies: Regulation by Information. Journal of 
European Public Policy 4 (1997) 262-275 , 262, 272. 
2f
' See Keohane, R. O.: Governance in a Partially Globalized World. American Political 
Science Review 95 (2001) 1-13. at 9. 
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A b s t r a c t . The study examines the new act on business associat ions passed in 2006 . It 
concludes , that the general principles, the structure of the Hungarian corporate law have 
remained unchanged since 1988, however, because of the practical demands and the European 
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act introduced several entrepreneur-friendly legal institutions and carried out a significant 
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On 1st July, 2006, the new Act on Business Associations (hereinafter: ABA) 
took effect. It is by that time the third pertinent act framed in this field, since 
the first ABA was promulgated as Act VI of 1988, the second one was adopted 
as Act CXLIV of 1997, and finally, Act IV of 2006 was adopted as the third 
ABA. 
1. A New Act in Its Form—Supplementary Law in Substance 
Legislation concerning business associations in the recent 20 years has had a 
specific history in Hungary. 
The first ABA was framed nearly two years before the political transfor-
mation, in a period, which was marked by an economic policy purported to 
introduce mixed economy in the framework of a liberal, albeit socialist political 
establishment, according to which, in line with the non-corporate "socialist 
sector", private business associations (Hungarian enterprises and joint ventures) 
would operate as a second sector, essentially in a similar manner to the current 
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working of the economy in China and Vietnam.1 However, due to minor amend-
ments (under Act XIII of 1989 and Acts LUI, LIV and LV of 1992), the first 
ABA was still applicable, when, in lieu of the mere change of the economic 
model, political transformation ensued in the autumn of 1989, furthermore, it 
could adequately ground the operation both of partially privatised, formerly state-
owned companies and of the formerly rudimentary small-scale enterprises 
(economic working communities (GMKs), entrepreneurial working teams 
(VGMKs), small-cooperatives, specialised groups) in prevailing forms of post-
transformation business associations. The ABA of 1988 proved to be progressive 
in several branches of business law, as well, primarily in re the Company Act 
of 1989, the Competition Act of 1990, the Act on Securities, Act XLIX of 1991 
on Bankruptcy Proceedings, Liquidation Proceedings and Voluntary Dissolution 
(hereinafter: ABP) and the Act on Accountancy. Owing to the adoption of the 
ABA, Hungary gained a remarkable competitive edge over neighbouring former 
socialist states. As the above demonstrate, fundamental law substantiating 
the newly evolving bourgeois market economy was drafted preceding the mid-
nineties, which facilitated that more foreign working capital flowed into Hungary 
before 1995, than into other European former socialist states en masse. 
As regards the second ABA, which took effect on 16th June, 1998, it was 
designed to prepare the entry of Hungary in the European Union. Accordingly, 
previous practical experience had been analysed, harmony with associated legal 
branches, primarily with law pertaining to capital markets and accountancy had 
been attained. Within the purview of Act XXXIX of 1995, systematic privati-
sation en masse had been in the main accomplished by 1997, consequently, 
private ownership became predominant in Hungarian proprietary structure, 
hence, the discrepancies of the first ABA deriving from the regulation of state 
ownership could be eliminated and the second ABA could be drafted to 
comply with its original purpose of constituting basic business law in support 
of the emerging system of modern capitalism. By 1997, the development of the 
technical and incorporate infrastructure of firmprocedure law accorded with 
that of the ABA, so far as Act CXLV of 1997 on Firmregistration (herein-
after: Firmregister Act) qualified as ancillary law of the ABA, wherefore, the 
rule pertaining to the obligation of ex nunc registration of companies, which 
had incurred numerous anomalies, could be annulled. As a matter of fact, the 
second ABA complied with most requirements posited by EU directives under 
1
 On the process of drafting the first ABA, see, A tulajdonreformról a társasági tör-
vény után (On the Reform of Ownership Following the Adoption of the Act on Business 
Associations). OKKFT, Budapest, 1989. 
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company law, therefore, no major amendment of company law was necessary 
upon the accession of Hungary to the EU. 
The third ABA was adopted by Parliament in December, 2005, neverthe-
less, its full recognition as well as political culture required that it did not take 
effect preceding parliamentary elections. However, the basic principles, frame-
work and structure of company law established within the scope of the first 
ABA in Hungary were not modified under the third ABA. This also results 
from the fact unparalleled in the history of the codification of Hungarian 
business law, i.e., each ABA was drafted by the same Codification Committee, 
last time joined by young colleagues headed by Gábor Gadó.2 Basically, at the 
end of the 1980s, we elaborated the codification technique of protecting the 
integrity of the ABA from political influence so far as possible, therefore, we 
laid down that 
- its annual amendment, which is customary in re law concerning the 
capital market and accountancy, shall be avoided, 
- the revision of the ABA in re its institutions shall be accomplished every 
6-10 years and the required amendments shall be introduced, 
- such revision eventuating in drafting new law shall be optimally scheduled 
by the end of the third year of government sessions, since the least 
forthcoming amending drafts submitted to Parliament are expectable in 
that period, 
- the new law shall be submitted for acceptance both by business federa-
tions and the government opposition, so that the contingently ensuing 
change of government does not incur the comprehensive amendment of 
the ABA. This modus operandi worked well both in 1998 and in 2006. 
The revision of the ABA approximately every 8 years is also deemed 
inevitable, because 
a) the company law of the EU is still developing, as it incessantly changes 
and its progress is cyclic. On the one hand, long-standing directives are 
amended (e.g., the amendment of Directive no. 2 on the Formation of 
Corporations and Assets is permanent) as well as new directives are 
framed (for instance, in trust law), on the other hand, supranational 
corporations regulated under Union law (e.g., European corporations may 
In all of the three cases, it was Tamás Sárközy (responsible for the general part) that 
headed the Codification Committee with the participation of members, such as György 
Wellmann [responsible for the chapters on unlimited partnerships (kkt.) and limited partner-
ships (bt.)J, Gábor Komáromi [responsible for the chapters on limited liability companies 
(kft.)], Tamás Sándor [responsible for the chapter on companies limited by shares (rt.)] and 
János Kálmán. 
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be formed in Hungary) operate as competitors of companies regulated 
by domestic law, 
b) the reach of technical development is significant, with respect to the 
gradual introduction of electronic company procedures, electronic exercise 
of members' rights, digitalisation of the operation of company organs, 
c) the development of associated legal branches must be taken into account, 
such as competition law upon framing trust law, accountancy law upon 
the regulation of company assets, as well as requirements set forth under 
law concerning the capital market upon the codification of law concerning 
public limited companies, 
d) finally, the periodical assessment of experience obtained in the course 
of the application of company law by attorneys, the Court of Registration 
and during judicial proceedings is necessary. 
In view of the fact that both the second and the third ABAs are supplementary 
law in substance, the technical justification for drafting new law was required. 
Since it is not only lawyers, but also enterprises, tax advisors and auditors 
whose work is comprehensively and directly determined by the rules of the 
ABA, we assumed that the development of the ABA into a labyrinth of rules 
(such as the Act on the State Budget and the Act on Capital Markets are) had 
to be prevented. Consequently, the reformulation of the ABA had to be 
accomplished in terms of the revision of its institutions. The requirement of 
lucidity was further supported by the observance of the following rules: 
a) The ABA shall be formulated in accordance with classical codification 
principles. Therefore, it is specified as a principal rule that an article may 
consist of a maximum of 6 paragraphs, a paragraph may consist of max. 
3 sentences and the combined justification of max. 2 articles is permitted. 
The latter rule was breached in some cases as a result of ministerial 
harmonisation and parliamentary debate (see, Article 202 regulating the 
share register as a pertinent instance). 
b) No enforcement decree issued by an organ of public administration may 
be appended to the ABA. (As an apparent exception, we must mention 
the government authorisation related to Company Law Advisory Bodies, 
which, however, does not affect the substance of company law.) 
In the course of the codification process in 2005, the former textual scope 
of the ABA could be basically retained, in spite of the fact that the number of 
articles during the administrative harmonisation and parliamentary debate, 
marked by newly prevalent legislative vehemence, increased by approx. 10 p.c. 
Unfortunately, the objective of public administration to extend its scope of 
authority could also just partly be curtailed. Therefore, the scope of the activity 
of the Service of the Ministry of Justice Providing Information about Companies 
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and Assisting Electronic Firm Procedures (an appalling designation) (IM Cég-
információs és Elektronikus Cégeljárásban Közreműködő Szolgálata) was 
considerably extended as per Para. (2) of Article 1 of Firmregistration Act (by, 
e.g., the provision of legal advisory service), furthermore, upon the motion 
made by an MP, in support of the work of the Ministry of Justice, a Company 
Law Advisory Body was established as per Article 332 of ABA, which may 
consist of as many as 100 members and renders expert opinions of "scholarly 
character" in three-member committees. The Advisory Body may contest the 
role of arbitration courts, which is a barely agreeable tendency. Over-meticulous 
regulation is more distinguishable in the Firmregistration Act, than in the 
ABA, albeit, excessive attentiveness to details results naturally from the 
character of procedural law. 
The inherent objective of the third ABA to safeguard continuity is high-
lighted by the fact that its effect pertains merely to new business associations 
founded on deeds of association that were submitted to the Court of Registra-
tion subsequently to 1st July, 2006. Business associations that had submitted 
data for registration and operated before 1st July, 2006 may continue operation 
within the purview of the second ABA either until the first change effected 
in their data or until 1st September, 2007, the latest. Under the ABA of 1997, 
no ultimate deadline for adjustment was determined for associations, which 
incurred disturbances in practice. Nonetheless, business associations that 
operated upon the adoption of the third ABA have been guaranteed a period of 
nearly two years for adjustment. This, in case of the majority of associations, 
probably implies that they will adopt deeds of association (Memoranda and 
Articles of Association of Companies) that comply with the third ABA at 
ordinary general/members' meetings assembling in the spring of 2007. We 
cannot fail to mention that in re the third ABA, which stipulates very few 
cogent rules in comparison with the second ABA, adaptation in the majority of 
cases will implicate benefiting from the specified additional options and their 
introduction into the deeds of association of already operating companies. 
Associations that will fail to implement the new cogent rules of the third ABA 
by 1st September, 2007 will be coerced in the scope of legality supervision 
proceedings conducted by the Court of Registration either to institute a valid 
legal framework for their operation or to ultimately terminate operation under 
Article 81 of Company Act. 
In order to demonstrate that no emergency to codify the third ABA obtained, 
we must point out that provisions incurring momentous changes in social-
economic circumstances will take effect subsequently to 1st July, 2007, that is, 
one year later, than the date of taking effect of less consequential provisions. A 
relevant instance is the revocation of the regulation of non-profit companies 
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(kht.) under Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code (hereinafter: Civil Code) and the 
concurrent introduction under the third ABA of the non-profit character as an 
option to pertain to all forms of business associations after 1st July, 2007. Non-
profit companies (kht.) that will still operate at that date shall be permitted to 
continue operation for a further period of two years. A second instance is the 
omission of the regulation governing joint enterprises as a form of business 
associations under the third ABA, since no new joint ventures were established 
following 1990, whereas, the joint enterprises registered before the third ABA 
took effect (more, than 100 companies) would be permitted to continue operation 
in concert with the second ABA without time limitation. To conclude the array 
of instances, the termination of the employment of executive officials as such 
of unlimited partnerships (kkt.), limited partnerships (bt.) and limited liability 
companies (kft.) is prescribed within the purview of the third ABA, which in 
fact guarantees a provisional period of five years for compliance subsequently 
to its taking effect. We expect that the application of the third ABA will admit 
equal flexibility in practice. 
With respect to terminology, the designation of various organs of business 
associations was in several cases simplified and unified under the third ABA. 
For instance, in re business unions, the term of members' meeting was in-
troduced instead of the misleading term of the board of managers. As for the 
regulation of unlimited and limited partnerships (kkt. and bt.), the alternatively 
used "general meeting" and "members' meeting" were uniformly superseded by 
the term of "members' meeting", which serves to underline the emphatic vague-
ness concerning the main organ of the simplest forms of association as opposed to 
that of the Ltd. On condition that it is only in these formal respects that the 
deeds of association of unlimited partnerships and business unions depart from 
the new law, we can barely assume that explicit emendation will be deemed 
necessary (for instance, the substitution of the established term of general meeting 
by members' meeting). Scilicet, bureaucratic formalism should be duly avoided 
in company law, even if technical problems may arise in the trade register as a 
consequence. 
2. The Relation of the ABA to Other Significant Regulations of Business Law 
The reformulation of the ABA allowed the reconsideration of its relation to 
other regulations of basic business law. 
a) In the course of re-codification, the Codification Committee intended to 
more systematically incorporate substantive provisions into the ABA 
and procedural provisions into the Company Act, thereby, to circumvent 
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repetitions and overlaps. Accordingly, the ABA includes merely general 
provisions pertaining to the legality supervision of business associations, 
since the detailed provisions are set forth in the Firmregistration Act, 
given that these are special proceedings conducted by the Court of 
Registration. The provisions specifying the reasons for the invalidity of 
deeds of association are basically formulated in the ABA, whereas, 
judicial contestation of the decision on company registration on grounds 
of the invalidity of deeds of association is admissible pursuant to Article 
69 of Firmregistration Act on "action for the establishment of the nullity 
of company foundation". Nevertheless, in some cases, with regard to 
the objective of safeguarding the uniformity of regulation, the ABA also 
specifies rules of procedure (such as the rule of the judicial contestation 
of decisions adopted by business associations and the plea in expulsion), 
at the same time, the Firmregistration Act also includes substantive 
provisions pertaining to, e.g., the name of the company, the company 
seat and registered offices. 
b) Interference with other legal branches could be avoided within the 
scope of the third ABA, for instance, the stipulations that guarantee 
tax allowances for foreign investors as well as tax-free and duty-free 
implementation of reorganisation were repealed, since these matters are 
already regulated under tax law. For political reasons, some exceptions 
had to be made, e.g., the stipulation that labour relations prevailing at 
business associations shall be regulated in accordance with the Labour 
Code was upheld under Article 8 of ABA, which, from a professional 
viewpoint, is an expressly redundant provision. 
c) Its relation to the new, currently reformulated Civil Code became 
unambiguous. It is definite that the endeavour to integrate the ABA into 
the Civil Code was obstructed, since the uniformity and substantiveness 
of the ABA as a code must be retained even following the completion 
of the new draft Civil Code, in re firstly, company law constitutes a 
complex legal branch, secondly, its textual scope and technical character. 
To that effect, the specificity of company law is now adequately 
articulated under Para. (2) of Article 9 of ABA, according to which, 
although, the Civil Code constitutes secondary law substantiating the 
ABA, in cases related to business associations, the Civil Code shall be 
not literally, but "appropriately" applicable. As the Supreme Court 
reasonably ruled, according to the solution based on the principle of 
clausula rebus sic substantibus, Article 241 of the Civil Code shall not 
be applicable in case of deeds of association concluded for an indefinite 
period. Scilicet, Part 4 of the Civil Code on Contract Law is modelled 
234 TAMÁS SÁRKÖZY 
on bilateral barter agreements, whereas, deeds of association specifically 
establish multi-entity organisational liability. 
As a matter of fact, the effect of company law on Part 2 on Entities of the 
currently formulated new Civil Code can be positively discerned.3 Its constructive 
aspect is that several solutions of company law (e.g., pre-association posited as 
pre-legal entity or reorganisation by universal legal succession) that were 
met by reluctance on the part of experts of civil law back in 1988 are being 
abstracted under the new draft Civil Code. Its detrimental aspect, as to my 
view, is that the draft Civil Code adopts the institutions of company law in 
extraneous areas, as well. Namely, by reason of the recent radical curtailment 
of the permitted period for company registration, the import of pre-associations 
has also remarkably decreased in company law, therefore, the regulation of 
the formation of, e.g., "pre-foundations" under the new Civil Code seems even 
more problematic. In contrast with company law, in which considerable 
deregulation was effectuated under the third ABA, the Chapter of the draft 
Civil Code on Legal Entities (as an overextended counter-effect of former under-
regulatedness) is incredibly over-regulated, so far as it completely unnecessarily 
introduces institutions of company law under provisions concerning ideal legal 
entities, such as the supervisory board and the auditor, which have gradually 
become discretionary in company law, as well.4(4) 
a) In the course of drafting the third ABA, we focused on the requirement 
of harmony with accountancy law, which was all the more deemed im-
perative, since EU company law directives abound in accountancy rules. 
To that effect, the observation of the terms of accountancy is more relevant 
under rules governing procedures of reorganisation, capital increase and 
reduction in the third ABA, than in its antecedents. Nonetheless, we 
intended to manifest that it is accountancy law that needs to be adjusted 
to basic solutions of company law, not vice versa. Therefore, when a 
business association is finally registered by the Court of Registration, 
the pre-association shall be finally and automatically established as a 
business association, i.e., the prescription of "a closing accountancy 
measure" is regarded as an excessively bureaucratic measure and to be 
abolished. 
3
 The Chapter of the draft Civil Code on Entities has been introduced for professional 
debate by the Ministry of Justice on its home page. 
4
 See, the critique by Sárközy T.: Alternatív javaslat „A jogi személyek általános sza-
bályaira" (Alternative Proposal for "the General Regulation Pertaining to Legal Entities"), 
Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció, nos. 4-5 /2005. 
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b) Upon the formulation of the Chapter on Companies Limited by Shares in 
the third ABA, its relation to the permanently evolving and incessantly 
amended Act of 2001 on Capital Markets (hereinafter: ACM) posed a 
dilemma. In my view, the ACM represents a peculiarly low quality 
regulation, its over-regulated and frequently self-contradictory provisions 
preclude its harmony with the third ABA, which would be a prerequisite 
of law-making despite the different approaches of the two legal areas. 
Consequently, we endeavoured to distinctly demarcate the scopes of the 
ABA and the ACM, to that effect, the scope of trust law under the ABA 
is restricted exclusively to the regulation of close companies limited by 
shares (zrt.) and limited liability companies (kft.), whereas, the rules of 
take-over procedures pertaining to public limited companies are specified 
under the ACM (redrafted incidentally with particular incoherence), 
even so, the contradictions in many cases couldn't be resolved without 
the violation of the rationale of company law. A recent "achievement" 
consists in the before-mentioned comprehensive amendment of the 
ACM under Act CLXXXVI of 2005 in December, 2005, which was 
followed by the latest amendment of the ACM under Act XXII of 2006 
in January, 2006. The latter act contains an innovation unparalleled in 
the history of Hungarian law-making, scilicet, it stipulates under Para. 
(4) of Article 6 that Paras. ( l ) - (2) of Article 354 of the third ABA "shall 
not take effect". 
3. Deliberate Progress from the Past to the Future 
The third ABA took effect in a period, when the basic trends of the next decade 
(perhaps decades) were already relatively adumbrated, viz., the accentuation of 
the requirements entailed by globalisation and information society as well as 
the consolidation of European integration. We presumed that our principal 
assignments in this situation were, on the one hand, the sustenance of domestic 
traditions of company law, on the other hand, continued adjustment to the 
international development of company law by constant modernisation. In this 
respect, we had to take into account the following crucial factors. 
The efforts of the European Union to create the unity of law, which per se 
accords with our objectives, by directives that concentrate on guaranteeing the 
uniformity of rules that govern primarily entities of the world of big business, 
that is, public limited companies, banks, insurance companies, investment 
funds, etc., also define the scope in which we need to consider the eventuality 
that supranational corporations founded in compliance with EU directives will 
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prevail over business associations founded on domestic law. Furthermore, 
Union law is more and more intensely overwhelming the national legislation of 
member states based on continental law with solutions originating in the 
Anglo-Saxon legal system, which has adverse effects and sometimes entails 
confusion in domestic law.5 For instance, at the beginning of this decade, 
German legislation was also obliged to frame separate law on capital markets 
and to co-opt a take-over procedure modelled on the US pattern in re public 
limited companies. Consequently, German corporations tend to abandon German 
company law (therefore, a recent session of the Deutscher Juristentag was 
marked by bewilderment) and reorganise as European corporations, which admit 
the board system. Thereby, they can evade the most characteristic institution of 
modern German company law, that is, the so-called parity Mitbestimmung 
(equally shared decision-making), which implies equal participation by employees 
in supervisory boards.6 
In view of the above, the Codification Committee relied on the following 
conclusions upon framing the third ABA: 
a) Attempts at the trivialisation and homogenisation of traditional forms of 
small- and medium-scale business associations need to be resisted. For 
several years, approx. 8,000 unlimited partnerships [(kkt.) as a typical 
form of micro-enterprises], 120,000 limited partnerships [(bt.) as a form 
of small-scale enterprises] and 220,000 limited liability companies [(kft.) 
as a typical form of medium-scale associations] have operated agreeably 
on grounds of permissive regulation in substance and in effect.7 The more 
positively contractual character of unlimited and limited partnerships 
was upheld and reinforced under the third ABA, while the efforts to 
declare these two forms of association legal entities were defied. The 
aspect of ltd.s constituted as associations of entities (e.g., the institution 
of several managers, but no board of managers is permitted), which 
distinguishes them from companies limited by shares, was maintained. 
Without doubt, the rules pertaining to close companies limited by shares 
3
 See, e.g., Halbhuber, Limited Company statt GmbH? Europarechtlicher Rahmen und 
deutscher Widerstand (Limited Company in lieu of GmbH? EU Legal Framework and 
German Resistance)., Baden-Baden, 2001. 
6
 Qualität und Preis am Markt für Gesellschaftsformen (Quality and Price on the 
Market for Business Associations). Zeitschrift für Unternehmens und Gesellschaftsrecht, 
no. 3/2004. 
7
 Para. (1) of Article 9 of ABA established cogency in form as a principal rule, since 
the efforts to formulate the permissive regulation of unlimited and limited partnerships and 
ltd.s (kkt.-bt.-kft.) during codification failed. In effect, however, the third ABA advanced 
distinctly towards permissive regulation. 
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and ltd.s, respectively, show more correlation, but the rapprochement 
eventuated basically owing to the regulation of companies limited by 
shares (e.g., preference shares that secure the right of pre-emption). 
b) It needs to be prospectively prevented that large-scale associations in 
Hungary relinquish the rule of domestic law and opt for Community law. 
Consequently, the third ABA, in an unprecedented manner in Hungarian 
company law, permits that the entities forming public corporations opt 
for the board system according to the model of Anglo-American integrate 
management in lieu of the German model of shared management. That 
integrate managing organ is designated as board of directors, which is 
distinguished from general management under the third ABA. That 
solution obviously benefits investors from the US, Britain and the Far-
East, however, permission of the establishment of boards of directors for 
ltd.s and close companies limited by shares would have been an evident 
excess. 
c) In accordance with the development of information technology, the third 
ABA allows to some extent both the exercise of members' rights and 
the operation of association organs, i.e., general meeting, management, 
supervisory boards via means of information technology, although, we 
must acknowledge that access to these facilities is not immediate reality 
for Hungarian entrepreneurs. The basic rules are stipulated under Article 
20, nevertheless, the chapters on ltd.s, and particularly, on companies 
limited by shares prescribe several special rules that govern, e.g., holding 
general meetings via video-conferences. Simultaneously, the use of these 
modern facilities is safeguarded by the rule that it may not infringe either 
members' rights to equal protection of the law or equal opportunity for 
participation in business matters. 
d) With respect to the purpose of modernisation, it was not only Anglo-
Saxon/Anglo-American solutions that we took into consideration. In my 
view, a momentous according step consists in the co-optation under 
Chapter 5 of the regulation pertaining to trusts already well-established 
in the Hungarian business world, and consequently, to the acquisition 
agreement from German law.8 The acquisition agreement is obviously 
not a typical element under civil law, its introduction was challenged both 
theoretically and functionally. Nevertheless, due to the institution of the 
acquisition agreement, the implementation of a uniform economic policy 
8
 See Mielicke, J.: Konzern durch Beherrschungs und Ergebnisübernahmeverträge 
(Trusts via Acquisitions and Take-Over Agreements), Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels 
und Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR), no. 4/2001. 
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will be considerably more refined, relations within the trust will become 
more perspicuous, the reasonable interests of the shareholders, creditors 
and the management of subsidiaries will be more defensible. As a matter 
of course, voluntary registration by trusts may not be immediately 
expected, therefore, the ABA can prove to be a progressive and program-
matic statute, furthermore, the provisions of Article 64 of ABA governing 
effective trusts also admit the judicial enforcement of registration. 
e) The consistent effectuation of the purpose of modernisation was not 
feasible for an economic and a legal reason in one area, that is, the 
distinction of corporations in terms of forms of operation. Firstly, 
economic policy-makers did not concur with the solution customary in 
Western Europe (which had not been included in the conception of 
the ABA, either), namely, that public limited companies would be 
peremptorily classified as companies quoted at the Stock Exchange. 
Scilicet, in this case, a corporation not quoted at the Stock Exchange 
would be automatically classified as a close company limited by shares. 
On condition that the public limited company is concurrently quoted, 
market self-adjustment could supersede a substantial range of legal 
regulations. Therefore, the regulation of corporate governance would 
not have been incorporated into the Section of the ABA pertaining to 
public limited companies, but, in concert with the German model, the 
issuance of an ethical code on corporate governance would have sufficed.4 
Secondly, as regards the legal reason, pursuant to the amendment of the 
ACM approximately one year before the adoption of the third ABA, the 
distinction of close and public corporations had been established in 
company law and in the Hungarian business world also to be denoted in 
the designation of corporations as abbreviations Zrt. and Nyrt., which is 
unfamiliar in Western-Europe and non-transplantable into English or 
German. This solution should have been interfered with under the third 
ABA within one year, which would have been evidently arguable from 
the point of view of legal policy. 
f ) The prima facie dogmatic solution of the separate designations of Zrt. 
and Nyrt. is based on the assumption that, if the scope of public limited 
companies does not coincide with the scope of quoted companies, EU 
directives concerning public limited companies will either govern all 
Hungarian corporations, or close companies limited by shares will have 
9
 Ringleb, H. H.-Kremer, T.-Lutter, M. -Werder , A.: Kommentar zum Deutschen 
Corporate Governance Kodex (Commentary on the German Corporate Governance Code). 
Munich, 2005. 18-21. 
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to be distinctly differentiated from public limited companies. In an effort 
to effectuate the latter alternative, the law-maker stipulated under Para. 
(3) of Article 171 of ACM that close and public operation shall be denoted 
in the designation of the company. This solution, however, is obviously 
defective in my judgement, because, on the one hand, it would have 
sufficed to denote the form of operation in line with the designation, not 
in the designation of the company. Namely, in re the obligation set forth 
under Para. (1) of Article 4 of ABA, according to which the non-profit 
character of corporations shall be indicated in the designation of the 
company, the abbreviation of non-profit close corporations will be NpZrt. 
On the other hand, even if we intend to denote the form of operation in 
the designation, it would have amply sufficed to prescribe the denotation 
of Nyrt. for at most 100 corporations that operate publicly out of the 
approx. 4,000 corporations, since all other corporations would have 
been necessarily classified as close corporations. Whereas, in this status 
quo, we have imposed substantial costs and administrative burden on 
our corporations (e.g., new firm stamps, bank-papers, exchange of shares, 
etc.), which contradicts the basic objectives of legal regulation. 
g) The indefinite differentiation of close companies limited by shares from 
public limited companies incurred a structural problem in law-making, 
viz., the structure of Chapter 10 of ABA on Corporations is excessively 
complicated. It is introduced by a General Section encompassing Articles 
172-183, which is followed by detailed regulation that constitutes the 
principal rules under Articles 184-284 pertaining to close companies 
limited by shares, subsequently, the auxiliary and departing rules 
governing public limited companies are specified under Articles 285-
315, and finally, corporate governance recommendations of the Budapest 
Stock Exchange concerning quoted public limited companies conclude 
Chapter 10. Obviously, the identification of the scope of quoted public 
limited companies with that of public limited companies would have 
eventuated considerably more undemanding and easily applicable 
regulation. 
h) With respect to Union law, we may eventually establish that law-making 
in Hungary should not verbatim adopt EU directives (which equals 
mere adaptation by "translation"), but the recognition of the purpose of 
legal policy is imperative, which may facilitate its implementation by 
legal instruments inherent in the Hungarian legal system. Therefore, for 
instance, the unreasonable adaptation of EU directives governing public 
limited companies to unions of entities is inappropriate, however, that 
practice has prevailed in re, e.g., the invalidity of deeds association since 
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1991, that is, the effect of Directive no. 1 of 1968 on Harmonisation of 
Safeguards for Business Associations has been extended to irrelevant 
areas not designed by law-makers of the EU. Furthermore, the adoption 
of still non-effective EU norms as a manifestation of "pushing forward" 
is also deemed inappropriate, which, nevertheless, had ensued in terms 
of the limitation of one-entity associations under the second ABA, 
nullified under Para. (4) of Article 5 of the third ABA. Nonetheless, in 
the course of codification of the third ABA, the adoption of the more 
rigorous, currently drafted EU regulation pertaining to auditors was 
propounded (e.g., of the provision that auditors' contracts of agency shall 
not be renewed), however, we defied and the contingent later settlement 
has been referred to the competence of accountancy law. 
4. A Pro-Entrepreneur Approach 
The third ABA is marked by an approach that emphatically favours entrepre-
neurs with the exception of the elements specified under Point e) of Section 3 
above. According to the standpoint of the Codification Committee, 
a) if the interests of entrepreneurs, public administration, the Court of 
Registration or attorneys (notaries public) conflict, entrepreneurial interests 
shall be promoted, 
b) the facilitation of more expeditious, inexpensive and simple formation 
of enterprises and of their operation shall be necessary. 
c) For the purpose of the accomplishment of the objectives above, the third 
ABA substantially deregulates, i.e., crucially diminishes the adminis-
trative burden imposed on associated parties and extends the scope of 
permissive regulation via basic reinforcement of the autonomy of 
associated parties and the specification of a broad set of applicable 
options for organisation and operation. The third ABA is based on the 
assumption that nearly 18 years after the restitution of company law in 
Hungary, both company law and business culture are adequately refined 
to admit such "liberal" regulation and its flexible implementation. 
In the following passages, we'll expose some instances of such pro-entre-
preneur approach: 
a) As to my point of view, the deregulation of the sphere of operation of 
business associations is particularly important. The third ABA sets forth 
the principle of the permission of all sorts of activities that are not 
prohibited or limited by law, even if the respective activity is not itemised 
in the sphere of activities. The business association shall be obligated to 
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indicate only one main activity in its sphere of activities, whereas, all 
other activities shall be included in the trade register at the specific 
according request of the association. This new regulation will basically 
change the proceedings of the tax authority. 
b) Upon the advent of political transformation, it was justifiable to adminis-
tratively limit the terms of the mandates of executive officials and the 
number of assumable executive positions, the limitation of which, how-
ever, is no longer required. Therefore, the limiting rule prescribing that 
one entity may concurrently fulfil executive positions at maximum three 
different associations was repealed under the third ABA. Whilst, the 
principal rule stipulating that appointments shall be valid for a definite, 
but at most for a five-year period was maintained as a permissive 
regulation. Therefore, deeds of association may permit that executive 
officials will be appointed for an indefinite period, in the case of which, 
mandates for indefinite periods may be conferred on supervisory board 
members, as well. At the same time and after much delay, the third ABA 
finally institutes the maxim of distinction between the legal relations of 
executive officials under company law (substantiated by the rules of 
contracts of agency under the Civil Code, albeit, such legal relations 
shall not be established by contracts of agency) and other potential 
employment of the concerned executive officials by the respective 
association. By the generalisation of the rule formerly pertaining merely to 
corporations, Para. (2) of Article 22 of ABA stipulates that the mandates 
of executive officials shall not be assumed in employment. Therefore, 
the legal consequences of mandates of executive officials governed by 
company law (the fulfilment of which may be either gratuitous or 
subject to consideration) shall be consistently differentiated from those of 
the potential employment of executive officials in other positions (e.g., 
in the director's position) at the specific association, which shall be 
unequivocally grounded on the Labour Code. Therefore, the general 
manager of a limited liability company may exclusively fulfil the position 
of managing director concurrently, on condition that the appointments 
are established on grounds of two separate scopes of legal relations. 
However, in view of the fact that the majority of ltd.s in Hungary have 
accommodated interwoven legal relations under company and labour law, 
this subtle regulation will merely govern legal relations established 
subsequently to 1st July, 2006. Whereas, the parties concerned shall be 
guaranteed a reasonable provisory period for the settlement of prevailing 
legal relations, since the legal relations of executive officials instituted 
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preceding 1st July, 2006 may be eventually upheld for a further period of 
five years. 
c) Under the third ABA, the significant reinforcement of permissive 
regulation extends the scope of entrepreneurial liberties. Although, for 
technical reasons of drafting, the cogency of its rules was maintained by 
virtue of Para. (1) of Article 9, owing to the General Section and to the 
rules governing specific forms of business associations, the freedom 
of parties to depart from the majority of the rules of the ABA was 
considerably expanded. The last phrase of Para. (1) of Article 9 stipulates 
with general effect that, if the departure from the ABA consists in the 
co-optation of a solution not recognised under the ABA, it will be 
regarded permissible (which formerly in most cases had been reversely 
adjudicated by the Court of Registration), with the exception (a safeguarding 
general clause is inserted), if the respective solution contradicts a) the 
general purpose of company law, or, b) the objectives of the regulation 
pertaining to the respective form of association, or, c) infringes the basic 
principle of bona fide exercise of rights pursuant to the Civil Code. In 
re the specific forms of association, due to the formulation of rules per 
se, approx. 95 p.c. of the regulation concerning unlimited and limited 
partnerships (kkt.-bt.) is currently de facto permissive, whereas, more 
than 50 p.c. of the regulation of ltd.s (kft.) and nearly 50 p.c. of the 
regulation of close companies limited by shares are also permissive in 
my judgement. In this scope, the substantial enhancement of the per-
missiveness of the regulation of close corporations is peculiarly emphatic, 
considering that the form of operation of the overwhelming majority of 
corporations in Hungary is close. Accordingly, it is unprecedented in 
the regulation of corporations in Hungary that the optional establish-
ment of the supervisory board is permitted [dependent on the respective 
claim of fifty per cent of the shareholders (nominal value rate) of the 
close corporation]. As to ltd.s, the establishment of supervisory boards is 
completely discretionary, in addition, the regulation of the institution of 
employee participation is permissive, as well. The rule that in case of 
associations with more than 200 full-time employees on an annual average, 
one-third the supervisory board members shall be appointed by the 
general/members' meeting upon the nomination of the works council 
was maintained, but the management of the association and the works 
council may conclude a deviating agreement. Which implies that in 
return for, e.g., pay-rise or the provision of social, etc. surplus services, the 
community of employees may renounce due participation rights. This 
may exclusively eventuate on a voluntary basis and in compensation, 
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since the enforcement of employer over-representation shall be expressly 
deemed ex parte abuse of rights and sanctioned. 
d) The range of eligible management options for associated parties was 
considerably extended, which is most conspicuously instantiated under 
the rules governing corporations. As to close corporations, the application 
of the option of the German drei Ecken (triangular) system, which 
constitutes the principal rule, is an alternative to the jointly applicable 
institutions of one-entity management as per Article 247 and of the 
executive supervisory board, the power of which was expanded as per 
Article 37. As to public corporations, the German management system 
established in Hungary is simultaneously instituted with the optional 
Anglo-American integrate management system, furthermore, new organs, 
such as the auditing board are also introduced. The establishment of 
optional organs, such as advisory bodies and boards modelled on the 
German Beirat is admissible with general effect as per Para. (6) of 
Article 19. 
e) The procedural auxiliary of the enhancement of permissiveness in 
substantive law consists in guaranteeing broader access to institutional 
and ad hoc arbitration courts in lieu of administrative courts for intent 
parties. Pursuant to Article 10 of ABA, the range of options for recourse 
to arbitration courts is extended in two respects. On the one hand, 
recourse to arbitration courts abroad is also secured for associations 
with exclusively Hungarian members, on the other hand, it is merely 
in re legal disputes between the association and the members that 
guaranteeing the opportunity for recourse to arbitration courts and the 
specification of one arbitration court in deeds of association shall be 
mandatory, whereas, irrespective of the before-mentioned criterion, for 
the settlement of disputes among members concerning the operation of 
the association, the members may resort to arbitration courts as well as 
may institute various arbitration courts. 
5. Conflicts of Interests 
Besides the protection of reasonable entrepreneurial interests, the third ABA 
purports to safeguard other interests, as well. Albeit, the business association is 
possessed primarily by its members, the proprietors, the enforcement of the 
interests of other parties must also be protected by law. To that effect, protection 
of the interests of the management is guaranteed by, e.g., the institution of 
exoneration pursuant to Para. (5) of Article 30. Furthermore, the former 10 p.c. 
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limit of the admission of collective minority protection was decreased to 5 p.c. 
pursuant to Para. (1) of Article 49, finally, the instruments of creditor protection 
were elucidated and circumscribed, for instance, in re the so-called company 
vacation, the scope of protection was extended to limited partners of limited 
partnerships (bt.) pursuant to Para. (3) of Article 50. 
As a matter of course, protected interests may conflict. Consequently, in 
my judgement, Para. (3) of Article 30 adopted during parliamentary debate upon 
the motion of an MP is defective, since it makes an exception to the principal 
rule as per Para. (2) of Article 30, according to which executive officials of the 
association shall proceed with regard to the primacy of the interests of the 
association, by the prescription of the obligation of executive officials to 
observe the primacy of creditors' interests "subsequently to the supervention 
of the minatory situation of insolvency of the association". Scilicet, executive 
officials constitute an organ of the association and shall proceed upon the trust 
of the general/members' meeting, therefore, they shall promote members' 
interests. Whereas, creditors' interests are basically protected under the ABP 
and other law along with the ABA, which shall be obviously observed by 
executive officials. Apart f rom the bona fide adherence to legal regulations, 
which explicitly precludes resort to irresponsible hazardous solutions, whats-
oever, executive officials may not further creditors' interests as opposed to the 
interests of the association. Furthermore, on condition that the association 
declares insolvency and the executive officials do not proceed with regard to 
the primacy of creditors' interests, Para. (3) of Article 30 also stipulates that 
separate law will lay down the liability of executive officials for creditors' 
interests. However, as to the regulation of limited liability companies, even the 
establishment of the secondary liability of members shall be exceptional, there-
fore, the specification that non-member officials shall accept responsibility in 
lieu of the association and the members is an overtly excessive rule in my 
view, an instance of the overreach of wrongful trading. The according law 
founding such responsibility was adopted pursuant to Article 33/A of Act VI of 
2006 amending the ABP, which circumscribes the supervention of the minatory 
situation of insolvency, grounds for the presumption of the infringement of 
creditors' interests, classifies liabilities for damages as debts to creditors and 
defines the imputation of executive officials, etc. According to my view, that 
qualifies as an overbreadth of law-making. In this context, we must also refer 
to Article 50 of ABA, in terms of which the court may transfer liability to the 
members of the ltd. or the corporation, the scope of which, nevertheless, is 
inordinately extended both under the Company Act and the amendment of the 
ABP, whereas, the admission of the transfer of responsibility is extremely 
exceptional in international legal practice. Notwithstanding, the provisions 
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under Paras. (2)-(3) of Article 63 of ABP and Paras. (I)—(2) of Article 93 of 
Company Act unreasonably extend the scope of the transfer of responsibility. 
En passant, the Company Act is not assigned to supplement the substantive 
rules of the ABA, such as the prescription of a separate rule of the transfer of 
responsibility, provided that the remaining total debt of the terminated 
association exceeds 50 p.c. of its equity capital. 
In view of the fact that the entrepreneur jeopardises its private property, the 
liberalisation of the regulation in this scope is justifiable. However, the case of 
business associations operating with public funds is assessed differently. The 
rigour of requirements in re associations operating with state (local govern-
ment) participation with majority interest as well as in re public corporations 
operating with significant investment by natural entities must obviously not be 
mitigated, but affirmed as opposed to the general tendency of liberalisation. 
Additional requirements concerning associations operating in the public sector 
must be formulated fundamentally under the Act on the State Budget in a 
similar manner to the amendment of the before-mentioned law by the so-called 
Transparency Act of 2003. Undoubtedly, the requirements concerning the 
corporate governance of associations in public property will have to be radically 
emended under a new Act on the State Budget. 
6. Streamlining and Economising Firmregistration Procedures — 
Functional Changes Concerning the Court of Registration 
The necessary implications of the enforcement of a pro-entrepreneurial 
approach consist in the freedoms of streamlined and economical formation of 
business associations, effectuation of required changes in deeds of association 
and in the forms of association, contingent termination of associations without 
the violation of public interest, such as authoritativeness of the trade register, 
creditors' interests, etc. 
As a matter of fact, streamlining the procedure of company registration and 
the introduction of electronic company procedures supervened before drafting 
the third ABA, wherefore, of course, the pertinent regulation was further 
amended. In this respect, the new rules pursuant to Para. (6) of Article 46 and 
Article 47 of Firmregistration Act are of fundamental importance, since the 
formerly differentiated registration of associations with investments by legal 
and non-legal entities was superseded, the term of registration was determined 
in a maximum of 15 working days as of submission of the respective claim and 
safeguards for the potential omission of the deadline were specified. As elements 
of basic streamlining, patterns of legal deeds of association were introduced 
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pursuant to Articles 48-49 of Firmregistration Act [four patterns, one for 
unlimited, one for limited partnerships and two patterns for (one-entity, multi-
entity) ltd.s], in case of the application of which, the term of registration shall 
be restricted to 8 working days for submission of claims on paper and to 2 
working days for electronic submission. 
The specification of the freedom of expressly voluntary application of the 
patterns of legal deeds of association is notably unprecedented in domestic 
business law, therefore, it has been contested by several legal theorists, attorneys 
and registry judges. In my judgement, the application of the pattern is expedient 
for the simplest forms of association, since it crucially effects streamlining and 
no complex contractual procedure is required in re small-scale enterprises. 
Consequently, those who agree to the application of the simple patterns without 
changes will be facilitated to establish associations more expeditiously. 
Whereas, those who intend to establish more complex associations (e.g., with 
several managers and supervisory boards at ltd.s) will conclude deviating and 
individual deeds of association. 
In my view, the patterns will also promote the economisation of the formation 
of small-scale enterprises in the long run, therefore, it is inappropriate to regard 
them as "awkward procedures". As a modus vivendi, mandatory endorsement by 
attorneys, which is unknown in Western Europe, was upheld, however, in the 
future, that requirement may be naturally cancelled in re deeds of association 
concluded according to patterns, and with the expansion of the market, attorneys' 
fees will evidently decrease, as well. Since the scale of contribution by the 
Court of Registration to the formation of associations on grounds of patterns is 
negligible, the respective fees will be soon and necessarily reduced by the 
Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, upon the following revision of the institu-
tions of the ABA, the publication of the formation of these simple associations 
will be obviously deemed unnecessary, whence, the related costs may also be 
released. Eventually, the facilitation of the formation of associations is also 
furthered by the procedure of the reservation of the name of the company 
under Article 6 of Firmregistration Act, which specifies the freedom to reserve 
the name opted for by the associated parties for a period of 60 days. 
Nevertheless, other company procedures have also been consequentially 
streamlined. In this context, we must refer to the simplification of the conclusion 
of deeds of association under Article 18 of ABA, which, e.g., authorises the 
management to effect minimal changes in deeds of association. Furthermore, 
by the definition of reorganisation as a change in the form of the association, 
the elements of the three-pillared structure of reorganisation, association and 
dissolution were more unequivocally distinguished under Article 67 of ABA. 
Again, the process of reorganisation was momentously streamlined under 
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Articles 71-72 of ABA, wherefore, in a basic case, a session of the chief organ 
may effectuate reorganisation as well as the scope of the obligation to draft a 
reorganisation plan was restricted, etc. In order to resolve former uncertainties, 
it is expressly stipulated that co-ordinate unions of legal entities may also 
reorganise as business associations, and, vice versa, then again, the dissolution 
agreement shall be concluded by members (not by the association) under Para. 
(3) of Article 84 of ABA. 
In the scope of the regulation of the termination of business associations 
without legal successors, the procedural rules of final settlement were revoked 
under the ABP and introduced into the Firmregistration Act, which marks 
remarkable progress. Scilicet, final settlement is a procedure related to the 
termination of associations not substantiated by insolvency. Therefore, enactment 
of such separate regulation of final settlement will probably impel law-making 
to eventually frame up-to-date law pertaining to insolvency equivalent to the 
pertinent EU regulation, so that it can supersede the effective obsolete regulation 
of bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings. (Pursuant to Act VI of 2006, only 
a minor amendment of ABP was adopted.) In effect, final settlement was 
momentously differentiated under the new Firmregistration Act, wherefore, 
coerced and voluntary final settlements were distinguished and the scope of 
streamlined final settlement was extended. 
Within the purview of the new Firmregistration Act, the procedures purporting 
to implement the termination of business associations are regulated (to some 
extent with reproachable "overindulgence") in a considerably more refined 
manner, than before. Accordingly, associations shall be formed by ex nunc 
registration with constitutive effect and cancelled in a similar manner from the 
trade register. The Court of Registration shall terminate, that is, dissolve business 
associations ex officio, a) if the association was finally liquidated by court, 
b) in proceedings directed at the termination of phony companies with head-
quarters at unknown addresses as per Articles 89-93 of Firmregistration Act, 
c) on account of repeated, gross misdemeanors on the part of the association as 
per Article 84 of Firmregistration Act. 
As the two latter-mentioned proceedings demonstrate, with the lapse of the 
boom of the formation of business associations and the establishment of the 
material and incorporate criteria of lawful and expeditious company procedures, 
the sphere of the activity of the Court of Registration has focused on the 
legality supervision of business associations, which is only partially designed 
to sanction, since it increasingly assumes functions of advocacy and assistance. 
The regulation of the procedure of legality supervision is more elaborate under 
Chapter 6 of Firmregistration Act, since it specifies new instruments of legality 
supervision, e.g., in parallel with by-law, the designation of supervisory trustees 
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ex officio is admissible as per Articles 82-83 of Firmregistration Act. Several 
peculiar procedures of legality supervision are further regulated under the 
Firmregistration Act, such as the appointment of an official receiver as per 
Article 85 as well as the enforcement of the deposition or publication of 
company reports as per Article 87. The settlement of the equivocal financial 
situation following the termination of the business association is promoted by 
the procedure of financial settlement introduced formerly and regulated as per 
Chapter 9 of Firmregistration Act. 
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I. What classifies as price abuse in the EU?1 
Under EU Competition rules price abuses are explicitly mentioned in Article 
82 of the EC Treaty: 
"Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as in-
compatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between 
Member States. 
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Such abuse may, in particular, consist of: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions" 
For economists, the keystone of price discrimination is efficiency. Generally 
speaking, they define price discrimination as the supply of different units of 
commodity during the same time period at various price sets not directly 
corresponding to the supply costs. This involves the supply of both same 
amounts of units to different buyers at different prices-under the same supply 
costs-, as well as supplying the same buyer with the same amount of units at 
different prices when the price differentials are not allocated to the supply 
costs.2 
II. Exclusionary and exploitative price abuse 
The Article 82 of the EC Treaty provides for two types of price abuses. How-
ever, the general concept of price abuse-seeing the aim of the action-may refer 
to two different price abuses. 
An excessive pricing practice may be an exploitative abuse, i.e. direct 
exploitation of market power. In this case, the dominant firm charges a price 
being too high to its being end-users or undertakings with which the dominant 
firm does not compete in the market.3 This is of less relevance for the topic of 
this article. 
On the other hand, an excessive price may constitute an exclusionary abuse, 
aiming to strengthen or maintain the market power of the dominant firm by 
putting rivals at disadvantage. In this case, the dominant firm in market sets 
the price of the input so high that the margin between wholesale and retail 
prices is insufficient for an efficient firm to profitably operate in the related 
market. This is a typical form of price abuse of upstream-downstream market 
relations. 
A good majority of the cases on abuse of dominance have concerned exclu-
sionary conduct by dominant firms, rather than behaviour directly exploitative 
of consumers. Exclusionary practices can be also indirectly exploitative of 
See also: Valgiurata, L.: Price discrimination under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty: the 
United Brands case. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 31 (1982) 3 6 - 5 9 . 
3
 Mot ta -de Streel: op. cit. 1. 
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consumers, and, as explained by Vickers (2005), there is a view that no conduct 
is properly characterised as exclusionary unless it is ultimately exploitative.4 
Many EU cases have dealt with pricing issues, which involved predatory 
pricing, selective price cuts, margin squeezes, and discounts as well as rebates. 
The cited abuses are different in economic and legal nature. For the purpose 
of this article I will deal with exclusionary abuse concerning pricing issues, 
namely with excessive pricing, price squeeze and predatory pricing.5 
III. Excessive pricing in the practice of the ECJ and the Commission" 
It is not an easy task to define what excessive pricing means. What constitutes 
unfair pricing has caused a heated debate amongst policy makers and academics, 
as well as amongst judges.7 
According to Joliet (1970), a given price is unfair when dominant firms have 
taken advantage of their dominant position to set prices significantly higher than 
those which would result from effective competition. Along with this, a price is 
excessive when significantly above the effective competitive level.8 
Others (Evans et Padilla: 2005) approach the problem from a practical point 
of view, which may lead us closer to the real issues. 
From a down-to-earth approach, the question is how competition policy 
authorities and courts could distinguish between workable competitive prices and 
overcharged high prices, i.e. where the limit is. The answers to these formal-and 
moreover practical-questions are of utmost importance since the actual effect 
on consumer welfare of regulatory interventions on the pricing policies of 
4
 See in: Vickers, J.: Abuse of Market Power. The Economic Journal, 115 (2005) 246 
et seq. 
Predatory pricing is regarded as variant of price squeeze in an upstream-downstream 
market structure, where the dominant f i rm uses extremely low prices at downstream level 
in order to eliminate competitors. I will not deal with predatory price in the classical sense 
when the firm being present on the retail market sets low prices for the ultimate eostumers 
therefore fishing them f rom its other competitors. 
" See also: Wish, R.: Competition Law. 5lh edition, London, 2003. and Kalleugher J . -
Sher, В.: Rebates revisited: Anti-Competitive effects and exclusionary abuse under Article 
82. European Competition Law Review, 5. 263-285; and Vickers: op. cit. 
1
 See also: Lang, J .T . -O 'Donoghue , R.: Defining Legitimate Competition: How to 
clarify pricing abuses under Article 82 EC. 26 Fordham International Law Journal 83; and 
Fox, E. M.: What is harm to competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect, 
70 Antitrust Law Journal, 2002. 371. 
8
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252 PÁL BELÉNYESI 
dominant firms depends on the ability of competition policy authorities and 
courts to establish whether or not prices are excessive in practice.4 
1. The first cases 
The first case to deal with the sensitive issue of excessive pricing has been 
decided by the ECJ in 1975. In General Motors the Court-annulled the 
decision of the Commission on the facts-stated in point 12 of its decision that 
[it is possible to abuse the exclusive position of a firm by fixing prices and] 
". . . such an abuse might lie, inter alia, in the imposition of a price which is 
excessive in relation to the economic value of the services provided, and 
which has the effect of curbing parallel imports by neutralizing the possibly 
more favourable level of prices applying in other sales areas in the Com-
munity, or by leading to unfair trade in the sense of Article 86 (2) a)".1(1 
It is worth noting that already in this early decision the Court identifies the 
abuse of such pricing as being an interrelated dilemma between the excessive 
nature in relation to the economic value and the effect on parallel or unfair 
trade. In other words, mere excessive pricing with relation to the economic value 
of the service in question would not suffice the establishment of the abuse. 
A year later, in the United Brands case, the ECJ went one step further and 
applied another mechanism." 
The Court observed that the UBC abused its dominant position on the 
banana market by partitioning the national markets and consequently by 
applying different prices in different countries, sometimes with a 100% 
difference, which actually had no relation to the economic value of the product. 
It held that: 
"It is advisable therefore to ascertain whether the dominant undertaking has 
made use of the opportunities arising out of its dominant position in such a 
way to reap trading benefits which it would not have reaped if there had 
been normal and sufficiently effective competition. 
9
 Evans, D.-Padilla, J.: Excessive Prices: Using Economics to define Administrable 
legal rules. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 1 (2005) 97-122. 
Case 26/75 General Motors Continental NV v Commission of the European Com-
munities, European Court Reports (1975) 1367. 
11
 Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal Ii V v Com-
mission of the European Communities, European Court Reports (1978) 0207. 
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In this case charging a price which is excessive because it has no 
reasonable relation to the economic value of the product would be an abuse."12 
While the Court turned down partially the decision of the Commission it pointed 
out that the lack of the appropriate cost-accounting system did not enable the 
Commission to sufficiently assess the real costs of UBC, and therefore the 
proper comparison had been the contrast of the prices on the territories where 
the undertaking was operating and where the bananas were sold.13 
The Court therefore used the methodology to prove an excessive price in 
United Brands as follows: 
„This excess could, inter alia, be determined objectively if it were possible 
for it to be calculated by making a comparison between the selling price of 
the product in question and its costs of production, which would disclose 
the amount of the profit margin (...). 
Other ways may be devised and economic theorists have not failed to think 
up several of selecting the rules for determining whether the price of a 
product is unfair".14 
Overall, the Court stated that in order to show that the prices are unfair the 
Commission has to prove that the compared prices are profitable and are different 
without just reasons.15 
2. Progress in the practice of the Court-the eighties 
Some years later the Commission fined British Leyland for the abuse of 
dominant position on the market of issuing national certificates of conformity 
because of excessive pricing, which were aimed to curb parallel imports of 
certain cars from other Member States.16 
The Court of Justice upheld the Commission's decision considering that the 
costs did not relate to the service performed-rather, they reflected a simple 
12
 Ibid, points 249-250. 
13
 Ibid, points 251-254. 
14
 Ibid, points 251-253. 
15
 In this case, the Commission failed to do this, therefore the Cour t has decreased the 
fine. 
16
 Commission Decision of 2 July 1984, British Leyland, Off ic ia l Journal (1984) L 
207/11. 
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administrative check-, and reiterated that the aim of such costs was to discourage 
imports from other Member States.17 Moreover, the discriminatory prices for 
the issued certificate-more expensive for dealers than for private individuals-
also represented that the sole reason for the charge was to discourage dealers 
from fierce competition by re-importing vehicles. 
Consequently, the Court found that applicant was acting afoul of Article 82 
(ex 86) specifically, by gravely restricting the opportunity for parallel trade. 
The further filtered price and cost analysis of the Commission had been 
upheld by the Court in the CICCE case.1* In its decision the ECJ upheld the 
Commission's decision that prices should not be compared in a generalized 
way but rather taken into account the different costs of different firms, even if 
they produce similar products due to the substantial variance of costs.14 
In the SACEM II case the Court came to two important conclusions.20 The 
first one concerns the X-efficiency, which is when the costs of an inflated firm 
are taken into account as opposed to the cost of a competitive firm with 
lacking monopoly power. In its judgment the Court declared that 
"... Where ... the staff of a management society is much larger than that of 
its counterparts in other Member States and, moreover, the proportion of 
receipts taken up by collection, administration and distribution expenses 
rather than by payments to copyright holders is considerably higher, the 
possibility cannot be ruled out that it is precisely the lack of competition on 
the market in question that accounts for the heavy burden of administration 
and hence the high level of royalties."21 
The Court elaborated on the matter of market prices on different markets in the 
Bodson case.2' In paragraph 31 of its decision the ECJ concluded that it is 
possible to make a comparison between prices charged by the undertaking that 
17
 Case 226/84, British Leyland Public Limited Company v Commission of the European 
Communities, European Court Reports (1986), 3263, para. 28. 
18
 Case 298/83, Comité des industries cinématographiques des Communautés européennes 
(CICCE) v Commission of the European Communit ies , European Court Reports (1985) 
1105. 
15
 Ibid, para 24-25. 
20
 Case 110/88, 241/88, 242/88, François Lucazeau and others v Société des Auteurs, 
Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM) and others, European Court Reports (1989) 
2811. 
21
 Op. cit. Case 110/88, 241/88, 242/88, para 29. 
22
 Case 30/87, Corinne Bodson v SA Pompes funèbres des régions libérées, European 
Court Reports (1988) 2479. 
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holds a dominant position and the prices of a competitive market where prices 
are defined according to the fierceness of the competition. 
However, in the previously mentioned SACEM II case the other significant 
conclusion made by the Court was when answering the referring French court's 
question, it stated that-with the lacking requirement of the competitive market 
in the other Member State-the abuse of dominant position by a firm is indicated 
by charging higher prices in one Member State than in the other where the costs 
are compared on a consistent basis. And this also requires the dominant firm 
to prove opposite of this allegation.21 Consequently, the geographical market 
comparison was applied as ancillary to the cost and price analysis by the both 
the Commission and the Court of Justice.24 
Nevertheless, as Motta and de Streel point out (Motta et de Streek 2003) it 
is likely that the investigating national authorities or the Commission would 
take into consideration the false national markets where all compared markets 
would be monopolised by different market players. This would, indeed, create 
a biased situation. 
The differentiation of national markets or even sub-markets within one 
member state should be considered as not being the only difficulty when 
comparing several cost structures. As the ECJ held in the CICCE case, the 
variance of cost structures and methodologies for allocating costs are central 
too. It is hard to imagine that two different enterprises are using accidentally 
identical costing schemes.25 Therefore when the responsible authority carries 
out an investigation it should focus on specific issues and in-depth economic 
cost examination. A statement whether the practice is anti-competitive should 
only follow a substantial and detailed enterprise-specific analysis. 
23
 Op. cit. Case 110/88, 241/88, 242/88, para 25. 
The method of geographical comparison of prices had been applied by the Commission 
earlier in the 70's. In the Deutsche Grammophon case the ECJ stated that it is not necessarily 
an abuse if the market prices are different in various Member States, however it is a 
definite indicator of such abuse if these differences are not objectively justified. Case 
78/70. Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. 
KG, European Court Reports (1971) 487, para 19. See also: Case 24/67, Parke, Davis and 
Co. v Probet, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and Centrafarm, European Court Reports 
(1968) 55. 
25
 It is also an indication if two firms are "accidentally" using exactly the same structure 
but differ in prices with regards to the same product. This may result in the founding of 
anticompetitive behavior but this is a different issue. 
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3. Seetor specific regulation and price abuse 
Pricing issues become more complex when there is a sector specific regulation 
that-at least to some extent-"ties the hands" of the market participants. 
The first case to deal with the dubious relation between sector specific 
regulation and competition law with regards to pricing issues was the Ahmed 
Saeed case.19 This was the initial case when the Commission and the ECJ has 
touched upon prices that were somehow indicated by sector specific regulation, 
in this case concerning air carriers. With regards to the relation of the two 
above, in paragraph 43 of the decision, the Court stated that 
"Certain interpretative criteria for assessing whether the rate employed is 
excessive may be inferred from Directive 87/601/EEC, which lays down the 
criteria to be followed by the aeronautical authorities for approving tariffs. 
It appears in particular from Article 3 of the directive that tariffs must be 
reasonably related to the long-term fully allocated costs of the air carrier, 
while taking into account the needs of consumers, the need for a satisfactory 
return on capital, the competitive market situation, including the fares of 
the other air carriers operating on the route, and the need to prevent dumping." 
By this, the Court suggested that given the sector specific regulation, prices are 
indicated through the method of long-term fully allocated costs, and therefore 
if the undertaking is charging fees which are afoul of this accounting method 
they are reliable for both the breaching of the sector specific regulation and 
(ex) Article 86(1) a). 
However, it is not indicated in the decision what type of rule should be 
applied if there is no regulation specific to the industry. Also, it still remains 
an open question whether there is a possibility to use benchmarking methods 
from other sectors. 
Generally, it is highly supported if there is an efficient regulatory scheme 
in the complementary markets via which non-discriminatory access is guaran-
teed to the targeted markets. The basis of this establishment should be an 
efficient and forward-looking price regime, where feasible. 
26
 Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisebüro GmbH v Zentrale 
zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e.V.. European Cour t Reports (1989) 803. 
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4. Development in the practice of the Commission 
A) Belgacom v. ITT Promedia 
A positive outcome was reached in the Belgacom case,27 referred to the Com-
mission in a complaint for abuse of dominant position filed by ITT Promedia 
NV in 1995. 
ITT Promedia NV, the Belgian subsidiary of ITT World Directories Company, 
accused Belgacom, the Belgian telecommunications operator, of charging 
discriminatory and excessive prices for access to data on subscribers to its 
voice telephony services. The company alleged inter alia that the conditions 
which Belgacom intended to apply for access to its subscriber data for 
publishing telephone directories were excessive and discriminatory and thus 
caught by Article 86 (now Article 82) of the EC Treaty. 
Following a formal statement of objections issued by the Commission, 
Belgacom endeavoured to meet the Commission's concerns and submitted a 
business proposal regarding access to its subscriber data for publishers which 
has now culminated in the present settlement. In assessing Belgacom's proposal, 
the Commission's services were assisted by an expert consulting firm to verify 
the cost-oriented basis of the proposal. 
Consequently, the Commission reached a settlement with Belgacom on the 
conditions under which publishers of telephone directories in Belgium had 
access to data regarding subscribers of Belgacom's voice telephone services 
(access to listing services). Following the settlement, directory publishers in 
Belgium were to be charged a price which was set in such a way that Belgacom 
could recover the costs it incurred in the collection, treatment and provision of 
the subscriber data required for publishing purposes, plus a reasonable profit 
margin. 
The Commission considered that, insofar as publishers of directories were 
dependent on telecommunications operators, access to data should be non-
discriminatory and based on prices calculated according to the operator's own 
costs. 
"
7
 Competition Policy Newsletter 3 (1997) 13-14. Available on: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpnv3n01.pdf, consulted on 14 
February 2006. Also: Press release IP/97/292 of 11/04/1997, on: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/97/292&format=HT 
ML&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, consulted on 14 February 2006. 
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This cost-oriented approach led to a very substantial reduction of more than 
90% in the amount originally charged to telephone directory publishers and 
was declared to be applicable throughout the EU. 
On the other hand, the Commission left level playing field open for further-
mainly technical-developments, which could allegedly lead to alterations in 
applied pricing mechanisms. 
B) Deutsche Telekom I.2* 
The Commission initiated proceedings against Deutsche Telekom AG (DT), the 
German telecommunications operator, following a complaint in 1996, made by 
a competitor against the conditions imposed on third parties for access to DT's 
infrastructures. 
After DT had submitted a draft new contract offering network access to 
competitors, the Commission had a price survey carried out by an accountancy 
firm which demonstrated DT's inability to prove that its prices were cost-
orientated and found the price level to be 100% higher than on comparable 
competitive markets. 
The Commission emphasized that it did not wish to act as a price regulator, 
but as a result of the comparative market analysis, which showed that the prices of 
DT were exorbitant, DT was invited to adjust the tariffs it charged to real 
economic conditions so that they could not constitute an abuse of a dominant 
position-in terms of price-squeeze-under the relevant Article of the EC Treaty. 
Thus, at long last, DT agreed to substantially lower its network access tariffs, 
in particular for providers of business services, by 38% for access to the local 
network and 78% for access to the long-distance network, and the Commission 
decided to terminate the proceedings. 
C) Deutsche Telekom II.29 
In January 1998, the Commission opened a procedure against DT on the basis 
that DT's fees for carrier-pre-selection and number portability were excessive, 
and hence, allegedly constituted an infringement of Article 82 of the EC Treaty.30 
28
 XXVIIth Report on Competition Pol icy (1997), point 77. Available on: 
http://europe.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/broch97_en.pdf, consulted on 15 February 
2006. 
29
 Press release IP/98/430 of 13/05/98, on: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/98/430&format=HT 
ML&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, consulted on 16 February 2006. 
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During the investigation period, the Commission sent out information 
requests to 35 telecommunication operators throughout Europe. In this request, 
the operators were asked to indicate their terms and conditions of carrier pre-
selection and number portability, and notably the fees charged for such services. 
The analysis of the replies showed that the fees charged by incumbent operators 
in other Member States, as well as the ones submitted by various German 
alternative providers, were considerably lower than those of DT. 
In April 1998, the German Regulatory Authority rejected DT's announced 
fees-which were already the corrected amounts-in the case of number 
portability for being too high; and parallel, the incumbent operator withdrew 
the requested fees for pre-selection. 
As a result of the National Regulatory Authority's decision and the taking 
into consideration of the results of the information request's analysis, the 
European Commission terminated its inquiry into Deutsche Telekom's DT fees 
because it observed no reason for pursuing its own initiative procedure on the 
grounds of excessive pricing. 
Following the decision, on the basis of DT's corrected request with new fees, 
the Commission decided to transfer the case to the German authorities for 
further examination of a possible abuse of dominant position by the incumbent. 
D) Commission's investigation into international phone call prices31 
The investigation concerning the charges for international phone calls paid to 
dominant operators in 1997 had been initiated by the Commission because 
charges for international calls were at the time generally higher than for making 
calls within a single member state.12 
30
 The initiation of the proceedings was based on the incumbent ' s announcement of the 
proposed fees for the services concerned. The Commission considered that these fees may 
constitute a barrier to market entry for alternative operators in Germany, and consequently, 
could also serve as a negative example for other incumbent operators in Europe. Thus, it 
was important for the Commiss ion to carry out and international comparison in this 
respect. 
31
 Press release IP/97/1180 of 19/12/1997, on: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/97/l 180&format=HT 
ML&aged= 1 &language=EN&guiLanguage=en, and Press release IP/98/763 of 13/08/1998, 
on:http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/98/763&format= 
HTML&aged= 1 &language=EN&guiLanguage=en, and 
32
 The proceedings started before the telecommunications markets were fully liberalised 
on 1 January 1998. 
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The investigation mainly concerned the so called accounting rates, which 
were originally set to cover the total cost of transporting the telephone call 
but-at the commencement of the proceedings-were no longer justified as 
technological development made it possible to make noticeable reduction in 
such costs. 
At the time of the initiation of the investigation two sets of policies required 
that accounting rates charged by major European operators were cost-oriented: 
under competition rules, the prohibition of abuses of dominant positions Article 
86 (now Article 82) of the EC Treaty; and respectively, under harmonisation 
rules, the so called "interconnection Directive" (based on Article 100A of the 
EC Treaty).33 
Requests for information had been sent to all dominant telecommunication 
operators at the time in the EU in order to collect the information necessary to 
assess the competition aspects of the accounting rate arrangements.31 
The investigation dealt with accounting rates, which is one of the ways for 
an operator to account for its customers' calls to another country, and focused 
more specifically on intra-Community calls. 
Although liberalization of the EU télécoms markets allows other systems to 
be used, an important proportion of cross-border calls within the EU was at the 
time still forwarded through the traditional accounting rates system, based on 
bilateral agreements between operators. 
Accounting rates had an important influence on the prices that users paid 
for international phone calls. The investigation did not focus on the end-user 
international prices, but it was indirectly relevant to these prices, since reduc-
tions in accounting rates should have led to substantial price reductions for 
consumers. A number of criteria were used in order to focus a second phase of 
procedures. 
Where actual costs for international calls could not be provided, the criteria 
included the margin between the accounting rates applied and "interconnect +", 
defined as national interconnection rates plus additional costs specific to the 
international routes. 
33
 Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on 
interconnection in Telecommunicat ions with regard to ensuring universal service and 
interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP), 
Official Journal L 199 of 26 July 1997. 0032-0052. 
34
 At the time, in parallel, national telecommunications regulators were implementing the 
interconnection Directive, which required that the principles of cost orientation and non-
discrimination were to be applied to both national interconnection and cross-border inter-
connection. 
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Tests were made both using the operators' interconnection rates on their 
domestic markets and using the EU "best practice" interconnection rates, in 
order to avoid discrimination against operators with lower interconnection rates. 
IV. The first formal Commission decisions on price abuse in the telecom 
sector35 
The leading Commission decisions with regards to abusive pricing behaviour 
emerged in the specific field of margin-i.e. also: price-squeeze. Before examining 
the first formal decisions and terminated procedures of the EC Commission 
concerning price squeeze, it is necessary to talk about the phenomenon in general. 
1. Margin squeeze as an exclusionary abuse 
A) Margin squeeze in general 
Margin squeeze occurs when a vertically integrated dominant firm sets the 
wholesale price for an upstream product-available for downstream competitors-
and the retail price for its final product such that the margin between them is 
disproportionately low, thereby anti-competitively squeezing rivals down-
stream or making it impossible for would-be competitors economically to enter 
the market. 
This occurs also, when the retail-wholesale margin is zero, in other words 
the wholesale price is unduly high relative to the retail price or when the retail 
price is unduly low relative to the wholesale price. It can also be seen as akin 
to undue discrimination between self-supply and supply to others.36 
In economic terms, anti-competitive price squeeze arises when a vertically 
integrated undertaking, with market power in the provision of an essential 
upstream input, prices it and/or its downstream product service, in such way 
and for a sufficiently long period of time to deny an equally or more efficient 
downstream rival a sufficient profit to remain in the market.37 
For those vertically integrated firms who serve upstream access it is critical 
how wide the retail-wholesale margin is. As pointed out by Vickers (2005), 
35
 See also in: R. Klotz et al.: The Commission decisions on price abuse in the tele-
communications sector. Competition Policy Newsletter (2003) 8-13. 
36
 See also in: Vickers: op. cit. 250-251. 
37
 Crocioni, P.—Veljanovski, C.: Price Squeezes, Foreclosure and Competition Law: 
Principles and Guidelines. Journal of Network Industries 4 (2003) 30 et seq. 
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while too small a margin can squeeze out efficient rivals, too large a required 
margin would shelter inefficient rivals to the detriment of productive efficiency. 
The other question is always whether there is a right benchmark by which 
to judge rivals efficiency. This is one of the hardest scales to determine in 
competition law. 
B) Margin squeeze in the EU18 
The definition of margin squeeze refers to situations in which a vertically-
integrated-usually dominant-firm uses its control over an input supplied to 
downstream competitors to prevent them from making a profit on a downstream 
market in which the-usually dominant-firm is also present. The supplying firm 
could do this in several ways. 
It could raise the input price to levels at which rivals could no longer sustain a 
profit downstream. Alternatively, it could engage predatory selling in the 
downstream market, while maintaining a profit overall through the sale of the 
upstream input. Finally, the dominant firm could raise the price of the upstream 
input and lower the price of the downstream retail product to create a margin 
between them at which a rival would not be profitable." 
Unless the dominant firm is actually discriminating in the prices charged to 
downstream rivals and its own integrated business the transfer charge that its 
downstream subsidiary pays to its upstream business should to be the same as 
the input charge paid by downstream competitors. This practice however, may 
already fit into the non-discriminatory derogations of Article 82. 
1. The question of dominance 
The first question arises with regards to the abuse of dominant position 
concerning this type of abuse when we want to define the firm's dominance. 
Should there be dominance in both markets, or is it enough if the firm is 
dominant in the upstream market and uses the price squeeze to leverage 
dominance on the downstream market? 
According to Article 82 of the EC Treaty, there is no need for dominance 
in both markets. 
18
 See also: Geradin, D.-O'Donoghue: The Concurrent Application of Competition 
Law and Regulation: the case of margin squeeze abuses in the telecommunications sector. 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2 (2005) 355-425. 
39
 See also: Geradin-O'Donoghue: op. cit. 357-358. 
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There are, however contradictory opinions (Bellamy and Child: 2001),40  
which conclude that double dominance is needed. 
The ECJ has pointed out in its case law41 that: 
"Price squeezing may be said to take place when an undertaking which is in 
a dominant position on the market for an unprocessed product and itself 
uses part of its production for the manufacture of a more processed product 
while at the same time selling off surplus unprocessed product on the market, 
sets the price at which it sells the unprocessed product at such level that 
those who purchase it do not have sufficient profit margin on the processing 
to remain competitive on the market for the processed product." 
This concept is controversial for example because it does not deal with the 
duration of the price squeeze, however it is economically more acceptable and 
logical given that it is enough to have dominant position on one market rather 
than having market power equal to dominance on both because this position 
already creates an incentive for the dominant company to behave abusively by 
leveraging its power from one market to the other. 
2. Legal price squeeze 
On the other hand, not all types of price squeeze are prohibited under Article 82. 
The essence of exclusionary abuse plays an important role when judging 
pricing behaviour hence competition on the merits is not at all afoul of com-
petition rules. Only certain practice is contrary to EC competition rules and 
therefore is to be condemned, i.e. which aims at eliminating efficient com-
petitors from the market or hinders would-be-but still, efficient-competitors 
from entering into the market.42 
Such pricing can also be a rational business strategy, even if not in many cases. 
For example, price squeeze would be acceptable under changing market 
conditions, where even firms with significant market power (i.e. it is stated in 
the framework of Electronic Communications) have to fight for costumers in 
411
 Bellamy and Child (ed.: Roth P.): European Community Law of Competition. London, 
2001, 730. Also, on the controversial issue of dominance, see: Kapitány, I.: Az európai 
bizottság kontra Microsof t ügy; avagy hátrány-e az e lőny? [The European Commission 
v. Microsoft Case. Is Advantage Disadvantageous?] Jogtudományi Közlöny, 2006/3. 9 1 -
108. 
41
 Case T-5/97, Industrie des Poudres Sphériques SA v Commission (2000) European 
Court Reports 11-3755., para 178, detailed later. 
42
 See also: Crocioni-Veljanovski : op. cit. 31-35. 
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the new-regulatory-environment. A broader geographic and product or service 
market definition may also create fierce competitive environment when the 
dynamism of the market entails the companies to act in a different way. 
2. Price squeeze in the practice of the E C J 
A) The National Carbonising case41 
The National Carbonising Co. (NCC) purchased all its coal from the National 
Coal Board and competed downstream with the National Coal Board's 
subsidiary-National Smokeless Fuels Limited-in the supply of industrial and 
domestic hard coke to UK consumers. Coal has to be technically transformed 
in order to be sold as domestic or industrial hard coke. National Coal Board 
held a monopoly position in coal production and its subsidiary almost 90% of 
the downstream coke market. As a result of continuing increases in the cost of 
the supplied raw materials sourced from National Coal Board, the costs of 
production rose by a significant amount so that NCC would not have been able 
to operate economically on the basis of these pricing structures and sought 
interim relief. 
The Commission's decision-the complaint was refused after the interim 
measures-does not enter into detail on the appropriate legal principles to be 
applied to a margin squeeze. It merely states that an upstream dominant firm 
supplying an essential input to rivals may "have an obligation to arrange its 
prices so as to allow a reasonably efficient manufacturer of the derivative a 
margin sufficient to enable it to survive in the long-term."44 
The Commission held, at paragraph 14 of its decision, that: 
"... an undertaking which is in a dominant position as regards the production 
of a raw material (in this case coking coal) and therefore able to control its 
price to independent manufacturers of derivatives (in this case, coke) and 
which is itself producing the same derivatives in competition with these 
manufacturers, may abuse its dominant position if it acts in such a way as 
to eliminate the competition from these manufacturers in the market for 
derivatives. From this general principle the services of the Commission 
43
 Commission Decision 76/185/ECSC of 29 October 1975, National Carbonising, 
Official Journal (1976) L 35/6. 
4 4Geradin, D . -O 'Donoghue : The Concurrent Application of Competition Law and 
Regulation: the case of margin squeeze abuses in the telecommunications sector. GCLC 
Working Paper (2005) 04/05, Bruges, 25. 
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deduced that the enterprise in a dominant position may have an obligation 
to arrange its prices so as to allow a reasonably efficient manufacturer of 
the derivatives a margin sufficient to enable it to survive in the long term." 
B) The British Sugar case45 
In the British Sugar case, British Sugar was found to have abused its dominant 
position by setting its retail and wholesale sugar prices so that the margin 
between the two was insufficient to reflect its own costs of transformation, i.e. 
the repackaging costs.46 
According to the investigation of the Commission, British Sugar was found 
dominant in the upstream market for the supply of raw sugar in the UK. Derived 
sugar sold in the UK, which can only be produced from raw sugar, was defined 
as the relevant downstream market. British Sugar was vertically integrated 
competing in the downstream market for derived sugar with Napier Brown, 
which purchased raw sugar from British Sugar. 
The EC Commission found that the difference between British Sugar's 
prices for derived sugar and the price it charged its competitor for raw sugar 
was insufficient for the latter to cover its own costs of transformation, consisting 
mainly of repackaging costs. 
Therefore, the Commission concluded that British Sugar's pricing scheme 
was a price squeeze and so an abuse of its dominant position under Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty aimed at forcing Napier Brown to leave the downstream market. 
C) The Industrie des Poudres Sphériques case47 
In this case the Court of First Instance rejected the appeal by the complainant 
but at the same time laid down some important principles. 
Industries des Poudres Sphériques (IPS) applied for the annulment of a 1996 
Commission decision which rejected its request for a finding that an infringe-
ment of Article 82 EC had been committed by Pechiney Electrometallugie (РЕМ). 
РЕМ was the sole Community producer of primary calcium metal and also 
marketed broken calcium metal, which is a derivative of primary calcium 
metal. IPS and РЕМ were competitors in the derivative market for broken 
calcium metal. 
45
 Commission decision 88/518/ECC of 18 July 1988, Napier Brown-British Sugar, 
Official Journal (1988) L 284/41. 
46
 Ibid., para 66. 
47
 Case T-5/97, op. cit. 
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The applicant-IPS-alleged that РЕМ set the price of primary calcium metal 
oddly high, which in combination with the very low price for broken calcium 
metal, forced its competitors to sell at a loss if they were to remain in the market. 
IPS claimed that that РЕМ's primary calcium metal offer gave rise to a 
margin squeeze. 
The Court of First Instance (CFI) defined a margin squeeze as arising where 
a vertically-integrated dominant firm supplies input to rivals at prices "at such 
a level that those who purchase it do not have a sufficient profit margin on the 
processing to remain competitive on the market for the processed product."48 
The CFI applied a single test for abuse, since it held that the upstream price 
would be abusive or the downstream price predatory if "an efficient com-
petitor" could not compete on the basis of the dominant firm's pricing.44 The 
CFI added that in the absence of an exclusionary margin squeeze, the way in 
which a dominant vertically-integrated undertaking decides its profit margin 
"is of no relevance to its effects on its competitors;" 
The Court has also found that it is relevant to ask whether the dominant 
firm has the best price on the downstream market or whether prices are influenced 
by other factors and would allow competitors to charge higher prices. " 
At the end, the Court of First Instance rejected the applicant's appeal-
particularly because there were alternative means for IPS to purchase relevant 
raw material from China or Russia- and came to the conclusion that there was 
no margin squeeze. 
As it was observed by the CFI the margin squeeze could occur in two ways: 
either in the form of predatory pricing in the downstream market or abusive 
pricing in the upstream market, but always taking the efficient competitor's 
ability to survive.51 
3. Margin squeeze in the practice of the Commission 
The first two formal prohibition decisions up to date, however, only came in 
the first half of 2003, when the Commission adopted its decisions pursuant to 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty regarding abusive pricing for the provisions of 
certain telecommunication services offered by two incumbents respectively in 
Germany and France.52 
48
 Case T-5/9, para. 178., op. cit. 
49
 Case T-5/97, para. 180., op. cit. 
50
 Case T-5/97, para. 183 et seq., op. cit. 
51
 Case T-5/97, para. 179., op. cit. 
52
 Wanadoo and Deutsche Telekom. To be detailed. 
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These decisions represent in reality the first formal actions of the Commis-
sion resulting in condemning business behaviour as being afoul of the 
provisions of Article 82 of the EC Treaty ever since the British Telecommuni-
cations had been found to abuse its dominant position in 1982, still acting as a 
state monopoly.53 
The decisions have generated a disagreement and academic debate not only 
because they concern a sector where the member states play a crucial role 
throughout the decision making process of the respective regulatory authorities, 
but also, because the industry is subject to ex ante regulation. 
A) The Deutsche Telekom case54 
Following several complaints starting already in 1999 by new entrants in the 
German fixed-line telecommunications market, in May 2003, the Commission 
adopted a decision denouncing the abusive behaviour of the German incumbent 
for its pricing strategy for local access to fix telephony network. According to 
the Commission decision this appeared in a margin squeeze when Deutsche 
Telekom (DT) charged higher prices for access to the local loop55 at wholesale 
level for new entrants than it charged at retail level for its subscribers. On the 
basis of standard economic theory and the previous decision of the Commission56 
a clear anticompetitive attitude thus resulted in discouraged alternative suppliers, 
and consequently in less choice of telecom services and price variations for 
final consumers. 
True, that local loop unbundling-as an obligation on the incumbent operators-
was introduced at EU level by way of legislation only in 2000,57 however, some 
53
 Official Journal L 360, 21 of December 1982, 36. 
84
 Commission Decision of 21 May 2003, Deutsche Telekom, Official Journal L 263/9. 
The decision was severely criticized by DT because of the price cap mechanisms and the 
super-regulatory pseudo funct ions of the EC Commission. 
58
 The local loop is a critical strategic point in providing telecommunications services 
because this is the physical connection between the costumer's premises and the operator 's 
local switch. Generally it appears in the fo rm of pairs of copper wire. As a result of 
telecom being a network industry, it is highly unlikely for new service providers to build 
an entire network including local loops to be able to arrive at the consumer's premises. 
Therefore it is vital for the new entrants to have access to local loops at reasonable and 
non-discriminatory terms. 
56
 Decision 88/518/EEC, Napier Brown-British Sugar, Off ic ia l Journal L 284, 19. 10. 
1988,41, par. 66. 
57
 Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Counci l of 18 
December 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, Official Journal L 336, 0 4 - 0 8 . 
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member states-such as Germany-have earlier introduced the aforesaid obligation. 
The Commission however, reached the conclusion that the regulatory framework 
is not the only tool available to solve competition problems in this area. Pricing, 
as one of the conditions of local loop unbundling is also subject to scrutiny 
under the EU competition rules. 
The Commission found that the incumbent was active both on the upstream 
market for wholesale local loop access to competitors and on the downstream 
market for retail access services to end-customers. Given that both markets 
were closely linked to each other and there were no adequate alternatives for 
newcomers to enter to the market and the incumbent was the only provider 
with nation-wide network coverage, Deutsche Telekom was in dominant position 
on the upstream market of wholesale access, and given that Deutsche Telekom 
was present 95% on the retail market-even after the national obligation of 
unbundling was introduced in early 1998—it was also affirmed that the 
incumbent was also in dominant position on the downstream market.38 
During the proceedings DT argued that the margin squeeze test could not 
have been applied because the wholesale charges are imposed by the German 
regulatory authority (RegTP). The incumbent was also pleading that any 
margin squeeze must be the result of excessive wholesale prices or predatory 
retail prices, or a combination of the two, and it must be legally possible to 
terminate the squeeze by modifying either of those prices, which was not the 
case here. 
The Commission rejected this argument14 and found an abusive margin 
squeeze, because the difference between DT's retail and wholesale prices was 
either negative or slightly positive, but insufficient to cover DT's product-
specific cost of providing its own retail services, creating therefore a situation 
for new entrants when they would have no scope to compete with DT for 
fixed-line access to end-consumers.''" 
s s
 The Commission compared upstream access to the local loops with a bundle of 
different types of retail offerings, namely analogue, ISDN and ADSL connections. 
" 'The Commission argued, that in the present case-and also general ly- the margin 
squeeze test can exist with regard to regulated tariffs. In these cases it has also to be shown 
that the undertaking subject to price regulation has the commercial f reedom to avoid or 
terminate the margin squeeze on its own initiative. If the company has that freedom, the 
question if and how the prices are regulated ex ante is relevant only for the choice of the 
correct remedy to bring the margin squeeze to an end. 
60
 In order to achieve a coherent comparison, the Commission used a weighted approach, 
taking into account the numbers of D T ' s customers for the different access types at retail 
level. The Commission thus compared the tariffs for wholesale access to the local loops 
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The Commission had also demonstrated that the abusive behavior was not 
imposed on the company by any way of public intervention, by setting out the 
scheme under which the incumbent operator could have managed the wholesale 
prices more entrant-friendly. The decision thus suggests that an increase-within 
the set-up price cap system-in retail charges, and a systematic parallel decrease 
in call charges would have created a better level playing field for new entrants.61 
The Commission stated that via this abuse, DT was jeopardizing the 
objective of achieving EU-wide establishment of an internal market for tele-
communications networks and services with undistorted competition.62 
As a result of the decision the national regulator (RegTP) had decreased 
the wholesale fees by 20%, adopted a new price cap regime, and DT had 
increased its retail fees by 10%, but simultaneously, lodged an appeal at the 
Court of First Instance claiming that the Commission's price/cost analysis was 
misconceived in its methods and there is no restriction on competition.62 
B) The Wanadoo case64 
In its decision the Commission-concerning the retail charges of France Telecom's 
internet access subsidiary, Wanadoo-had not come to the conclusion that the 
case was a clear margin squeeze, however concluded that Wanadoo was 
charging predatory prices for its consumer broadband internet access services.65 
In consistency with the case law of the ECJ,66 referring to the current 
situation on the basis of the information collected during the examination of 
the companies, the Commission reached the following conclusion: 
"Broadly speaking a distinction can be made between three separate periods 
since the beginning of 2001: (i) from 1 January to 31 July 2001, Wanadoo 
Interactive was far from recovering the (adjusted) variable costs of the 
with those for a number of different retail offerings-analogue, ISDN and ADSL connections-
at the end of every year. 
61
 DT had previously introduced several reductions in call charges. 
''
2
 Commission Decision of 23 May 2003, Official Journal L 263/9, point 203. 
63
 Pending case T-271/03. See: Official Journal С 264/29 of 1 November 2003. 
64
 Commiss ion Decis ion of 16 July 2003, Wanadoo, Official Journal L 075 . 
65
 The reason for the "easier" examinat ion was that France Telecom and Wanadoo 
were not 100% vertically integrated ra ther had a close relat ion with France Te lecom 
owning 7 0 - 7 2 . 2 % of the subsidiary. 
66
 Refer r ing to: Case C-62 /86 , Akz.o Chemie v Commission (1991) European Court 
Reports 1-3359, pa r ag raphs 71 and 72; C a s e C-333 /94 P Te t ra Pak v C o m m i s s i o n 
(1996) European Court Reports 1-5951, paragraph 41. 
270 PÁL BELÉNYESI 
services at issue; (ii) from 1 August 2001 to 15 October 2002, Wanadoo 
Interactive came close to satisfying the test applied by the Commission, but 
without ever actually doing so: Wanadoo did not recover its (adjusted) full 
costs; nor-although it did recover its (outturned) adjusted variable costs for 
part of the period-was it able before March 2002 to forecast the achieve-
ment of such recovery in advance; (iii) from 15 October 2002 onwards, 
Wanadoo Interactive clearly satisfied the cost recovery test applied by the 
Commission, both for full costs and for variable costs, even though its 
instantaneous revenue may have been lower than its accounting costs."67 
There is an interesting point in the decision. The Commission makes note of 
the fact that there is no such economic theory that reduces the application of 
predatory pricing methods-i.e. the requirement of the under pricing of the average 
variable cost being per se abuse, and the under pricing of the average total cost 
but aiming at eliminating a competitor being also but not per se abusive-is not 
limited to mature markets or which are taken as emerging markets.68 
"To subordinate the application of the competition rules to a complete 
stabilization of the market would be to deprive the competition authorities 
of the power to act in time before the abuses established have exerted their 
full effect and the positions unduly acquired have thus been finally con-
solidated. It follows, on the contrary, from the case-law that it must be 
possible to penalize predatory pricing whenever there is a risk that com-
petitors will be eliminated, as the aim pursued by the Treaty, which is to 
maintain undistorted competition, rules out waiting until such a strategy 
leads to the actual elimination of competitors."69 
This argument is twofold. It does not take into account that there is differen-
tiation between mature and emerging markets. 
Indeed, there could be a difference between a market sector where com-
petition is developed and functioning, also, where more or less demand and 
supply define the prices for services or products and an emerging market where 
costs are to be recovered in the long run. There are different commercial tactics, 
which come forth when a market player wants to establish steady position 
and attempts to win as many costumers as possible in order to be able to be 
profitable in the long run. 
67
 Wanadoo, po in t 257., op. cit. 
This was the case with Wanadoo with the h igh-speed internet access market. 
69
 Wanadoo, po in t 301., op. cit. 
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It could therefore be stated that in the case of substantial upfront costs, 
which are recoverable over time a period of below-cost pricing is not necessarily 
exclusionary. 
The same business plans and pricing tactics cannot be applied in a functioning 
market where conditions are set and the profitability is ideally only attainable 
by innovation and production efficiency.70 
However, the argument of the Commission is well-based on the famous 
paper of Areeda and Turner71 when the authors argue that a firm in dominant 
position does not have to practice the predatory pricing strategy in order to 
attract new costumers and draw consumers' attention to the product.72 Therefore 
it is rather irrelevant whether the market at stake is mature or emerging. 
The question is whether it is fortunate to try to specify market power-and 
therefore dominance-in an admittedly new market shortly after the opening up 
or competition authorities should wait until more stable environment is created 
but by doing so risking the exit of would-be efficient competitors from the 
market. 
Conclusion 
The clear solution for the issue of margin squeeze remains dubious. 
This is so firstly because testing a price squeeze is extremely difficult. There 
has not been set a common EU-wide test that should be used when deciding 
upon behaviours allegedly applying price squeeze techniques. However, based 
on the decisions of the ECJ and the Commission it seems that the equally 
efficient competitor test-taking into account the dominant company's own 
cost-is more suitable than examining the competitors' costs. This seems to be 
a better solution because it leaves no ground for less efficient firms to enter or 
remain on the market.73 
The second reason for this conclusion is that the assessment of future 
profitability and uncertainties in the game is vague. The best approach seems 
70
 Tha t is why there is di f f icul ty to set up a clear legal test to ex ante de f ine pricing 
strategies. The assessment of future probabil i t ies is also compl ica ted and debated . 
71
 Areeda , P . -Turner , D.: Predatory Pricing and Related Pract ices under Section 2 
of the She rman Act. Harvard Law Review 88 (1975) 714. 
12
 W a n a d o o , point 3 1 1 o p . cit. 
73
 S tandard economic sense suggests that if the dominan t f i r m ' s downs t ream unit 
would be loss-making if it paid the wholesa le prices charged to rivals, there is a 
margin squeeze; otherwise there is not. 
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to be the economics-based approach as it was used in the Wanadoo case by the 
Commission. 
However, this involves the evaluation of predatory pricing being per se abuse 
of dominance or the need for anti-competitive effects of the pricing conduct to 
be qualified as exclusionary practice. 
With regards to excessive pricing, it is fairly difficult to define the right 
benchmark. The differences in cost schemes and allocation are so many 
depending on the firms' will that there cannot be a general rule that is applicable 
in all sectors and all markets. The best way to tackle this problem is the in-
depth economic analysis that serves the core of the legal reasoning, a more 
economic approach with eye for specificity and legal burdens. 
The nature of such investigations develops the problem when the authorities 
responsible for carrying out the inspections are held back because of lack of 
capacity and human resource for such analysis. 
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tive the scope of which extends to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability in 
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persons can be traced back to the 15th century. The roots of contemporary German 
disability-related legislation are rooted in Bismarck's social security system and 
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disability rights as we know them today, are guaranteed irrespectively of the 
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cause of disability. During the horrors of World War II many disabled individuals 
became victims of the Nazi ideology. Partly as a response to these atrocities, 
partly as a return to pre-war period, both East- and West-Germany adopted 
extensive disability-related protection mechanisms. The laws now in force are 
following this tradition making the system of German disability rights one of 
the most progressive one in Europe. A single title of the Social Code is devoted 
to the rights of disabled persons,1 while the general equality of disabled is 
ensured by a separate act.2 The Basic Law, Germany's constitution has been 
amended, so that disability is included among the prohibited grounds of the 
clause on non-discrimination.1 Most recently, Germany should have implemented 
the European Union's Framework Directive the scope of which extends to the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability in employment matters. 
After having scrutinized the German pieces of legislation, one can conclude 
that as to disability-and here I refer to disability only, and I am not dealing 
with other protected grounds listed in the EU piece of legislation, such as religion, 
belief, age or sexual orientation-the Directive has almost been implemented in 
its entirety. Nevertheless, it is worth looking at the implementing national bill 
and discuss its failure, since many legal and constitutional issues are brought 
up that had not been discussed at the time the German disability-related laws 
had been adopted. The study of the controversies may shed some light on the 
underlying constitutional issues-not only in Germany, but in all Member States 
of the Union which implemented the Directive without any public, political or 
legal debates. 
The anti-discrimination law raises the same issue as the EU Directive: is it 
conceivable to regulate discriminations on the basis of the different characteristics 
in a single piece of legislation? The EU differentiates somewhat between the 
prohibited grounds, but the degree of protection came closer in recent years. 
The free movement rights presuppose that there is no differentiation whatso-
ever on grounds of nationality. Whereas previously gender seemed to follow 
nationality among the most protected characteristics, now race and ethnicity 
are said to replace the leading role of gender. At the bottom of the hierarchy 
are the characteristics listed in the Framework Directive, which only extends to 
1
 Title IX of the Social Code (Sozialgesetzbuch IX) on the Rehabilitation and Partici-
pation of Disabled People entered into force on July 1, 2001. 
2
 The Equal Opportunities for People with Disabilities Act (Behindertengleich-
stellungsgesetz) entered into force on May 1, 2002. 
3
 Article 3 Section (3) has been amended by Sentence [2] in 1994: "Persons may not 
be discriminated against because of their disability." 
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employment matters. The German implementing legislation is comprehensive, 
since it incorporates the prohibited grounds listed in the diverse Directives. 
Since however the nature of discrimination based on different grounds are 
entirely different, the rules cannot take the different needs into account, they 
are necessarily general. Whereas for example differentiation on the basis of sexual 
orientation is in most of the cases a result of unjustified negative attitudes 
against gays and lesbians, discriminations on the basis of disability may serve 
a legitimate objective and might be permissible. As to disabled individuals, the 
German solution is beneficial, since the protection of disabled persons is 
detailed and tailor made in federal laws other than the anti-discrimination law. 
The theoretical issues at the heart of the German debate touch the boundaries 
of the third party effect. The EU pieces of laws have been adopted without any 
further considerations on the horizontal effect of the Directive: it applies to 
both public and private entities, i.e. it is also applicable for relations between 
private persons. In the European Union states can either make difference in the 
implementing legislation, or the distinction to make is left to the judiciary. 
According to the German tradition justices decide on the horizontality of basic 
rights and also on equality. In the disability-related part of the Social Code, just 
like the draft implementing law the legislators decided on the matter by excluding 
the judiciary. The horizontality of basic rights is said to limit individual freedom, 
therefore the controversy whether equality and freedom are mutually exclusive 
will also be addressed. 
The German legislation combines a substantive equality-based approach, 
both striving to achieve equality of opportunities, equality of result, and a social 
rights based approach. Social assistance however depends on the income, it 
can only be granted to the needy. In the current disability discourse there is 
less emphasis on social rights, which corresponds to the shift from the medical 
to the social model of disability. The medical model located the problem in the 
disabled individual, whereas the social "concept indicated the close connection 
between the limitation experienced by individuals with disabilities, the design 
and structure of their environments and the attitude of the general population."4 
Whereas the medical model calls for social benefits, the social concept intends 
to modify the environment and to integrate disabled persons, therefore the 
emphasis on the equality concept. Despite the claimed adherence to the social 
model, the medical model heavily influences the German legislation, especially 
4
 United Nations Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons 
with Disabilities. 
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when it comes to the definition of disability and the determination of the degree 
of impairment. 
In the following I will discuss the legal and political considerations behind 
the German law implementing the EU anti-discrimination Directives. In the first 
part of the paper I summarize the European imperatives in the filed of equality 
that are applicable to people living with disabilities; in the second and third 
parts I will give an insight into the German attempts to comply with the European 
imperatives. In the fourth part of the present essay I summarize the theoretical 
considerations that might have prevented the German law from being adopted, 
such as the consequences of a hierarchy of equality, the effects of Drittwirkimg, 
and the underlying clashes between freedom and equality. In the fifth part of 
the paper I will address the legal consequences of non-implementation, whereas in 
the conclusion I engage in forcasting the future of the German anti-discrimi-
nation legislation. 
1. European Imperatives 
A Council Directive of 2004, one of 2002 and two Council Directives of 2000 
address the issue of discrimination at EU level. Council Directive 2004/113/EC 
implemented the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the 
access to and supply of goods and services (hereinafter referred to as the "Gender 
Goods and Services Directive"), Directive 2002/73/EC amended Directive 
76/207/EEC on equal pay for equal work for women and men in employment 
matters (hereinafter referred to as the "Gender Directive"). Council Directive 
2000/43/EC of June 29, 2000, implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (hereinafter referred to as 
the "Race Directive") and the Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 
2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation (hereinafter referred to as the "Framework Directive") both 
deal with non-discrimination measures. The latter lists disability as a prohibited 
ground on the basis of which direct or indirect discrimination, instruction to 
discriminate or harassment are impermissible. All Member States should have 
implemented the Directive by May 1, 2004. As of September 2005 Germany and 
Luxemburg, furthermore Austria at regional level, and in respect of Finland, 
the Âland Islands failed to transpose the Directives.3 The German government 
5
 Cormack, J.-Bell, M.: Developing Anti-Discrimination Law in Europe: The 25 EU 
Member States compared. Belgium and the Netherlands, 2005. 13. 
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was striving to transpose the EU laws, however failed to adopt the Act which 
would have implemented the EU Directive's provisions. The German Bundes-
länder, which should also implement the law, are waiting for the federal 
legislator to act. 
The EU Directives set the basic principles and the framework rules, and 
following from the nature of a Directive, set the objectives each Member State 
should achieve individually through implementation. The Directives leave wide 
discretion to the Member States as to transposition. Apart from non-implemen-
tation, several other kinds of national approaches can be traced. Some Member 
States incompletely transpose the Directives picking the elements they prefer 
and excluding those that are controversial in their society. Others copy the 
Directives word by word into their national law, which is problematic, since the 
details are deliberately left to the individual Member States by the EU Directives; 
failing to regulate these details leaves an unjustifiably wide responsibility to 
the courts in interpreting the vague provisions. Finally, there are states that 
went beyond the prerequisites of EU law and afforded greater protection to the 
covered groups than necessary according to the acquis communautaire,6 
2. German Implementation 
Towards the end of 2001 the parliamentary factions of SPD (German Social 
Democratic Party) and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (Green Party) drafted a 
law which would have implemented the gender-related and Race and the 
Framework Directives together in a comprehensive way. This corresponded 
to Point IX. 10. of the Coalition Agreement of October 20, 1998.7 In its first 
6
 Mark Bell differentiates between five possible approaches on the side of Member 
States: non-implementation, incomplete implementation, incorrect implementation, paper 
implementation, and innovation and implementation. Presentation at a seminar conducted 
in the framework of the Community Action Programme to Combat Discrimination: The Fight 
Against Discrimination: The Equal Treatment Directives of 2000. Trier, 28 -29 November 
2005. 
7
 "Die neue Bundesregierung will Minderheiten schützen und ihre Gleichberechtigung 
und gesellschaftliche Teilhabe erreichen. Niemand darf wegen seiner Behinderung, Herkunft, 
Hautfarbe, ethnischer Zugehörigkeit oder sexueller Orientierung als Schwuler oder Lesbe 
diskriminiert werden. Dazu werden wir ein Gesetz gegen Diskriminierung und zur Förderung 
der Gleichbehandlung (u.a. mit der Einführung des Rechtsinstituts der eingetragenen 
Lebenspartnerschaft mit Rechten und Pflichten) auf den Weg bringen. Die Empfehlungen 
des Europäischen Parlaments zur Gleichberechtigung von Lesben und Schwulen werden 
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official form, Herta Däubler-Gmelin, then Minister of Justice presented the 
draft law. The proposal was however much broader in scope than the EU 
Directives would have required. Comparing the scope of the Race and Frame-
work Directives it becomes visible that the former is much broader. Sometimes 
this notion is referred to as the "hierarchy of equality".8 In gender issues there 
are a great number of pieces of legislation to achieve equal treatment and an 
extensive case-law of the European Court of Justice is backing it up. As to race 
an ethnicity the scope of protection is still wide, however less broad than in 
case of sex. Finally the characteristics listed in the Framework Directive since 
the document's entry into force also enjoy some protection against discrimi-
nation, however the material scope of the law is narrower, and a number of 
explicit exceptions are granted. The EU Directives require implementation in 
the field of general contract law as regards discrimination on the basis of 
sex, race and ethnic origin. As to the other grounds, implementation is only 
necessary in employment and related fields, such as vocational training and 
education. 
The result of a common implementation of the pieces of EU legislation was 
that the drafters elevated the level of protection as regards religion, belief, 
disability, age and sexual orientation regulated by the Framework Directive to 
contracts, to the supply of goods and services offered to the public, i.e. to the 
level of protection granted by the Race and Gender Directives, which are way 
beyond the scope of the former. 
The first draft of the German law intended to insert a new subtitle, Subtitle 
5 to Section 3 Title 1 BGB on the creation, subject matter and termination of 
contractual obligations [Articles 319 a)—e)]. Article 319 a) would have prohibited 
any discrimination based on race, ethnic origin, sex, religion or belief, sexual 
identity, age or disability in the conclusion, content or termination of a contract 
offered to the public concluded in the field of occupation, education or health-
berücksichtigt." [..The new Federal Government wants to protect minorities and to achieve 
their equal rights and social participation. Nobody may be discriminated against on the basis 
of his or her disability, origin, skin color, ethnic origin or sexual orientation as gay or a 
lesbian. In addition we will draft a law against discrimination and for the promotion of 
equal treatment ( among others with the introduction of the legal notion of registered life 
partnership that encompasses rights and obligations). The recommendat ions of the 
European Parliament regarding the equal rights of lesbians and gays will be considered."] 
ht tp: / /www.datenschutz-berl in .de/doc/de/koalo/09.htm#ix 10 
8
 E.g. Waddington, L.: The new equality Directives - mixed blessings, in Costello, 
C.-Barry, E. (Eds.): Equality in Diversity, The New Equality Directives. Dublin, 2003. 3 9 -
54; Borillo, D.: Lutter contre les discriminations. Paris, 2003. 
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care. The prerequisite "offered to the public" means that the rule has to extend 
beyond private relations. With the Framework Directive in line, Articles 319 
a) and 319 b) prohibited any direct or indirect discrimination, harassment or 
instruction to discriminate. Article 319 d) dealt with exclusively private relations 
(with the exception of labor law). It took account of the fact that the ban on 
discrimination cannot be as absolute as in case of public contracts. It allowed 
for the balancing of private interests to some extent, and as an exception allowed 
for discrimination in case of certain professions. An explicit exception referred 
to age and disability in case there was a genuine and determinative occupational 
requirement that prevented handicapped persons, or people under or above a 
certain age to take the job. Further, according to the draft discrimination did 
not occur, if there is a reasonable purpose (sachlicher Grund) for the differential 
treatment of persons having the listed characteristics. Such reasonable purposes 
relevant for disabled persons were especially the avoidance of dangers, prevention 
of damage or other purposes of comparable kind; the protection of privacy or 
personal security; if different treatment was designed to grant special advantages 
and an interest in the penetration of equal treatment was missing; and finally in 
case of private insurance companies' statistical risk evaluation (however, here 
potential pregnancy is excluded as a justifiable reason for differentiation). In 
line with the Framework Directive and similarly to Article 611 Section (1) 
BGB on the prohibition of gender-based discrimination in case of employment 
contracts, the new Article 319 c) allowed for the partial reversal of the burden 
of proof with the aim to enhance discriminated persons' chances to litigate a 
case. According to this provision the persons protected only had to make the 
facts which indicated that discrimination had occurred, plausible (glaubhaft 
machen). The other party to the case was to bear the burden of proving that 
his or her decision, action had been unrelated to the applicant's protected 
characteristic. The opponents of the modification argued that negative evidence, 
in this case the lack of discriminatory intentions, is very difficult to be proven.9 
Indeed, this criticism has been voiced in relation to the mentioned EU Directive 
as well. An employer has to use objective tests when interviewing applicants 
for a position, and he or she can only take the job-related characteristics into 
account. However, in order to prove at a possible later litigation that no 
discrimination occurred, employers first have to ask questions in writing, or 
record an oral interview and second, they must keep these documents and 
9
 Ladeur, K.-H.: The German Proposal of an ,,Anti-Discrimination"-Law: Anticonsti-
tutional and Anti-Common Sense. A Response to Nicola Vennemann . German Law 
Journal. 2002. 
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records so as to be able to prove at a later point in time that a rejected applicant 
has not been discriminated against. This might be especially burdensome for 
smaller companies where the method of interviewing is rather informal, oral 
and where the recording and storing of data is problematic. It has also been 
pointed out that these procedural rules "only touch the stupid","1 as it is fairly 
easy to overcome the provisions and to use more sophisticated filters for screening 
out disabled, if someone really intends to do so. It has been predicted that 
employers will find a way out from the legal obligations, and the whole legal 
system will be weakened by this forced dishonesty." Again others reminded to 
the disadvantages in living under a permanent threat for being suspicious of 
discriminatory behavior. Once the fact of discrimination has been established, it 
may have two kinds of consequences according to Article 319 e). First, when-
ever relevant, the court may oblige the discriminator to refrain from such 
behavior in the future, and second the court may order the employer to treat the 
applicant in a non-discriminating manner and to undo the consequences of 
discrimination. (Folgenbeseitigungsanspruch) This can also lead to the modifi-
cation of the employment contract. Should the employer already have concluded 
a contract with someone by the time the discrimination has been proven, this 
contract cannot be contested, but instead compensation can be asked.12 The 
same rule applies in case of one-time occasions.11 The new rules on granting 
the possibility for associations and other legal persons to represent discriminated 
individuals reflected Article 9 of the Framework Directive. Victims of discrimi-
nation could have assigned their claims for compensation to associations. These 
NGOs would have had the possibility to represent persons discriminated in 
court proceedings, where representation was allowed by persons other than 
attorneys. The procedural rules have partially repeated the wording of Article 
63 SGB IX extending this rule to discrimination based on other grounds as 
well. A difference in the Verbandsklagerecht regulated by SGB IX and the 
proposed anti-discrimination act is that the latter allowed for representation of 
the discriminated person, even in lack of his or her authorization. It has been 
criticized as being a too far reaching position, driven by the "impulse to fulfill 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Picker, E.: Anti-Discrimination as a Program of Private Law? German Law Journal, 
2003. 778; Ladeur: op. cit. 9. 
12
 The compensation requirement is also subject to many criticisms, because of the 
high possibility of abuse. See e.g. Picker: op. cit. 776. 
" Vennemann, N.: The German Draft Legislation on the Prevention of Discrimination 
in the Private Sector. German Law Journal, 2002. 
THE GERMAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION. 281 
a German 'Übersoll"\14 however technically it is difficult to imagine a scenario 
where a legal person litigates against the injured party's will without his or her 
cooperation. In the rare cases when it happens however, associations should 
consider whether bringing a case to the court in the absence of the victim's 
wish would be beneficial or detrimental for him or her. As to discrimination 
based on disability, the SGB IX as lex specialis compared to the proposed anti-
discrimination legislation, would prevail over the latter. 
The bill has been redrafted several times until the Bundestag adopted it on 
June 17, 2005. The Bundesrat voted against the law on July 8, 2005 with the 
argument that the proposed act was unreasonably wide, and violated private 
autonomy.15 The issue was promised to be brought up again in the new, 16lh 
election period. The coalitions agreement between the SPD and CDU/CSU 
took the implementation of the anti-discrimination Directives for granted despite 
all disagreements.16 
The initial draft has been changed both in structure and in content. Whereas 
the first version intended to amend the BGB, the later bill was drafted as a 
separate federal act initially named Act on Anti-discrimination [(Gesetz zum 
Schutz vor Diskriminierung (Antidiskriminierungsgesetz, ADGJ].17 In the last 
version of the bill the title has been changed to General Equal Treatment Act 
(Allgemeine Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, AGG). Finally, the act has been adopted 
in August, 2006. The aim of the law is to prevent or eliminate negative dis-
crimination (Benachteiligung) on the basis of race, ethnic origin, sex, religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual identity.18 The German legislature adopted 
parallelly a separate law on anti-discrimination of soldiers. (Gesetz zum Schutz 
der Soldatinnen unci Soldaten vor Diskriminierung, SADG) 
In the meanwhile since the first steps of the implementation process, two 
more laws have been adopted by the EU legislators, so the recent versions of 
14
 Picker: op. cit. 116. 
15
 Unterrichtung durch den Bundesrat Gesetz zur Umsetzung europäischer Antidiskri-
minierungsrichtlinien: Anrufung des Vermittlungsausschusses - Drucksachen 15/4538, 
15/5717. 
18
 Die EU-Gleichbehandlungsrichtlinien werden in deutsches Recht umgesetzt. [The 
EU Equal Treatment Directives will be implemented into German law.] Point 2.3. of Title 
VII. The Agreement mentions the social laws in favor of disabled persons, their social 
participation and the need for the promotion of parasport. http://koalitionsvertrag.spd. 
de/servlet/PB/show/1645854/111105_Koalitionsvertrag.pdf 
17
 Gesetzentwurf Drucksache 15/4538 Deutscher Bundestag, December 16, 2004. 
http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/15/045/1504538.pdf 
18
 Article 1 AGG. 
282 PETRA BÁRD 
both the general anti-discrimination law and its twin sister, the law protecting 
soldiers transplant the Gender Goods and Services Directive, the Gender 
Directive, the Race Directive and the Framework Directive. 
The scope of this general anti-discrimination law is, similarly to the previous 
one, much wider than the EU Directives would have required. It extends to 
employment in the broad sense of the word, i.e. including self employment, 
access to employment, promotion, benefits, work conditions, dismissal, vocational 
training, promotion, dismissal, educational training, employment advice, involve-
ment in trade unions, etc.; social protection, social advantages, education, 
access to goods and services available to the public, including housing.14 The 
law consists of different parts, separately regulating labor law,20 and modifying 
contract law.21 
As to employment it is to be noted that sheltered workshops are not included, 
the draft only refers to traditional labor relations. The definition of discrimination 
corresponds to the definitions in the Directives. Direct, indirect discrimination, 
harassment and instruction to discriminate are included. Exceptions that the 
EU Directives allow are also granted in the implementing law. Indirect discrimi-
nation does not occur in case of a different treatment, if objective reasons 
justify it. There is an express exception granted to religious organizations, 
where belief might be a determinative factor,22 and special exceptions are allowed 
on the basis of age.2 ' Once a violation occurred, the employer has to compensate 
for material and immaterial damages.24 Similarly to the previous solution, 
these also have to be paid in case the person having been discriminated against 
also has a right to compensation in cases he would not have been employed even 
if discrimination had not occurred. As opposed to the first draft, victimization 
is only mentioned in labor relations, but not in reference to general civil law. It 
has been pointed out that this is not necessarily a detriment, since most cases 
of victimization seem to be covered by the general rules of contract law, and in 
some cases even criminal law protection is granted."7 
19
 Article 2 Section (1) Points 1 - 8 . AGG. 
21
 Abschnitt 2, Schutz der Beschäftigten vor Benachteiligung. 
21
 Abschnitt 3, Schutz vor Benachteiligung im Zivilrechtsverkehr. 
22
 Article 9 AGG. 
23
 Article 10 A G G . 
24
 Article 15 A G G . 
25
 Mahlmann, M.: Prospects of German Antidiscrimination Law. Transnational Law 
and Contemporary Problems, 2005. 1045. 
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The second part of the Act on general contract law invoked more criticisms. 
This is the field where German legislation went far beyond than what is 
required by EU law, which only obliges Member States to respect the principle 
of non-discrimination as regards sex, race and ethnic origin in this field. Never-
theless, the German legislator extended the protection to contract law to persons 
having other characteristics listed in the Framework Directive. However, this 
protection of persons having the protected characteristics only applies to such 
contracts that are typically concluded with a large number of partners in large 
number of cases of comparable nature (Massengeschäfte , mass businesses), 
2 6 • 
and where the identity of the contractual partner is of minor importance. This 
formulation seems to exclude the much debated topic of housing, unless a 
company or a private person is involved in the business of renting flats, 
apartments, houses or hotel rooms. To make it more explicit, due to the public 
outcry and the opposition from the legal profession concerning housing, a 
specific exception has been granted for cases where there is a special relation 
and trust between the parties. As to the grounds listed in the Framework 
Directive including disability this exception is permissible, however as to race 
and ethnic origin, the exception is clearly in violation of the Race Directive. 
The only provision that could save the German clause is in Recital 3 Race 
Directive stating that it is „also important, in the context of the access to and 
provision of goods and services, to respect the protection of private and family 
life and transactions carried out", however in the actual body of the law such 
reference cannot be found; according to Article 3 the Directive applies to 
"all persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, including public 
bodies". The EU legislator could have opted for inserting an exception into the 
provision on the scope of the Directive, if intended to do so, just like in the 
case of the Gender Goods and Services Directive, which is according to its 
Article 3 only applicable to persons providing goods and services available to the 
public, "and which are offered outside the area of private and family life." The 
drafters of the Race Directive in contrast did not grant any such exceptions in 
the actual body of the law, therefore the German law's respective provision 
seems to be in violation of the acquis communautaire. As it has been shown, 
it is also against common sense and basic morals, since strictly interpreted, it 
would allow for the hanging of a sign "Rooms for rent - except for Jews", if 
the person letting the room lived in the same house,27 although it would 
certainly contradict the general clauses of the BGB. 
26
 Article 20 AGG. 
27
 Mahlmann: op. cit. 1045. 
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Partly as a result of compromise, a number of other exceptions are granted 
in the second and final version, too. First, contracts in the field of family law 
are exempted. Second, an objective reason may justify differentiation on the 
grounds of religion, belief, disability, age, sexual identity or sex."8 Third, the 
prevention of dangers and damages may justify difference in treatment. Fourth, 
the protection of privacy or intimacy may be a ground for justifiable differen-
tiation. Fifth, special advantages may be granted to groups of persons, if the 
interest to enforce equal treatment is lacking. Sixth, religious communities may 
attach importance to the belief of individuals. Seventh, insurance companies are 
exempted from the scope of the law as well, in case if the protected characteristic 
is a determining factor as to the subject of the contract and it is underpinned 
by statistical data. (However, just like in the first draft, pregnancy-related 
concerns cannot justify different treatment.)29 
The procedural rules have not been amended as compared to the previous 
bill; they are taken over from the Directives. The Act expressly states that rules 
on the representation of disabled persons, i.e. Article 63 SGB IX are not 
effected.30 A novelty is the establishment of the Federal Anti-Discrimination 
Agency (Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes) functioning at the Federal 
Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth.31 The Bundes-
präsident(in) appoints the person directing the Agency at the suggestion of 
the federal government.32 The Agency receives complaints, supports persons 
submitting complaints, assists counseling by other bodies, promotes mediation, 
takes measures of prevention, every four years reports to the federal govern-
ment and the Bundestag and makes recommendations.33 The Agency has to 
enter into dialogue with NGOs and other responsible bodies, and in order to 
promote this cooperation it has to create an advisory body of independent 
experts in the field.34 
According to a later draft the unified anti-discrimination code would have 
been called "Act on the Implementation of European Directives for the Reali-
zation of the Principle of Equal Treatment" (Gesetz zur Umsetzung europäischer 
28
 Article 21 of the bill. 
29
 Article 21 Points 1-5. of the bill. 
311
 Article 25 Section (5) of the bill; also see the explanatory note attached to the 
provision. 
31
 Article 26 of the bill. 
32
 Article 27 of the bill. 
33
 Article 28 of the bill. 
34
 Articles 3 0 - 3 1 of the bill. 
THE GERMAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION. 285 
Richtlinien zur Verwirklichung des Grundsatzes der Gleichbehandlung). In 
Article 1 one could have found the actual Act on the Protection against discrimi-
nation. (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz), Article 2 would have contained 
the Act on the Protection of Soldiers against Discrimination (Gesetz zum Schutz 
der Soldatinnen und Soldaten vor Diskriminierungen), Article 3 had modified 
a number of other laws and Article 4 disposed of the entry into force. 
The final version came into being with the title General Equal Treatment 
Act (Allgemeine Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, AGG) and has been adopted 
simoultaneously with the separate law on anti-discrimination of soldiers. 
(Gesetz zum Schutz der Soldatinnen und Soldaten vor Diskriminierung, SADG) 
The legislator opted for the word "Benachteiligung" (disadvantaging) instead 
of "Diskrimination" (discrimination) in order to emphasize that not all kinds of 
different treatment are of a discriminatory character. The exemption of 
churches has been extended;33 victims of discrimination can sue within three 
months from the point in time they got to know about the discrimination; the 
victim of discrimination cannot claim from the court that a contract shall be 
concluded with him or her (no Kontrahierungszwang)\ in contrast to the 
previous draft, victims cannot assign their pecuniary claims for damages to 
NGOs, and NGOs may not represent cases independently from the victim. 
The first reading of the bill should have taken place on May 19, 2006, but it 
has been postponed to June, 2006. Finally, it has been adopted on 14 August 
2006, and entered into force four days later. 
3. Political Debate around Implementation 
Previous comments and the heated debate indicated from early on that it will 
be difficult to reach a compromise. The draft law for the implementation of EU 
anti-discrimination provisions has been called an "attempt against the basics of 
the republic."36 Volker Kauder, then CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union 
of Germany/Christian Social Union) federal faction whip formulated this 
objection even more explicitly: "Previously we have been told, it depends on 
the 'proper race'. Later, in the GDR the 'proper class' has been propagated, later 
35
 Religious organizations irrespectively of their legal form and facilities associated 
with them may discriminate on the basis of religion. Article 9 of the new bill. 
16
 "Anschlag auf die Grundzüge dieser Republikcc. Quoted from Forum gegen Rassismus, 
Arbeitsgruppe Gleichbehandlung, Info-Brief Nr. 6 März 2005. Bundesministerium des Innern, 
Ref. IS 3. 
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it has been a matter of the proper skin color. 'And now we experience: one has 
to take the proper political stand'. Should this not help, an anti-discrimination 
law will be drafted."37 Many others expressed their worries that the law "desires 
in its regulating furor, to replace the free individual with the 'good' one",38 i.e. 
that government will be transformed into a moral enforcing agent suppressing 
liberty and diversity.34 
In this particular case freedom of private employers, churches, landlords 
were confronted with the equality of those who are having one or more of 
the characteristics listed in the Directives. Private employers criticized the 
bill as one limiting private autonomy. Churches, particularly the Christian 
ones expressed their worries that they cannot exclude persons in the future 
who would contradict their teachings, if they had at the same time a protected 
characteristic. 
Some voice bureaucratization concerns, saying that as a result of the 
reversal of the burden of proof, all sellers and service providers will have to 
store evidence to show that they have not discriminated against potential buyers, 
consumers. Other criticisms refer to the difficulties in differentiating between 
permissible and prohibited differentiations, the additional burden on the judiciary 
as a result of the flood of anti-discrimination cases, the irrational limitation of 
the market economy, and preference for certain minorities over family and 
children. 
Mainly small- and middle-size companies voiced their worries about 
unnecessary bureaucratization, which is understandable since recording and 
storing evidence for a potential later case might be a disproportionate burden on 
them. Another reason for the silence of multinational companies is that most of 
them already adopted anti-discrimination programs following the international 
trend. 
The forces favoring the law are lobby groups and entities of civil society 
pushing for the rights of women or disabled people. In the political arena the 
17
 "Früher hät ten die einen gesagt , es komme auf die 'richtige Rasse ' an. Später in 
der DDR sei die ' r ichtige Klasse' propagiert worden, dann sei es um die richtige Hautfarbe 
gegangen. 'Und jetzt erleben wir: Es muss einer die korrekte politische Einstellung haben. ' 
Wenn das nicht he l fe , werde ein Antidiskriminierungsgesetz gemacht ." Forum gegen 
Rassismus, Arbeitsgruppe Gleichbehandlung, Info-Brief Nr. 6 März 2005. Bundesministerium 
des Innern, Ref. IS 5. 
38
 Picker: op. cit. 784. 
39
 E.g. Adomeit , К.: Diskriminierung - Inflation eines. Begriffs. Neue juristische. 
Wochenschrift, 2002. 1622-1623, Ladeur: op. cit. 
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drafters, i.e. the green party and the social democrats pushed for the adoption 
of the law. They emphasized that the ease of the burden of proof existed for 25 
years in Article 611 a) BGB in relation to gender-based discrimination. They 
also stressed the responsibility of Germany as a Member State to implement 
the Directives that the Germans also voted in favor of. 
It has also been pointed out that it was embarrassing to ask prospective 
Member States to comply with human rights and to adjust their legal systems 
according to the acquis communautaire, whereas a founding Member State does 
not respect its obligations under EC law in the filed of anti-discrimination. 
According to some observers the reason for the failure of the Directives' 
implementation can be explained by the fact that civil society has not been 
loud enough, as NGOs traditionally pursuing strong lobbying activities in the 
field of human rights did not doubt that implementation will occur.40 
4. Theoretical Debate around Implementation 
4.1. Hierarchy of Equality 
The German law implementing the four anti-discrimination-related EU Directives 
reject the hierarchy of equality that is typical for the acquis communautaire, 
i.e. the national law rejects the idea of the diverse levels of protection and the 
different scope of application of the anti-discrimination Directives. 
The uniform domestic rules resulted in difficulties and prevented the 
implementing law from adoption for a long time. The protection of disability 
and other grounds in the Framework Directive have been elevated to the level 
of protection the Race Directive granted for race and ethnic origin. Apart from 
an eagerness and ambition of post-World-War-II Germany to be the leading 
Member State when it comes to the protection of human rights, there might be 
some constitutional considerations behind the common regulation. 
According to a constitutional principle one cannot differentiate between the 
protected grounds laid down in Article 3 Section (3) Basic Law. Accordingly 
the legislator is obliged to find a common solution. Disability might however 
be an exception to this principle, since the Basic Law only prohibits negative 
differentiation of disabled persons, however does not mention the prohibition 
of favoring them, as in case of the other protected grounds. 
40
 Ibid. 
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In spite of the constitutional obligation to treat all persons with any protected 
characteristic the same way and to grant them the same rights, laws do differ 
on a lower level, since equality of persons with certain characteristics need 
legislation of different nature than others. In order for the laws to be effective, 
the reasons for differentiation have to be identified, and they have to be over-
come in suitable ways. Whereas it is almost impossible to find any possible 
scenario where direct age discrimination may be justified,41 differentiation 
on the basis of disability might be legitimate in a number of cases, like the 
protection of consumers, fellow employees, just to mention a few. 
The advantage of the absence of a hierarchy of equality is that the victim 
of discrimination does not have to search for his or her most protected 
characteristic to win a case. Human beings fall into different subgroups at 
the same time: they are men or women, hetero- or homosexuals, religious or 
non-religious persons, young or old, disabled or able-bodied and-minded. As 
Susanne Baer pointed out, everyone who has been discriminated against shall 
be able to make a case irrespectively of the grounds on the basis of which the 
victim has been disadvantaged.42 
4.2. Drittwirkung 
Based on Article 1 Section (3) Basic Law fundamental rights apply in the 
relation of the individual versus the state. As opposed to this verticality, 
Drittwirkimg, or the third party effect doctrine would mean that the funda-
mental rights of a constitution, in this case the Basic Law are applicable in 
horizontal, i.e. private relations. A direct third party effect (unmittelbare 
Drittwirkung) has not been foreseen by the Basic Law. The arguments against 
it are manifold. First, denial of horizontal effect can be derived from the text 
of the above mentioned Article 1 Section (3), which expressly states that the 
Basic Law's fundamental rights "bind the legislature, the executive, and the 
judiciary as directly enforceable law." Second, as Hermann von Mangoldt, 
then representative of Parliament pointed out, the drafters of the Basic Law 
41
 It is possible to think of many indirect age discrimination cases; for example when a 
certain physical strength is necessitated for the job, aged persons may be excluded; in 
contrast if the position requires experience, this may lead to the screening out of young 
applicants. 
42
 Baer, S.: Kultur am Sonntagmorgen: EU als Gesetzgeber, Antidiskriminierungs-
gesetzgebung und europäische Rechtskultur, aired on radio Deutschlandfunk, at 9:30 a.m. 
on September 11, 2005. (Audio record on file with author.) 
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intended to guarantee basic rights in the classical sense, i.e. the founders of the 
constitution wanted to "regulate the relation between the individual and the 
state by setting limits to the exercise of state power, so that humans' dignity 
remains inviolable."43 Third, following a systemic interpretation, one can find 
certain provision in the Basic Law that expressly extend to horizontal agree-
ments, therefore one can conclude a contrario that in all cases there is no such 
extension in scope, the provision in question, i.e. the majority of fundamental 
rights does not apply in private relations.44 Fourth, when engaging into a 
teleological interpretation, one cannot assume that the primary aim of the Basic 
Law is to limit the freedoms of private persons, which would be the result of a 
general direct third party effect.45 
As it has been shown, vertical effect of fundamental rights is not subject to 
dispute, Article 3 Section (3) [2] Basic Law on the prohibition of discrimi-
nation based on disability is directly binding on the legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers. However it is also applicable in private relations, though to a 
limited extent. Although basic rights do not have a direct third party effect, they 
are applicable in private relations through the indirect (mittelbare) Drittwirkung 
doctrine. 
The underlying idea behind the general applicability of rights can also be 
derived from the Basic Law itself. According to Article 1 Section (2) human 
rights are "the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world." 
The third party effect is also justified by the argument that in contemporary 
societies it is not only the state that may abuse power and restrict the rights 
of individuals, but employers, economic entities may also do so.46 Therefore 
43
 „Vielmehr sahen die Beteiligten ihre Aufgabe darin, die Grundrechte im Sinne der 
alten klassischen Grundrechte zu gestalten. [ . . . ] In den Grundrechten sollte also das 
Verhältnis des Einzelnen zum Staate geregelt werden, der Allmacht des Staates Schranken 
gesetzt werden, damit der Mensch in seiner Würde wieder anerkannt werde." Parlamen-
tarischer Rat, Bonn 1948/49, Annex to the stenographic report of the May 9. 1949 session. 
Written memorandum of Dr. von Mangoldt on Part I on Basic Rights. Reproduced at 
http://www.gewaltenteilung.de/grundrechte.htm. 
44
 Such as Article 9 Section (3) for example, banning private agreements impairing the 
right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and economic conditions. 
45
 Pierroth, B.-Schlink, В.: Grundrechte. Staatsrecht II. Heidelberg, 2005. 44, Rn. 
174-175. 
46
 Ibid. 176. 
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private entities that may also stand in vertical power relation to individuals, 
shall not be exempted from basic rights scrutiny.47 
The justification of the original fear behind the concept of vertical effect, 
i.e. that the state is likely to abuse power to the detriment of individuals, has 
also been called into question. Through social and economic rights the state 
has been burdened by positive obligations, and it has to provide appropriate 
procedures and resources for the realization of these rights. Freedom, as German 
scholar Ulrich Preuß put it "does not only imply freedom from the state but 
also requires institutional devices that allow the realization of freedom through 
the state,"48 (emphasis in original) As the vertical nature of private relations, 
such as those between employers and employees, and the state support systems 
show, the lines between horizontal and vertical Drittwirkung are blurred, 
especially in the German Federal Republic, where the constitution guarantees 
that Germany be a social state.49 
The German Federal Constitutional Court dealt with the fundamental issue 
of third party effect in a very early case carving out the borders of free 
speech.50 In the Liith case the Court first emphasized the objective order of 
values in the Basic Law centering upon dignity and the free development of 
personality influencing all fields of law, be it public or private. The Court then 
rejected an unlimited horizontal application of fundamental rights in private 
relations propagated in earlier cases by the Federal Labor Court, but held that 
"[t]he legal content of basic rights as objective norms is developed within 
private law through the medium of the legal provisions directly applicable to 
this area of the law. [...] A dispute between private individuals concerning rights 
and duties emanating from provisions of private law-provisions influenced 
by the basic rights-remains substantively and procedurally a private law 
dispute [...] The influence of the scale of values of the basic rights affects 
particularly those provisions of private law that contain mandatory rules of law 
and thus form part of the ordre public [...] In bringing this influence to bear, 
the courts may invoke the general clauses which, like Article 826 of the Civil 
Code, refer to standards outside private law. "Good morals" is one such 
47
 Sommeregger, G.: The Horizontalization of Equality, in Sajó, A.-Uitz, R. (Eds.): 
The Constitution in Private Relations: Expanding Constitutionalism. Utrecht, 2005. 41. 
48
 Preuß, U.: The German Drittwirkung Doctrine, in Sajó-Uitz (Eds.): op. cit. 29. 
49
 Article 20 Section (1) Basic Law: „The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic 
and social federal state." This provision is even protected by the Article 79 Section (3), the 
eternity clause of the Basic Law, i.e. it cannot be amended. 
50
 Liith Case, 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958). 
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standard."51 Ultimately courts, i.e. public institutions are deciding private 
disputes. The judicial power, together with the executive and the legislative, is 
directly bound by basic rights as declared by Article 1 Section (3) Basic Law. 
The German Federal Constitutional Court concluded that courts deciding on 
private law matters have to interpret civil law in line with fundamental rights. 
Basic rights do not directly effect private relations, but certainly influence 
them. The rights contained in the Basic Law do not solve civil law disputes 
concretely, but find complete expression through the rules dominating the given 
branch of law.52 Like basic rights in general, Article 3 (3) [2] also radiates 
through an indirect third party effect (Drittwirkung) into private relations 
through the civil law's general clauses (Generalklauseln).53 These are contained 
among others in Article 826 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 
BGB)5A and refer to the concept of good faith, public morals, public order 
(sittenwidrige vorsätzliche Schädigung). Courts interpret these clauses in light 
and in conformity with fundamental righs. According to their historical 
understanding, industrial societies set the conditions for freedom and equality, 
which presuppose a factual symmetry, according to which all persons have the 
same rights to act according to their interests and to enforce these.55 This factual 
symmetry is today compromised by both the state and by private entities. The 
Basic Law itself establishes an imbalance when protecting property and the 
right to conclude contracts; further the legislative power is entitled to construct 
asymmetric relations, as long as privileges are not created and some persons 
are not placed in a helpless or defenseless situation.56 
The notion of third party effect, Drittwirkung, is at the center of the German 
debate preventing the anti-discrimination law from being adopted. Many German 
legal scholars argue that there should be a differentiation between prosecution 
of discrimination in the public arena and intrusion into private relations. It has 
been contended that the new law extensively regulating the private sphere is 
unconstitutional, foreign to the liberal tradition of the BGB and against common 
sense.57 Some see the enforcement of equality as the limitation of private 
51
 Translation is cited from Kommers, D. P.: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Durham and London, 1997. 363. 
52
 Pierroth-Schlink: op. cit. 181. 
53
 Heun, W. in Dreier, H. (ed.): Grundgesetz, Vol. I, Tübingen, 2000. Article 3. Rn. 123. 
54
 See also Articles 138 on contracts contra bonos mores and 249 BGB on Treu und 
Glauben, i.e. bona fide. 
55
 Heun: op. cit. Article 3. Rn. 139. 
56
 Pierroth-Schlink: op. cit. 183. 
57
 E.g. Ladeur: op. cit. 
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autonomy by curtailing the general liberty to choose.58 They contend that 
autonomous choice, a possibility to distinguish without any justification or 
reasoning, according to one's irrational choice or taste, is the basis of private law, 
which has now been curtailed. Others see the law as the peak of a continuous 
development of German law since the World War II. They emphasize that the 
law does not intend to prohibit discriminatory thoughts, but only discrimi-
59 
natory actions. 
Whereas in the previous discussion of the notion of third party effect, I 
dealt with the role of the judiciary, anti-discrimination laws raise a different 
problem. It is the legislative power that prescribes the horizontal application 
of Drittwirkung obligatory. Therefore some writers differentiate between three 
kinds of horizontalities: direct horizontality, indirect third party effect, and 
Drittwirkung prescribed by the legislative.6" 
At the heart of the German debate on Drittwirkung is a provision of the 
Race Directive. According to Article 3 Section (1) h) „Within the limits of the 
powers conferred upon the Community, [the Race] Directive shall apply to 
all persons, as regards, both the public and private sectors, including public 
bodies, in relation to [. . .] access to and supply of goods and services which are 
available to the public, including housing." The reference to supply of goods 
and services offered to the public are missing from the Framework Directive. 
Nevertheless the German Act extends the protection of all protected groups 
having the characteristics listed in both the Race Directive and the Framework 
Directive to goods and services offered to the public and housing. It should 
also be noted at the same time that the interpretation of the term 'offered to 
the public' is left to the Member States. Of course not all offers to the public 
can be meant. A repeatedly invoked example is the newspaper advertisement 
listing the desired characteristics of the preferred future partner.61 In such a 
personal issue legal prohibition of discrimination against persons with certain-
58
 Sommcregger, G.: The Horizontalization of Equality, in Sajó-Uitz (Eds.): op. cit. 46. 
54
 Winkler, V.: The Planned German Anti-Discrimination Act: Legal Vandalism? A 
Response to Karl-Heinz Ladeur. German Law Journal, 2002. Winkler rejects all three 
assumption by Ladeur, i.e. that the draft was unconstitutional, against common sense and 
also opposes the deeply rooted belief that the BGB was liberal. He thinks its a myth since 
Gertrude Ltibbe-Wolff first said so in her writing: Die Grundrechte als Abwehrrechte. 
Baden-Baden, 1988. 
60
 Sommeregger: op. cit. 34. 
61
 Schöbener, В.-Stork, F.: Anti-Diskriminierungsregelungen der Europäischen Union 
im Zivilrecht - zur Bedeutung der Vertragsfreiheit und des Rechts auf Privatleben, 
Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien, 2004. 60. 
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even protected-characteristics would be contrary to common sense. It is a 
widely accepted principle that the more a law intrudes into the private sphere, 
the more flexible it should be towards arbitrary differential treatment.62 In line 
with the principle, private and family relations are currently not covered. 
Recital 4 of the Race Directive reinforces that "[i]t is important to respect such 
fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to freedom of association. 
It is also important, in the context of the access to and provision of goods and 
services, to respect the protection of private and family life and transactions 
carried out in this context." Many contend however that contractual freedom in 
general, and not only in the very intimate sphere would be impaired and be 
against common sense, once screened though anti-discrimination laws. 
4.3. Freedom versus Equality 
There have been some attempts to compare the Directives to the common 
constitutional traditions of the Member States instead to submit them to national 
scrutiny. Affected rights of potentially discriminating persons, respected by the 
European Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as: ECJ) have been identified. 
The two main rights are the right to property and contractual freedom, and the 
right to private life, privacy. Article 16 of the not yet binding Charter of Funda-
mental Rights, the case-law of the ECJ,61 the right to conclude contracts as 
derived from Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR on the right to property have been 
invoked in relation to the former. As to the latter aspect, Article 7 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, the case- law of the ECJ64 and Article 8 ECHR have 
been named. Authors arrived to the same conclusion that has also been reached 
in the evaluation of the Act on the basis of already existing national laws: 
elevation of equality cannot mean the reduction of freedom of others, since in 
a situation the law tries to prevent, the person having specific characteristics 
would be pushed out of the market. They would remain unprotected and would 
only have a formal declaration to a right to conclude contracts.65 Furthermore 
it shall be borne in mind that the ECJ also protects equality as a general 
principle of law, not only freedom of contract and private life. Articles 20 and 
62
 Ibid. 66. 
63
 Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-334/00 Tacconi [2002] ECR 1-7357. 
64
 Case C-62/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR 1-2575; Case C-404/92 X. v 
Commission [1994] ECR 1-4737. 
Schöbener-Stork: op. cit. 61. 
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21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on general equality and equality 
before the law, Articles 22-25 of the Charter on cultural rights, equality 
between men and women, rights of children, of the elderly, and of persons with 
disability, Article 13 EC Treaty, Article 14 ECHR, or Article 1 of Protocol 12 
ECHR can be named. Elevated to this level, a collision of general principles of 
laws can be declared. 
Freedom, mostly freedom of contract and equality are opposed also in the 
German debate.66 This is an old controversy that comes up from time to time in 
Germany in many fields. As it has been pointed out in the framework of 
constitutional law, the political demand to ensure as wide societal freedom as 
possible collides with the wish to ensure as much equality as possible. Societal 
freedom is freedom of the strong, whereas societal equality is the equality of the 
weak. As opposed to the social constriction of the conflict, the constitutional 
protection of these two values peacefully cotton. The constitutional provisions 
protecting equality and freedom leave a wide margin of appreciation to the 
legislative power by only setting the borders.67 
The legislative previously used to ensure equality before the law, equality 
in relation to the state and the individual, and equality in private relations 
through the general clauses of the BGB. It was up to the judge to fill the general 
clauses and interpret them in light of fundamental rights. Through the adoption 
of anti-discrimination legislation the room left to the judiciary shrank and the 
legislative determines-and takes political responsibility-for the moral choices 
the judiciary used to make. The judge may still enter into a kind of balancing, 
but the major outline of the equality approach in private relations is set by the 
legislative. 
This solution is not entirely unknown to the German legal system. At a 
lower level of norms, the issue comes up in labor law around the employers' 
obligation to treat all workers equally (arbeitsrechtliche Gleichbehandlungs-
grundsatz]1.68 Whereas previously equal treatment has been justified by the 
community bonds between employer and employees, modern reasoning is closer 
to the roots of non-discrimination law. According to the more recent theory, 
66
 Loenen, T.-Rodrigues, P. R. (Eds.): Non-discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives. 
The Hague, 1999. 
67
 Pierroth-Schlink: op. cit. 430. 
68
 Schiek, D.: Torn between Arithmetic and Substantive Equality? Perspectives on 
Equality in German Labour Law. The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations, 2002. 153-154.; Schiek, D.: Differenzierte Gerechtigkeit: Dis-
kriminierungsschutz und Vertragsrecht. Baden-Baden, 2000. 
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the contractual employment relationship is typically long-term, in many cases 
the parties conclude the contract for indefinite time. Since it is impossible to 
regulate all kinds of possible future disputes in a casuistic way, at least the 
basic principles have to be set. "If there is some collective order, it is held that 
this order must correspond to a standard of equality to be just."69 It seems that 
this theory mirrors a social contract theory applying it to a smaller community. 
As Susanne Baer showed it, "Whenever freedom is not seen in an isolated 
way, but in relation to other basic rights, one inevitably comes to the conclusion 
that no basic rights can grant empowerment for the discriminatory use of 
freedom. The unity of the constitution commands rather to make freedom in 
equality possible, as a realization of human dignity."™ It should be admitted 
that freedom is only freedom of those who are treated equally.71 Disabled, who 
have no chance to access buildings so as to participate at a job interview, just 
like foreigners not served in restaurants, or potential tenants with dark skin 
colors have solely theoretical, but no real freedom of contract. The full reali-
zation of equality understood this way is a costly means of realizing non-
discrimination. As people are inherently different, equal freedom will never be 
achieved, but the starting points could be equalized. However, ensuring even 
this understanding of equality may be burdensome in two ways. First, the 
realization of equality in the access to goods and services may drive a seller 
out of the market, if majority customers punish him for his non-discriminating 
behavior. If however the principle of non-discrimination extends to all sellers 
and service providers, the racist/sexist/etc. consumers will have no chance to 
boycott non-discriminating companies.72 Second, direct costs occur when it 
69
 Schiek: Torn between Arithmetie and Substantive Equality? op. cit. 153-156. 
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" "Wer Freiheit nicht isoliert, sondern im Zusammenhang mit anderen Grundrechten 
denkt, kommt zwangsläufig zu dem Schluss, dass kein Grundrecht dazu ermächtigen kann, 
Freiheit diskriminierend zu nutzen. Die Einheit der Verfassung gebietet es vielmehr, 
Freiheit in Gleichheit als Verwirklichung der Menschenwürde zu ermöglichen." Baer, S.: 
'Ende der Privatautonomie' oder grundrechtlich fundierte Rechtsetzung? Zur deutschen 
Debatte um Antidiskriminierungsrecht, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik, 2002. 290-294. 
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 Schöbener-Stork: op. cit. 61., also shared by Winkle r in Winkler: op. cit. 
paragraph 10. 
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 At a different level, the equalization of starting points had also been considered at 
the beginning of European integration. Article 141 EC Treaty (ex Article 119) states the 
principle of equal pay for equal work irrespective of gender. This is the oldest non-
discrimination principle of EC law, which has been inserted into the Treaty of R o m e upon 
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comes to accommodation, be it the accommodation of religion or disability. 
The issue of allocation of these costs among the state, private parties and the 
disabled persons themselves shall be addressed. 
Coming back to the anti-discrimination legislation, the first version of the 
extensive law implementing the relevant EU Directives received many criticisms 
and resulted in harsh opposition. It has been argued on the theoretical level that 
freedom-based systems are necessarily inherently discriminatory, and exception 
to freedom can only be granted to this in case of serious grievances, like in 
case of contracts that are against the public order. This problem however is 
said to be solved through the general clauses of the BGB.7, 
The solution of the modified bill can be regarded as a compromise. Total 
prohibition of discrimination applies only for "mass businesses" ("Massen-
geschäfte"). A special issue dominating the discussion in Germany is whether 
landlords may discriminate when renting a flat or a room. Again a compromise 
has been reached. Whenever a house, flat or room is to be rented or sold where 
the owner him- or herself is also living, one cannot speak of an offer to the 
public. Renting a room to someone with whom the landlord will live together 
or selling a part of the seller's house if he or she is going to stay in the other 
part of the building involves a part of private life, where law cannot enter.74 
Some referred to freedom of contract as follows from the free development of 
personality laid down in Article 2 Section (1) Basic Law. It is however contested 
whether national basic rights as laid down in the domestic constitution, serve as 
a proper test for the limits of implementation of an EU law. 
5. Legal Consequences of Non-Implementation 
The European Commission filed a suit with the ECJ against Germany for the 
non-implementation of the Race and Framework Directives. The ECJ declared 
in its decisions C-329/04 of April 28, 2005 and C-43/05 of February 23, 2006 
that, by failing to adopt, within the prescribed period, the laws necessary to 
comply with the Race and Framework Directives, Germany has failed to fulfill 
its obligations under EC law. 
principle, France will not suffer such detriments. Barnard, C.: EC Employment Law, Oxford, 
2000. 198. 
73
 Picker: op. cit. 771-784, 782. 
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According to the principle of supremacy of EU law, the acquis com-
munautaire has primacy over the national law of the Member States. The 
principle „lex posterior derogat lege priori" does not apply in case of a conflict 
between the acquis and national law, since it would undermine EU law. Although 
there is no Treaty reference to this principle,75 the answer is clear, the primacy 
of EU law has been established by the early case-law of the European Court of 
Justice.76 The ECJ reestablished the principle of supremacy of Community law, 
and held that the only court that can invalidate EU laws is the ECJ.77 In relation 
to the non-implemented Directive the question emerges whether German courts 
or parties can rely directly on the Directives in lack of an implementing 
national law, i.e. whether a person who feels to have been discriminated 
against may invoke the Directive directly, if a Member State has not (or not 
fully) implemented it. 
There are major differences as to the direct effect of Treaty provisions, 
Regulations and Directives. Whereas primary sources of Community law and 
Regulations can be relied on directly in national proceedings, the situation of 
Directives is more complicated. Following from the nature of the Directive, as 
opposed to Regulations and decisions, the EC Treaty in its Article 249 
prescribes for national implementation of Directives. Directives are the main 
„instruments of harmonization"78, they are binding as the result to be achieved, 
however the form and choice of methods to achieve the objective are left to 
Member States. 
The criteria of direct effect of Directives has been established by the case-
law of the ECJ. The first is a general rule: any part of the acquis communautaire 
can only be relied on directly, if it is clear, precise and unconditional.79 
Following from their nature, Directives are not that detailed and precise, often 
the ambiguous language is the result of a political compromise, and national 
peculiarities can be taken into account in the process of implementation. In the 
5
 In the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union this question would be solved. 
Article I—10 Section (1) of the draft Treaty by codifying existing case-law provides that the 
"Constitution, and law made by the Union's Institutions in exercising competences conferred 
on it, shall have primacy over the law of the Member States". 
lh
 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Administrate der Belastingen [1963) ECR 3, Case 
6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 1141. 
7
 For further discussion about the supremacy doctrine, see Craig, P. -De Bűrca, G.: EU 
Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, 2003. 275-316 . 
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 Cra ig-De Búrca: op. cit. 202. 
74
 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 3, Case 
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lead case, Van Duyn, the ECJ held that Directives are binding, as to their effet 
utile, i.e. their useful effect.80 In this way Member States have been precluded 
from relying on the non-implementation of a Directive in cases initiated 
according to them by individuals. 
Second, in case of Directives, the date for implementation must have been 
passed. Nevertheless, according to the ECJ's settled case-law, during the period 
of implementation of a Directive, Member States must refrain from taking 
measures that are likely hamper the attainment of the result to be achieved by 
the Directive. 
In the case Mangold81 the ECJ held that in relation to the compliance with 
the Framework Directive that it was „the responsibility of the national court to 
guarantee the full effectiveness of the general principle of non-discrimination 
in respect of age, setting aside any provision of national law which may conflict 
with Community law, even where the period prescribed for transposition of 
that directive has not yet expired." 
Third, Directives, unlike Treaty provisions and Regulations only have 
vertical direct effect, i.e. they can only be invoked against public entities. The 
reason for this limitation is that Directives are addressed to the Member States, 
which are required to implement them into national laws. Since private 
individuals do not participate or influence that process, it would be unjust to 
make them responsible for non-implementation of EU Directives. It should 
however be mentioned that the ECJ has been very generous with the determi-
nation of what entity amounts to a public body.82 Furthermore, it established 
the principle of indirect effect. According to the Von Colson principle, domestic 
courts are obliged to interpret all national laws in the light of the Directives.83 
Another way victims can make use of the Directive is to invoke the concept 
of state liability. In case the state's breach of EC law is sufficiently serious, 
pecuniary compensation can be claimed. The fact that someone asks for 
compensation does not preclude him or her from relying on the vertical direct 
effect at the same time. The test for state liability and damages has been phrased 
80
 Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337. 
81
 C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR 1-9981. Reference for a 
preliminary ruling from the Labor Court of München. 
82
 E.g. Case C-188/89 A. Foster and Others v British Gas pic Office [1990] ECR I-
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83
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1891. 
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in the in the Francovich case.84 The ECJ first established a test for making 
Member States liable for failure to implement Directives and in later cases 
refined the requirements. 
Recently the Berlin Labor Court in a decision of July 13, 200585 relied on 
the Framework Directive in the case of a disabled applicant who has been 
rejected by the Berlin police. She received a compensation amounting to a gross 
six-month-salary at the police. Although she satisfied all criteria necessary and 
prescribed for the job of supervising parking lots, she has not been employed 
solely because she had a disability the degree of which was 40%. Although 
the applicant suffered from serious neurodermitis, she could work previous to 
her application to the police without any difficulties, and she has not been sick 
for a single day for the last 8 years before she applied for the job. Since her 
disability did not reach 50%, and she has not been granted equal status to 
severely disabled persons, she was not covered by the respective provisions of 
the Social Code.8'1 Since the police is a public, state employer, the Berlin court 
invoked directly the respective provisions of the Framework Directive. 
6. Conclusion and Predictions on the Future of German Anti-
Discrimination Legislation 
A few days before the present essay has been submitted, the German legislator 
adopted the long-awaited the General Equal Treatment Act, the anti-discrimi-
nation law transposing the EU 's equality Directives. The delay in the adoption 
of the domestic law and the failures of the several drafts were subject to hot 
debates in the last more than two years. 
Susanne Baer explains the failure of the previous anti-discrimination drfats 
pessimistically by the general attitude of the majority of German citizens. She 
explains the "dissonance of the Germans in the European orchestra"87 with 
the racist and anti-Semitic attitude of most members of society. Indeed, as the 
Eurobarometer studies show,88 Germans' resistance to multicultural society, 
84
 Cases C-6 and 9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy [1991] ECR 1-5357. 
85
 86 Ca 24168/04, NZA-RR 2005, 608. 
86
 Article 81 Section (2) SGB IX. 
87
 Baer: op. cit. 
88
 Coenders, M„ Lubbers, M. and Scheeper, P.: Majorit ies ' attitudes towards minorities 
in European Union Member States, Results from the Standard Eurobarometers 1997-2000-
300 PETRA BÁRD 
opposition to civil rights, favoring the repatriation of migrants, is beyond the 
average. Both East and West-Germans' attitudes are the second or third most 
negative from among the pre-2004-enlargement Member States towards 
minorities, depending on the specific minority-related question. 
I believe the reasons for the lengthy non-implementation of the EU anti-
discrimination Directives are multi-layered. The question is not whether private 
autonomy may be limited or not, but the extent to which restriction is permitted 
is at stake.89 Equality is a long adopted value by the German legal system and 
also by society. The principle of equality is not questioned, rather the version of 
substantive equality is searched that is reconcilable with market considerations. 
A growing tendency against minorities at societal level is one side of the coin, 
which is coupled by the fact that German legal theory and tradition extensively 
elaborated on the concept of third party effect and non-discrimination, so the 
German drafters took the law implementing the EU Directives seriously. 
With a sincere discourse law can change social conceptions more efficiently. 
Those discriminating either maliciously or without ill will are not faced with 
these ideas first when the law sanctions them, but can actively participate in 
the debate and express, develop their views on the matter. Law shapes social 
constructions not only in the field of equality, but also contractual freedom 
would be unthinkable without the legally constructed concept of contract. Law 
has an effect on all citizens irrespectively of whether they know the relevant 
provisions of the BGB or not. Similarly, equality legislation may add to people's 
general understanding of non-discrimination. In this sense the debate that 
evolved around the implementing law is certainly beneficial. 
In the German literature sexual orientation, and religion are often mentioned 
as problematic grounds for non-discrimination in private relation; in contrast 
disability discrimination and its profit-diminishing aspects are mentioned 
surprisingly rarely. The reason is most probably that the Framework Directive 
does not specify a number of concepts: For example the definition of 
disability, sanctions for non-compliance are left to the Member States.90 
Therefore the realization of disability rights mainly depends on the Member 
2003, Report 2 for the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Ref. no. 
2003/04/01, http://eumc.eu.int/eumc/material/pub/eurobarometer/EB2005/Report-2.pdf 
84
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rule." Winkler: op. cit. paragraph 8. 
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States themselves. As it has been shown, the German government did not only 
intend to implement the EU pieces of law, but wanted to give a way broader 
protection to traditionally discriminated groups than the Directives prescribed. 
This approach although benevolent, had theoretical and practical mistakes. 
Theoretically, it did not take sufficiently account of the fact that there are different 
reasons behind discrimination of individuals with diverse characteristics that 
serve as the basis of protected grounds.91 It is certainly problematic to regulate 
the different kinds of mental, physical, psychological impairments together in 
one instrument, but it is almost impossible to regulate disability together with 
race, ethnicity, age, sex, sexual orientation, religion and belief, if detailed rules 
are to be laid down.92 Such a common regulation is only imaginable in the form 
of a single constitutional equality provision, or an EU Directive setting only the 
objectives and the framework for national legislation. These are sufficiently 
broad and vague rules for a joint regulation of the different kinds of protected 
grounds. However, once the details are to be set, it is more advisable to regulate 
them separately. The practical side of the problem is that a law giving an 
overbroad protection to persons with diverse characteristics can hardly enjoy 
the support of all parties adhering to different ideologies. The lack of political 
consensus led to the fall of the previous draft laws or at least to the Act's 
hibernation for years. The fact that Germany wanted "to be more 'European' than 
'Europe'"91 was not only detrimental to the persons belonging to the groups the 
anti-discrimination law intended to protect, but Germany was also in violation 
of EU law for more than two years. At a more positive note however the 
German legal philosophical and political controversy can serve as an example 
for Member States which either complied with EU laws without any further 
legal debate and civil dialogue or even worse, translated the Directives into 
their official languages and promulgated it in the form of a national piece of 
legislation. 
91
 In the German context, three reasons have been differentiated and an economic case 
has been advocated for anti-discrimination rules in private law by Engert in: Enger t , A.: 
Allied by Surprise? The Economic Case For an Anti-Discrimination Statute. German Law 
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The Reform of Hungarian Criminal Policy 
1. Reforms in an International Context 
The assertion made by Géza Dombóváry about Hungarian criminal policy in 
the twilight of the 19th century,1 according to which a huge number of various 
conceptions prevail concerning the imperative reform of criminal policy,2 obtains 
validly in our days, as well. However, it is valid not only in a Hungarian, but 
also in an international context that multifarious conceptions concerning a 
major and urgent reform of criminal policy persist. 
In my judgement, in countries under the rule of common law, criminal policy 
is marked by the correlation of punitive purpose and iron fist policy with 
restitutive justice. In the United Kingdom, government has proclaimed the 
directive of "tough justice", but the necessity of the extension of the scope of 
protection for victims and witnesses and of the support of community justice in 
a broad scope is also emphatic. The institution of community justice is also 
promoted by the factor of cost reduction, furthermore, citizens' confidence can 
also be reinforced by the opportunity for participation in the administration of 
justice. According to the operative criminal policy, criminal justice focuses on 
the compensation of victims of criminal offences. Perpetrators, on the other 
hand, have to reckon with a powerful and effectual criminal justice system that 
will take firm action, resolve cases and impose just punishment on offenders. 
Leng claims that traditional British criminology aligns with a notion of 
criminality, according to which the lower classes are preying upon the more 
prosperous middle classes. Nonetheless, the new directive of "Tough on crime 
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Reformed University, Budapest 
E-mail: domokos.andrea.@drotposta.hu 
1
 Géza Dombóváry (1874-1938), lawyer and free-lance contributor to law journals, 
such as Büntetőjog Tára and Jogtudományi Közlöny. 
Dombóváry, G.: Fenyítöeljárási és börtönügyi adalékok vármegyéinknek XIX. század-
eleji gyakorlatából (Excerpts on the Law of Criminal Procedure and Prisons from Early 19,h 
Century Practices in Hungarian Counties). Budapest, 1931. 3. 
304 ANDREA DOMOKOS 
and tough on the causes of crime" also recognises that it is in the main the lower 
classes who bear the burden of criminality as victims.3 The strategic plan for 
the period preceding 2009 continues to lay great emphasis on fighting crime 
and antisocial behaviour, which is substantiated by the assumption that the 
population is living in fear. Therefore, it is a priority in the United Kingdom to 
convince law-abiding citizens that they are safe.4 Accordingly, Act of 2000 on 
Local Governments stipulated the duty of local authorities to consult key stake-
holders and elaborate community plans for the advancement and improvement 
of economic, social and environmental welfare in their areas and for contribution 
to sustainable development. Act of 1998 on Crime & Disorder set forth the 
imperative of co-operation of prisons and local governments so as to guarantee 
the safety of communities. Since its adoption in the summer of 1998, each local 
government in Britain has been obligated to elaborate and implement a strategy 
for the reduction of crime and disorder in the area within their boundaries.5 
Vivien Stern introduces a British project ( from 2000 to 2004) under the title 
"Prisoners Working for the Benefit of Others". It had two main objectives, 
namely, to induce debate on the purposes of imprisonment and prisons and to 
generate practical changes in the functioning of prisons. These objectives were 
based on four tiers: 
1. Promotion of new relations between prisons and communities, 
2. Guaranteeing opportunities for prisoners to work for the benefit of others, 
3. Raising the awareness of prisoners of the suffering of victims of criminal 
offences, 
4. Establishment of new bases for conflict settlement in prisons.6 
With respect to the US criminal justice system, according to Becket and Sasson, 
it is "a system of injustice".7 The gross imbalance between high-level police 
operation and the excessive amounts of funds spent on the work of the police 
vis-a-vis the work overload of courts and their crippling lack of funding 
3
 Leng, R.: The Reform of Criminal Jurisdiction in England in the 1990s, in: Kriminál-
politika és büntető igazságszolgáltatás Nagy-Britanniában a '90-es években (Criminal 
Policy and Just ice in Great-Britain in the 1990s). Miskolc, 2000. 34^18. 
4
 Administration of Justice, Rights and Democracy, DCA Strategies 2004-2009 , 
Department of Constitutional Matters , www.dca.gov.uk/dept/strateg/dcastratch4. 
5
 Establishment of Relations of Prisons and Local Governments, papers from a conference 
held in Middlesborough on 9th July, 2003. 
6
 Stern, V.: Prisons and their Communities: Testing a New Approach. An Account of 
the Restorative Prisons Project, 2000-2004. 
7
 Becket, K.-Sasson. Th.: The Politics of Injustice: Crime and Punishment in America. 
Thousand Oaks, CA:, 2000. 
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strikingly resembles a well-organised system of the disregard of justice.8 
Accordingly, as Wacquant asserts, the US criminal policy is currently offensive, 
which is considered by many the only way to fight crime.9 As to more moderate 
views, the prevention of antisocial behaviour and fighting crime is not feasible 
via the "get tough" trend. The lower classes, expelled to the periphery of the 
labour market and forsaken by the welfare state, constitute the main targets of 
the policy of "zero tolerance", which, as a consequence, divides both experts 
and the general public. According to Katalin Gönczöl, a confidence crisis has 
shaken the foundations of the welfare state and of criminal policy,10 the latter 
of which has ascended to the level of emotionally overheated great power 
politics." The epoch of the welfare state is over, since it is withdrawing and 
yielding its role to the punitive state. Therefore, Katalin Gönczöl assumes that 
severe changes have ensued in US criminal policy. The justice system does not 
deal with the causes of crime, since it merely purports to punish offenders, 
• • 1 2 
compensate the innocent and protect the interests of law-abiding citizens. 
Earlier, the "underclass" received aid, whereas now, the state strikes down on 
"criminal lower classes" with an iron fist. Nils Christie quotes Mauer by stating 
that, undoubtedly, the US has a high crime rate, whereas, research conducted 
in 2004 shows that despite falling crime rates, the number of the incarcerated 
is rising in the United States.13 The latest figures also suggest that the recent 
increase in the number of the incarcerated is not due to a rise in the number of 
offences, but to the more stringent criminal policy of the past decade." 
Criminal policies in the Nordic countries are not unified. Nevertheless, 
according to Lahti, a "Scandinavian criminal policy" that demonstrates several 
common features is distinguishable. Several common criminal policy strategies 
(e.g., social and situational crime prevention, consideration of costs and benefits, 
sanctions policy) prevail in order to ensure the proper application of the 
8
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9
 Ibid. 50. 
10
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Varró István tiszteletére (A Life in the Service of Judicial Statistics. Special Volume in 
Honour of István Varró at the Age of 70"). Budapest, 2006. 47-55. 
11
 Gönczöl, К.: A nagypolitika rangjára emelkedett büntetőpolitika (Criminal Policy 
Ascending to the Level of Great Power Politics). Kritika, 2001. 12. 116-121 . 
12
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fundamental elements of Scandinavian criminal policy.15 Anttila analyses the 
common requirements posited by Scandinavian criminal justice,"1 which involve 
that a) conditions in penal institutions should correspond to everyday social 
life to the largest possible extent, b) penalties must be enforced in such a 
manner that they do not needlessly encumber, but potentially promote the future 
reintegration of convicts into society, c) the period of imprisonment should be 
effectively utilised, d) disadvantages incurred by the deprivation from freedom 
must be precluded so far as possible. 
Consequently, we can affirm that demands for the institution of a more 
unified or harmonised criminal policy on an international as well as on a 
European level persist. Alternative punitive sanctions tend to be instituted all 
over Europe. One of these is the flexible method of mediation, which is more 
customary in the area of problem-solving. Mediation is based on an intense 
and broad participation of the parties concerned in the criminal procedure. 
Owing to this method, the sense of responsibility of offenders may increase.17 
Eventually, Vivien Stern claims that it is market society per se that tends to 
produce criminality. Stern argues that with globalisation, crime and punish-
ment transgresses national borders. The rich retreat into communities behind 
expensive security systems, at the same time, the poor tend to fall prey to 
criminality and abuse by corrupt police. In parallel, an extended range of acts 
and an increasing proportion of the population are criminalised and imprisoned. 
She claims that the tendency of criminalisation and imprisonment does not 
eventuate more effective control of criminality and safer communities, further-
more, she expands on the manners of the criminalisation of the poor and of 
shaping social responses to crime by commercial interests.18 
In Hungary, according to László Körinek, a growing "moral panic" prevails 
owing to the impact of the media and politics,19 which tend to focus on winning 
eligible voters over to the cause of the party in government, and before long, in 
15
 Lahti. R.: Towards a Rational and Human Criminal Pol icy-Trends in Scandinavian 
Theory of Penal Law. Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, 
Routledge, (1) 2000. 141-155. 
16
 Anttila, I., Criminal Justice and Trends in Criminal Policy. In: The Finnish Legal 
System (ed.: Uotila, J.). Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Company Ltd., Helsinki, 1985. 232 -
242. 
17
 The Ministerial Commit tee of the Council of Europe def ined the basic principles of 
mediation under Protocol No. 19 of 1999. 
18
 Stern, V.: Crime and Punishment in a Market Society. How Just is the Criminal Justice 
System?-Lecture at the British Institution of Human Rights, 9 lh February, 2006. 
19
 Körinek, L.: A statement made at a conference organised by the Faculty of Political 
and Legal Sciences at the Eötvös Loránd University on April 8, 2006. 
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an effort to get messages through to voters, politicians will be using the Penal 
Code as a "message book".21' As he established, the importance of safeguarding 
"security" becomes more emphatic, when the majority of society is overwhelmed 
with fear and anxiety. 
2. Elements of Criminal Policy 
The purpose of criminal policy is the circumscription of the objects and manners 
of punishment. The term of sanction (sanctio) originally denoted sanctification 
or consecration, i.e., response to human behaviour with different implications. 
Bona fide deeds are sanctioned with rewards, male fide behaviour with punish-
ment.21 
The conceptualisation of individual responsibility by the law-maker will 
determine the definition of the objective of punishment. In a determinist approach, 
the individual will forever bear the stigma of his/her determination to commit 
criminal offences for either genetic, biological, psychological or sociological 
reasons. If the individual is regarded as a determined offender, the state will 
respond with the elimination and isolation of the person. In this case, the 
individual shall bear no responsibility, since his/her acts are mechanically 
determined by external or internal factors. Whereas, the offender's responsibility 
is not established, he/she will not be relieved of responsibility, since society 
must be protected from determined offenders. According to this approach, 
offenders are in a difficult situation, since they have to endure the uncertainty 
of confinement for indefinite, but possibly very long periods. In a non-deter-
ministic approach, the individual that resorted to unlawful action out of free will 
shall receive equitable punishment in direct proportion to the crime committed. 
As Beccaria formulates, penalties are explicit instruments that prevent forceful 
and law-breaking individuals from immersing society into a primordial chaos. 
Accordingly, Carrara also claims that punishment is not designed to guarantee 
either the predominance of justice, or retaliation of the perpetrator, or compen-
sation for damages of the aggrieved party, or the intimidation of citizens, or 
the correction of the offender. These may be (desirably) appurtenant with the 
20
 Körinek, L.: quote f rom lecture. 
21
 Angyal, P.: A jogbölcselet alaptételei (Maxims of Legal Theory). 5th Edition, Pécs, 
1926. 94. Angyal defines sanctions (sanctio) as follows: Legal consequences of any human 
behaviour affecting the subject of that behaviour. Legal sanctioning by the state manifests 
itself in the regulation of the consequences of acts. Bona fide acts entail rewards, whereas, 
male fide acts entail punishment and compensation. 
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penalty, however, its imposition would still be imperative without any of these 
effects.22 The objective of punishment consists basically in the restoration of 
law and order, since criminality eventuates in moral damage by reason of the 
disturbance of order. Therefore, punishment is assigned to redress such damages 
and restore order. As Carrara concludes, criminal law, which must be limited 
by justice, must be based on the protection of human rights. 
Mátyás Vuchetich, author of the first Hungarian scholarly work on criminal 
law, asserted that the legal grounds for punishment consists in the stipulation 
of the threat of punishment. As he maintained, a counter-motive needs to be 
instituted vis-a-vis the intent to commit criminal offences. Since punishment 
can never be an objective per se, its immediate objective consists in the enforce-
ment of the principle of "quo peccatum est ne peccatur", while, a more 
prospective objective is safeguarding law and order and the persistence of the 
state under the rule of law.23 
While analysing retaliatory measures, István Bibó emphasised their emotional 
character. Retaliation, accomplished in the form of rational and strict legal 
procedures and institutions, is a legal consequence that originates in and releases 
resentment. Wherefore, we are unable to accept a punitive system based 
exclusively on practical defence, since such a system is deemed indifferent, 
extremely tolerant with criminality and void of sympathy for the resentment of 
the aggrieved party or community, which is a characteristic feature of all forms 
of institutional retribution.24 
In recent theory, the assumption that criminal offences should not be 
necessarily followed by punishment has gained ground, whereas, the necessity 
of the enforcement of the principle of equal opportunity has been also emphatic. 
Tibor Király regards the imperative of legality as a theoretical parallel of 
equality before the law, which implies that citizens are guaranteed equal 
protection of the law and that all offenders shall receive equal and proportionate 
punishment for the crime committed. Despite the embracement of the principle 
of equal opportunity, the state sometimes renounces punishment for practical 
reasons, such as economisation on and adjournment of proceedings or for bare 
22
 Carrara. F.: A büntető jogtudomány programja (The Program of the Science of Penal 
Law). Volumes 1 -2 . , Budapest, 1878, Vol. 2, 74. 
" 'Madarász, A.: Vuchetich Mátyás, in: Büntetőjogász, professzorok a Pázmány Egye-
temen (Professors of Criminal Law at the Pázmány University). Budapest, 1942. 24. 
24
 Bibó, I.: Etika és büntetőjog (Ethics and Penal Law). (1938) In: Bibó, I.: Válogatott 
Tanulmányok (Selected Essays 1935-1944) . Budapest, 1986. 161-182. 
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negligence.23 Accordingly, Ákos Farkas maintains that the enforcement of the 
principle of equal opportunity seems to supersede the imperative of legality. 
Therefore, it is no longer evident that criminal offences must be followed by 
punishment. Criminal justice does not always impose proportionate penalties, 
sometimes it merely threatens with punishment."'1 
In point of principle, one major alternative of criminal policies obtains, viz., 
the options of restrictive and restorative policies. The first alternative is based 
on the assumption that the criminal justice system can rely on citizens' 
traditional respect for legality, therefore, conventional and strict penalties will 
be supported by the public. In return, the state provides guarantees for citizens 
that it will not tolerate the infringement of norms and it will resort to force in 
order to promote enforcement of the law. This improves the citizens' sense of 
security and supports the image of a powerful state, which may resort to 
preventive measures, criminal investigation and law-enforcement. Whereas, 
a drawback of the restrictive alternative consists in the difficulty to ensure 
timely responses to new developments. Furthermore, it hampers facing the fact 
that delinquents are part of the same society that the majority belongs to. 
Whereas, offenders do not receive assistance or models to follow concerning 
the appropriate manner of conflict settlement that meets the expectations of the 
majority of society, besides, they do not recognise reasons for being personally 
interested in showing due respect for the norms of the majority. As to the 
restorative alternative, it is based on the conception that criminality is a 
product of society, therefore, criminals are not responsible for the offences 
committed. Accordingly, upon the judgement of criminal offences, the circum-
stances facilitating that the individual followed norms deviating from those 
embraced by the state and the majority of society must be taken into 
consideration. The enforcement of that policy, however, requires active co-
operation by society, which means that citizens must learn to apply important 
defence methods and instruments, which relieves considerably higher costs of 
external policing as well as the public's fears. Norms can be just partly 
enforced by administrative principles and mechanisms, since infringements of 
norms and their causes tend to have local characteristics. These can be effectively 
eliminated by local methods and instruments, furthermore, local achievements 
25
 Király, T.: Bizonyítás a készülő büntetőeljárási kódexben (Evidence to the Currently 
Drafted Code of Penal Procedure). In: Domokos, A. (ed.): Kriminológiai Közlemények 54. 
Budapest, 1996. 90-103. 
2
'' Farkas, Á.: A büntetőeljárás reformja és a bűnmegelőzés (Reform of the Regulation 
of Criminal Procedure and Cr ime Prevention). In: Büntetőpolitika, bűnmegelőzés (Criminal 
Policy and Crime Prevention). Budapest, 1994. 9 - 2 9 . 
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result in a sense of higher local security. A drawback of the restorative alternative 
is that a policy based on the unconditional protection of the individual can 
expect less support by the community, than conventional criminal policy. Then 
again, the enforcement of the instruments of national criminal policy is not 
always feasible on a local level. The co-ordination of various crime-prevention 
institutions can be far more difficult, than the institution of administrative control 
mechanisms. Besides, it may also result in the abandonment by the state of its 
key administrative tasks. In our days, advocates of community punishment and 
community policing are criticised as Utopians. 
Recently, the importance of social control mechanisms and the responsi-
bilities of small communities have been subject to deliberation. As Károly Bárd 
articulated in the 1980s, the functioning of the justice system is impossible 
without social support and recognition. As we are aware, criminal justice 
functions as a minatory institution operated by the state, however, if it expects 
social recognition on a long term basis, it shall not content itself with the 
establishment of the enforcement apparatus, but it must function so as to 
facilitate that society supports the exercise of jurisdiction and assumes it as a 
social cause."7 
3. Hungarian Criminal Policy in Retrospect 
As early as a hundred years ago, József Trócsányi emphasised that all regulations, 
morality and the rule of law purport to promote social needs, whereas, their 
ultimate purpose is the sustenance and protection of social life. Adopted norms 
compel observance of the law, which is enforced by state administration via its 
"mechanical compulsive authority" (Jhering's term), whilst, society resorts to 
psychological pressure to impel moral behaviour.28 Then again, in the early 20th 
century, Ákos Pauler criticised the legal system, including the system of criminal 
justice, for failing to create ideals. As he claimed, any correct law, i.e., ideal law 
is sanctioned by the demonstration of respect for human beings. Thus, by 
prescribing citizens to sustain culture, the state will also be constituted as a state 
founded on the rule of law pursuant to its purpose to be governed by law.2" 
21
 Bárd, К.: Társadalomtudományok és büntető igazságszolgáltatás (Social Sciences 
and Criminal Justice). In: Kerezsi, К. (ed.): Kriminológiai Közlemények, 26-27. Budapest, 
1989. 5-19. 
28
 Trócsányi, J.: Erkölcstelen ügyletek (Immoral Transactions), Budapest , 1909. 
24
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In connection with correction by imprisonment, Eötvös and Lukács 
maintained that punishment is aimed at repression and correction. Lajos Kossuth 
wrote a pertinent editorial on 14th August, 1842, in which he urged Bertalan 
Szemere, the Interior Minister to substantiate punishment by imprisonment as a 
manner of correction. As Deák-Hertelendy formulated in his deputy report of 
1840: "Punishment loses its objective of benefiting the common good, if it is 
imposed on offenders merely in retaliation, not as a corrective instrument, if 
prisons are mere places of suffering and no attention is paid to moral improve-
ment. Neither the rigour of punishment, nor the certainty of its immediate 
imposition will suffice to reduce the number of criminal offences, because fear 
without stronger morality will not generate observance of the law in the 
general public." "Prisons have so far functioned as schools of criminality."30 
Early emerging practical points of view are instantiated by Balla's contention, 
which demonstrates that arguments for equal opportunity and expedience were 
not first propounded in the second half of the 20th century. Balla suggested that 
the costs of building more modern prisons in order to provide more human 
accommodation for convicts could be easily covered by the establishment of 
lotteries. He claimed that "although, lotteries are decadent institutions, pure 
decency does not prevail in real life. Politics can be administered by decent 
instruments as long as these prove useful, however, it is beyond doubt that 
lotteries are not so detrimental morally as the horrendous damages, or, in fact, 
perils caused by currently functioning prisons."31 This peculiar suggestion for 
prison reform may seem naive, however, pragmatic ideas proliferated in the 
late 1800s. 
Gyula Wlassics, as an advocate, albeit, not an explicit disciple of the classic 
school, acknowledged the necessity of reforms. As he asserted, "whenever a 
new trend of criminal policy challenges the constitutional guarantees and their 
moral and legal foundations, we must defy."32 For instance, he precludes the 
possibility that a criminal justice system may impose unspecified punishment, 
which he, however, deems admissible in re specific offences. With respect to 
first offenders, some conceptions emphasise that, in order to avoid social 
stigmatisation, even the reprimand of offenders should be avoided. An article 
by Dombóváry illustrates that this is by far not a new idea: "With regard to the 
30
 Dombóváry, G.: Fenyítő eljárás és büntetési rendszer Pest megyében a XIX. század 
első felében (Punitive Procedures and the System of Punishment in Pest County in the First 
Half of the 19,h Century). Budapest, 1906. 272. 
31
 See: ibid. 278. 
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 Proniewicz, F.: Wlassics Gyula. In: Büntetőjogász professzorok a Pázmány Egyete-
men (Professors of Criminal Law at the Pázmány University). Budapest . 1942, 88. 
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minor significance of the offence, the court will establish that the crime was 
committed, but will not impose punishment. With regard to valid mitigating 
circumstances, culpability is so slight that even the usual reprimanding procedure 
will be neglected." In this case, „the remission of punishment is grounded on 
lenience", which corresponds to the standpoint of most recent criminal law. 
At the previous fin de siècle, Liszt was accused of abandoning the classic 
path of criminal law for the Romantic approach of criminal policy. Later, 
Finkey defended Liszt vis-a-vis his contemporary critics, by asserting that the 
revision of the practical elements of criminal law was also imperative." While 
focusing on the required reform of the penal system in 1935, Finkey insisted 
on the institution of a purposeful criminal policy by maintaining that more 
severe penalties should be imposed on offenders who commit serious criminal 
offences, whereas, penalties in re lighter offences committed for pardonable 
reasons should be mitigated. The necessity of differentiation could hardly be 
formulated more matter-of-factly today." 
Currently, the reformulation of the Penal Code is in progress. With respect 
to the requirements posited by international criminal policy, the attainment of 
the substantiation of social peace, of the differentiation of the system of 
sanctions, of the enforcement of community punishment in the broadest possible 
scope is expected. If we compare the before-mentioned objectives with those 
of the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, we can discern that the basic purposes 
of criminal policy are still the same, since specific objectives are recurrently 
reformulated upon the commencement and implementation of reform processes. 
The ultimate purpose of the current reform of Hungarian criminal policy may 
be assessed as the institution of a "fair and equitable" criminal justice system. 
Ferenc Irk, while elucidating the criminal policy of risk society in Hungary, 
concludes that changes need to be effected in criminal law, since, upon the 
examination of effective regulations, we can establish that those were framed 
to meet the demands of the 19th century and the first two-thirds of the 20th 
century. Whereas, a continuous change has marked the recent 25 years in re 
the priorities of judgement of dangerous social behaviour, this made no impact 
on criminal policy, even though Hungarian penal law looks back on an era of 
150 years of successful adjustment of theoretical principles to practical require -
33
 Finkey, F.: A XX. század büntetési rendszerének reformkérdései (Reform Issues of 
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ments.15 We can only affirm, it is unquestionable that an overwhelming demand 
for change prevails, which is also supported by a large number of publications. 
In prospect, we'll see, whether according incentives will finally effectuate a 
comprehensive reform, and particularly, whether ideas in concordance with the 
legal requirements of the 21s' century will permeate the regulations of new 
Penal Code. 
35
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The concept of significant market power is of paramount importance in regulating 
electronic communications markets. The notion of significant market power 
(SMP) is almost equivalent to the competition law concept of dominance, 
however, SMP requires a more pro-active regulatory approach since its aim is 
not primarily to ex post deal with competitive restraints as general antitrust 
rules do, but to establish a competitive market from an originally monopolistic 
situation in a network based economy where competitive bottlenecks are 
characteristic. In order to achieve a competitive market an active and continuous 
regulatory contribution is needed in order to help to open up those bottlenecks 
for competition, until sustainable competition is achieved on the relevant market. 
On December 1, 2005 some 80 experts and professionals from all over Europe 
gathered in the headquarters of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for an 
international conference on Application of the concept of significant market 
power in electronic communications. The conference was organized by the 
Centre for Infocommunication Laws in the Institute of Legal Studies, Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences (CIL), in cooperation with two well known German 
research and consulting centres, the Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur-
und Kommunikationsdienste (WIK), and the Institut für Informations-, Telekom-
munikations-, und Medienrecht (ITM) of the Westfälische Wilhelms-University 
of Münster, Germany. 
The conference aimed at providing a systematic overview of the various 
legal and economic issues regarding the application of significant market 
power (in the following SMP) concept introduced by the new EC framework 
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on electronic communications, at both national and EU level, and the practical 
and theoretic implications of the results of the SMP designation in the new and 
old Member States and on the policy-making of the EU itself. Special attention 
was attributed to the first practical experiences with regard to SMP decisions 
of the National Regulatory Authorities and to the so called Article 7 procedure, 
the harmonization in the new Member States and selected problem areas, 
which can have an effect on the 2006 review of the electronic communications 
framework. 
The topic of the conference has been subject to different research projects 
conducted by CIL in the last two years and the program and some presentations 
contains scientific results of the above research projects, too. 
For an unprecedented two days, the participants from Hungary and other 
fifteen European countries enjoyed the rare opportunity of meeting and sharing 
information with each other about their experience and discussing the common 
goals of the EU regulation with regard to SMP. At the conference there were 
nineteen presentations in six sections. The invited lecturers came from respected 
international and national organisations and institutes from all over Europe. 
The organisers and the academic background provided a neutral environment 
and a unique opportunity where both the EU and governmental-regulatory 
experts, practicioners and leading academics could exchange their views on the 
practical and theoretic issues of SMP regulation. 
Prof. Dr. Ákos Detrekői, president of the National Council for Communi-
cations and Information Technology opened the international conference on 
Thursday, 1 December. In his opening speech, besides the introduction of the 
venue and the conference topic to the participants he pointed out that the 
managing the problems of the SMP procedures is in the spotlight of the European 
regulation. 
A keynote presentation by Krisztina Rozgonyi, Member of the Board of 
the National Communication Authority Hungary outlined the problems of 
the regulation in Hungary and the main challenges of the emerging new 
technologies in today's EU policies. She stated that according to the changes in 
the technology and the market of electronic communications, a new and open 
environment should be created by the regulators, but of course the rules of that 
market should suit a lot of criteria, which are mentioned in the concerning 
programs of the EU. After the opening lectures, the conference continued 
with the presentations in six sessions following each other. The themes of the 
sessions outlined the whole problem circle of the SMP concept. 
The presentations in the first session had the objective to give an overview 
on SMP regulation in the European Union. It was opened by the presentation 
of Mr. Anthony Shortall from the European Commission, Directorate General 
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Information Society. Mr. Shortall, who is currently working on the review of 
SMP rules gave a very detailed overview of the SMP regime in the European 
Union. First, he talked about the regulatory framework and current issues of its 
application. The so called "Three step approach" (i.e the identification of relevant 
markets suspectible for ex ante regulation, assessment of effective competition, 
application of remedies) has great importance in regulation. The lecturer 
noted that during the application of the processes, the definition of markets, 
competition and dominance have great importance. The dominance is near to 
the monopoly level of market power. The different kinds of common regulations 
contain almost clearly the obligations and the applicable remedies of the 
national regulatory authorities related to the SMP-but an update process of 
the Access Framework was started at the end of 2005. The planned timetable 
of the possible discussions was already known in December, no results of them 
were publicized till this time. As Mr. Shortall stated, the update is needed 
because of the considerable changes at the relevant market. The declared national 
consultation and the public workshop offer a great place for representatives of 
the authorities to meet with the market operators. 
This presentation was followed by the lecture of Dr. Ulrich Stumpf\ deputy 
director of the WIK. He outlined the economic aspects of the SMP concept. 
According to the analysis of the market notifications, it could be stated that 
some controversies came up after the application of SMP concept. The process 
of the notification of markets takes a lot of time, especially for the smaller 
countries with smaller background. The notification of markets needs an exact 
definition of markets, which require a lot of information. Markets could be 
circumscribed by legal measures, by the different type of services, retail costumer 
groups and by the technologies used. All of the above mentioned facts should 
be considered during the NRA' s notification. As Dr. Stumpf stated, market 
analysis should include the forward looking and the greenfield approach, too. 
There's a special kind of SMP, when joint dominance realizes. In case of SMP 
this special collective dominance is satisfied in relation to market for wholesale 
mobile access and call origination on public mobile telephony networks. The 
complexity of joint dominance requires the elaboration of specific tests by the 
NRAs for proper identification and analysis. 
After a short coffee break the conference continued with a very interesting 
lecture of Mr. Stefan Kramer from the European Commission, DG Competition, 
Brussels. The theme of the lecture was the view of the Art. 7 Task Force on the 
result of market notifications. He illustrated the main aims and objectives of 
the of the Art. 7 procedure. According to the high number of received notifi-
cations, it can be stated, that it works in practice but not with the same 
efficiency in each Member State. He pointed out that during the last two years 
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the Commission had some key findings on the procedural issues. The cooperation 
between the National Regulatory Authorities and the National Communication 
Authorities sometimes has difficulties, which impact on the dynamism of the 
procedure. The veto decision was used only in a few cases. During the last 
two years it became clear that there are cases when the SMP analysis raises 
complex competition law issues, so a comprehensive approach is necessary. 
Mr. Kramer stated that a better targeted and consistent regulation is needed for 
the future. Probably, the ongoing public consultation regarding market review 
will bring important benefits. 
The last theme of this session was the view of the European Regulators 
Group (ERG) with regard to applicable remedies. Prof. Dr. Heinrich Otruba 
talked in his lecture about the key findings of the common position of the ERG 
on the approach to appropriate remedies in the regulatory framework. In the 
presentation it was stated that the recent common rules and measures have 
many advantages, just as they give more competence for NRA's and allow 
flexible reaction to market conditions. The regulation of remedies is of great 
importance in order to create guidance for the authorities and certainty for the 
market operators. He also analysed the notifications received from the Member 
States, and the defined markets. The replies for these actions were quite soft 
as the Commission used veto only in four cases from the 303. This practice 
was also a reason for the update process which started with a call for public 
consultation in the end of 2005. The main changes will be in the clarification 
of the often used emerging market's definition, the charting of the new infra-
structures, the removal of remedies and in the variation of remedies. 
The second session was started at 2 p.m. with the presentation of Anne 
Hombergs from ITM, Germany. She was talking about the procedural rules 
concerning SMP. The regulation can be divided into three parts: the SMP 
could be defined in narrow sense, through flanking procedures and by general 
procedural rules. She detailed the market regulation procedure in the different 
kind of common papers. The so called flanking procedures contain the consolida-
tion procedure, the veto procedure and the consultation procedure. During 
these acts the NRA's have high importance, but due to their high workload, to 
adopt the final decision takes a lot of time, which causes instability at the 
market. 
Till that time the participants were able to listen to some lectures of the 
SMP concept and the relevant rules, but only a few words were spoken on the 
practical experiences of the procedure of Article 7. The expert of the German 
Bundesnetzagentur, Dr. Annegret Groebel presented a paper on the application 
of the SMP regulations in practice. She started her presentation with the review 
of the regulatory framework, its principles and role. After it the participants of 
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the conference heard a very deep study of the remedies process and some 
information on the form of consultation and consolidation in Germany. The 
notification of markets in Germany is close to the end. The proposed remedies 
were notified separately as the Bundesnetzagentur aims at monitoring the result 
of the consolidation procedure with regard to the notified markets before 
taking a decision on remedies. She also discussed the problems of the notifi-
cation of different markets and the efficiency of the veto decision. 
There is no debate that not only the rules and measures are important, but 
the regulators should also ensure the protection of rights. Both lecturers of 
the third session analysed the enforcement and protection of rights, but they 
emphasized two different aspects of the question. In his presentation Prof. 
Robert Queck vice director of the Research Centre for Computers and Law at 
the University of Namur (CRID) stated that the National Regulation Authorities 
(NRA) have a central role through the whole application process of the 
regulatory framework. The NRA's are mostly well adjusted to the system of 
the other national decision-making and executive organisations. There is no 
debate that as for the NRA's complex exercises the conditions for effective 
monitoring and proactive market regulation is a must. In the lack of these 
their functioning will not be appropriate. But one should not forget about the 
division of powers that Montesquieu prefers: the executive, legislative and 
judicial powers should be separated. The NRA's independence from both 
service providers and government has great importance as it guaranties the 
quality of the function. As sometimes there are high numbers of authorities 
concerned with electronic communication sector, Mr. Robert Queck outlined 
that it could cause problems in transparency and coordination. The role of 
NRA's should be analysed at a European level, as well, because there are a 
lot of common measures and rules which have influence on the national 
authorities. In the end, if we think about future amendments on regulation, we 
will have to consider both economic and social needs. 
The last lecturer of the first day was Christiane Seifert from the Bundes-
netzagentur (BneztA), the German regulator, she talked about the problems 
regarding protection of rights. In Article 4 of the framework directive stands 
that for an effective and appropriate mechanism for the review of the decisions 
of the NRA an independent appeal body should be created. To meet these 
demands, the function of the NRA's needs to be analysed at a European level-
this statement is common with the former lecture. Ms. Seifert raised problems 
of the approach among NRA' s decision, standpoint of Commission and the 
decision of the Court. The efficiency of the NRA's function is sometimes 
bottlenecked by the Commission's decisions, but for solving the emerged 
problems not just a sector-specific but a comprehensive amendment is needed. 
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After the interesting and crowded day the participants were invited to take 
place at a gala dinner in a good and well-known restaurant in the downtown of 
Budapest where they had time to discuss the former lectures in an informal 
environment. 
The second day started with the session titled SMP assessment in Member 
States. In the first lecture Prof. Szabolcs Koppányi, managing researcher of 
CIL, talked about legal problems associated with the SMP assessment procedure 
in Hungary. He affirmed the importance of the independent functioning of 
NRA's but he also mentioned the problem of regulatory capture, which means 
that the interest of the electronic communication industry raise its influence on 
the regulatory authorities-but lobby activity appears at common level, too. As 
Mr. Koppányi stated there are cross-area problems: the different legal areas 
follow several principles even ones in conflict with each other. In some cases 
the legislation is well written, but the preconditions for effective implemen-
tation are missing in lack of cross-area solutions. The new Member States have 
much more problematic points at the harmonisation. The emergence of the 
regulatory framework is an issue of continuous development and the countries 
of the EU-15 had the opportunity to affect even the regulation process, in 
contrast to the new member states. Without the experience in the application of 
the European regulation, the NRA's in the new member states often lack 
liberalisation experience and are reluctant to confront with the Commission. 
The problem of passive attitude emerges when the NRA does not act. There is 
also a special methodology for market analysis used by the Hungarian NRA, as 
it does not possess the quality of normativity nor the quality of a regulatory 
decision. As a consequence, the whole concept and methodology of the market 
analysis procedure is not subject to judicial review, contrary to Art. 4 FWD.; 
neither does it deal extensively with remedies. 
After a short debate the conference continued with the regulation of 
broadcasting market-the lecturer was György Molnár-Bíró, an expert of the 
CATV project at the NRA of Hungary. He outlined in his presentation the 
high fragmentation levels of the cable TV broadcasting market, therefore the 
regulation faces with issue of problems. In the last few years technology had 
changed a lot and new challenges appeared at the market. To date, digitaliza-
tion is an everyday issue at this market, but as the switch to the new technology 
is expensive, it will be a long procedure. In Hungary, there are more than five 
hundred cable TV providers, most of them has regional dominance at the 
market of this broadcasting service. Now the regulation of the sector needs 
changes, the application of light touch regulation would be useful at this case. 
Mr. Molnár-Bíró raised the question as the service providers do not have the 
interest to change, who would make the first step? 
320 MÁRIA KITTI POPOV1CS 
The third lecture of the day was held by Krisztián Kecsmár, who is responsible 
for the implementation of the framework in Hungary at the European Commis-
sion, DG INFSO, Brussels. He gave a general overview on the implementation 
processes and problems of the EU Member States. After a short overview of 
the SMP regulation, he talked about the decisional practice of the European 
Commission (Commission). The Commission has various tools to affect market 
regulation like making statements at formal and informal decisions, detecting 
problems at transposition or application of the common rules, and launching 
infringement proceedings. Even some of the old member States face with 
difficulties at the transposition of the SMP rules because of the discrepancies 
at the national system. In Finland, the rigour and inflexible regulation led to 
infringement proceedings. Most of the Member States have problems with the 
notification of markets, although it is one of the main tasks of the national 
authorities. In the end, we should only hope that the future amendments of the 
common regulation would be more applicable in the Member States. 
Through the roundtable discussion on the specific problems of EC harmoni-
sation a lot of actual and practical problems emerged. Although the discussion 
was focused on the difficulties of the new Member States, the questions of the 
participants were mostly about the whole operation of the SMP regulations. 
The organizers of the conference had respect for the fact that in a few years 
a new round of enlargement will be completed, and both Romania and Bulgaria 
will have to apply the acquis. The representative of the Romanian Communi-
cation Authority, Vlad Cercel, had the opportunity to report on the proceeding 
transformation and the emerging problems in the Romanian electronic communi-
cation sector. The Romanian government set up the Regulation Authority in 
2002, after the adoption of New Regulatory Framework. At that time the 
Romtelecom had still dominance of the fixed line services, although a 
liberalisation process was started in 2001. The most increasing part of the 
electronic communication market is the provision of internet services. Mr. Cercel 
gave detailed overview of the application of the SMP concept in Romania: 
he stated the main criteria for determination the individual and collective 
significant market power and described the NRA's cooperation with the 
Competition Council. According to the national environment, the Article 7 
procedure is not applied, and no decisions on SMP were made by courts. He 
also analysed in his presentation the national wholesale and relevant retail 
markets. In the last few years competition increased in all markets, new 
technologies become available in short time for the costumers. The elaboration 
of the new national regulation on electronic communications sector is in progress, 
and the main objective is to get closer to the harmonisation of the EU 
framework. 
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Mr. Ioannis Constas from the South Eastern Europe Telecommunications 
and Informatics Research Institute (INA) in Greece gave a more general over-
view of the case of the Balkan countries aiming to become a member of the EU. 
After the short introduction of the INA, he talked about the future enlarge-
ment procedures and the affected countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and 
Turkey). Although the governments in these countries have the will to adopt 
the EU's regulatory framework for electronic communications sector, they have 
problems through the realization. Some of the mentioned challenges are the 
following: strong protection of national markets, reduction of prices, free 
access to information for all citizens and to assure attractive environment for 
foreign investors. The lecturer analysed the states at the Balkan area f rom the 
viewpoint of SMP's legal basis, the applicable remedies and the operators. The 
main objectives for the further years in these countries are liberalisation of 
the markets, application of some EU measures, and adoption of a more effective 
national regulation. For the realisation they need real help from the EU Member 
States, as they can share experience and give proposes for the further steps. 
The theme of the afternoon session was about the future of SMP regulation. 
Mr. Alexandre de Street held a thought-provoking and impressive presentation 
on the new paradigm of SMP concept. The realization of the government's 
principles needed more time than expected, so till today only the technology 
neutrality and harmonisation of methods are successful. The evolution of 
technology and markets create new challenges in the sector: regulators should 
reflect convergence in their decisions and pay specific attention to retail 
services, the questions emerging infrastructure and the collision of IT firms 
using new technologies and the recent companies in the new market structure. 
The analysis of the regulatiory framework in the United States would bringv 
some new ideas and Europe could learn from the experience. At the other shore 
of the Atlantic, the progressive removal of regulation had started in 2003. Mr. de 
Streel made some proposals for the future European amendments. According 
to his opinion, the sector regulation should have more attention to structural 
markets, and try to give solutions for its problems. The market should analysed 
in segments, and the regulator should focus on the most problematic ones. 
The recent regulation is very complex, and it is hard to apply. Mr. de Streel 
recommended to adopt more transparent regulation, define the phenomena and 
emerging markets more distinctly, and a clearer set of objectives for the 
NRA's. 
The program of the conference continued with another predictive lecture 
offering ideas for the future regulation. The title of the presentation of Prof. 
Dr. Martin Cave from Warwick Business School was 'New solutions with 
regards to remedies'. According to the current regulations, remedies should be 
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based at Article 8 of the regulatory framework. The NRA's have to consider a 
lot of interests: technological neutrality, pluralism, support of effective compe-
tition, non-discrimination and consumer protection. Today the EU regulations 
and the aforementioned list of interests leave only small place to act. The common 
law after the changes should be more appropriate to the real conditions and the 
decision makers should avoid overregulation. Now the SMP has great role in 
many sectors, there are both retail and wholesale remedies, and a deregulatory 
theory emerged. Prof. Cave supported that last direction of changes, however he 
pointed out that deregulation should be regulated as well. 
Prof. Dr. Pierre Larouche, a well-known expert from the Tilburg University 
held a presentation on possible scenarios for institutional divide of competences 
in the future. The idea of deregulation could seem to be an exemplary way for 
future regulation. But as the regulation was the main objective for a long time, 
the decision makers and the authorities have only experience on that. Now, the 
regulatory framework is incongruous to the Lisbon strategy, which means that 
a comprehensive consideration is needed. After analyzing the SMP procedure 
written down at Article 14 to 16 in the framework directive Prof. Larouche 
stated that from the relationship between S M P and effective competition it 
emerges the possibility of giving more discretion to the NRA's, which probably 
will increase the amount of regulation. The current regulation obligates the 
NRA's to take control and notify wide range of markets. The reduction of the 
markets will help the NRA's to relieve the work pressure, and parallel to the 
offered change the need for regulation will become lower. Prof. Larouche also 
made a review of the procedure under Article 7 of the framework directive. 
The wide possibility of veto decrease the efficiency-the conditions of veto and 
the whole measure should not be abolished entirely but tightened. The third 
problematic point of the current regulation is the judicial review of the NRA's 
decisions. Thinking about the future of the sector's regulation, an issue of 
creating the European Telecommunications Agency rose up. There are debates 
on how wide competency should it have, and what will be its objectives. 
Prof. Dr. Bernd Holznagel from ITM presented a paper on suggestions for 
the improvement of the procedural aspects concerning the SMP concept. He 
started his study with the review of the shortcomings of the SMP procedure. 
The efficiency would be increased with the use of time limits in the NRA's 
practice and at the elaboration of guidelines and market recommendations in 
the Commission. The current common regulations do not contain any restrictions 
for the length of the procedure, so sometimes it takes years, which cause 
uncertainty and decrease the growth of the sector. Now the Commission has 
the possibility to adopt measures which are binding to the national level, but 
the scope of these obligations are not laid down. The maintenance of the 
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national administrative background has great costs, which is disadvantageous 
for the smaller Member States. Prof. Holznagel emphasized the need to tighten 
the Article 7 procedures and to combine the consolidation procedure with 
exceptional procedure in the practice of NRA's . 
The conference was closed by a roundtable discussion on the future oppor-
tunities for regulation. The participants had questions on the emergence of new 
retail services, the protection of the first mover at a market, on the leverage at 
the electronic communications sector, and relations to the Lisbon strategy. 
According to my opinion the conference offered a deep overview of the SMP 
regulation in the European Union and experiences of the National Regulatory 
Authorities in the Member States. The conference was extremely productive on 
a number of levels, as the invited lecturers had respectable knowledge of the 
main theme of the event, and the international and national participants were 
able to make conversations with these experts and to realize new connections 
and problems. 
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Our age, the post-post-Cold War era, seems to be the era of réévaluation from 
a number of aspects. Each branch of social sciences must reevaluate its concepts 
and insights, in harmony with the profound transformation of the social context. 
The emergence of globalization and its impetus on the traditional, mainly 
positivist and modern framework of assesment in social sciences has made it 
necessary to rethink all concepts, even though these concepts had already 
attained commonly shared and widely accepted interpretations. Additionally, 
the inner complexity of the phenomenon, authors mainly call globalization, has 
acutely raised the need for an interdisciplinary approach toward all contemporary 
problems. In these aspects, thus, different fields of social sciences had to 
cooperate effectively, in order to attain relevant achievements. 
International public law regulating interstate relations had to face serious 
challenges during the last years. It is enough to mention Kosovo, Afghanistan 
and Iraq, or the 'human rights black hole' of Guantanamo, whereas the case of 
US administration with the International Criminal Court can also serve as an 
example. Obviously, the political heart of the interstate system lies in the United 
Nations, so its functioning has often been under severe and comprehensive 
criticism, as if the UN would be responsible for all the international problems 
by itself. Therefore, the analysis of the current tendencies of development 
concerning the UN has a vital interest for all researchers-i. e. international 
analysts, global economists, as well as international lawyers-who work with a 
certain aspects of international relations. 
The authors of this book-Thomas G. Weiss, professor and director of the 
Ralph Bruce Institute for International Studies at the City University of New 
York; David P. Forsythe, university professor of political science at the University 
of Nebraska; and Roger A. Coate, professor of international organization at the 
University of South Carolina-endeavored to comprehensively analyze the role 
of the UN in the contemporary global scene. The authors' comprehensive 
work discusses all the core aspects of the UN's functioning in detail. They 
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made a grand effort to reevaluate some sensitive questions and widely shared 
commonplaces in the light of the current international, or rather global conditions. 
That is why it is anticipated that this book would prove to be interesting also 
for lawyers, this being the foremost reason for it being analyzed in further 
detail. 
The volume consists of three major parts and each of them is devoted to a 
single broad topic. Part One discusses in detail the main problems of inter-
national peace and security through three chapters. The first chapter analyzes 
the historical place of United Nations within the efforts of the 20th century-the 
Hague conferences, the League of Nations-trying to regulate interstate relations. 
Following this historical introduction the authors present the theoretical 
background of international security affairs focusing on the theory of collective 
security, as well as on its legal bases laid down by the UN Charter. 
The next chapter is dedicated to the diverse UN security efforts during the 
Cold War. The authors briefly analyze the case-studies of Palestine, Korea, Suez 
and the Congo, then they sketch the main outline of the 'traditional' paradigm 
of peacekeeping. According to the authors' position, five guiding principles 
can be formulated for all peacekeeping operations of this era: (i) consent is 
imperative before an operation begins, (ii) these operations need full support 
from the Security Council, (iii) participating countries need to provide troops 
and to accept risks, (iv) a clear and precise mandate is desirable, (v) peace-
keeping units can use force only in self-defense and as a last resort, (p. 38—41.) 
The new challenges that have arisen because of the end of the Cold War 
and the effects of the profound transformation of the whole international 
context are scrutinized in the third chapter of Part One. The authors often refer 
to the concept of humanitarian intervention, because it might become a new 
standard or a guideline for peacekeeping operations in place of the older, 
mostly interstate logic. This chapter reflects a quite realistic attitude toward 
peacekeeping, the authors argue that the "enthusiasm for UN helping hands 
must be tempered with the realities of UN operations." (p. 83.) In sum, UN 
security operations seemed to be far from the ideal solution in the majority of 
the cases. 
September 11 and its consequences on global security are the topic of the 
last chapter. So far international law has not been able to adequately answer 
the challenges of global terrorism, because there is lack of consensus among 
member states about the per se definition of terrorism. From the UN's point of 
view the major problem of terrorism is its non-state nature, and because of this 
its handling seems to be quite difficult by an organization based on classical 
intergovernmental principles. Moreover, the emergence of the so-called Bush 
Doctrine that emphasizes a broad, from the aspect of international law unusual 
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notion of preemptive self-defense, has also not made much easier the settle-
ment of the whole problem. Consequently the authors argue that it is indis-
pensable to find a new balance of state sovereignty and need of multilateral 
conflict settlement in order to make the UN operations more effective and 
successful. 
Part Two focuses on major issues related to human rights and humanitarian 
affairs. Its first chapter presents most of the major theoretical questions con-
cerning human rights; it explores their historical origins including their different 
generations, it analyses their contribution to the system of international 
security, and it interprets the relevant articles of the UN Charter (Art. 1. and 55.), 
as well as lists all the human rights conventions until December 2002. 
In the second chapter of Part Two the reader can find useful information 
about the whole UN human rights organizational structure. This complex system 
is comprised of a variety of offices and agencies that try to realize two types of 
strategies in general. Firstly, some of these bodies are engaged in supervising 
state policies in the light of human rights standards, while other bodies make 
efforts to promote, or to teach, new attitudes which might be beneficiary for 
the individuals. The authors analyze in detail, f rom the human rights 
perspective, the role of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Office 
of the Secretary-General, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 
Human Rights Commission, while they only touch upon some supplementary 
bodies. 
The last chapter of Part Two discusses some controversial problems of 
human rights protection. Inter alia the authors raise serious questions about the 
proliferation of human rights treaties and bodies or sub-bodies and their 
counterproductive effects (for instance, currently five different UN organs and 
many NGOs might be involved in torture issues). They analyze the influence 
of individual or coalitional state policies on human rights policies and they 
scrutinize the improving role of nongovernmental actors (NGOs). In sum they 
argue that states must learn that having a detailed transnational human rights 
system is an obvious advantage for them in our global age. 
The last part of the book, Part Three, focuses on the global problems of 
development and the role of the UN in this process. In general, as the first 
chapter clarifies this broad problem, the promotion of social and economic 
development is a central issue of global security. It is obvious that the UN 
must attain a crucial role in the management of development problems due to 
its internationally comprehensive nature. Currently there is a consensus in the 
UN administration that human security endorsing the aim of sustainable 
development and respect for human rights, as the Millennium Summit pointed 
that out, is the highest priority on the tasklist of the UN. This chapter introduces 
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the historical formation of the concept of human security, and the cornerstones 
of this development process. 
The next chapter, similarly to the relevant chapter of Part Two, firstly 
sketches the whole organizational structure responsible for the management of 
development issues. Neither this structure is too easy to survey, but the text 
guides the reader well into the world of development agencies. The second half 
of the chapter discusses the so called "Rio Process" and recent developments in 
this field. The authors emphasize that the sustainable human development 
model, forged out by the widely-known Human Development Reports, should 
be build on (i) a new partnership between state and market, (ii) new patterns 
of national and global governance and (iii) new forms of international coope-
ration. (p. 281.) 
Lastly, in Part Three, the authors concentrate on the impact of globalization 
regarding development policies, as well as they present and evaluate the 
Millennium Goal Strategy. Quoting Kofi Annan's position, they suggest that 
the major challenge for the UN is to find alternative strategies how to use the 
opportunities of globalization in order to help people better cope with the 
negative effects of globalization, (p. 289.) The Millennium Development Goals 
and Targets are aiming at, for instance, the eradication of extreme poverty or 
the assuring of an environmental sustainability, that may help governments and 
peoples to focus on the most crucial problems of southern hemisphere. It can 
only be anticipated that these targets will be successful or at least partially 
realized by 2015. In sum, the UN must further enhance its development 
activities in order to help the process of adjusting to the qualitatively new 
global challenges. 
The three parts presented briefly above constitute the marrow of the volume. 
However, the book contains additional parts, too, which might also be 
interesting. The reader can find an introduction and a conclusion within which 
the authors formulate additional theses and, in some cases, their opinions. The 
introduction specializes on such basic questions as the nature of state sovereignty, 
the relationship among sovereignty and intergovernmental organizations, the 
impetus of the new global context on the traditional interpretations of raisons 
d'état and the nature of UN politics. In the conclusion the authors formulate 
theses of conclusive nature using the prism of the volume, so they discuss the 
UN ' s role in the articulation of interests, rule making and rule enforcement in 
the global scene through the evaluation of the relevant aspects of security, 
human rights and development issues. Lastly, they examine the future of 
interstate cooperation in the system of 'global governance' which is mostly 
determined by the proliferation of nonstate actors in global politics, the 
shifting location of authority to transnational or sub-national levels and the 
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accelerated pace and intensity of economic and social interactions, (p. 341.) 
Taking a modest, not maximalist but not at all minimalist position in the 
evaluation of the UN's successes and failures one can state that the UN can 
play a serious role in the settlement of the problems of our 'post-post-Cold 
War era' . 
Additionally, the volume includes very useful appendixes; Appendix A 
shows the whole UN system in a table, Appendix В lists the most relevant 
websites related to the UN's work and Appendix С comprises the Charter of 
the United Nations. The book also has a nine page long list of acronyms which 
might be life-saving for the reader when she/he nearly gets lost in the literary 
soup of UN organizations. It should also be mentioned that the whole volume 
contains numerous figures, tables and photos which make it much more easy to 
understand relationships and problems. 
In the preface the authors discuss their aims in detail. One of their major 
aims is to capture the essence of the UN as a political organization and show 
its aspects, for instance, security questions or international public law, through 
these political lens. Furthermore, they define other aims, too; i. e. they want 
to stress the importance of history, and they prefer to avoid the majority of 
the theoretical debates of social sciences via a non-theoretical approach. 
According to the impressions of the reviewer these guiding principles were the 
best choices because by using them the authors avoided lots of intrinsic and 
structural problems. Skepticism in theories and emphasis on history when one 
discusses such a complex issue as the UN is in itself is indispensable, because 
reality is much richer than the theories can ever be. Only history can guide us 
adequately in these affairs. So, this history-oriented, non-theoretical approach 
is one the major advantages of the book. On the basis of these principles, the 
authors present such a comprehensive and comprehensible manual, that 
proves to be very useful for students, but is quite promising for researchers at 
the same time. 
It must be recognized, that the authors, stemming mainly from the above 
presented epistemological conservativism, reflect a realist attitude toward the 
entire UN (in their words: "we are not card-carrying members of the UN fan 
club" p. xxiii). They accept that the outcome of UN policies depend essentially 
on the individual state foreign policies (p. 344.), and they point out the weak-
nesses of the UN system many times. So, they do not at all think that the UN is 
the best solution for all international problems, but as for now, there is no 
better way. So they represent that way of thought what was emphasized by 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld: "The purpose of the UN is not to get us 
to heaven but to save us from hell." (p. 345.) This statement is the key for 
understanding the whole attitude of the volume. 
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Lastly, the authors declare in the preface that their book has two purposes, 
first, it may be a coursebook for college courses on international organization 
and the United Nations, secondly, it might be supplemental reading for other 
fields of study, like, for instance, international law. (p. xxv.) The reviewer can 
easily affirm that the book adequately serves the second purpose. According to 
the opinion of the reviewer the volume has its own place on the bookshelves of 
all researchers whose studies touch upon, from any aspects, international 
relations. 
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VANDA LAMM* 
The Multilateral Treaty Reservation Revisited 
Abstract. In the State practice regarding the declarations of acceptance of the International Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction one can trace some disputed reservations containing proviso which under-
mine the obligation assumed regarding the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. One of the limitations 
is called reservation concerning multilateral treaty, otherwise known as the Vandenberg reservation 
or multilateral treaty reservation. 
The article treats these reservations by examining their origin, contents and Court's juris-
prudence on the matter. 
According to the author the multilateral treaty reservations have destructive effect on the 
compulsory jurisdiction system, chiefly because the broad conception of interpretation of the 
"affected" States bars proceedings before the Court over disputes as to multilateral treaties 
concluded by a larger group of States, if not all the States party to the treaty are also parties in the 
proceedings before the Court. As for the other part of the reservation, that stipulation virtually 
invalidates the obligations assumed in declarations of acceptances, since it hampers the Court to 
deal with a dispute submitted to it unless the State making such a reservation in its declaration or, 
on the basis of reciprocity, the adverse party has agreed to the Court's jurisdiction. The adverse 
effect of the reservation is all the more so since the multilateral treaty reservations expressly 
concern disputes with regard to treaty interpretation, and considerable part of the cases brought 
before the Court concern precisely such disputes. 
Keywords: multilateral treaty reservation, Vandenberg reservation. International Court of 
Justice, declarations of acceptance, optional clause 
The more than eighty years of State practice and the jurisprudence of the two 
World Courts revealed that States, while accepting the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the International Court of Justice or its predecessors that of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, join to their declarations of acceptance such 
reservations or limitations which raise the question whether the given State had 
made a real commitment toward the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. In 
the literature of international law one of these limitations is called reservation 
concerning multilateral treaty, otherwise known as the Vandenberg reservation 
or multilateral treaty reservation, hereinafter for the sake of abbreviation we 
will use the term of "multilateral treaty reservation". 
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1. Appearance of the reservation 
The appearance of multilateral treaty reservation is linked up with the 1946 
United States' declaration under the optional clause accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.1 
The origin of this limitation can be traced to the Memorandum which John 
Foster Dulles-head of the United States delegation to the United Nations General 
Assembly and later Foreign Secretary of State-sent to a subcommittee of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the s Senate on 10 July 1946. In his Memorandum 
Dulles explained that in case of disputes as to multilateral treaties it was 
possible that a matter at issue in the case might arise in relations not only 
between two States party to the given multilateral treaty and being in the case 
parties before the Court, but also between the other contracting parties to that 
treaty. In view of such matters it would be necessary to make clear that it was 
not compulsory to submit to the Court a dispute as to the given multilateral 
treaty solely on the ground that certain States party to the treaty were required 
to do so under the optional clause, the reason being that the other States party 
to the treaty had not undertaken to resort to the Court and thereby to become 
parties, so they were not bound by Article 94, of the Charter providing that 
each Member of the United Nations "undertakes to comply with the decision 
of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party".2 It was 
on the basis of the Dulles Memorandum that on the proposal of Senator Vanden-
berg the Senate decided to also include in the United States declaration of 
acceptance the limitation that there should be excluded from the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction 
"disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all Parties to the treaty 
affected by the decision are also Parties to the case before the Court, or (2) 
the United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction". 
1
 The United States of America was not a member of the optional clause system of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. In 1946 the Washington Government the first 
time made a declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute. 
" On the Dulles Memorandum compare and see Anand, R. P.: The Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. New York, 1961. 220.; and Briggs. H. W.: 
Reservations to Acceptance of Compulsroy Jurisdiciton of the International Court of 
Justice. Recueil des Cours, 1958. 306-307. According to Briggs, Hudson called the Dulles 
Memorandum "a jumble of ideas". 
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It was characteristic of the Senators that, as is pointed out by Briggs, they 
had adopted the reservation without clarifying debate and without under-
standing its meaning and implications.3 
According to Judge Ruda, Washington Government intended, by making 
that reservation, to avoid a situation in which it would be obliged to apply a 
multilateral treaty in certain way in line with the Court 's judgement, while the 
other States party to the treaty and not participating in the proceedings re-
mained free, to apply the treaty in different ways from that determined by the 
judgement of the Court, since according to Article 59, of the Statute the 
decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in 
respect of the particular case.4 
Relying on the related Senate documents, Maus writes that the Senators were 
not aware at the time of the reservation's modifying the jurisdiction already 
conferred to the Court and believed that by making that reservation they 
actually settled an issue.5 However, the solution of the problem is out of the 
question, for the reservation is vague and, as will be seen later, lends itself to 
various interpretations. 
For that matter, Kelsen asserts that the wording of the reservation was 
modelled on Article 62, paragraph 1, of the Statute, which refers to "an interest 
of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case", having the 
meaning that all parties to the multilateral treaty which may be affected by the 
decision of the Court are also parties to the case before the Court.6 
The example of the American declaration of acceptance was followed by 
other States, with certain variations of the reservation found in several 
declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction.7 
3
 Briggs: op. cit. 307. 
4
 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), Judgement of 26 November 
1984. Separate Opinion of Judge Ruda. ICJ Reports, 1984. 456. 
5
 Maus, В.: Les réserves dans les declarations d'acceptation de la jurisdiction 
obligatoire de la Cour internationale de Justice. Genève, 1959. 165. 
6
 Kelsen, H.: The Law of the United Nations. London, 1951. 530. 
7
 On this score see the declarations of acceptance by France (1947), India (1956), 
Liberia (1952), Malawi (1966), Mexico (1947), Pakistan (1948), The Philippines (1972), 
South Africa (1955) and The Sudan (1958). 
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2. The notion problem of "being affected" 
The multilateral treaty reservation, given its uncertainty and vagueness, was 
criticized by numerous author in the literature on international law. What was 
most frequently written in criticism was that the reservation withdrew, at the 
will of the United States, a large fraction of legal disputes arising under multi-
lateral treaties covered by the optional clause.8 
The vagueness of the reservation is manifested chiefly in the first part of the 
limitation and is linked to the phrase "all Parties to the treaty affected by the 
decision are also Parties to the case before the Court". This passage raises two 
problems. The first concerns the question of who or what should be understood 
by the word "affected": all the parties to the treaty or the multilateral treaty?9 
If the reference is to the parties, an answer should be given to the question of 
when a party to the treaty is to be deemed "affected".10 If, on the other hand, it is 
the treaty that is to be considered "affected", then '"affected" are, under the 
reservation, all parties to the treaty and hence all of them should participate 
in the proceedings before the Court. In other words, it is not clear whether 
the drafters of the Vandenberg reservation had in mind the participation in 
proceedings, over a dispute arising under a multilateral treaty, of all parties to 
that treaty or only of the parties affected by the dispute. This possibility of two 
different interpretations allows of a narrow and a broadly conception of the 
reservation, depending on whether the reference is to all parties to a multilateral 
treaty or only to the States affected by the dispute. 
If the drafters of the reservation wanted to secure participation in the 
proceedings of all parties to a multilateral treaty, attainment o f tha t aim is next 
to impossible in practice, since it would call for ensuring the presence of as 
many as 50 or 100 States before the Court, the examination of their written sub-
missions, etc. This in turn would present a task almost impossible to perform, let 
alone the uncertainty surrounding the intention of all States party to the treaty 
to become parties to the case before the Court, for it may well be imagined that 
several contracting parties have no interest whatever in having the given 
dispute decided by the Court. All these aspects may combine to result in that a 
dispute as to, for instance, the United Nations Charter or some other major 
multilateral treaty will in fact never be dealt with by the Court. 
8
 Waldock, C. H. M: Decline of the Optional Clause. The British Year Book of Inter-
national Law. 1954. 275. 
9
 Cf. Kelsen: op. cit. 530. 
10
 Anand: op. cit. 222. 
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During; the 1970s the multilateral treaty reservations came to be formulated 
in clearer terms. Thus, for instance, the declarations of El Salvador (1973), 
India (1974) and The Philippines (1972) contain the literally uniform text "all 
parties to the treaty are parties to the case before the Court". ELL . In this way 
the said reservations make it unambiguously clear that all States party to the 
multilateral treaty are to participate in the proceedings before the Court, which 
is to say that the States mentioned above included in their respective declarations 
of acceptance the broad conception of the reservation. In connection with these 
reservations I should like to refer to a statement by Judge Sette-Camara in the 
Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States); he observed that the broad conception of the reser-
vation might have rather far-reaching consequences and that such reservations 
would require the appearance before the Court all member States of the United 
Nations and of the Organization of American States, e.g., the Nicaragua Case, 
together with the original parties in the case." 
Judge Sir Robert Jennings, in his separete opinion delivered on the pre-
liminary objections in that same case termed as bizarre the idea for as many as 
20 to 30 States to participate in the proceedings, but, for all that, he considered 
that the declarant State was entitled to make such a reservation, the practical 
result is, that the Court had no jurisdiction in the absence of special agreement.12  
In his dissenting opinion joined to the judgement on the merits of the case the 
British Judge emphasised that, in spite of the difficulties connected with the 
reservation, the Court was under obligation to respect it and apply it.11 
3. Problems concerning participation of third States in the proceedings 
Those who are defending the Vandenberg reservation are usually arguing that 
this limitation serves to defend the interests of third States party to a given 
multilateral treaty. Such reasoning is not convincing because Articles 62, and 63, 
of the Statute expressly provide for safeguarding the interests of third States 
1
 Cf. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Merits) Judgement of 27 June 1986. Separate Opinion of Judge Sette-Camara. 1CJ Reports, 
1986. 192. 
12
 Cf. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), Judgement of 26 November 
1984. Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings. ICJ Reports, 1984. 554. 
13
 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Merits), Judgement of 27 June 1986. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings. 
ICJ Reports, 1986. 529. 
336 VANDA LAMM 
by entitling those States to intervene in the proceedings before the Court. There-
fore, as is rightly stated by Verhoeven, the reservation defends the interests of 
only one State, that which has written the reservation into its declaration of 
acceptance.14 
A closer look at multilateral treaty reservations leads us to make the point 
that in certain cases safeguarding of the interests of third States may prove all 
too strong an asset, since a State or States party to the multilateral treaty may 
happen to have no interest whatever in having a dispute regarding the inter-
pretation or application of the treaty decided by the Court. On a broader 
conception of the Vandenberg reservation, the consent even of these States is 
required to proceedings before the Court, yet, under the reservation, these 
States are not obliged to participate in the proceedings, that is to say that they 
may refuse their participation. By so doing they undoubtedly defend their own 
interests, but, at the same time, they prejudice the interests of those States 
party to the treaty which, on the other hand, seek to have the dispute to be 
decided by the Court. At any rate, the reservation gives States a measure of 
manoeuvre to decide by themselves, despite their commitment undertaken in 
respect to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and 
actually on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular legal dispute may be 
dealt with by the Court. 
In exploring a solution to these problems arising out of the Vandenberg 
reservation Louis Sohn suggested that the reservation should be reworded15 
to exclude from compulsory jurisdiction "disputes relating to a multilateral 
treaty, unless all the parties to that treaty have agreed that any decision 
rendered in any such dispute between two or more of them will be binding 
upon all of them ..." (my emphasis-V. L.)."1 Lori Damrosch is critical of Sohn's 
suggestion, which she believes to have more disadvantages than advantages, 
and she raises the question of its compatibility with Article 94, of the United 
Nations Charter and Article 59, of the Court's Statute. The American professor 
is of the view that Sohn's proposal purports to derogate from the binding 
14
 Cf. Verhoeven, J.: Le droit, le juge et la violence. Revue général de droit inter-
national. 1987. 1177. 
15
 After the withdrawal in 1986 of the United States declaration of acceptance of 1946 
experts of international law have written widely on what the new United States declaration 
of acceptance should contain, a draft of a new declaration prepared by Professor Louis 
Sohn. 
16
 On Sohn's draft see Sohn, Louis В.: Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court and 
the United States Position: The Need to Improve the United States Declaration. In: Clark 
Arend, A. (ed.): The United States and the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice. University Press of America, 1986. 3—28. 
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character of the Court's decisions in contentious cases, because the unanimous 
consent as mentioned in the proposal can hardly be expected to be given by 
States with no interest in a particular matter.17 Damrosch also tries to remedy 
the problems caused by the reservation by suggesting a formula that would 
deny the United States consent to jurisdiction if the case "concern the interests 
of third States".18 
Within the meaning of the Statute and the Rules of Court, intervention in 
the proceedings is the legal institution through which a third State may participate 
in contentious case before the Court in defence of its own interests. Without 
dwelling on questions of intervention in cases before the Court we can state that 
there exist in fact two ways of intervention, depending on whether intervention 
is based on Article 62, or Article 63, of the Statute.14 Under Article 62, States 
are empowered to intervene in a case if they consider that a legal interest of 
theirs may be affected, in that case the State may submit a request to the Court 
to be permitted to intervene. The permission may be granted or refused, upon 
the decision of the Court, considering whether or not the intervening State's 
legal interests are affected by the proceedings instituted. 
On the other hand. Article 63, covers precisely a case which involves the 
interpretation of a multilateral treaty before the Court and in which, along with 
the disputants, the other States party to the treaty are permitted to intervene. " 
Intervention under Article 63, thus accords to the States party to a multilateral 
treaty the right to intervene. 
Participation by third States in the proceedings before the Court under the 
Vandenberg reservation has some similarities with intervention under Article 
63. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between the two situations. 
(a) According to the Vandenberg reservation proceedings before the Court 
cannot take place unless the other States party to a multilateral treaty also 
participate therein-and the question of whether those States are affected by the 
decision of the Court or they include all States party to the multilateral treaty 
17
 Cf. Damrosch, Lori F.: Multilateral Disputes. In: Damrosch (ed.): The International 
Court of Justice at a Crossroads. New York, 1987. 398. 
18
 Ibid. 399. 
19
 On this score see Ruda, J. M.: Intervention before the International Court of Justice. 
In: Lowe, V.-Fitzmaurice, M. (ed.): Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice. Essays 
in honour of Sir Robert Jennings. Cambridge, 1996. 487-502. 
20
 Article 63, reads as follows: "1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which 
states other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall 
notify all such states forthwith. 2. Every state so notified has the right to intervene in the 
proceedings; but if it uses this right, the construction given by the judgement will be 
equally binding upon it". 
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is of no relevance here-, the reservation practically exercises some sort of 
pressure on these States to participate in the proceedings, because the Court 
cannot decide on the legal dispute without their presence. By contrast, in the 
case of intervention under Article 63, of the Statute, it is exclusively for the 
affected State to decide whether to make use of its right to intervene. 
(b) Under the general rule governing intervention it is for the Court to 
decide on intervention, even in the case of intervention under Article 63, since 
the treaty to be interpreted is determined by the Court, whereas under the 
Vandenberg reservation the Court is actually left without discretion to decide 
on the participation in the proceedings of States other than the original parties, 
because the reservation makes it to some extent an obligation of the States 
affected to participate in the proceedings or else the proceedings before the 
Court cannot take place at all. 
In connection with the Vandenberg reservation the question also arises of 
what will be the position in the proceeding of the other States party to the multi-
lateral treaty. This is an open question, all the more so since the position in the 
proceedings of the intervening State is similarly awaiting full clarification. 
It was in 1992, for the first time during the existence of the International 
Court of Justice, that the Court permitted a third State to intervene in the Case 
concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. 
Honduras). Until this case the literature on international law was also rather 
uncertain about the position in the proceedings of the intervening State.21 
Precisely for that reason the Court, when it permitted to Nicaragua's inter-
vention in the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras,"" found it necessary 
to make certain statements concerning the status of the intervening State in the 
23 
case. 
The Court held that the intervening State does not become a party to the 
proceedings and does not aquire the rights or become the subject of the 
obligations pertaining to parties under of the Statute, the Rules of Court, or 
general principles of procedural laws. At the same time, however, the inter-
vening State is also vested with certain rights, such as the submission of a 
written statement and right to be heard.24 
Cf. Davi, A.: L'intervento davanti alia Corte Internazionále di Giustizia, Napoli, 1984. 
209-215. 
" For that matter, the case involved intervention under Article 62, of the Statue. 
' Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (Application by 
Nicaragua for Permission to Intervene), Judgement of 13 September 1990. ICJ Reports, 
1990, 135. 
24
 Ibid. 1990. 135-136. 
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In respect to reservations concerning multilateral treaties this means that, 
on a broad conception of the reservation, for instance, all States party to multi-
lateral treaty (which may number 30 or 40 or even more) should participate in 
proceedings over a particular case, all invested with the right to be heard by 
the Court! It needs no further explanation that this would not be a viable path 
in practice. 
If, on the other hand, the intervening State being a non-party in the case, 
the Court's decision is not binding on it. In the Case concerning the Land, Island 
and Maritime Frontier Dispute this reasoning was also practically upheld by the 
ad hoc chamber, composed of members of the Court, in dwelling on the 
question of res judicata and Article 59, of the Statute.25 In dealing with this 
matter Rosenne points out-along lines similar to the declaration, made by Judge 
Oda and attached to the judgement of 11 September 1992,:h-that, since that case 
concerned a territorial dispute, the Court's judgement was binding not only on 
the parties, but is valid erga omnes. Precisely for this reason, the Israeli professor 
stated that it was difficult to understand why the chamber did not somehow 
written into the judgement Nicaragua's declaration, made at the time of sub-
mitting its request for intervention, that it would abide by the terms of the 
judgement.27 
In respect of the Vandenberg reservation all this leads to the conclusion that 
if the Court should be seized on the basis of a multilateral treaty's compromissory 
clause and the States party to the treaty also wishing to participate in the 
proceedings before the Court under the terms of the Vandenberg reservation, it 
can be taken as very likely that, having regard to the judgement in the Case 
concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, these States 
would be considered by the Court as non-parties in the proceedings and would 
also not be bound by the judgement of the Court. It is not sure, of course, that in 
a dispute as to a multilateral treaty the Court would by analogy apply its legal 
practice with regard to intervention, while it is unlikely that under the Vandenberg 
reservation the Court would recognize for third States participating in a case 
more rights than it had conceded to the intervening State in the Case con-
cerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute. 
25
 Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute. Judgement of 11 
September 1992. ICJ Reports, 1992. 135. 
26
 Cf. Ibid. Declaration of Judge Oda. 619-620. 
27
 Rosenne, Sh.: Intervention in the International Court of Justice. Dordrecht, Boston, 
London, 1993. 155. 
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The second part of multilateral treaty reservation, as contained in the United 
States declaration of acceptance and stipulating in fact an alternative condition, 
provides that in a dispute arising under a multilateral treaty the Court may not 
have jurisdiction "unless the United States of America specially agrees to juris-
diction". This practically means nothing else than that disputes as to multi-
lateral treaties cannot be brought before the Court solely under the optional 
clause and that the consent of the State including the Vandenberg reservation 
in its declaration of acceptance-and, on the basis of reciprocity, that even of 
the adverse party-is required to proceedings in related matters. 
Hudson asserts that this clause of the reservation shows a confusion of 
thought, for if the United States agrees to jurisdiction, it is virtually that consent 
which, functioning, as it were, as a special agreement, constitutes the basis for 
the Court's jurisdiction, and therefore the question does not even emerge of the 
application of the declaration of acceptance.28 One can say that in respect of 
the reservation it is unclear whether the special consent of the United States 
practically replaces the declaration of acceptance and that lack of its consent 
entails disregard of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in disputes arising under 
multilateral treaties. According to Waldock, the reservation practically operates 
to preclude the United States from being brought before the Court in a dispute 
as to a multilateral treaty unless the United States specifically consents to 
jurisdiction after the case has arisen.24 
In respect of multilateral treaty reservation the question also arises of how 
reciprocity affects this limitation, especially that part of it which requires even a 
separate consent of the declarant State to the Court's jurisdiction, since according 
to the principle of reciprocity a reservation may be invoked by the opponent 
party as well. This entails that the reservation in a concrete case should be 
applied as if the party referring to it has also attached to the declaration of 
acceptance the clause that, in addition to the declaration accepting compulsory 
jurisdiction, its separate consent is required to the Court's jurisdiction over 
disputes arising under multilateral treaties. One can conclude that the reser-
vations concerning multilateral treaties, in combination with the principle of 
reciprocity, nullify the obligations undertaken with regard to the Court 's 
compulsory jurisdiction, not only of the States including such limitation in 
8
 Hudson World Court-America 's Declaration Accepting Jurisdiction. 32 A. B. A. 
Journal (1946) 836. Quoted by Anand: op. cit. 221. 
29
 Waldock: op. cit. 214. 
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their declarations of acceptance, but in concrete cases the opponent party's 
commitment regarding compulsory jurisdiction as well. 
5. The reservation in the practice of the Court 
In the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice the reservations 
concerning multilateral treaties were considered for the first time in the Case 
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua.10 
In its memorandum presented in response to Nicaragua's application and in 
the course of the oral proceedings the United States advanced the point that 
Nicaragua had invoked in its application four multilateral treaties, the United 
Nations Charter, the Charter of the Organization of American States, the 1933 
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States and the Havana Con-
vention on the Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife. The 
Washington Government argued that since the dispute submitted to the Court 
"had arisen" under the treaties listed, the Court, under the Vandenberg reservation 
contained in the United States declaration of acceptance, may exercise juris-
diction only if all treaty parties affected by a prospective decision of the Court 
are also parties to the case. For its part, the American Government did name the 
said States (Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras) and maintained that if a 
single one of them was found by the Court to be "affected", the United States 
reservation was to come into play." 
In its judgement on the preliminary objections the Court itself acknow-
ledged that the multilateral treaty reservation attached to the United States 
declaration of acceptance was vague and lent itself to two different inter-
pretations: "It is not clear whether what are "affected", according to the terms 
of the proviso, are the treaties themselves or the parties to them".12 So, in fact, 
the Court did nothing else than repeat the questions formulated in the literature 
of international law with respect to the reservation. Those questions were 
not, however, answered by the Court, and that for two reasons. First, because, 
111
 On this aspects of Nicaragua case see: Alexandrov, Stanimir A.: Reservations in 
Unilateral Declarations Accepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice. Dordrecht—Boston—London, 1995. 112-119. 
11
 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. ICJ 
Pleadings, vol. II. Cf. USA Counter-Memorial. Part III. 74-97. 
32
 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Juris-
diction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), Judgement of 26 November 
1984. ICJ Reports, 1984.424. 
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according to the judgement, the reservation had been interpreted by the United 
States itself as applying only to States affected by the decision (i.e. Washington 
sought to apply the narrow conception of the reservation) and the three neigh-
bouring States that might be affected had also been indicated by Washington.22 
Second, the Court found that the reservation concerning multilateral treaties 
did not affect its jurisdiction in that case, as Nicaragua invoked a number of 
principles customary and general international law, which have been enshrined 
in the text of the convention relied upon by Nicaragua. The Court emphasized: 
"The fact that the above mentioned principles, recognized as such, have 
been codified or embodied in multilateral conventions does not mean that 
they cease to exist and to apply as principles of customary law, even as 
regards countries that are parties to such conventions."24 
By taking this view the Court actually escaped application in the concrete 
case the multilateral treaty reservation. 
Over and above these points the Court's judgement covered the question of 
who vas to decide whether a State was or was not "affected", according to the 
terms of the proviso, by a future decision of the Court. The Court held that 
should a State consider itself affected by the decision, it would either file an 
application itself or would submit a request for intervention. 
The Court could identify the States "affected" only when the general outline 
of judgement to be given become clear.25 "Certainly the determination of the 
States 'affected' could not be left to the parties but must be made by the 
Court".36 This line of the Court 's reasoning is similar to that of Kelsen, who, 
shortly after the Vandenberg reservation had appeared, wrote that the question 
of which States were affected by a decision of the Court can be decided 
"only after the Court had assumed and exercised jurisdiction in the dispute 
concerned".27 
" For that matter, the United States did not but merely mention the other possible 
construction of the reservation, namely that which required participation in the proceedings 
of all States party to the multilateral treaties indicated. 
4
 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Juris-
diction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), Judgement of 26 November 
1984. ICJ Reports, 1984. 424. 
35
 Ibid. 425. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Kelsen: op. cit. 530. 
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The question of "affected" States was likewise considered by the Court in 
dealing with the merits of the case, namely in the context of the extent to 
which the Court ' s decision affected the rights of El Salvador and hence the 
Salvadorian State itself in the concrete case.18 The United States did not 
participate in that phase of the proceedings, but the Court considered at length 
the United States' contention based on multilateral treaty reservation. 14 In 
connection with the Vandenberg reservation the Court stated that 
"... the reservation does not require, as a condition for the exclusion of a 
dispute from the jurisdiction of the Court, that a State party to the relevant 
treaty be 'adversely' or 'prejudicially' affected by the decision, even though 
this is clearly the case primary at view."40 
In other words, application of the reservation does not require determining 
whether the State is unfavourably or otherwise "affected"; "the condition of 
the reservation is met if the State will necessarily be 'affected' , in one way or 
the other".41 The Court held that in the concrete case the multilateral treaty 
reservation operated as a bar to certain documents being invoked as multi-
lateral treaties, but it did not in any way affect the consideration of Nicaragua's 
claims based on other sourcess international law.42 That is to say according 
to the Court, it had jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute 
to consider Nicaragua's claims based upon customary international law, but it 
should exclude from its jurisdiction of disputes "arising under" the United Nations 
and the Organization of American States Charters.41 As for this finding, 
38
 In that case Washington contended that by the American activities carried out in El 
Salvador and protested against by Nicaragua it had exercised the right of collective self-
defence from a possible armed attack by Nicaragua and that collective self-defence was 
recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as well as by the Charter of the Organization 
of American States. Therefore the dispute under consideration had arisen under multilateral 
treaties, to which El Salvador was also a party along with the United States and Nicaragua. 
Cf. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. ICJ 
Pleadings, vol. II. 86-91. 
34
 On this score see the author's Gondolatok a Nemzetközi Biróság eljárásától való távol-
maradásról (Reflections on the Non-appearance before the International Court of Justice). 
Állam- és Jogtudomány, 1982. 21—40. 
40
 Cf. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Merits), Judgement of 27 June 1986. ICJ Reports, 1986. 37. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Ibid. 38. 
43
 Ibid. 97. 
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Judge Oda, in his dissenting; opinion joined to the judgement, expressed the 
view that the Court should have proved, not that it can apply customary and 
general international law independently, but that Nicaragua's claims, had not 
arisen under these multilateral treaties" (the above-mentioned two multilateral 
treaties-V. L.).44 
At any rate, the Court 's decision on the merits of the Nicaragua Case 
similarly failed to answer several important questions relating to multilateral 
treaty reservations, and, as is pointed out by Briggs, the Court disregarded the 
fact that a reservation stipulating that "all States party to a multilateral treaty 
and affected by the decision shall also participate in the proceedings" has a 
destructive effect on international adjudication and is incompatible with the 
Statute of the Court. Instead, the Court stuck to the term "affected State" with-
out thoroughly examining whether El Salvador's rights were affected by the 
case at all or what was meant by that term in the context of Article 59, of the 
Statute, which provides that the decision of the Court has no binding forte 
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.48 According to 
the well-known British expert, the Court was content to merely state that El 
Salvador was "affected", but it did not say the same in respect of Honduras, 
albeit that country was the base of the operations against Nicaragua.46 
In recent years the other case before the International Court of Justice, 
the Case concerning the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), 
similarly involved multilateral treaty reservations. In response to the Pakistan's 
application India filed preliminary objection invoking, inter alia, the fact that 
its declaration of acceptance of 1974 contains the multilateral treaty reservation, 
which bars Pakistan from invoking the Court's jurisdiction against India 
"concerning any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of a 
multilateral treaty, unless at the same time all the parties to such a treaty are 
also joined as parties to the case before the Court". India contended that the 
United Nations Charter, on which Pakistan founded its claims, belonged 
exactly to the category of multilateral treaties to which the reservation applied. 
Apart from this, India gave no consent to anything and signed with Pakistan no 
special agreement derogating from the content of the reservation. 
The multilateral treaty reservation was not considered in the case since, as 
mentioned earlier, the Court based itself an the Commonwealth reservation 
44
 Ibid. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda. 219. 
4
 Briggs, H. W.: The International Court of Justice Lives up to its Name. American 
Journal of International Law, 1987. 81. 
46
 Ibid. 
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joined to the Indian declaration of acceptance and found that it had no juris-
diction to entertain the application filed by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.47 
From the foregoing it becomes clear that the multilateral treaty reservations 
have destructive effect on the compulsory jurisdiction system, chiefly because 
the broad conception of interpretation of the "affected" States bars proceedings 
before the Court over disputes as to multilateral treaties concluded by a larger 
group of States. As for the other part of the reservation, the said stipulation 
virtually invalidates the obligations assumed in declarations of acceptances, 
since it hampers the Court to deal with a dispute submitted to it unless the 
State making such a reservation in its declaration or, on the basis of reciprocity, 
the adverse party has agreed to the Court's jurisdiction. All this is detrimental 
to judicial settlement of international disputes, all the more so since the multi-
lateral treaty reservations expressly concern disputes with regard to treaty 
interpretation, and considerable part of the cases brought before the Court 
involves precisely such disputes. 
6. The Vandenberg reservation and the Statute 
With regard to the reservations to declarations of acceptance one can meet with 
views expressed both before the Court and in the literature of international law 
to the effect that this or that reservation is "incompatible with the Statute". 
References to incompatibility with the Statute appear to suggest that what we 
have are reservations to the Statute, although limitations to declarations of 
acceptance can in no way be considered as reservations to the Statute. Decla-
rations of acceptance are unilateral acts with proviso freely made up by States. 
Yet, no matter how free States may be to introduce conditions for or limitations to 
their declarations of acceptance, these declarations may not contradict to the 
Statute and must be in line the UN Charter, the Statute and the Rules of Court. 
While in several cases the Court has more or less clarified the question of 
incompatibility of certain reservations with the Statute, it did not give answer 
to the question of compatibility with the Statute of the truly "problematical" 
reservations, namely, among others, the multilateral treaty reservations. 
The question of compatibility with obligations under the Statute and the 
optional clause arises in connection with multilateral treaty reservations, both 
with the first part of the reservation on account of its vagueness, as has been 
discussed already, and with the second part thereof, which requires the decla-
47
 Case concerning Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Jurisdiction of the Court) 
Judgement of 21 June 2000 .1С J Reports, 2000. para. 46. 
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rant State's special consent to the jurisdiction of the Court. This part of the 
reservation is clearly contrary to the obligations under Article 36, paragraph 2, 
of the Statute and even to the spirit of the optional clause, namely that States 
declare to recognize "ipso facto" and without special agreement the jurisdiction 
of the Court. 
Owing to the second part of the Vandenberg reservation the parties' decla-
rations of acceptance become purposeless, the Court's compulsory jurisdiction 
cannot come into play in disputes as to multilateral treaties, and such disputes 
cannot be considered by the Court unless the State including this reservation in 
its declaration-and, on the basis of reciprocity, the opponent party-specially 
agree to submit the dispute to the Court. 
By this part of the multilateral treaty reservation the declarant State takes 
back the compulsory jurisdiction which it conferred on the Court by its accession 
to the optional clause system. Practically such is the case with the automatic or 
subjective domestic reservations the so called Connally reservations as well. 
This is perhaps even more readily perceptible with multilateral treaty reser-
vations than with subjective domestic jurisdiction reservations, for if in a legal 
dispute before the Court the State entitled decides not to invoke the subjective 
domestic jurisdiction reservation, the Court may go on with the proceedings 
without further consideration, as the application of the reservation is not 
automatic and parties should refer to it before the Court. In the case of 
multilateral treaty reservations the parties have no such "discretion" and, if one 
clings strictly to the wording of the reservation, the Court may not, in 
matters covered by the reservation, assume jurisdiction unless the parties 
specially agree thereto. Of course, multilateral treaty reservations may also 
happen not to be invoked, but in that event the Court's jurisdiction is practically 
founded not on the declaration of acceptance, since under the reservation 
joined to the declaration the Court could not deal with the particular matter 
in any way, but on the forum prorogatum, i.e. on the parties' consent to 
jurisdiction given in the process. 
7. Has the invalidity of the reservation any effect on the declaration 
as a whole? 
In connection with multilateral treaty reservations the question arises of 
whether these reservations are valid at all and whether the eventual invalidity 
thereof carries implications for the declaration of acceptance itself. 
Both the views of the judges of the International Court of Justice and the 
position of the literature of international law are divided as to the extent to 
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which an invalid reservation affects the declaration of acceptance itself. On 
one view, invalidity bears upon the declaration of acceptance as a whole, 
whereas on the other view invalidity has no effect on the declaration itself. 
The question of separability of an invalid clause from the rest of the 
declaration arise in connection with the reservations concerning multilateral 
treaties, but this set of problems has received much less attention than the 
subjective domestic jurisdiction reservations have. In the Nicaragua Case 
Judge Mosler asks whether the declaration of acceptance as a whole is affected 
by the invalidity of the reservation.48 He, too, leaves this question unanswered, 
however, and the German Judge confines himself to stating that "If an affirmative 
conclusion were to be taken, its effect would be worse than to apply the 
reservation and to maintain the rest of the declaration".49 In his separate opinion 
Judge Jennings dwells on whether the difficulties concerning the uncertainty of 
the exact meaning of the reservation do not render the whole reservation so 
vague that it can be discarded, which, however, leads on to the other question 
whether, since the reservation might be not severable from the declaration, it 
might render the entail American declaration of acceptance void.5" 
We, for our part, are of the view that the authors claiming that an invalid 
clause has no bearing on declarations of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction 
or on the reservation itself and that, apart from the invalid part, the rest of the 
declaration of acceptance remains operative are not proved right. If a reser-
vation or a clause attached to a declaration of acceptance is deemed non-
existent, while the rest of the declaration is recognized as valid, the obligations 
of the declarant State are increasing without the consent thereof, which 
contradicts to the jurisprudence of the two International Courts, that juris-
diction exists only within the limits expressly accepted by the parties and that 
it should be interpreted in a narrow sense. This was expressed in the judgement 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzów Factory Case 
and reiterated by both Courts in several other cases, stating that " . . . the 
Court's jurisdiction is always a limited one, existing only in so far as States 
have accepted it...".51 
48
 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), Judgement of 26 
November 1984. Separate Opinion of Judge Mosler. ICJ Reports, 1984. 469. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings. Ibid. 554-555 . 
51
 German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia and the Factory and Chorzów. Judgement 
(Jurisdiction), July 26, 1927. Hudson, M. O. (ed.): World Court Reports, 1920-1942. New 
York, 1972. vol. 1. 610. 
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It would be primarily for the Court to decide the open questions concerning 
disputable reservations and their compatibility with the Statute. However, as 
the foregoing go to show clearly, in dealing with a variety of matters the Court 
has in fact avoided giving answers to these questions. 
As mentioned already, the International Court of Justice did not decide 
upon the validity of the Vandenberg reservation. At the same time, however, 
the judgment delivered in the Norwegian Loans case (Norway v. France) 
suggests the conclusion that the Court recognized as valid an other also very 
disputed reservation, the subjective domestic jurisdiction reservations joined to 
French declaration of acceptance. In his separate opinion attached to the 
judgment in that case Judge Lauterpacht points out that an eventual decision of 
the Court holding that a declaration of acceptance including the above 
mentioned reservation would also have a bearing on the declarations by a 
number of States which have had no opportunity to express their view on the 
matter. According to the British judge, under Article 63, of the Statute the 
Court would have had to recognize the right of intervention for those States 
which had included the said reservation in their declarations. Since it failed to 
do so, the States concerned may take the position that by virtue of Article 59, 
of the Statute the Court's decision is limited to the present case and may reserve 
themsel ves the right to express their views on this question in an another 
occasion.52 
Those who challenge the International Court of Justice for having failed to 
take a different stand on the question of the validity of reservations with rather 
disputable contents are undoubtedly right at first glance, but if one examines 
this problem more carefully and probes into it in light of the Court's possible 
findings on the matter, one must admit that the International Court of Justice 
was right to refrain from taking a definite stand on these delicate issues. 
Had the Court decided that the multilateral treaty reservations or the subjec-
tive domestic jurisdiction reservations or the declarations containing such 
limitations were valid, it would obviously had exposed itself to sharp criticism 
on the one hand and would have undermined its own prestige and authority on 
the other. In addition, a definite stand of the International Court of Justice on 
clearly accepting as valid the contested reservations and the declarations 
accepting compulsory jurisdiction and containing such reservations would by 
52
 Case of Certain Norwegian Loans. Judgment of July 6th, 1957. Separate Opinion of 
Sir I lersch Lauterpacht. ICJ Reports, 1957. 63-64. 
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all means have afforded for States a kind of "encouragement" to incorporate 
such limitations in their declarations of acceptance. 
The other avenue open to the Court would have been a pronouncement on 
the invalidity of declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction and containing 
disputed limitations to or reservations. 
Abrogation in their entirety compulsory jurisdiction declarations containing 
subjective domestic jurisdiction reservations or multilateral treaty reservations 
would have resulted in the Court depriving such declarations of acceptance even 
of the small fraction of legal effect they have retained despite these reservations 
in respect to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. 
Pronouncing the invalidity of declarations containing such reservations would 
have operated to rule out even the theoretical possibility of the Court 's 
compulsory jurisdiction coming into play over matters not affected by the 
reservations or, should the parties still not invoke the said reservation for some 
reason, that of the Court deciding the legal dispute submitted to it. 
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"The Sollen, the form of norm of a hypothetical proposition 
is in most cases therefore not the component of the positivated 
legal order but the a priori normative-logical basic form of it." 
(István Losonczy 
A funkcionális fogalomalkotás lehetősége a jogtudományban 
{The availability of functional concept-formation in jurisprudence) 
[Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda 1941], p. 65) 
According to its classical understanding, legal technique covers the entire 
process from law-making to law-applying, in contrast with the simplification 
by some recent literary elaborations that would handle it as an instrumental 
know-how of legislation only. However, as so called law-making gets actualised 
through law-applying by gaining a definite meaning and primary significance 
in it, it is basically still the range of problems connected with law-applying 
that is at stake here. Or, we might say: there is something that is law, on the 
one hand, and there is something that is legal policy (denoting the entire 
mesh of social interconnections within which a country seeks to achieve some-
thing), on the other, and legal technique is meant to serve as a bridge between 
the two. 
In our present-day understanding, on the final analysis law is a profession in 
the service of coneeptualities framed in given ways and composition as wrapped 
into a rigidifying formality, characteristic of the law's modern formal ethos, 
with logicity and formalistic entrenchment as decisive features by now. That 
is, formal law builds around itself a system to be treated and referred to with a 
kind of geometrical ideality, and it demands a model of justification that is 
usually required only for drawing theoretical conclusions. Notwithstanding all 
this, in reality the judge is by far not an entity simply reducible to a logical 
automaton but a being permeated with all qualities and fullness of any human 
existence. So even if he is covered by the robe particular to his role, he keeps 
on irrevocably carrying all his further social roles as well. While attempting-in 
compliance with his professional expectations-to disregard everything falling 
beyond the competence defined for his profession, he is aware that he takes 
responsibility for his decision and thereby also for the way he is shaping living 
law, by putting his ethical ego to the test. 
Perceiving the specificity of the function to be filled by law in the gap 
between the law's social embeddedness and apparently formal automatism, 
George Lukács described the process in a way that the judge has to face a 
genuine social conflict, communicated to him as a controversy also in a legal 
sense, that is, as the logical contradiction of opposing claims, supplied by the 
parties to the case. However, his profession is made a lawyerly craft or art 
exactly by his ability to find a sufficiently formulated solution in law that can 
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refine the controversy to an illusory and transcended conflict, solved in and by 
the law.1 
And the question of what goes on meanwhile was described by the analytical 
attempt at reconstruction by Alexander Peczenik over the past decades," summed 
up in the notions of "transformation" and "jump". Thereby, his doctrinal expla-
nation turned into a self-contradiction, as in the wake of the classic debate 
between Georges Kalinowski and Chaïm Perelman, representing the positions 
of formalism and anti-formalism (which debate ended conclusively for me 
with the legal relevance and explanatory force of the latter),3 he had opted for 
formalism, having declared inexorably the need that decisions be deducible, 
that is, logically unambiguously inferred. In result of his failure in this very issue, 
eventually he arrived at a self-critical (and in view of formalism, also self-
annihilating) self-restriction, which he introduced exactly due to the notions 
of "transformation" and "jump", by proving the repeated forced interruption of 
any logical chain in legal reasoning. Otherwise speaking, that what has become 
an illusory and transcended conflict in the above sense out of the said contro-
versy was regarded by him as the result of necessary conceptual transforma-
tions) which therefore involves a jump in the logical derivation-that is, a 
categorical evaluation (through reflecting the abstract normative patterns onto 
the fragmentary but qualified description of the facts of the case, taken out 
from a compound life situation), at the completion of which the judge may by 
now declare that the matter has become reassuringly clear for him to reach his 
1
 Lukács Gy.: A társadalmi lét ontológiájáról I—III [The Ontology of Social Being). 
Magvető, Budapest, 1976. as well as, from the author, The Place of Law in Lukács' World 
Concept. Budapest, 1985. 193 pp. 
2
 Peczenik, A.: Non-equivalent Transformation and the Law. In: Peczenik, A.-Uusitalo, J. 
(eds.): Reasoning on Legal Reasoning. Vammala, 1979. 47-64., as well as, from the author: 
Theory of the Judicial Process The Establishment of Facts. Budapest, 1995. 249 pp. 
3
 Namely, it was the purely theoretical philosopher Perelman who expressed as his 
astonishing opinion that it was enough of legal philosophers and it was also good time for 
lawyers to come and explain the process-just like the centipede of the story when he was 
asked how he could walk with hundred legs (and afterwards he could not take one single 
step just pondered how he could nevertheless walk)-, and we ourselves had to finally 
reconstruct from the lawyers' narratives what went on actually and how. At the end of all 
such reconstructions, legal technique would turn out to be capable of the world 's most 
genuinely creative achievements. And finally, it was on such a basis that he could state that 
our European continental legal ideals were not just outdated but had nothing indeed to do 
with reality, as they only constituted the mere facade of a professional ideology with 
extremely creative acts going on behind the scene. In more details, cf., from the author: On 
the Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning. Logique et Analyse (1973), Nos. 61 -
62, 21-78. and in: Perelman, C. (ed.): Études de logique juridique V. Bruxelles, 1973. 21-78. 
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judicial conviction so that he can already decide in the given way by rejecting 
any other alternative(s). Of course, from now on it is also visible that this 
endpoint does not any longer presume a creative act in a logical sense. There-
fore, once the jump has taken place in the transformation, that what-so to 
speak-follows will from then on also derive obviously with logical formality 
and necessity. 
The paradigmatic basis of such a multiple professional attitude is provided 
by the recognition that in both language and law, everything is ambivalent 
and nothing is compelling by itself. This is just the antipode of the founda-
tional idea of Imre Szabó's work on The Interpretation of Legal Rules,4 written 
half a century ago as an emblematic epi tome of socialist jurisprudence, 
according to which the law is given with a definite meaning from the outset 
and it is only in relation to this that interpretation may approve, extend or 
restrict a proposed meaning. But if everything is given f rom the beginning for 
those who apply it at any subsequent time, then legal technique, described as 
above, would generate something differing f rom what has been originally given. 
That is, within the perspective of normativism, the judge will necessarily misuse 
his authority if he extends or confines the law's vigour beyond or within its 
originally defined scope. On the other hand, in the theoretical perspective 
outlined above with a focus on legal technique, in reality there is nothing that 
could be given. It is only a materialisation, actualisation and implementation 
ongoing constantly that we can perceive. After all, there is nothing but judicial 
event in the course of which a decision is taken and something will be actualised 
by this decision.3 Or, things get actualised through the actual uses of the law. 
And in this respect, legal technique indeed seems to be an all-embracing 
concept, used as good almost for all that may stand the judicial test through 
reconsiderations in appeal, until sealed by the legal force. If we ponder repeatedly, 
for instance, classical legal principles, then our interpretation can indeed so to 
speak freely be expanded or narrowed in function of the particular circum-
stances involved in the establishable facts of the case and therefore in a way 
4
 From Szabó, I.: A jogszabályok értelmezése [Interpretation of Legal Rules], 
Budapest, 1960. 618 pp. and Interpretare a normelor juridiee. Bucureçti, 1964. 439 pp. and 
Die theoretischen Fragen der Auslegung der Rechtsnormen. Berlin, 1963. 20. 
7
 This is what Wróblewski commented upon by stating that interpretation is either of a 
static or of a dynamic ideal. That is, the interpreter either constructs a conceptual world, by 
claiming that it testifies to the original meaning and then all we have to do is try to 
reconstruct it by all means, or we conceive of the responsible judicial profession as free, 
and formulate a task of adaptation for ourselves within it. Cf. Wróblewski, J.: The Problem 
of the Meaning of the Legal Norm. Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 14 
(1964) 3-4, especially 265 et seq. 
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN L A W 355 
scarcely influenced by abstract conceptual limitations but only judgeable 
exclusively on the plane of the actual and the concrete. In view of this, Kálmán 
Kulcsár had once good reason to assert in his legal sociology decades ago'' that 
there is at all time an individual (albeit sociologically generalisable) situation of 
law application: we have to decide at any time within the boundaries of an 
in-itself complete and unlimited situation of legal argumentation and reasoning, 
in which also our moral, our idea of man and of course even our concept of the 
Divine may have a role-in addition to all other considerations. For it is an open 
situation at least in a sociological sense, in which thoughts and alternatives of 
solution are formed while finally, as represented by the individual judge (and 
in function of his sociologically describable hierarchical dependence and further 
circumstances) and eventually an entire lawyerly community will have something 
accepted or rejected (within the confines of the prevailing legal culture and its 
institutional operation). 
In contrast to the view represented by, e.g., Szabó above or to the reifying 
conception of usual simplifications, in legal technique (operating law while 
actualising a meaning to it) there is no before or after. For that what is given 
from earlier cannot be but sheer potentiality [dynamei] as it can exclusively 
become something of an ontological existence in a Lukácsi an sense through 
practical legal operation, that is, as operated by the applied legal technique. 
Consequently, it is from the outset two different media (and, through them, the 
intertwining of heterogeneous aspects) that are at stake and in play in law. 
There is a concentrated form, on the one hand, and a practical action, inseparable 
from everyday existence and driven by practical considerations, on the o ther -
and these two media are being continuously amalgamated. That what will in its 
own way emerge out of this as the message of the law arises at any time 
exactly from this amalgamation. 
It was François Gény, having revealed the moment of enchantment in specific 
legal operation with techniques that may render available almost anything and 
its opposite, who did the most for the description of the actually ongoing 
process in law at the turn of the 19th to 20 ,h centuries. Jean Dabin was the first 
one of all to reconsider the issue in the subsequent decades.7 Dabin had already 
raised awareness of the fact that there is some kind of a magical process taking 
6
 Kulcsár К.: A szituáció jelentősége a jogalkalmazás folyamatában [The significance 
of the situation in the process of law-application]. Állam- és Jogtudomány XI (1968) 
545-570. 
7
 Gény, F.: Science et Technique en droit privé positif I—II. Paris, 1913-1930 and 
Dabin, J.: La technique de l'élaboration du droit positif spécialement du droit privé. 
Bruxelles-Paris, 1935. 
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place in law. For in fact, law is hardly more than a kind of an open-ended 
mediation by pondering. In such a complex, there is a properly formulated 
form we usually call 'law' but this is far from being the end-point. This is some-
thing that will have to transform into any given and definite message through 
the practical life of (the) law. 
The conjecture and the figurative message of the circumstance that the law 
is not something to arrive at but something wherefrom the overall specific 
move starts (a "path" that "channels" argumentation and reasoning in law) denote 
just the beginning of the recognition that, in this case as well, there may also 
exist something as legal culture, as a perhaps even more comprehensive and 
decisive notion than legal technique is. For it is legal culture that provides for 
the medium in which legal techniques can at all be selected. For instance, two 
early decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court on compensation for the 
damages caused by the Communist regime and on facing the crimes of the 
totalitarian past dealt with basic dilemmas of (to be addressed in merit as a sine 
cpia non prerequisite to) any genuine transition from Communist dictatorship. 
Yet, with its formalistic decision a limine rejecting those bills, actually the 
Court annihilated the original claims themselves, instead of contributing to 
their solution. One of the characteristics of such and similar decisions, practically 
eliminating the very chances of a fundamental socio-political transformation, 
was precisely that, by having been squeezed into the sublime robe of 
"constitutionality" with some formal allusions to the Constitution's wording on 
equality before the law in a Republic being based on the democratic rule of 
law, in fact the Court even declined to face the underlying social problem that 
should have been solved. Therefore, if and in so far as the activism of the 
Constitutional Court, relying on the in-advance awareness of the legal force of 
all those acts which it may have arrived at its free discretion without a 
compelling legal basis, was a fiasco in Hungarian history, we have to consider 
it the failure of the entire legal culture behind the applied legal techniques. 
Namely, our legal profession in general and our lawyerly elite in particular 
rejected indeed to assume those tasks of legal interpretation and legal technical 
operation (placing-by making use of legal principles, as the case might be - the 
law's formal regulation into deeper and broader contexts), which the legal 
professions of other nations, more sensitive towards their nations' fate and at 
least morally more responsible and responsive (e.g., in Germany or the Czech 
Republic), did in fact assume.8 
8
 Cf., e.g.. Varga, Cs. (ed.): Coming to Terms with the Past under the Rule of Law 
(The German and the Czech Models). Budapest, 1994. The obstinate sterility of the 
survival of the skills and work-patterns reminiscent of the age of socialist legality, that is, 
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As it became clear for me during the completion of one of my earlier 
papers (struggling with the dilemma of whether or not the law is reducible to a 
system of enactments9), legal change may have at least a dual path: it may 
take place either by a direct modification of the provisions concerned (this is 
classical legislation) or by re-shaping the hermeneutic medium of interpre-
tation behind the rule. Or, legal change may be direct and indirect. In the latter 
case, reconditioning and altering the law's field of meaning, that is, the social 
conventionalisation that gives it a meaning, will bring about a practical 
modification of the message of the law. Of course, such a duality of feasible 
strategies may entail interactions, including crossing effects as well. For instance, 
the impact may be rather questionable when the acceptance of a regulation 
(to the reception of which the given society is by far not ready) is only due to 
force or a plot, lobbying or political blackmailing. In case of inflicting a 
regulation aimed at (e.g.) protecting national minorities merely by (external 
or internal) pressurising on an otherwise intolerant community, no success 
can be guaranteed by itself. A lasting change can scarcely be implemented in 
a legal culture once pushed into a difficult situation, if the whole society with 
its legal professionals will continue blocking any tolerance in the future. 
Meanwhile, reconsidering the range of problems underlying the present paper, 
a new feature can be added. Notably, an intention at strategically changing the 
message of the law (e.g., in the frame of modernisation through the law) may 
be provoked also by the long-term re-selection of legal techniques applied, 
without either formal modification of the rules or informal re-shifting of the 
social conventionalisation behind those rules. Accordingly, there is another 
indirect mode of changing or reforming the so-called living law. 
To emphasise the decisive extent to which legal technique may shape the 
law's practical purport,'" let me refer to René Dekkers who in his time arrived 
the practical ignorance of legal principles and the aversion to undertake democratic 
decision-making, responsible indeed-in brief, the lack of familiarity with, and of genuinely 
participatory experience in, the jurisprudential style developed since the end of WWII in 
Western Europe-,with the threat posed by this to the European Union through our EU-
accession, is analysed by Kühn, Z.: Worlds Apart: Western and Central European Judicial 
Culture at the Onset of the European Enlargement. The American Journal of Comparative 
Law LII (2004) 531-567. 
4
 From the author: Is Law A System of Enactments? In: Peczenik, A.-Lindahl, L.-van 
Roermund, В. (eds.): Theory of Legal Science. Boston-Reidel, 1984. 175-182. and Acta 
Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 26 (1984) 413-416. 
1,1
 See, e.g., from the author: Technique and Doctrine in Law. Iustum, Aequum, 
Salutare II (2006) 3 -4 (in print} & < www.univie.ac.at/RI/IRIS2004/Arbeitspapieren/ 
Publikationsfreigabe/Csaba_Phil/Csaba_Phil.doc >. 
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at the conclusion that, properly speaking and on the final analysis, legal 
conceivability is mostly not a function of the law itself. For finding a solution 
conceivable in law or ensuring a path promising to lead to a given result in law 
scarcely means anything else than whether we are able rationally, through 
applying given legal techniques, to defend a certain standpoint better than 
others would another (or, in case of some pressing interests, we can defend it 
at all), with the logical demand for perfection which is usual in the given legal 
culture. Or, on the final analysis, what is at stake here is just justifying a given 
solution-with the exclusion of its rejection from the outset. Referring to 
historical examples, partial analyses in the multitude of various Western 
European and Anglo-American (etc.) practices (known to be used to setting 
legally high and sophisticated standards by the way) show such a diversity that 
we have to conclude: the least that legal conceivability demands is the limiting 
condition not to admit openly and with explicit textual formulation to be 
running against the text interpreted. And therewith the developments by Hans 
Kelsen on discretion and the moment of the legal force" present themselves in 
a new setting-namely, instead of logical consequence, the lack of procedural 
rejection, and, as a final criterion, instead of the positive statement of logical 
inclusivity, the negative inertial force of the fact that the decision in question 
has not been actually annulled or overruled, by being expelled from the circle 
of the accepted regime of law and order in the legal process. 
As can be seen, the arsenal of legal techniques definitely grants lawyers 
discretionary power to conclude-precisely due to the inherent ambivalence of 
any text-that, on the final account and in bordering situations, that what the 
basic social conventions of a nation's culture consider important and vital 
enough to form a foundational component of its survival strategy will not be 
inconceivable ab ovo in most of the cases. This is what can be strikingly 
observed especially in times of crisis and above all in countries and epochs 
where and when a high-standard background culture of self-defence with 
the powerful representation of national interests has developed and is being 
persistently cared for; in particular contrast to the fatigue and the enervation, 
living aimlessly from day to day with no perspective and ability to do one ' s 
utmost for good causes, a condition that can unfortunately be seen in the life of 
our nation, exhausted by the after-1956 repression and the strange transition 
therefrom. For the examples of vital impulse with a determination to survive 
are numerous from the Czech Republic to Romania and to Ireland, or f rom 
" Cf., e.g., from the author: A bécsi iskola [The school of Vienna]. In: Varga, Cs. 
(ed.): Jogbölcselet XIX XX. százcid: Előadások [Lectures on legal philosophy in the 19lh to 
20th centuries]. Budapest, 1999. 24-32. 
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the State of Israel to the United States of America. To be clear, it is the use of 
techniques and the ability to react by adequately responding to challenges what 
I mean here and now, rather than whatever emotional relation, sympathy, or 
identification. After all, all this does not necessarily imply more than the issue 
whether a social substrate has ever developed, a substrate that is able to decide 
(without debates generating discord internally and the very impossibility of 
performance externally) what the nation wants at all, at least in strategic 
directions and on the most sensitive fields; whether a kind of mechanism has 
evolved to facilitate that basic expectations, even if unsaid, can be tacitly 
agreed upon; whether the societal background is structured in a way that some 
dominant will can be formulated at least on given fields, and if necessary, also 
asserted to prevail-even if through most diverse paths and by roundabout 
means but, all things considered, even defying obstacles if needed.12 Based on 
the analysis of cases and from a certain historical perspective, all this is relevant 
as-in want of any other point of reference-we have to see that if properly 
significant interests are at stake as represented at proper levels, practically 
anything and also its opposite may have a chance of passing through the 
institutional test of legality in practice. And referring again to Kelsen's 
wisdom in his theoretical reconstruction, this can be achieved by no means 
necessarily through any spectacularly flagrant defying of the law but just by 
building up those bridges of reasoning (based on scholarly comparative-
historical analyses in depth and the lawyerly talent in analysis, argumentation 
and inventiveness) that may render the solution in question conceivable in the 
given culture under given circumstances." 
The primary lesson of all this may be summarised in that no matter how 
exciting and flexible our language is, in itself and as a mediator, it is not 
suitable for definition. By legal technique, in fact, we mean the standardised 
set of instruments of how to handle a certain language lawyerly. Rules may 
involve norms (norms themselves being nothing but projections of logic, logifying 
denominations). Whether we act as philosophers or as linguists or lawyers, we 
have to apply categories in distinction, in order to enter into an intelligible 
121 attempted to clarify the components of such a favourable or unfavourable 
disposition through a comprehensive analysis in my opening lecture [ '»Worthy of the 
fate, qualified for the challenge«: On the state of our intellect and scholarship' (in 
manuscript)] of a seminar for Hungarian history teachers in the Carpathian Basin, 
organised by the Rákóczi Association in the Benedictine Abbey of Pannonhalma during 
the summer of 2004. 
13
 Which may have even led, e.g., to collective responsibility instituted with reference 
to a law having lost its effect yet still allegedly surviving, in heritage of an earlier mandate 
rule. See note 10. 
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communication at all. Looking methodologically behind what we commonly call 
law, we can scarcely claim more than: in the world of the intellectual construct 
called 'law', so-called norms, mediated by conceptualities defined in rules, offer 
certain sets with paths of, and menu-references in, procedures within the insti-
tutional process generated by the same law-together with all the ambivalences 
inherent in its linguistic mediation. But this is just the recognition that Lukács 
once thematised in his social ontology as the trap of mediation, witnessing to 
the basic unity that prevails nevertheless, despite the world's artificial fragmen-
tation through its human intellectual representation. For language is a medium 
incessantly formed-with the law's and lawyers' language, too-, being unceasingly 
re-conditioned by each and every actor of the law's community in general and 
its dedicated professionals in particular, who actualise it while processing cases 
through its filter at any time. 
According to our starting point, we all speak a language and language 
does not label itself. Any of us can say, for example, that now he enters the 
terrain of scholarship, by incorporating new conceptualities into this scholarship. 
Well, such an allegation may prove true (or verifiable) and false (or refutable) 
alike, as any of us may at any time expound in a meta-level reconstruction 
that the sequence of deduction has been false or that nothing but passions, 
uncontrollably visceral affections/aversions have been expressed in the guise 
of conceptuality, i.e., in a basically not conceptual language-use. Or, one can at 
all times identify a meta-system superior to all our linguistic communications, 
based on which new explanations may be formed about what has been told. 
The language's not labelling itself does also involve the perspective of that, 
according to official expectations at least, the more differentiated the society we 
live in, the less the law-applier's distinctively individual personality will have 
a share in making his decision, and this is exactly the most decisive factor in the 
judge's performing his function-whether he still wears his powdered wig visibly 
or it is present only hidden in his professionally socialised subconscious. 
Within himself, the judge has to distinguish between his individuality and his 
function defined for his legal quality. Yet no matter how unambiguous this is at 
the level of theory or formalised ideology, we have to reckon with the fact that 
any such official expectation is hardly more than a normative desideratum, that 
is, the law's internal rule for its own game to be played (apart from the 
underlying social requirement which does not inevitably enforce itself). The 
duality inherent in this apparent antinomy is verified by sociological reality. 
Because insofar as the law is seen as a field of giving meanings, in shaping of 
which we all play a role (especially via our professionally competent lawyers), 
then whether we want it or not, the said field will necessarily be actually shaped 
by individual human beings through the filter of their own personalities. All 
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LAW 361 
this entails the secondary effect (also described by Lukács) that shifts of emphasis 
and changes of context, maybe invisible in themselves, will inevitably emerge 
in the ontological process of our social actions, which may eventually add up 
to some decisive shift(s) of direction in the long run. That is, our professionalism, 
with our lawyerly ideology and skills in legal operation, will distinguish and 
homogenise us according to the requirements of the legal complex and to our 
understanding of the roles suited to it, on the one hand, but nevertheless, the 
unity and the individual expression of all these in our personalities and 
fullness of being are ontologically still inseparably all together present, on the 
other; and therefore, we can only try to separate aspects differing in homogeneity 
within the heterogeneity of such an ontological unity of existence for the sake 
of and within analytical purposes exclusively. The point under discussion 
may remind one of the stand taken by Lukács who, having pondered the 
tension between the sought-for unambiguity and actual ambiguity of language, 
characterised the development of civilisation and scientific thought over 
thousands of years as an implied fight for making language unambiguous, 
while basic objectives in practice are often realised in a hyperbolic way at the 
most. Notably, we usually set a goal and approach it as we can, yet, mean-
while, new divergences are inevitably getting introduced into the process-and 
the same is what happens to the judge as well. 
Or, the judge's personality, his individual character, together with linguistic 
ambivalences pervading mediation in all its forms-all these leave their marks 
on every operation. What we claim here is that in every artificial human 
construction there is some kind of homogenisation which at the same time 
carries its counterpoint to it. For example, in our civilisatory efforts, we place 
the law and the range of social problems to be addressed as legal into a well-
separated and thoroughly homogenised sphere, to which the legality of the 
law's domain can be directly applied already. Nevertheless, we still cannot tear 
the whole process from the heterogeneity of its human carrier, which will 
inevitably lead to its overall definition by overall life conditions, that is, by all 
the particularity of the historically given hie et nunc. 
As we have seen, language does not label itself, and it would downright be 
unfit for it. And yet we all speak a language, apparently the same language in 
the same community. The legislator is to write (after having read), and the law-
applier is to read (and then, also to write). More than a thousand years ago, in 
Iceland, the law was announced by the lagsaga [or lögsögumadur], reciting 
it standing on a rock. This may have been a practical gesture in itself, yet our 
present-day reconstruction may rightly regard it as something more: objecti-
fication, externalisation, rendering its factuality an independent act. It is such 
an objectification upon which, in our present-day complexity of modern formal 
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law, we have built a new professional aspiration, the so-called doctrinal study 
of law [Rechtsdogmatik], aimed at having a conceptual system formed out of 
what was told by the legislator and interpreted in authoritative practice. All 
this having been incorporated in our culture, today we presume almost by habit 
that, after the law was drafted by one of us as a governmental specialist, voted 
for by others of us as members of the parliament, commented on by yet another 
one of us as a jurisprudent, taken into account in legal transactions by others of 
us and, in the end, applied by the last of us as a judge in a conflict still arising 
between some former ones; well, we indisputably presume in our culture that 
all of us use conceptual instruments and, accordingly, understand texts and 
messages just in the way as conventionalised in our culture. Therefore, if any of 
us says "purposefulness", this has to mean what our commentary and standing 
practice understand as 'purposefulness'. Of course, the exchange in communi-
cation of social understandings and feedbacks is not coded in the text, and the 
speaker is mostly unaware of the complexity of layers behind a textual meaning, 
as he only spoke a language. Yet the meta-system of the language of conceptual 
reconstructions, superimposed upon language as used by us in our everyday 
life, asserts itself even in roundabout ways, assuming an in-depth and in-
volume more comprehensive concept behind the actual language usage. It is 
this role in which the doctrinal study of law proves to be an unexcludable 
mediator.14 And it is this context within the perspective of which we can state 
that legal technique, too, is unexcludably present anywhere where there is law 
with a practical use. 
No need to add that the doctrinal study of law has its own technique!s), 
too, of course. Rudolf Jhering and Carl von Savigny described already in the 
second half of 19th century that this technique suggests a basically theoretical 
model-like what is customarily used, for example, in theological dogmatics 
and similar fields of scholarship-, where exclusively the logical instruments 
of conceptual analysis (starting out from given texts) and conceptualisable 
evidences or axioms are utilised. Consequently, the analytical apparatus of 
the doctrinal study of law applies mostly classical types of logical operation, 
14
 Marx and Engels may have rightly written in The German Ideology in the above sense 
that the Germans have once drowned their misery into scholarship, and what they failed 
to achieve through revolution they finally built up in theoretical doctrine. It is worth 
mentioning that a similar duality prevails in Anglo-American culture as well, but there this 
role is played by the judge ' s conscience. Therefore the genuine issue is to whom to allocate 
the power of the doctrine. For that what is a scholarly-made doctrinal study of law for us in 
the European continental (German) pattern is the practical construction f rom case to case 
for the Common Law. Cf., e.g., At iyah, P. S.: Pragmatism and Theory in English Law. 
London, 1987. 
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including, above all, conceptual division and classification and, of course as 
assigned to these, deduction and induction. Notwithstanding this, that what has 
been told about the magical transforming effect of legal technique is built not on 
the primacy of logifying instruments but sees in law basically a technique of 
argumentation. According to this, the various forms of argumentation (with the 
help of which the judge, by considering various presumably feasible positions 
more or less relevant in one sense or another, gets closer to answering the 
dilemma of the applicability of various rules) appear as elements of the legal 
technique applied by him. 
It was in an explication written on the function of law and its correlation to 
the function of codification three decades ago17 that I came to realise that in 
socialism, the acknowledgement of rights only in function of their "proper" 
exercise as spirited by the Civil code had the same function as categorising a 
deed's being dangerous to society as the criterion of criminal offence had in 
the Penal code. However, my initial political indignation calmed down to silent 
melancholy later on, when I also realised that this is nothing more than quite 
commonly the jurisprudence based upon so called clauses, which is in fact 
the same age as legal culture. It is precisely the Lukacsian symptom already 
mentioned in connection with linguistic ambiguity that re-emerges here. 
Notably, in our civilisatory development, we are trying to limit discretion by the 
means of law, in order to prevent the judge's personality-along with included 
irrational factors as well as with factors ensuing from differing rationalities-
from affecting the judicial discernment. At the same time, we incorporate 
clauses of immense generality into the system so that the judicial assessment, 
bound this way, can nevertheless be freed and the otherwise relevant legal 
provision put aside, if needed, in any unforeseeable border situation at any 
time. It is precisely this issue that Ronald Dworkin thoroughly discussed in his 
famous essay-"Is Law a System of Rules?"16-, having risen by today to be the 
paradigmatic cornerstone of Anglo-American legal thought. In his opinion, the 
challenge of creativity begins exactly when the judge, stepping out from his 
self-comforting everyday routine, finds that the judgeability of his case is hard 
and problematic and, as such, requires re-consideration. This is the culmination 
of the complex socio-legal determination of the judicial process, when the law-
applier may identify a legal principle out from either the Roman law's common 
15
 Cf., from the author: The Function of Law and Codification. In: Anuario de Filosofia 
del Derecho 7 Madrid, 1973-1974. 493-501. and Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum 
Hungaricae 16 (1974) 269-275. 
16
 Dworkin, R. M.: Is Law a System of Rules? [1967], reprinted in his The 
Philosophy of Law. Oxford, 1979. 38-65 . 
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heritage or domestic jurisprudential precedents, and once the latter's relevance 
is established, he will forbear from applying minutely elaborated sets of rules.17 
Of course, we may have distressing memories about the socialist use of the 
clause on the proper exercise of rights, for instance, when the political police 
was hard on retaliating upon the sociable gatherings of the banned elderly monks 
as an abuse of the right of assembly. However, it must not be forgotten that 
the simultaneous cult of clauses had, on principle, the same aim in Western 
Europe, namely, to foresee the unforeseeable. Otherwise speaking, there is neither 
legislator nor living legal culture without incorporating clauses according, of 
course, to the prevailing cultural patterns. Such were, for instance, the concepts of 
"common good", "public order" (etc.),18 used in fields ranging from public 
administration to civil and criminal law in the West, which seem to have since 
the last decades lost their primacy unfortunately, on account of some false 
liberalisation and individualistic anarchism.19 
Providing that we consider such resolutions problematic, we have to 
inevitably presume an ontology in which unidirectional definition is available 
on the field of social action. In comparison to such simplicism, Lukács himself 
proved to be far more differentiated. His explication into the opposite direction 
was built exactly on the presumption that there is no motion without counter-
motion, therefore it is not realistic to pursue any human ambition without some 
safety valves inserted. Moreover, no homogenisation is feasible without some 
re-heterogenisation at the same time. Paradoxically speaking, while modern 
formal legal development went in the direction to mechanise the judge, the 
realisation was also made that law with its irrevocably ethical colour had ever 
been too serious an undertaking to be just left alone to logifying highbrows who 
would, as it were, process it with their impersonally formalistic apparatus. 
Therefore law has ever built in the scheme, simultaneously with the very first 
act of formalisation, the possibility of de-formalisation as well. 
Well, legal technique is in itself quite an omnipotent and universal instrument 
which can be used by anyone for any purpose in any direction, on the one 
1
 In this sense, we might as well say that the gap is in us at the most, that is. any problem 
that there may be is attributable to the applier of the law, because the legal order is perfect 
in the form it is done available to us. That is, the cause of problems may be that until now 
we have failed to activate it in the sufficient depth, exploiting its classical theoretical 
foundations. 
18
 Cf., above all, Bolgár, V.: T h e Public Interest: A Jurisprudential and Comparative 
Overview of the Symposium on Fundamental Concepts of Public Law. Journal of Public 
Law 12 (1963) 13-52 . 
19
 Cf., e.g., f r om the author: Rule of Law-At the Crossroads of Challenges. lustum, 
Aequum, Salutare [Budapest] I (2005) 73-88. 
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hand, yet, one that can exclusively be operated in (and according to feasibility 
criteria set by) a given legal culture, on the other. Consequently, there is one 
given legal culture inevitably destined for us to build that what will define 
the frames within which we can at all move, by offering us those paths in 
practice which will decide on the final account from what we may-by being 
encouraged to-conclude to what in fact. As to its genuine root-components, 
legal culture is, on the final analysis, an incessantly re-actualised progressing 
network of social conventions, within the womb of which certain skills, selected 
from among the huge many skills spread in the various civilisations, are utilised 
with a given intellectuality and according to a given ethos and a given goal-
rationality. For instance, there is a logico-analytical culture-the cult of conceptual 
analysis spread over from Oxford as taken over from the field of philosophico-
ethical investigations to law-in which our actions depend on one single 
formalistic consideration, in conclusion of some previously posited assumption, 
according to which even options of whether I may express a feeling of sympathy 
or when I am authorised to kill my foetus, my mother, and so on, will possibly 
be definable with a dry logic. Nonetheless, I hope it is still thinkable that we, 
as sound souls and worthily of our human quality, do not wish to rely in our 
actions on the logic of abstract conceptual extrapolations as substitutes for 
individual moral responsibility. For so many issues were thought to be proven 
on paper as inferred from theories throughout history, yet in sober societies 
and communities we do not act expectedly as automatons, exactly because we 
think in a more complex way, trusting our numerous human faculties and the 
many talents bestowed on us. And with all this we presuppose, at least as a 
potentiality, that our backgrounding human culture may also develop the 
arsenal of further finely chiselled instruments as well. 
In addition, in a last analysis it is also obvious that it is the same legal 
culture having already produced the most strictly formulated rules to be applied 
on a mass scale that has also made rights a function of the proper exercise of 
rights and categorised the fact of being actually dangerous to society as one of 
the criteria for a deed to be qualified as a crime. Hence, unlawful acts were not 
due to clauses themselves provided for in socialism, either. For it is the same 
ruthless dictatorship that subordinated everything in every field, every way and 
under any circumstances to the political purposes of that central or local 
despotism (dominated basically by the personal intentions of individual party 
potentates) which also brutally totalised society. All things considered, it is 
exactly the use of so-called clauses as a legal technique that is accidental; but it 
is clearly inevitable on the level of social totality that where a homogenised 
sphere is built up also a safety valve has to be wedged in in order to ensure 
social heterogeneity to prevail, even if most exceptionally, in the very last 
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resort. Comparing societies and epochs, often a close parallel can be observed 
between a given legal culture and the use of some adequate culture of legal 
technicalities. Within this, it is of course tradition and the inherent urge of 
skills already practised that are to decide which particular instruments of legal 
technique will be finally recoursed to. 
Almost this same duality (or jump into the opposite) manifests itself in our 
example referred to earlier, namely, in the Constitutional Court 's decisions on 
compensation and facing with the criminal past of socialism during the political 
transformation in Hungary. For there is no-and has never been any-expressed 
constitutional provision " on the basis of which their adjudication would have 
not allowed a much more moderate decision or eventually even abstention 
from, or just the opposite of, the extreme decisions that were actually made. 
Remarkably enough, when the justices were giving official reasons, their 
justification was limited to sheer formalism. In doing so, they were drawing on 
the so-called "invisible constitution", that is, on one exclusively posited in 
their imagination. However, on expiry of their mandate-i.e., of the exclusively 
enforceable limit of their activity-, when they may have felt that the memory 
of their past activity and its assessment by the posterity were already at stake, 
their subsequent attempt at justification proved rather material. This is what we 
call acting by double standards. And so also was that when they declared to 
adopt the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg European Court for ruling henceforth 
(of course, again, without any authorisation, i.e., purely out of their own 
decision), our lawyerly community welcomed the news once "materially" and 
with enthusiastic applause, while at another time the same community only 
murmured that this was nothing but discretionary goal-rationality, that is, 
legally speaking, plain arbitrariness.21 At times, therefore, it seems that we get 
11
 Unless we think of the constitutional description of the Republic of Hungary defined 
as a "democratic state under the rule of law" (Article 2/1), where the definiendum can only 
indicate cultural ethos rather than codif ied ways and conditions. See, e.g., for the nature and 
variety of understandings of the key term, Fallon, R. H.. Jr.: »The Rule of Law« as a 
Concept in Constitutional Discourse. Columbia Law Review 97 (1997) 1 -56 . 
1 find it somewhat similarly frivolous to say now, for instance, that the Consti-
tutional Court's past activism in its f i rs t decade may have been adequate to the conditions 
then but it would be no longer timely if it went on similarly later on. For the Constitution 
has not changed meanwhile, consequently the Constitutional Court 's statutory mandate to 
adjudicate constitutionality has been the same from the beginning. And the mere fact that 
the Constitutional Court has no forum to be appealed against, wherefore each of its actions 
in procedure has f rom the outset had the seal of constitutional force on it, must not have 
entitled it to any acts at will. That is, we need to clarify also theoretically if an activism 
legally so unfounded by the wordings of the Constitution (but having so far-reaching social 
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enticed to adopt blind positivistic attitudes only to suddenly switch over into 
the charismatic contentuality of self-liberation. 
We might add that, at the same time, all this involves the availability of a 
strategic change of law as mediated by modifying either the context and/or 
the legal technique as well. Because whether or not this was consciously 
foreplanned by the Constitutional Court's consideration, eventually the path 
actually taken had proven to be the strategically safest one, with an effect 
irreversible and irrevocable, as the Constitutional Court, by the same token, 
also accomplished the job of doctrinal conceptualisation when it formulated (in 
a way rather sophisticated) the grounds for its decisions in question. For, as 
known, the "invisible constitution" (if this may signify a sensible term at all) 
indicates a conceptually elaborated system behind the Constitution's textual 
wording, a kind of dogmatics rendered by constitutional force under the 
Constitutional Court's seal.22 And it does so with an effect that, even if one or 
consequences at the same time) is just one of the feasible materialisations of the free 
discretion that can be resorted to optionally or, otherwise speaking, discretion is not verging 
on abuse only provided that it will not have reached to acting as legislative or even 
constituent power. Because exclusively the elimination of "unconstitutionality" can be 
understood by the test-or adjudieation-of "constitutionality" in a literal sense, that is, 
according to the Constitution's provision in force at its execution. When Lord Acton 
summed up the experience of several millennia-saying that "power tends to corrupt and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely"-, he himself did not mean anything more than that 
law, especially in issues of a dramatic impact for the public, is by far not the automatic 
result of the possible lack of further formalistically posited delimitations. 
For he was of the opinion that "Historic responsibility has to make up for the want of 
legal responsibility. Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great 
men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority: still 
more when you superadd the tendency or the certainty of corruption by authority. There is 
no worse heresy than that the office sanctifies the holder of it." Lord Acton ' s letter to 
Bishop Mandell Creighton on April 5, 1887, in his-Fears R. J. (ed ,)-Selected Writings 
Essays in the Study and Writing History. Indianapolis, 1986. 383. 
22
 As the president 's concurrent opinion to the decision 23 of 31 October, 1990 holds, 
"the starting point is the totality of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court has to continue 
determining in its interpretations the principled bases of the Constitution and the rights laid 
down thereby and establishing a coherent system by means of its judgments , which as an 
»invisible Constitution« serves as a standard benchmark of constitutionality above the 
Constitution which is nowadays being amended in everyday political interest". Cf. 
Sólyom, L.: Introduction to the Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Hungary. In: Sólyom, L.-Brunner, G. (eds.): Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court. Ann Arbor, 2000. 41 et seq. Cf . also Sajó, A.: 
Reading the Invisible Constitution: Judicial Review in Hungary. Oxford Legal Studies 15 
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two decisions may be circumvented singularly in one way or another, surely a 
whole conceptually elaborated system cannot, because with such a step we would 
inevitably lose the guiding principle in any of our prospective interpretations. 
* 
If we claim that in the realm of classical positivism, law is a reified entity with a 
completely ready-made set-up and with boundaries given from the outset for 
the outside world, and this (along with the appropriate lawyerly culture and 
professional deontology) also involves the expectation that the law can be applied 
deductively as processed through our lawyerly logic; but if, in the guise of 
theory, now we also declare that all this is nothing but a mode of parlance until 
it becomes actually present and applicable for the jurist exclusively through an 
established meaning assigned to it-well, then we do not necessarily tell more 
than what Kelsen did once. For this tempting intellectual dead-end was fore-
seen by his philosophical reconstruction already (and with a tension induced 
by its internal contradiction) when in the second half of his life he concluded 
that in a legal sense, there is no "murder" (and, consequently, no "lawfulness", 
no "constitutionality" and "unconstitutionality", that is, no whatever legal qualifi-
cation) in and by itself. There are nothing but procedural positions within the 
realm of law. And if, by the force of any of these, the judge declares now that 
you are a murderer or a woman, then it will be completely indifferent in a legal 
sense what you actually did or what your gender is in reality. What will matter 
for law is exclusively the decision arrived at procedurally by the authority, 
which once will be sealed by the legal force, will from then on also be utterly 
indisputable-as long as the given legal order prevails. Well, my above explanation 
relieves somewhat the austerity of normativity. Namely, although in terms of 
this explanation, reification in law is only an appearance in epistemology, as 
exclusively exchanges of meanings and attitudes conformed to the latter are 
traceable in society ontologically; however, the latter still constitute a kind of 
continuum constantly moving and changing, shifted and re-shifted again in their 
tendencies with changing contexts, yet with elements built upon each other 
reliably; and thereby, they also will build into a kind of uninterrupted sequence of 
progress (irrespective of the fact that the law may suffer, as the case may be, 
no change in its objectified, textual form). 
Simplifyingly expressed, traditional legal positivism is a position against 
natural law, emphasising that there is a worldly identifiable maker of the law, 
(1995) 253-267. and Füzér, К.: The Invisible Constitution: The Construction of Constitu-
tional Reality in Hungary. International Journal of Sociology 26 (1997) 48-65. 
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as opposed to the classical natural law's stand that traces validity back to a 
source transcending this law. In the light of such a duality, my point is on the 
borderland, as it doubtlessly (and maybe also astonishingly) proclaims a kind 
of invisible démocratisation. After all, although law has both a particular maker 
and a definite circle of addressees in the light of what has been said above, yet 
inevitably and incontestably we are all there in the work oflaw-that is, all we 
in society, even if represented, for the most part, by jurists (justices and lawyers) 
who practically apply the law. I would even add that it was rather ironical for 
me to expound this just during socialism in Hungary, as such an allegation 
does involve that there are limits even to despotism, for each and every 
addressee of the law actually takes part in one way or another in the processes 
of giving meanings to law and thereby making it-again: in one way or another-
reconventionalised. 
Nevertheless, our established culture of developing meanings in law may 
derive itself only from norms authoritatively issued. And this necessarily 
embodies the ontic process, sociologically describable as a fact, in terms of 
which society as a circle of addressees conventionalises it while acquiring it. 
The question arises whether this can be anything else or more than a kind of 
AY/sen-reinterpretation. Well, although Kelsen's aim might have been quite the 
opposite,23 by the further elaboration of his Pure Theory of Law he had 
actually relativised all the law's components, thrusting us back into a kind of 
uncertainty and sheer accidentality. Because he built up, with endless austerity, 
a pyramid-like theory of gradation [Stufenbau], offering a logified picture on 
the structure and operation of the whole set-up of law with inexorable 
consistency, excluding any contingency, on the one hand.21 However, with the 
American publication in 1946 of the re-formulation of his work25-in which he 
elevated the moment of the legal force into a criterion set-, he had rendered all 
this relative, on the other. This way it has become clear that within the field of 
23
 Because-as István Losonczy himself once noted i t- , according to the law's "dogmas" 
[A mulasztás 1: A mulasztási bűncselekmények okozatossága (The default , I: The causality 
of crimes of defaul t ) Pécs, 1937. 70], Kelsen built up "the doctrine of legal forms" [A 
funkcionális fogalomalkotás lehetősége a jogtudományban (The availability of functional 
concept formation in jurisprudence) (Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, Budapest, 1941), 
p. 90), wherein he used the concept as "a law of sequence building", as a "sequence of 
functions propounded within a definite law" [ibid., pp. 25 & 81, meaning by 'law' here the 
regularity established by sciences], albeit the "syncreteness of [legal] law is nothing but 
[ . . . ] the result of the particularity of such [scientific] laws that constitute the [legal] l aw" 
[A mulasztás, p. 73]. 
24
 Kelsen, H.: Reine Rechtslehre. Wien, 1934. 
25
 Kelsen, H.: General Theory of Law and State. Cambridge, Mass., 1946. 
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discretion in which such a simultaneous application and making of the law 
takes place, in fact everything and also its opposite may occur. This is all the 
more so because the very question of what is application-i.e., what is that can 
be regarded, from a normatively higher level in hierarchy, as pre-defined for 
the lower level-can be exclusively answered from a procedural position entitled 
to official reconsideration or revision (as anything else can only be taken as a 
private opinion), and thus, any optional element or consideration, even if outside 
the law, may, in case it becomes legally final by the seal of a res iudicata, get 
incorporated forever into the law, despite its eventually random contents. Well, 
on the final account, it seems as if Kelsen's entire oeuvre accentuated nothing 
but this: although the law has a logifiedly solid framework, built up laboriously 
and at the cost of great efforts, yet if anyone really wanted to take it into his 
hands, the structure would suddenly crash and just slip away like grains of 
sand. 
In the spirit of the above, we usually say that, all things considered, law 
defines itself. However, this, examined closer, may turn out to be misleading, 
because we can exclusively speak of its (being incessantly in the course of) 
getting defined. For this is a process of self-generation in which a normative 
factor is given, with reference to which we may attempt to define its meaning 
for ourselves (in our positions as judges, attorneys, lawyers, etc.); at the same time 
our version of meaning is confronted with that of others, which communication 
of meanings eventually adds up to continuous re-conventionalisation. This 
understanding of the law is, on the final analysis, nothing but a social-institu-
tional-praxis theory. It suggests that the ultimate certainty, starting out from 
which Kelsen would have tried to intellectually reconstruct the world of law 
with its structure and operation out of some elementary stones as experienced, is 
eventually nothing else than we ourselves. 
As a matter of course, it was by the end of his life that Kelsen actually 
could arrive at what could serve for me already as a starting point. Namely, 
when as explanatory principles he introduced the moments of both legal force 
and efficacity (i.e., the factual acceptance of that it is exclusively an order by 
and large being already enforced about the validity of which we may speak 
sensibly at all), he actually already concluded backwards from a social end-
result as a total result, and obtained by reduction that what he can now build 
up the law from. So, from the moment I started re-considering Kelsen's theory 
of law-application,261 could recognise only this path as acceptable. 
6
 From the author: Kelsen's Theory of Law-application: Evolution, Ambiguities, Open 
Questions. Acta Juridica Hungarica 36 (1994) 3 - 2 7 . 
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Accordingly, the closed-open system that characterises the relation of what is 
inside and what is outside the law (with the movement inside the law) is itself 
nothing else but a continuum, displaying features of a particular autonomy only 
from an analytic point of view. We can define its foundation, outlines and 
contents basically only from the facts of practice as from the last empirical donné 
['what is given', as once formulated by Gény] that we can reconstruct at all. It 
is this wherein the sense of excluding the availability of normative logical 
conclusions from law lies, as thereby we resolve all this in a feasible reconstruc-
tion from actual practice. For practice testifies both continuity and reliability. 
For jurisprudence as the living practice of law, characteristic of a country or of 
an epoch, can by and large certainly be described as a sequence of consecutive 
steps in harmonisation with and conformity to each other in the light of 
posterior reconstruction.27 
If we asked again whether law defines itself and whether this is true in all 
respects both inside and outside the law, we might perhaps respond to the above 
by referring to the ideal picture of three intertwining circles.28 According to 
this, there is a constant movement going on objectively in the total societal work 
of shaping the law. The components taking part in this movement, pressing 
against each other, are (1) the legally relevant attitudes in society, (2) the 
actual judicial decision-making practice, as well as (3) the posited law (with 
the law's doctrinal aspiration to define itself in Rechtsdogmatik). In the incessant 
whirl of the subsequent actions by the various actors in (1) social action, (2) 
legal action, and (3) the law, we can be assured of one circumstance at least: at 
last, it can always be described-at least posteriorly-which of them will prevail 
(if at all) in their struggle. In addition and on the last analysis, one of them may 
become predominant irrespectively of which specific legal doctrine is being 
enforced in the given society at a given time. That is, the process of their being 
pressed against one another with one of them becoming (relatively or absolutely) 
predominant is bound to take place anyway. And our repeated statement on 
that law eventually defines itself and that, in this self-determination of getting 
defined in the given situation, only the given (and not another) status (or 
qualification in and by the law) could arise as a result of the process, becomes 
understandable in this context. 
27
 That is, with a given-subsequently certainly reconstructible-failure rate, the extent 
and pretensions of which are of course again indicative of the quality of the legal cul ture in 
question. 
28
 First applied by the paper in note 3, as well as, also from the author: Lectures on the 
Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999. 279. especially in para 6.1 on pp. 203 et seq. 
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The final conclusion, too, will conclude from this statement above, namely 
that an integration (with ensuring unification within the European Union or 
elsewhere) will not be effectuated in terms of cultures but in ones of rules and 
instruments-in case such a process will go on at all. And this is not a pious 
wishful agenda of legal policy but a value-free statement on probabilities based 
on the foregoing. Just as I cannot grasp law as such, only its meaning(s) as 
getting asserted in practice, in the same way we cannot do anything with legal 
culture at wish either (e.g., by targetedly shaping or integrating it with some-
thing else), because, as we have seen, legal culture, too, can only manifest 
itself in nothing but continuous givings of meaning, that is, in the actuality and 
succession of conventionalised meanings. Consequently, all we can integrate 
through human intervention (and with politics by deploying artificial instru-
ments) is nothing else than kinds of objectivation we may have symbolically 
erected, in want of better means-for example, texts with their direct logical 
consequences involved. 
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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 
T h e c o r n e r s t o n e of every d e m o c r a t i c pol i ty i s t h e adherence to the p r inc ip le o f 
the rule of l aw w h i c h en ta i l s t he ex i s t ence o f legal m e c h a n i s m s g u a r a n t e e i n g 
"no t only that a cour t be ab le to deal with all t h e violat ions of legal rules bu t , in 
addi t ion , that all in jured par t ies be entitled to ad jud ica t ion of the i r g r i e v a n c e s " . 1 
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1
 Scheingold, S.: The Rule of Law in European Integration. Connecticut, 1976. 41. 
374 COSTAS KOM BOS 
The redress of grievances is directly dependent on the existence of facilitative 
instruments for testing the procedural and substantive legality of measures 
adopted by the institutions ofthat legal order. An essential component of a system 
that provides for the challenge of measures is the capacity to bring actions (or 
locus standi) which acts as the gateway to judicial review proceedings. 
In the context of the European Union (EU), the capacity of individuals to 
bring actions in order to challenge the validity of secondary Community law 
is formally guaranteed in Art. 230(4) EC. The assessment by commentators 
of the effectiveness of that provision in according standing to individual 
applicants,2 places the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First 
Instance (CFI) in an apologetic position.1 The critical perspective against the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ on Art. 230 (4) EC, can be synopsised in the argument 
that the Court construed the requirement of individual concern, the main 
admissibility requirement for actions brought by individual applicants for the 
annulment of Community acts, too restrictively.4 The criticism extends to the 
For a selection of accounts on standing see: Harding, C. : The Private In teres t in 
Challenging Community Action. 5 (1980) European Law Review, 345; Harlow, C.: Towards 
a Theory of Access for the European Court of Justice. 12 (1992) Yearbook of European Law, 
213; Craig, P.: Legality, Standing and Substantial Review in Community Law. 14 (1994) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 507; Rasmussen, H.: Why Is Article 173 Interpreted 
Against Private Plaintiffs? 5 (1980) European Law Review, 112; Arnull, A.: Private 
Applicants and the Action fo r Annulment unde r Article 173 of the EC T r e a t y . 32 
(1995) Common Market Law Review. 7; Greaves, R.: Locus Standi under Article 173 EEC 
when Seeking Annulment of a Regulation. 11 (1986) European Law Review, 119; Neuwahl, 
N.: Article 173 Paragraph 4 EC: Past, Present and Possible Future. 21 (1996) European 
Law Review, 112; Arnull, A.: The European Union and its Court of Justice. Ox fo rd , 
1999. 21-69 ; Ward, A.: Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EC Law. 
Oxford, 2000. 202-287; Albors-Llorens, A.: Private Parties in European Community Law. 
Challenging Community Measures. Oxford, 1996. 
1
 See the critical analysis in Lsher, J. A.: Direct and Individual Concern-an Effect ive 
Remedy or a Conventional Solution? 28 (2003) European Law Review, 575; Albors-
Llorens, A.: The Standing of Private Parties to Challenge Communi ty Measures: Has the 
European Court Missed the Boat? 62 (2003) Cambridge Law Journal, 72; Craig , P.: 
Standing, Rights, and the Structure of Legal Argument . 9 (2003) European Public Law, 
493; Ragolle, F.: Access to Justice for Private Applicants in the Community Legal Order: 
recent (r)evolutions. 28 (2003) European Law Review, 90: Biernat. E.: The Locus Standi of 
Private Applicants under article 230 (4) EC and the Principle of Judicial Protection in the 
European Community . Harvard Jean Monnet Working Section No. 12/03, h t tp: / /www. 
jeanmonnetprogram.org/sections/03/031201. html 
4
 Granger, M-P.: Towards a Liberalisation of Standing Conditions for Individuals 
Seeking Judicial Review of Community Acts: Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v Commission and 
Lnion de Pcquenos Agricultores v Council. 66 (2003) Modern Law Review, 124. 
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point that the requirement of individual concern constitutes all but an intractable 
barrier for individual applicants to the extent that it transformed standing from 
a gateway to judicial review to a permanently close door.5 In addition, there is 
also a discrepancy with the jurisprudence of the Court in other fields where 
the ECJ demonstrated a bold willingness to develop important constitutional 
principles.'1 The departure from the general strategy of expansion of the enforce-
ment potential of European Community (EC) law when it came to standing, is 
surprising due to the fact that the Court seems to disregard the coexistence with 
the constitutional legal structures of the Member States that guaranty the 
existence of liberal legal mechanisms for challenging the validity of measures 
in their municipal systems.7 
Unfortunately, the same restrictive approach has been applied to the stand-
ing of representative groups, irrespective of the fact that the Union has recently 
placed its emphasis on the promotion of participation of citizens in the decision-
making process,8 thus resulting to an inconsistency between policy goals of the 
EU and the approach of the ECJ to standing.4 The idea of enhancing participation 
5
 For similar v iews see: Enchelmaier , S.: No-One Slips Through the Net? Latest 
Developments, And Non-Developments, in the European Court of Just ice 's Jurisprudence 
on Art. 230(4) EC. Working Paper 3, <http://www.competitionlaw.ox.ac.uk/iecl/pdfs/ 
working3enchelmaier.pdf>, 2; Kombos, C.: The Recent Case Law on Locus Standi of 
Private Applicants under Art. 230 (4) EC: A Missed Opportunity or A Velvet Revolution? 
European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 9 (2005) <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2005-
017.pdf>, 1. 
6
 E.g. the development of State liability: Pekka, A.: Twelve Years of Francovich in the 
European Court of Justice: A Survey of the Case-law on the Interpretation of the Three 
Conditions of Liability. In: Moreira de Sousa, S.-Heusel, W. (eds.): Enforcing Community 
law from Francovich to Köbler: Twelve Years of the State Liability Principle. Cologne, 
2004. 59.; Arnull, A.: Rights and Remedies: Restraint or Activism? In: Lonbay, J.-Biondi, 
A. (eds.): Remedies for Breach of EC Law. Sussex, 1997. 15.; Barav, A.: State Liability in 
Damages for Breach of Community Law in the National Courts. In: Barav, A.-Wyatt D. A. 
(eds.): Yearbook of European Law 1996. Oxford, 1997. 87. 
7
 For the liberal stand of Member States on standing see, e.g., German law: Bundes-
verwaltungsgericht 1.12.82 BverwGE 66, 307 (crab-fishermen case)', Italian law: TAR Lazio, 
20. 1. 95, No 62 Foro Italiano 1995 11-460; Belgian law: Conseil d'État, Ville de Liège et Heze, 
20. 9. 91, No 37.676; French law: Conseil d'État, 24. 6. 91, Soc Côte d'Azur, Lebon, 1110. 
8
 Commission's White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428 European 
Governance-A White Paper, 27 July 2001; Laeken Declaration on the Future of Europe, 
December 2001, available <http: / /www.euconvention.be/stat ic/LaekenDcclarat ion.asp>. 
For analysis see Armstrong, K.: Rediscovering Civil Society: The European Union and the 
White Paper on Governance. 8 (2002) European Law Journal, 102. 
9
 Cygan, A.: Protecting the Interests of Civil Society in Community Decision-Making-
The Limits of Article 230 EC, 52 (2003) International Comparative Law Quarterly, 995. 
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has inherent links with the operation of representative groups that exercise 
considerable influence at the pre-legislative level through the medium of 
lobbying practices.10 The Commission's White Paper on European Governance" 
has, according to Curtin, accepted the significant role of representative groups 
in terms of their "dedication to the disinterested search for the public interest in 
society".12 By a logical expansion of the preceding reasoning, it can be argued 
that there is no compelling reason for limiting the quest for promotion of the 
public interest to the drafting stage of legislation. Cygan has supported this 
approach by suggesting that "representation and protection of citizens' interests 
requires ex post judicial protection in circumstances where the legislative 
measure breaches fundamental rights or if its application infringes principles 
of procedural propriety".12 Therefore, it would be paradoxical to insist on the 
functional and democratic utility of representative groups, while simultane-
ously denying any effective standing rights for challenging legislative measures. 
Needless to say, that paradox has become the norm in the sphere of EU law. 
As a corollary, the purpose of this paper is twofold: to offer a descriptive 
analysis of the development and state of the law in relation to locus standi of 
individuals and representative groups and to examine the possible alternatives 
that could be utilized for sidestepping the hurdles created by the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ and CFI in relation to representative groups. The working hypothesis 
applied states that the state of the law is unduly restrictive and economically 
unrealistic and is likely to remain such because of the recent rulings of the ECJ 
that were effectively reaffirmed and codified by the Draft Treaty Establishing 
a Constitution for Europe.14 The alternatives that could be used include the 
10
 On the role of interest groups see: Mazey, S.-Richardson, J.: Interest Groups and the 
Brussels Bureaucracy. In: Hayward, J . -Menon, A. (eds.): Governing Europe. Oxford, 2003. 
208.; Bouwen, P.: Corporate Lobbying in the EU: the Logic of Access. 9 (2002) Journal of 
European Public Policy, 365; Eising, R.: Interest Groups and the European Union. In: Cini, 
M. (eds.): European Union Politics. Oxford, 2003. 192. 
" Op. cit., note 8. Note that the relationship of the Commission with interest groups 
has a long history as evident from Commission of the European Communities, An Open and 
Structured Dialogue Between the Commission and Special Interest Groups, Brussels, 1992, 
CEC: SEC (92) 2272 final, 2 December 1992; Commission of the European Communities 
and Council of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on 
Promoting The Role of Voluntary Organisations and Foundations in Europe, COM (97) 241 
final. Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997. 
' "Curt in . D.: Postnational Democracy: The European Union in Search of a Political 
Philosophy. The Hague. 1997. 90. 
13
 Cygan: op. cit., 995. 
14
 Available <http://europa.eu/constitution/futurum/constitution/index_en.htm> 
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agency analogy that refers to the collective challenging through pressure groups'5 
and the enhanced participation at the drafting level that would aim at creating 
procedural rights of challenge that would be enforceable on the basis of legitimate 
expectations. The preceding proposals apply primarily to representative groups 
but could function as the bridge for relaxing standing requirements in general or 
more realistically for expanding the scope of exceptions to Plaumann. 
In terms of terminological completeness, it must be clarified that the denomi-
nation 'representative groups' is a generic term encompassing a plethora of 
different types of groups. Those cover a broad thematic spectrum ranging from 
pressure groups for specific interests (e.g. environmental groups), representa-
tive groups of sections of the economy (e.g. industrialists) and of workers (trade 
unions). The nature of each representative group impacts on the approach that 
the ECJ and the CFI adopt as will be shown infra, with the stringent approach 
reserved for environmental groups and for bodies that base their claims on 
fundamental human rights. At the other side of the continuum, there are those 
bodies that can establish participatory rights flowing from procedural grounds. 
The other term used by this paper is 'surrogate actions' that refers to actions that 
are intentionally brought by groups in instances where an individual applicant 
would fail due to the Plaumann criteria. 
In structural terms, the paper is divided in three sections: the necessary 
sketching of the existing state of the law, the approach of the ECJ and the CFI 
towards different types of representative groups and the assessment of different 
strategies that could potentially reverse the unsatisfactory legal framework. 
2. Locus standi under Art. 230 EC: the Plaumann shadow 
Art. 230 EC establishes a trichotomy between different types of applicants 
seeking to challenge the validity of acts of the institutions, alas without 
distinguishing between forms of m e a s u r e s , t h u s covering both legislative and 
administrative acts of the Community institutions.17 Moreover, Art. 230 EC 
15
 For an excellent introductory analysis see Douglas-Scott, S.: Constitutional Juris-
prudence of the European Union. London, 2002. 363-368. 
16
 Albors-Llorens, A.: Private Parties in European Community Law. Challenging 
Community Measures. Oxford, 1996. 4, 6. 
17
 Ibid., 5. For the comparison with national systems see Fromont. M.: L ' inf luence du 
Droit français et du Droit allemande sur les Conditions de Recevabilité du Recours en 
Annulation devant la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes. 2 (1966) Revue 
Trimestrielle de Droit Européenne, 47. 
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draws a rigid distinction between legal entities based on the identity of the 
applicant,18 therefore establishing a typological approach whereby there are 
privileged, semi-privileged and non-privileged applicants. These classes have 
in common only the general conditions of Art. 230 (1) EC, namely the act must 
be an act of an EC Institution1' that produces legal effects,20 and the challenge 
must be brought within the two-month time limit.21 On this basis, Art. 230 EC 
adopts an approach of selective actio popularis in the sense privileged applicants 
have automatic standing to challenge measures adopted by the Institutions,22 
while the semi-privileged class can take action against other institutions only 
for the purpose of protecting their prerogative powers.21 
18
 Hartley, T.: The Foundations of EC Law. Oxford. 1998. 349-350. 
14
 Institutions whose acts are excluded by Art. 2 3 0 (1) are the European Council, 
COREPER and the Council when acting under intergovernmental powers: Case T-584/93, 
Roujansky v. European Council, [19941 European Court Reports, 11-585; Case C-25/94, 
Commission v. Council (FAO), [1996] European Court Reports, 1-1469; Cases C-181, 248/91, 
Parliament v. Council and Commission (Aid to Bangladesh), [1993] European Court 
Reports, 1-3685. 
11
 A relevant concept is to be found in the landmark decision in Case 22/70, ERTA, 
[1971] European Court Reports, 263: the list of acts that can be reviewed in Art. 249 EC is 
not exhaustive and other acts that are sui generis in nature can be reviewed, provided that 
they have legal effects. See also Case 60/81, IBM v. Commission, [1981] European Court 
Reports, 2639, Case T-3/93 , Air France v. Commission, [1994] European Court Reports, II-
121. See also the recent decision in Case C-131/03 P. Reynolds Tobacco and Others v 
Commission, Official Journal 2003 С124/10. delivered on 12,h September 2006. 
Starts from the moment that the measure in ques t ion is published or from the 
moment that the applicant is notified: Case 156/77, Commission v Belgium. [1978| European 
Court Reports, 1881: Cases 10 & 18/68, Eridania v Commission, [1969] European Court 
Reports , 459; Case C-195/91 P, Bayer AG v Commission, [1994] European Court Reports, 
1-5619. 
" Privileged applicants: Member States, Commission, Council and after the Treaty of 
Nice the European Parliament. On the gradual change to the standing rights of the EP see 
C-302/87, European Parliament v. Council (Comitology), [1988] European Court Reports, 
5615, Case C-70/88 European Parliament v. Council (Chernobyl), [1990] European Court 
Reports, 1-2041. For comment see Weiler, J.: Pride and Prejudice-Parliament v. Council. 
14 (1989) European Law Review, 334.; Bebr, G.: The Standing of the EP in the Com-
munity system of Legal Remedies: A Thorny Jurisprudential Development. (1990) 10 
YBEL 171. 
_1
 Semi-privileged: ECB and the Cour t of Auditors. See Craig. P.: EMU, the European 
Central Bank and Judicial Review. In: Beaumont-Walker (eds.): Legal Framework of the 
Single Currency. Oxford, 1999. 112. 
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Any natural or legal person can challenge the validity of a measure on the 
basis of Art. 230 (4) EC, provided that the measure is one described as within 
the scope of the provision and that the dual requirement of 'direct and individual 
concern' is satisfied. Direct concern is an unproblematic test of causation whereby 
the applicant needs to show that he is affected by the contested measure and 
that there is no discretionary implementing measure breaking the chain."4 In 
terms of individual concern when challenging decisions addressed to a third 
party, it was held in the landmark decision in Plaumann v. Commission25 that 
a claimant is individually concerned if the decision in question "affects them 
by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of 
circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by 
virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually".2'1 Therefore, the Court 
construed the individual concern requirement as a two-part test requiring that 
the claimant is differentiated from all other persons and that by reasons of those 
distinguishing features the claimant is singed out as the original addressee of 
the decision. 
In Plaumann the application of the test to the specific facts made the test 
even more narrow and demanding and in effect created a third requirement. 
The Court ruled that the claimant is affected by the decision because he was an 
importer of Clementines but could not be singled out in the same way as the 
original addressee as in the future any individual could enter in the practice 
of the specific commercial activity. It becomes therefore clear that the ECJ 
introduced an additional test in terms of the singled out requirement by requiring 
that the claimant has to satisfy the dual test not only at the present but also 
show that the same would apply in the future. 
The 'future element' represents a constraint that renders the individual concern 
requirement almost impossible to satisfy since the Court starts from the premise 
that at any moment in the future any individual could decide and enter the 
specific commercial circle. Clearly, that is an argument that in effect ignores 
fundamental principles of economic activity according to which the entry into 
24
 Case 62/70, Bock v. Commission, 119711 European Court Reports, 897.; Case 11/82, 
Piraiki-Pcitraiki v. Commission, [1985] European Court Reports, 207.; Case T-96/92, Comité 
central d'entreprise de la Société générale des grande sources v. Commission, [1995] 
European Court Reports, 11-1213 and Case T-12/93, Comité central d'entreprise de la Société 
anonyme Vittel v. Commission, [1995] European Court Reports, 11-1247. See Hartley: op. 
cit. 369-373; Craig, P . -De Bùrca, G.: EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials. Oxford, 2003. 
518-520. 
"
s
 Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Commission, 11963] European Court Reports, 95. 
26
 Ibid., para. 107. 
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a market is not always open to anybody but is restricted by a plethora of 
factors. Those could include the strength of existing and established competitors, 
the growth potential of the market, the significance of established brands and a 
number of other factors that are beyond the scope of this work. 7 
The restrictive nature of the Plaumann formula has been confirmed in 
numerous subsequent decisions that can be placed in two categories: (i) appli-
cation of Plaumann leading to "economically unrealistic"28 results, and (ii) 
'generous' application in a retroactive context.29 In terms of challenging 
regulations, Art. 230 (4) EC allows for the challenge of regulations that are in 
essence decisions and the relevant requirement is again that of direct and 
individual concern, with Plaumann supplemented in Calpak30 and the test whether 
a regulation is of general application or specific application." Therefore, the 
economically unfounded and unrealistic approach of the ECJ in relation to the 
criteria applied in Plaumann has been applied in the context of regulations, 
regrettably reinforced with the additional requirement that the regulations have 
specific application.32 Once again, a limited exception applies for occasions 
where the factual background is placed in the past and the set of events was 
~
7
 A good starting point for appreciating the economic unstableness of the "future" 
requirement is the seminal work by Porter. M.: How competitive forces shape strategy. 59 
(1979) Harvard Business Review. In brief, there are 5 forces that influence a firm's 
competitive strategy. Four forces- the bargaining power of customers, the bargaining power 
of suppliers, the threat of new entrants, and the threat of substitute products-combine with 
other variables to influence a f if th force, the level of competition in an industry. 
2S
 Craig-De Bùrca: op. cit., 489. See for examples the decisions in Case 231/82, Spijker 
Kwasten v. Commission, [ 1983] European Court Reports, 2559. 
24
 See for example Cases 106-107/63, Toepfer v. Commission, [1965] European Court 
Reports, 405. 411. "the membersh ip of the class is fixed and ascertainable at the date of 
the adoption of the contested measure". See also Case 11/82, Piraiki-Patraiki v. Commission, 
[ 1985] European Court Reports, 207. 
30
 Cases 789-790/79, Calpak SpA and Società Emiliana Lavorazione Frutta SpA v. 
Commission, [1980] European Court Reports, 1949. 
31
 Ibid., para. 9. For crit icism see Craig-De Bùrca: op. cit., 494; Craig, P.: Standing , 
Rights, and the Structure of Legal Argument. 9 (2003) European Public Law, 495. 
32
 Case 101/76, KSH v. Commission, [1977] European Court Reports, 797; Cases 103-
9/78 Beauport v. Council and Commission, [1979] European Court Reports, 17; Case 162/78, 
Wagner v. Commission, [ 1979] European Court Reports, 3467; Case 45/81, Alexander Moksel 
Import-Export GmbH v. Commission, [1982] European Court Reports, 1129; Cases 97, 
99, 193 and 215/86, Asteris AE and Greece v. Commission, [1988] European Court 
Reports, 2181. 
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completed,1' thus creating inconsistency through the weak technical dichotomy 
between the Calpak rule and the exception." 
The inconsistency is strengthened by the development of subject matter 
exceptions where the Court has relaxed the standing requirements applying to 
challenges of regulations that are disguised decisions. The five subject matter 
areas are de facto exceptions to the restrictive interpretation of individual 
concern, as it is evident from the case law in the fields of anti-dumping, " state 
aid,36 competition,37 trademark rights38 and instances where a democratic con-
sideration is present.34 
As an interim conclusion, the approaches of the ECJ and the CFI in inter-
preting Art. 230 (4) EC and the requirement of individual concern have been 
extremely restrictive and narrow. The decision in Plaumann is highly problematic 
" C a s e 100/74, Société CAM v. Commission ( 1975] European Court Reports, 1393; 
Cases 41-44/70, International Fruit Company BV v. Commission, [1971] European Court 
Reports, 411. 
34
 Cf. Case 138/79, Roquette Frères v. Council, [1980] European Court Reports, 3333; C-
152/88, Sofrimport Sari v. Commission, [1990] European Court Reports, 1-2477 with Cases 
789-790/79, Calpak SpA and Società Emiliana Lavorazione Frutta SpA v. Commission, 
[1980] European Court Reports, 1949; Case 11/82, Piraiki-Patraiki v. Commission, |1985] 
European Court Reports, 207. 
35
 Case 113/77, NTN Toyo Bearing Co. v. Council and the Commission, | I979] 
European Court Reports, 1185; Cases 239, 275/82 Allied Corporation v. Commission, [1984] 
ECR-1005; Case 264/82, Timex Corporation v. Council and Commission, [1985] European 
Court Reports, 849; C-358/89, Extrámét Industrie SA v. Council, 11992] European Court 
Reports, 1-3813. See the Opinion by AG Jacobs in Extramet, para. 33 where he states "Nor 
do I believe it is necessary, in order to reach a satisfactory conclusion, to make direct 
reference to the European Convention on Human Rights, on which Extrámét places some 
reliance in these proceedings. The Convention and the laws of the Member States are, 
however, indirectly relevant in that they support the existence of a general principle of law, 
namely the right to an effect ive judicial remedy: see Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief 
Constable of the RUC, [1986] European Court Reports, 1651; Case 222/86, Unectef v. 
Heylens, [1987] European Cour t Reports, 4097. In my view, Article 173 should be 
interpreted so as to give effect to that principle". 
36
 Case 169/84, COFAZ v. Commission, [1984] European Cour t Reports, 391;Case 
C-198/91, William Cock pic v. Commission, [1993] European Court Reports, 1-2486; Case 
730/79, Phillip Morris Holland BV v. Commission, [1980] European Court Reports, 2671. 
37
 Case 26/76, Metro-SB-Groâmarkte GmbH & Co KG v. Commission, [1977] ECR 
1875. 
38
 Case C-309/89, Codorniu SA v Council, [1994] European Cour t Reports, 1-1853. 
3 9 Case 294/83, Partie Ecologiste 'Les Verts' v. Parliament, [1986] ECR-1339. See 
Craig, P.: Democracy and Rule-making within the EC: An Empirical and Normative 
Assessment. 3 (1997) European Law Journal 105. 
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leading the subsequent case law to take the form of an anthology of examples 
of missed opportunities, economically unrealistic criteria, absurd outcomes and 
exceptions that are in reality further elaborations on and confirmations of the 
strictness of the tests. Unfortunately, those problematic parameters of individual 
concern for third parties were transplanted to challenges by representative groups. 
3. Actions by representative groups and the Plaumann shadow 
3.1. Representative groups, the symbiotic relation with the institutions and 
their constitutional role 
The preceding section pictured the unduly restrictive and limited approach to 
standing that has been severely criticized40 for its economic naivety and lack of 
protection for the individual. It is, therefore, interesting to examine whether 
the Court has adopted a different approach in relation to representative groups 
that bring actions on behalf of their membership. If the approach of the Courts 
is more liberal than that adopted for individual applicants, then there is an 
effective alternative circumventing the Plaumann test and its expansion in the 
jurisprudence. This is the rationale behind the agency analogy. 
The agency analogy refers to the use of group actions as a medium for 
challenging the validity of measures where the individual applicant would 
normally fail due to the interpretation of the individual concern requirement 
in the case law.41 Therefore, the idea of surrogate actions could provide an 
effective alternative for bypassing the consistent restrictive approach of the 
ECJ and the CFI in relation standing under Art. 230 (4) EC. The main theme of 
this section is whether it is desirable and justifiable to have a two-tier approach 
reserved for representative groups and other private applicants. 
One dimension of the debate perceives representative groups as having 
extraordinary opportunities to intervene and influence the nature, content and 
scope of legislative measures. The influencing power of representative groups 
has been described as symbiotic with the Commission.4- with the latter depending 
on representative groups for expert advice, technical expertise and for offering 
cross-national advocacy coalitions that are essential for the successful introduction 
411
 See the thorough analysis by Enchelmaier, S.: op. cit. 
41
 For an influential account supporting a reversal of the case law see Usher, J.: Judicial 
Review of Community Acts and the Private Litigant. In: Campbell, A.—Voyatzi, M. (eds.): 
Legal Reasoning and Judicial Interpretation of Community Law. Trenton, 1996, 121. 
42
 Mazey-Richardson: op. cit., 209. 
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of legislative proposals.41 Consequently, such groups already have a dispropor-
tionately prominent role that generates influence impacting on the substance of 
legislative measures. Therefore, is seems unjust and democratically dispropor-
tionate for representative groups to have a special treatment reserved for them in 
the context of legal challenges.44 Moreover, it has been argued45 that associational 
standing is undesirable because it could be exploited by associations at the 
expense of the 'Hohfeldian claimant'.46 Such type of claimant can be defined 
as the applicant that has a material claim correlative to a distinct obligation in 
another person or entity, while an interest group has an ideological claim.47 
Therefore, the argument is based on the subset of rules that Hohfeld identified 
in a legal system that have the functional task of regulating and directing the 
behaviour of the subjects of the system, namely individuals and associations, 
through prohibiting and stipulating what those agents are required by law to 
do. If an association takes advantage of the subset of rules that grants standing 
rights on the basis of a broad right to participation and at the same time the 
individuals with a concrete interest in challenging a measure are effectively 
excluded from doing so by the rules of the subsystem, then there is a legitimacy 
gap. In other words, the ideological right of associations to standing is placed 
at an equal level with the right of an individual to challenge where there is a 
vital interest at stake, or alternatively at a higher level if the individual is 
effectively denied of a standing right.48 
The problem is magnified by the fact that the ECJ has persistently applied 
the strict Plaumann criteria to actions brought by private applicants. The creation 
of an exception favoring representative groups would create an unnecessary 
and unjustified dichotomy that would be creating the assumption that the 
individual deserves and receives protection of a lower intensity.4" The con-
sequences for the legitimacy and authority of the Union's judicial architecture 
would be negative and undesirable, since a double-standard yardstick would 
be seen as applying. At a practical level, the objection is that a liberal approach 
to the standing of representative groups could result in the creation of the 
43
 Ibid. 4 0 9 ^ 1 0 , 4 1 5 . 
44
 Harlow, C.: Public Law and Popular Justice. 65 (2002) Modern Law Review, 13. 
45
 Douglas-Scott: op. cit., 361. 
46
 Term used to describe the ideas expressed by Hohfeld, W. N.: Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied to Judicial Reasoning [ed: Cook, W. W., Yale University Press]. 
New Haven and London, 1919. 
47
 Douglas-Scott: op. cit., 367. 
48
 Tushnet, M.: The Sociology of Article III: a Response to Professor Brilmayar. 93 
(1983) Harvard Law Review, 698. 
49
 Cygan: op. cit., 996. 
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phenomenon of "busybodies or meddlesome organizations".50 As a corollary, 
the workload of the courts would increase, the legal certainty would be under-
mined as legislative measures would not be effective in practice until the time 
limit for challenge expires and the danger of test cases or delaying challenges 
from financially powerful bodies would be immanent. 
On a different level, the creation of an exceptional class of private applicants 
in the form of representative groups could upset the delicate institutional 
balance. This is the case because according to Harlow5' judicial review could 
be substituted by political accountability in the sense that legal challenges are to 
be made possible against policy decisions. In other words, the representative 
groups' function is not to second-guess informed policy decisions made under 
the complex legislative process when the result of their lobbying has proved to 
be unsuccessful. The democratic processes could, therefore, be bypassed with 
the practical consequence of placing the unelected judiciary at the difficult 
position of deciding cases that are in practice reviews of policy questions. 
Finally, the argumentation against expanding standing rights for association 
groups includes a practical element that refers to the "repeat player phenomenon" 
and the "saga approach", whereby associations initiate repeatedly challenges 
and apply a systematic attack approach on a specific policy.5" The consequence 
of the actions of such representative bodies would be the increase in the 
workload of the courts, while at the same time there seems to be an unjustified 
and disproportionate capitalization on the politically influential and expanding 
negotiating power of interest groups. 
The opposite line of reasoning counters the latter point by pointing to the 
fact that judicial review is not isolated from the policy level and the judges 
have arguably the sensitivity of restraint in areas of pure policy determinations. 
Moreover, it is practically intricate to distinguish between administrative 
decisions and policy decisions, with the example of the Greenpeace case53 
proving the point. There, the issue was the funding of a power station that was 
on the face of the record in breach of the environmental safeguards provided 
under EU law. At which point does the policy element end and the administrative 
element begin? Or, can it be argued that the issue is purely a policy matter or 
alternatively solely an administrative propriety topic? Solving the Gordian 
'"Ibid. 
4
 Harlow: Public Law and Popular Justice, op. cit., 13.; Harlow. C.: Towards a Theory 
of Access for the ECJ. 12 (1992) Yearbook of European Law, 213. 
52
 Harding: op. cit., 116. 
53
 Case T-585/93, Greenpeace v Commission, [1995] European Court Reports, 11-2205. 
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knot of demarcation must be entrusted to the judiciary otherwise judicial review 
would be ab initio externally limited. 
On a different point, the argument about placing representative groups higher 
than individuals in terms of standing must be approached with the pragmatic 
factor of an overly restrictive approach to standing of private applicants in mind. 
Therefore, the main issue is whether it is productive to maintain a legal lacuna 
in standing on the basis of a theoretically valid principle of equal treatment. It is 
submitted that the persistent unwillingness of the ECJ to reform the Plaumann 
criteria as was reaffirmed in the UPA3A and Jègo-Quèrè55 decisions and by Art. 
III-365 DTC56 creates a pragmatically persuasive reason for relaxing standing 
requirements at any given opportunity through the creation of exceptions. 
The outcome is not ideal but is preferable than a stagnated cu-de-sac. 
In relation to the workload concern,57 it can be argued that the experience of 
national legal orders with a liberal approach to the standing of representative 
groups has not shown any increase in the workload of the national courts.58 
At the same time, the busybody phenomenon can be preempted since there is 
no argument supporting an actio populáris for representative groups, but a 
balanced test that distinguishes between representative groups with a genuine 
interest and those bodies that have a diametrically opposite agenda. The 
experience of national legal orders and the United Kingdom in specific that is 
analysed infra, points to the existence of such solutions. 
As an interim conclusion, there are reasons of principle against the creation 
of a dual approach to standing of representative groups and individual appli-
cants, but those arguments have to be approached in a holistic manner that 
takes into account the pragmatic limitations to standing and the need to create 
exceptions to the application of the Plaumann criteria until a new trend is 
created. 
54
 Case C-50/2(X)() P, Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council [2002] European Court 
Reports, 1-6677 (hereafter "UPA"). 
55
 Case C-263/02 P, Commission v Jègo-Quèrè [2004] CM LR 12 (hereafter " Jègo-Quèrè 
Appeal"). 
56
 For analysis see Kombos, C.: The Recent Case Law on Locus Standi of Private 
Applicants under Art. 230 (4) EC: A Missed Opportunity or A Velvet Revolution? European 
Integration online Papers (EloP) Vol. 9 (2005) № 17, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2005-
017.pdf>, 14-16; Var jú , M.: The Debate on the Future of the Standing under Article 
230(4) TEC in the European Convention. (2004) 10 (1) European Public Law 42. 
57
 As expressed by the CFI in Case T-585/93, Greenpeace v Commission, [1995] European 
Court Reports, 11-2205, 2230-2232. 
58
 Conclusion reached by Cygan: op. cit., 1000. 
386 COSTAS KOM BOS 
3.2. Representative groups and standing: the ECJ and the English approach 
compared 
The jurisprudence of the ECJ is very restrictive towards representative groups 
and the Court has persistently refused to create an exception to the Plaumann 
approach when a representative group has sought to challenge under Art. 230 (4) 
EC.59 Accordingly, the position has been summarized by the CFI in Associazone 
Nazionale Bieticotori v. Council60 where it was held that interest bodies are 
able to bring actions under Art. 230 (4) EC when: a legal provision expressly 
grants procedural powers to trade associations;61 the members of the association 
would have been able to bring individual actions as a result of being directly 
and individually concerned;6" the associations negotiating position has been 
affected by the challenged legislative measure, thus attributing to the association 
direct and individual concern as an entity.6 ' 
This is partly surprising because groups have evolved to be a highly active 
and integral part of the legislative process and have been perceived as a remedial 
tool for the representative/democratic deficit of the Union.64 Moreover, there is 
a comparative paradox in the sense that the development of the state of the law 
in Member States reflects a favorable disposition towards standing in general65 
and surrogate groups especially when those groups seek to initiate judicial 
review actions.66 
51
 See Cases 16,17/62, Confederation Nationale des fruits et Producteurs des fruits et 
Légumes v Council, (4962) European Court Reports, 471. See also Cygan: op. cit., 1003-
1005. 
6,1
 Case T-38/98, Associazone Nazionale Bieticotori v. Council, ( 1998] European Court 
Reports, 11-4191, para. 25. 
61
 Case 191/82 Fediol v Commission, [1983| European Court Reports, 2913, paragraphs 
28 to 30; Case T-12/93, Comité Central d'Entreprise de la Société Anonyme de Vittel and 
Others v Commission, [1995] European Court Reports. 11-1247, paras. 39-42 
62
 Joined Cases T-447/93, T-448/93 and T-449/93, AITEC and Others v Commission, 
[1995] European Court Reports, 11-1971, para. 62. 
63
 Joined Cases 67/85, 68/85 and 70/85 Van der Kooy and Others v Commission 
[1988] European Court Reports, 219, paras. 21-24; Joined Cases T-481/93 and T-484/93 
Vereniging van Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and Others v Commission [1995] European 
Court Reports, 11-2941, para. 64. 
''
4
 Sudbery, I.: Bridging the Legitimacy Gap in the EU: Can Civil Society Help to Bring 
the Union Closer to its Citizens. 26 (2003) Collegium, 75. 
65
 Conclusion reached by Cygan: op. cit., 991. 
'* For the liberal stand of Member States on standing see, e.g., German law: Bundes-
verwaltungsgericht 1.12.82 BverwGE 66, 307 (crab-fishermen case): Italian law: TAR Lazio, 
20.1.95, No 62 Foro Italiano 1995 11-460: Belgian law: Conseil d'État, Ville de Liège et 
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In the English context, the modern origins of granting standing to surrogate 
groups can be found in the Greenpeace (No.2)bl ruling, where Greenpeace sought 
to challenge a decision by the Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP) that granted 
a variation in the license of BNFL, a company reprocessing nuclear waste, 
enabling the company to expand its operations in its plant in Cumbria. HMIP 
argued that Greenpeace had no standing as it could not show sufficient interest 
in the decision made, but the judgment by Otton J rejected that argument and 
held that a representative action could be brought by Greenpeace because there 
was a geographical proximity element. In other words, the deciding factor was 
the existence of 2,500 members of Greenpeace in the Cumbria area, thus 
establishing a sufficient interest in the decision that extended the license to 
processing of nuclear waste.68 
In contrast to the pragmatic approach of Otton J in Greenpeace (No.2), the 
Pergau Dam69 decision represents an expansion in the sense that a more 
theoretically holistic and constitutionally sound reasoning was deployed for 
justifying the granting of standing to representative groups. The issue was the 
legality of a decision to use funds from the overseas aid budget for financing 
the building of the Pergau dam in Malaysia. The World Development Movement 
(WDM), an organization concerned with the distribution of aid, challenged the 
decision on the basis that the project was not going to be beneficial for the 
Malaysian economy and did not represent good value for the British taxpayer. 
The legal basis for the action was the failure of the Foreign Secretary to adhere 
to the provisions of the Overseas Development and Cooperation Act 1980 that 
enabled the financing subject to the existence of a purpose of promoting the 
development or maintaining the economy of an overseas country. Moreover, 
section 1 of the preceding Act limited funding to situations that it was of an 
economically sound nature.70 
Heze, 20.9.91, No 37.676; French law: Conseil d'État, 24.6.91, Soc Côte d'Azur, Lebon, 
1110. 
67
 R v Inspectorate of Pollution and another, Ex parte Greenpeace Ltd (No.2), 11994| 4 
All ER 329. 
68
 Analysis by Harlow: Public Law and Popular Justice, op. cit. 4 et seq.; Cygan: op. 
cit., 998-1000. 
69
 R с Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ex parte World Development Movement 
Ltd, [1995] 1 All Englis Reports, 611. 
70
 Section 1 of the Overseas Development and Cooperation Act 1980: "The Secretary of 
State has the power, for the purposes of promoting the development or maintaining the 
economy of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, to furnish any person or 
body with financial or technical assistance". 
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The judgment by Rose LJ concentrated on the constitutionally focal position 
of judicial review in a legal system and the essential function of judicial 
review as the guarantor of effective accountability of governmental agencies 
that includes both substantive and procedural fairness in decision-making 
processes.71 Therefore, the fact that the action by the WDM was the only 
available legal challenge to the executive action in this instance was a relevant 
and significant consideration in ensuring that effective governmental account-
ability required under the constitutional rule.72 The existence of technical 
legalistic requirements that could prevent access to a court in circumstances 
where no other legal action was possible,73 was discarded by Rose LJ in the 
exact way that Lord Diplock regarded such obstacles as grave legal lacunae in 
a dissenting judgment in the ex part Federation of Small Businesses case.74 
Moreover, Rose LJ held that the specific characteristics of the pressure group 
were such that distinguished it from meddlesome busybodies, since WDM had 
showed in the past an active and constructive involvement in the distribution of 
aid.73 The lack of an impact on the membership of WDM akin to that present 
in the Greenpeace (No.2) case was not a determinant factor because of the 
interests of accountability, the absence of other potential challengers and the 
evident expertise and prominent role of the organization in the field of 
development aid.76 
It is, therefore, apparent that there is a favorable approach towards interest 
groups in the English context that is not adopting an actio popularis yardstick, 
but which is distinguishing between groups that have a contribution to make in 
the effectiveness of the process of judicial review. Therefore, the argument that 
a 'repeat player' could take advantage of a more liberal approach to the 
standing of surrogate groups to initiate actions that range from test cases to 
time wasting, delaying actions, can be rejected as simplistic. Moreover, the 
possibility of creating a system that would encourage the 'saga strategy' is 
again remote because each case is examined individually and the decision 
1
 R v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ex parte World Development Movement 
Ltd. [1995] I All ER 611, 619. For analysis see Tomkins, A.: Judges Dani(n) the Govern-
ment. 7 ( 1996-1997) Kings College Law Journal 91 ; Harlow: Public Law and Popular Justice. 
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whether an interest group has standing in the specific case depends on a 
combination of tests that seek to establish the existence of a genuine interest.77 
The problem created is the formation of a dichotomy of approaches to the 
standing of interests groups, with national courts and the ECJ adopting 
diametrically opposed methodologies and rationales. The national courts favor 
a structured and liberal stand that aims at the improvement of the effectiveness 
of the process of judicial review and of its purposes, while at the same time 
appreciating the increased participatory role of interest groups in modern 
society. On the other hand, the ECJ adopts a rigid approach founded on the 
perception that there can be no distinction between individual applicants and 
interests groups in terms of standing, thus applying the Plaumann criteria to 
surrogate actions. As a corollary, the extremely narrow and restrictive tests 
applicable to the actions of annulment under the ECJ's interpretation of Art. 
230 (4) EC are applied to the actions by interest groups, on the basis that indi-
vidual concern must be proved in accordance with Plaummann. The dichotomy 
of approach leads to the application of double standards and inconsistency, 
with national courts granting standing to interest groups that challenge national 
legislation for incompatibility with Community law, while the same group 
would not have standing to challenge a Community legislative measure. In R v. 
S.S. for Employment, ex part EOC78 it was held that the Equal Opportunities 
Commission had standing to challenge the compatibility of an Act of Parliament 
with Art. 141 EC, which contrasts with the persistent denial of standing to 
pressure groups by the ECJ that is represented in the Po Delta judgment.7 ' ' 
3.3. Representative groups in the environmental context 
In the Po Delta case the CFI8" this time and later the ECJ81 on appeal rejected 
the application of agriculturists and other affiliated associations seeking to 
challenge a Decision approving an EU funded plan for the environmental 
protection of their local area. The CFI concluded that the applicants were not 
in any way differentiated from the other residents of the area, because the 
77
 See Harding: op. cit., 116. 
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effect of the plan on the agriculturists would have been the same with the 
effect on any other citizens living in the area. More significantly, it was stated 
that "it cannot be accepted as a principle that an association, in its capacity as 
the representative of a category of traders, is individually concerned by a measure 
affecting the general interests of that category".82 Therefore, an association/in-
terest group was equated with individual applicants and no special status was 
given to the association in terms of the Plaumann requirements. 
In an analogous ruling, in Danielson v. Commission83 an application for 
interim measures brought by residents of Tahiti in relation to nuclear tests 
undertaken by France was found to be inadmissible under Art. 34 EURATOM. 
The fact that they could show the possibility or likelihood of serious physical 
or economic harm84 was not enough for establishing individual concern as they 
applicants were not in any way differed from the residents of the island as a 
whole.87 In more detail, it was held that "even the assumption that the applicants 
might suffer personal damage linked to the alleged harmful effects of the 
nuclear tests in question on the environment or on the health of the general 
public, that circumstance alone would not be sufficient to distinguish them 
individually in the same way as a person to whom the contested decision is 
addressed".8'1 The factual circumstances of the case and the unequivocal 
rejection of the claim of the applicants, irrespective of the logical argument 
that there is an actual threat to the health of the residents, has triggered 
negative criticisms of the strictness of the approach of the CFI.87 
The landmark Greenpeace88 decision is representative of the approach of 
the Court and a brief description of the factual background is necessary in 
82
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order to present the standard type situation when a surrogate organization 
brings an action for annulment. 
Three environmentalist groups and local residents of the Canary Islands 
challenged the legality of a bundle of Commission Decisions that granted aid 
from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in order to contribute 
to the construction of two power stations. The allocation of funds from the 
ERDF is governed by Art. 7 of Regulation 2052/8889 that requires that the 
distribution of funds complies with the purposes and provisions of the EU 
legal order, including environmental protection. Conformity with the preceding 
provision is ensured through the requirement that an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) should be carried out, but such an assessment was not com-
missioned. Subsequently, the first of four installments was paid to the Spanish 
Government in 1993, thus triggering the challenge by Greenpeace before a 
Spanish court, with the purpose of declaring the payment to be illegal and 
stopping further payments. The action was unsuccessful because the doctrine 
of Foto-Frost90 prevents national courts from declaring a Community act 
invalid, but it is interesting to note that the Greenpeace's action was dismissed 
not because of lack of standing but due to the nature of the measure that was 
challenged and the limitations imposed by the ECJ in Foto-Frost. On this point, 
AG Cosmas in his Opinion stated that "I do not see in what way the issue of the 
legality of that decision could be raised in the context of national proceedings. 
Those proceedings can concern only the lawfulness of the administrative 
authorizations granted for construction of the electricity-generating power 
stations, or of the environmental impact assessment".91 
The next step for Greenpeace was to initiate action before the CFI on the 
basis that the provisions of the Environmental Impact Directive4- were not 
complied with prior to the payment of the first installment, because there was 
no Environmental Impact Assessment carried out.93 Greenpeace also raised 
the point that it had raised this failure in communications to the Commission 
both prior and after the payment of the installment.94 The applicants argued 
that the CFI must adopt a liberal approach to standing in the present case 
89
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because their interest is in the protection of the environment and not of an 
economic nature."5 Moreover, the applicants stated that the membership of the 
association were individually concerned, thus creating a logical need to allow 
the association to represent their interests.'"1 Alternatively, the applicants claimed 
that their focused and coordinated involvement during the stage of legal control 
differentiated them from other potential applicants."7 
The CFI dismissed the application based on the lack of individual concern98 
in accordance with Plaumann as manifested in the failure of the applicants to 
show that they were different from all other individuals resident or working in 
the area and their inability to form a closed category in line with the Calpak 
test.99 The appeal to the ECJ was the only option left for Greenpeace and the 
local residents seeking to challenge the decision. 
Before examining the judgment of the ECJ, it must be clarified that the 
findings of the Court were expressed in an unusually laconic manner whereby 
only eight short paragraphs were devoted to the examination of the arguments 
of the applicants. The ECJ, relied on the CFI 's judgment, thus it can be argued 
that the ECJ endorsed the arguments of the CFI which requires reference to 
both judgments in order to fully appreciate the reasoning applied. 
The main argument of the applicants was that their communications to the 
Commission in terms of the lack of an Environmental Impact Study amounted 
to rights of participation that form procedural rights.100 The ECJ rejected the 
argument by highlighting the fact that the participation of Greenpeace was 
voluntary, unsolicited and not part of the formal consultation process.101 There 
was no invitation to Greenpeace to participate in the process of consultation, 
nor was there a request by the Commission to provide evidence and expert 
opinion that would have placed the organization within the contemplation of 
the decision-maker.1112 In the absence of a formal element that would create 
95
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participation rights, Greenpeace was not differentiated and singled out from 
the wider public in a manner that would grant standing. 
Greenpeace's second argument stated that the Environmental Impact 
Directive's preamble sets as the purpose of the measure the protection of the 
public concerned,'03 thus outlining the creation of a closed group of applicants 
that possessed procedural rights of participation. The ECJ rejected the argument 
on the basis that the directive's purpose was too vague and could not be 
construed as creating a closed class of applicants that could have participation 
rights by virtue of their interest in environmental matters.104 A directive is a 
general legislative measure that differs significantly to a decision and a failure 
under a decision to follow certain procedural requirements could create a closed 
class, whereas it is incoherent to have a closed class formed from a general 
legislative measure like a directive.'05 
Greenpeace made a third related argument contending that the right to 
environmental protection ensured through environmental policies could never 
form a closed class since by definition such interests are communal and of 
such paramount importance that warrants the granting of standing for their 
protection.10" The ECJ repeated its earlier point, namely that the applicants 
lacked individual concern as defined in Plaumann and could not be distinguished 
and singled out from any other resident, worker or tourist.107 
The decision is myopic and reflective of an inability to adjust to the 
demands created by the persistent reliance on Plaumann.",s The overall effect 
is that the Courts remained within the spirit of their interpretation of individual 
concern and the pre-existing restrictive jurisprudence, which can be seen as an 
attempt to avoid criticisms for applying double standards in favour of pressure 
groups. In response, it can be argued that interest groups are more powerful 
and organised than individual applicants therefore it would be easier for those 
associations to meet the individual concern requirements. Moreover, a different 
approach would have created a paradox where an individual was offered weaker 
103
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protection than organised groups, thus triggering criticism for expanding the 
libera] approach to individual applicants. 
Nonetheless, the preceding line of reasoning must be approached with 
scepticism since the wider context of the strict approach to standing for 
individual applicants needs to be considered as a relevant factor requiring the 
relaxation of rules applying to interest groups in order to address certain of the 
deficiencies of the system. Unfortunately, yet understandably as the author 
argued elsewhere,"14 the ECJ refused to alter its position in the most important 
interest group case that came before it. 
The UP A case"" represented for some an opportunity to reform the unduly 
problematic Plaumann test and to set the criteria for standing in general and 
for interest groups in specific on a completely new foundation."1 The case 
concerned UPA, a major Spanish trade association that represents the interests 
of Spanish farmers, that sought review of a Council Regulation concerning 
olive oil production aid and price caps. The ECJ stated in unequivocal terms 
that "a natural or legal person does not, under any circumstances, have stand-
ing"112 if the Plaumann conditions are not met, thus directly rejecting the 
option to create an exception. The ECJ placed the burden on the national courts 
by requiring them to ensure access to effective judicial protection through 
establishing an appropriate system of legal remedies and procedures. The duty 
under Art. 10 EC required, according to the ECJ , ' " that the national courts 
should facilitate as far as possible access to a court when there is a claim of 
invalidity, by construing national rules accordingly. Therefore, the ECJ 
explained that the system of remedies is complete at the Union level and that 
the alternatives to Art. 230 EC are effective, with the obligation to ensure 
access resting with national courts.1" The decision was reaffirmed in Jègo-
104
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Quèrè,n> a case that has no interest group element, and in this respect analogous 
to the t/PA judgment where the standing of the trade association was considered 
in conjunction and inseparably from the general standing issue for individual 
applicants. Therefore, the UPA case focused solely on the standing according 
to Plaumann and made no reference to the distinct class of challenges by 
interest groups, thus falling outside the scope of this paper. It is suffice to say 
that the UPA case reaffirmed the approach of the ECJ that perceives interest 
groups and individual applicants as a unit under the umbrella of Plaumann. 
In conclusion, the restrictive approach to standing of individual applicants 
seeking to challenge legislative measures at the Union level has provided the 
skeleton for the development of an equally restrictive jurisprudence in relation 
to interest groups. The agency analogy has been excluded by the ECJ and can 
not provide an effective alternative for circumventing the standing hurdles 
resulting from the Plaumann formula. However, it is submitted that the study 
of the case law relevant to interest groups offers an insight into ways in which 
such groups could create the conditions that would enable them to show the 
existence of individual concern and those conditions refer mainly to the creation 
of procedural rights expressly mentioned in and forming part of the legislative 
framework. 
In other words, the existence of procedural rights ranging from participation 
to consultation would trigger a legitimate expectation that is essentially procedural 
and which would provide the foundation for the obtainment of individual concern. 
Representative groups can ensure the right to challenge legislative enactments 
through the medium of creating the conditions for influencing decision making 
bodies, which is in effect their driving goal. Whether the expansion of effective 
and efficient influencing for the attainment of a status of individual concern is 
the theoretically appropriate and principled manner for ensuring access to 
judicial review, is a completely different issue that would not be removed until 
the approach to standing is altered. What is more practical is the examination 
of the possibility of having a different judicial approach based on the type of 
claim and the area that the legislative action regulates. In other words, is there 
a typological approach in relation to representative groups that creates layers 
of standing rights? If the question is affirmatively answered, one must 
examine the input of that typology in the quest for finding effective ways to 
circumvent standing restrictions for representative groups and subsequently 
individual applicants. The employment context offers an interesting paradigm 
reflecting such factors. 
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4. Representative groups in the sunshine and away from the Plaumann 
shadow: Lessons from the employment context 
The Union's interest in promoting employment is entrenched in the Treaty and 
in secondary legislation, epitomised in Art. 2 EC that refers, inter alia, to the 
promotion of a high level of employment and social protection. At a functional 
level, the promotion of employment is performed at two interrelated levels. 
First, the gradual development of legislative initiatives116 and secondly, the 
development of the "flanking policies""7 that refer to the use of structural 
instruments that aid the restructuring and repositioning of the economic 
organisation of Member States."8 The role of the European Social Fund (ESF) 
has been integral in financing the initiatives of the Union aiming to supplement 
national policies that address matters of employment. The management and 
general use of the ESF is regulated by Council Regulations"4 and is subject to 
judicial review, thus safeguarding the legitimacy, accountability and financial 
control of institutional action.120 It is at this stage that Art. 230 EC becomes 
relevant and it is interesting to examine the approach of the Courts within an 
area like employment that has three specific characteristics. 
Firstly, the allocation of funds from the ESF is primarily a political and 
economic decision founded on considerations of employment policy and long-
term economic strategic organisation. Secondly, the use of the ESF exists in 
parallel and supplements national policies because employment and social 
policies remain within the ambit of national competence,121 thus in pragmatic 
terms the application of the ESF is the corollary of complex political 
compromise.122 Thirdly, there are always economic actors with a substantial 
116
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interest in the allocation of resources from the ESF that are willing to challenge 
Community acts. From an economic perspective, the granting of aid, the 
continuation, the suspension and the readjustment of the size of financial input 
flowing from the ESF, represent a strong incentive to recipients and applicants 
for challenging measures that impact on their financial position.123 It is within 
this framework that the judicial approach must be placed. 
The approach of the ECJ and the CFI has been reflective of the preceding 
issues and is an illustration of economic pragmatism and judicial realism that 
contrasts with the broader jurisprudence that follows the dogmatic and prob-
lematic reasoning of Plaumann. The differences are numerous and are briefly 
examined in order to offer a complete picture of the judicial approach to 
challenges related to the ESF, before examining representative groups. 
In the first place, the notion of a reviewable act has been broadly construed 
with the ESF context. The ERTA[24 judgment that established that reviewable 
acts include any act that produces legal effects has been applied broadly in 
the context of the ESF to include exclusively the legislative acts adopted by 
the Commission. Under the ESF, the national authorities cooperate with the 
Commission in the decision making process to the extent that "shared respon-
sibility for the decisions of the Commission"125 can be assumed. However, 
the ECJ held that the final responsibility rests with the Commission,126 thus 
clarifying the identity of the body responsible for the legislative measure and 
excluding the delegation of legal responsibility to bodies that would fall 
outside the scope of Art. 230 EC. 
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At the same time, the ECJ has balanced its approach by appreciating the 
distinct economic character of the operation of the ESF and as a corollary it 
has safeguarded the decision-making process that is purely advisory, expertise 
based and policy oriented. An example to that effect is the internal guidelines 
adopted by the Commission concerning the net financial corrections127 whereby 
the Commission is empowered to suspend or reduce the assistance granted if 
irregularities are found on the basis of technical calculations provided by the 
internal guidelines. The challenge of the internal guidelines has been unsuccess-
ful since the ECJ128 found that the guidelines do not create rights or obligations 
for third parties and do not have produce legal effects. The same protective 
approach has been taken in relation to the reports and recommendations 
adopted by the anti-fraud bodies of the Union when examining the financial 
propriety in managing resources allocated from the ESF. The ECJ held that 
these reports are mere notifications to the national authorities and the 
Commission and produce no legal effects because it is the responsibility of the 
recipients of the reports to determine whether legal measures of recovering the 
resources should be taken.124 
The balanced approach of the ECJ that ensured the protection of advisory 
bodies entrusted with technical matters has not extended to situations where 
the challenge of a legislative measure is made difficult because of the practice 
adopted by the Commission. Normally, the Commission issues a decision 
under the regulations that provide the legislative framework for the ESF and 
sends a letter to the national authority as a matter of notification, but without 
the actual decision enclosed. The national authorities either write to the recipient 
of the ESF assistance and inform them about the decision of the Commission 
or forward the Commission's letter and the decision itself. Therefore, the 
recipients of ESF assistance rarely receive the actual decision of the 
Commission, thus any potential challenge will lack all the information about 
the decision and would by implication be incomplete. The ECJ has identified 
the procedural gap and provided the necessary protection to incomplete 
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challenges lacking information1 " provided that there is evidence of the existence 
of a decision.131 
Finally, the more favourable approach of the ECJ in the context of the ESF 
is evident in the indirect expansion of the standing for privileged applicant to 
cover regional authorities involved in the operation of the ESF.132 Moreover, 
the ECJ held that the lack of challenge to the standing of local and regional 
authorities was an important factor that pre-empted the Court from examining 
the standing of such bodies on its own initiative.133 Nonetheless, the Court 
stopped a step short from including local bodies as a matter of right in the class 
of privileged applicants by stating that the fact that the standing of regional 
bodies was intentionally not examined by the ECJ does not imply acknowl-
edgment of the challenge was brought by a legal entity equivalent to a Member 
State.134 Therefore, in the context of the ESF there is an effective, yet not formal, 
expansion of the privileged applicants' class to include regional bodies that 
"have a vital role to play in the articulation of cohesion and integration 
policies".135 
In relation to private applicants, the approach of the ECJ departs from the 
Plaumann reasoning of economic unrealistic results and unduly restrictive 
narrowing of standing rights. One possible explanation, though simplistic, is 
the fact that under the legislative framework regulating the operation of the 
ESF, the Commission uses decisions and not regulations, thus limiting the scope 
of application of the measure. In other words, there is practically no danger to 
have challenge to a regulation that if successful, it could grant standing rights 
to numerous applicants. At the same time, the exclusive use of decisions 
renders the identification of potential applicants predictable and the number of 
such applicants is ab initio limited to those parties that the decision singles out. 
Therefore, within the context of the ESF the actio popularis concern of the 
ECJ and the possibility of an open ended class of applicants being formed are 
130
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excluded by the fact that the decisions are practically identifying and limiting 
the number of challengers.136 
The jurisprudence of the ECJ shows a consistency in granting standing to 
applicants that were third parties to the decision of the Commission, but who 
can be distinguished and singled out since they were identified expressly in the 
decision.17 The direct and individual concern requirement is satisfied in this 
context in cases relating to the suspension and withdrawal of assistance138 and 
to cases relating to the granting of assistance with the beneficiaries clearly named 
in the decision.134 Moreover, the ECJ has shown a willingness to recognise in 
effect rights to legitimate expectations in situations where the Commission 
refuses to make a payment that it has previously undertaken to grant,140 
regardless of the fact that no decision granting the assistance exists. The CFI 
has applied this reasoning in the Murgia Messapica case141 where the applicant 
had previously applied for assistance and participated substantially in prolonged 
procedures for evaluation of their application by the Commission. 
Therefore, there is a shift in the approach of the Courts within the context 
of the ESF, with an assumption in favour of granting standing and contra to the 
traditional Plaumann rationale, as evident from the case law in relation to 
competitors of the final recipient of assistance. The ECJ has ruled that such 
competitors may challenge the validity of the decision granting the assistance 
to another beneficiary if it can be established that the market position of the 
applicant has been significantly effected by the assistance granted.142 This 
generous approach must be qualified with reference to the condition that the 
competitor and the recipient are located in geographically proximity to each 
1,6
 Skiadas: op. cit., 7. 
137
 Case C-291/89, Interhotel v Commission, [1991] European Court Reports, 1-2257 
para. 13; Case C-304/89, Estabelecimentos Isidore M. Oliveira SA v Commission, [1991] 
European Court Reports, 1-2283 para. 13. 
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 Case C-181/90, Consorgan-Gestäo de Empresas, Lda v Commission, [1992] European 
Court Reports, 1-3557 para. 12; Case C-189/90, Cipeke-Commércio e Indústria de Papel 
Lda v Commission, [1992] European Court Reports, 1-3573 para. 12. 
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 Case T-450/93, Lisrestal-Organizaçâo Gestào de Restaurantes Colectivos Lda and 
Others v Commission, [1994] European Court Reports, II-1177 paras. 45-46; Case T-85/94, 
Eugenia Bianco Lda v Commission, [1995] European Court Reports, 11-45 paras. 25-26. 
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 Case T-465/93, Murgia Messapica v Commission, [1994] European Court Reports, 
11-361. 
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 Ibid., para. 26. 
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 Case C-169/84, COFAZ v Commission, [1986] European Court Reports, 391 para. 28; 
Joined Cases T-447/93, T-448/93, T-449/93 Associazione Italiana Tecnico Economica del 
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other141 and the establishment by the competitor of an interest resulting from 
participation in the proceedings leading to the adopted decision.144 Consequently, 
the approach of the Courts can be seen as departing from the strict formalistic 
conditions and more importantly from the spirit of Plaumann, but the marked 
difference has failed to filter to the standing of representative groups. 
The general conditions for representative groups that apply in general apply 
in the field of employment law. Trade associations and interests groups within 
the framework of the ESF must show that a personal interest exists in the case 
that is distinct from those of the industrial policy of the Member State 
concerned145 and that the general interest of the membership has been affected 
within the Plaumann meaning.146 Alternatively, it would suffice to show that 
the membership could have brought an action challenging the decision,147 and 
that procedural rights flowing from participation existed.144 
Before criticising the narrower approach to the standing of representative 
groups when compared to the more liberal stand towards applicants in the 
context of the ESF, it must be noted that the case law relating to representative 
groups within the ESF is extremely limited. The reason for this is the com-
parably greater possibility for successful individual challenges that results 
from the economically orthodox approach to challenges of measures in the 
context of the ESF. Moreover, there is the example of the Murgia Messapica 
case 49 where the applicants were a group of entrepreneurs set up to develop 
economic activities at the rural level, in the Italian Murgia Messapica region, 
and specifically to implement the Leader Programme launched by the Com-
143
 Joined Cases C-10/68, C-I8/68, Eridania v Commission, [1969] European Court 
Reports, 459, 481. 
144
 Case C-264/82, Timex Corporation v. Council and Commission, 11985] European 
Court Reports, 849, paras. 12-16; Case C-169/84, COFAZ v Commission, [1986] European 
Court Reports, 391, paras. 25 -26 . 
145
 Case C-282/85, Comité de Développement et de Promotion du Textile et de /' 
Habillement v. Commission, [1986] European Cour t Reports, 2469 para 18. 
146
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Reports, 11-455 paras. 27-28. 
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Commission, [1996] European Court Reports, H-1283, para. 35. 
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mission. The group is, therefore, not a representative group in terms of either 
offering representation for its membership or pursuing the promotion of certain 
broader interests, but is rather a collective body representing specific economic 
interests relating to the funding under a project. Nonetheless, the action was 
from a group and was approached by the CFI in a favourable way whereby 
standing rights were granted due to participation in the bilateral (Italian authori-
ties and applicants) and tripartite (Italian authorities, applicants and Commission) 
discussions and assessments meetings for the proposal submitted by the 
applicants. Therefore, in this context the CFI was willing to grant standing on the 
basis of Plaumann for a group of entrepreneurs applying for funding under a 
project financed through the ESF, even if the proposal was initially selected 
but subject to numerous modifications proposed by the Commission, which 
were not undertaken by the applicants. The proposal was regarded as incomplete 
and substandard in the final assessment round, but the mere participation up to 
that stage was perceived by the CFI as creating procedural rights that satisfied 
the direct and individual concern requirement. Clearly, the judgment represents 
a significant shift from the broader approach to standing of both private 
applicants and representative groups and shows the way for a possible solution 
to the Plaumann problem. By placing the emphasis on participation, represen-
tative groups can ensure compliance with the Plaumann criteria since the ECJ 
and the CFI have shown a willingness to recognise procedural rights and a 
possible procedural legitimate expectation to challenge a legislative measure 
that has been adopted with the effective participation of the applicant. Therefore, 
representative groups could be granted standing rights under the present 
unsatisfactory legal system that is based on Plaumann and which influences 
the approach towards representative groups, if those groups manage to lobby 
there way into the legislative process. Enhanced participation and influencing 
the formation of the substance of legislative measures is the essential and core 
function of representative groups. It must now be used to target the procedural 
formation of legislative measures by ensuring that any input by representative 
groups becomes a formal part of the consultation and advisory processes, thus 
giving rise to procedural rights to participation. Therefore, the case law of the 
ECJ and the CFI leaves room for participation rights of representative groups 
that can be quite extensive as the Murgia Messapica case150 shows and the 
representative groups can take advantage to bring surrogate actions on behalf 
of their members that would not otherwise be granted standing. The key is in 
the effective lobbying practices that have to target formal recognition of 
150
 Case T-465/93, Murgia Messapica v Commission, [1994] European Court Reports, 
11-361. 
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their role in the legislative process. Representative groups can go round the 
standing problem by simply being effective at what they are doing, namely 
lobbying. Finally, the context within which a representative group operates 
plays an important role in whether standing would be granted as does the type 
of claim that the group makes before the Court. The case law has shown that 
the use of the human rights argument, whether in the form of effective 
judicial protection or a fundamental right like environmental protection being 
threatened by the challenged legislative measure, will not be successful by 
virtue of the paramount importance of human rights. What will make the 
difference is the existence of documented participation that creates procedural 
rights and which is not the result of the group's general activity in the field but 
part of the procedural requirement for the adoption of the measure, as the 
Greenpeace case showed. Moreover, the context of operation could be important, 
with cases brought within the contexts of state aid, competition, employment 
and social cohesion being favourably treated by the Courts, but this difficulty 
can be circumvented if the procedural rights are established in any context.13' 
Therefore, there is a typology of claims and contexts in relation to the standing 
of representative groups, but the main deciding factor as regards the granting 
of standing is the effective lobbying at the procedural level leading to 
documented participation triggering procedural rights. This solution bypasses 
typologies of claims and contexts and simplifies standing for representative 
groups, which can then use surrogate actions on behalf of their membership as 
a solution to the restrictive criteria of individual concern that effectively 
exclude individual challenges. 
Epilogue 
The issue of locus standi performs an instrumental function in the process of 
judicial review and should act as the gateway that would distinguish between 
claims that are artificial and fabricated and claims that have a substance. In the 
Union, the regulation of standing on the basis of the Plaumann criterion has 
proved an impossible hurdle for individual applicants seeking to challenge the 
validity of a legislative measure. This regrettable outcome has filtered through 
to the challenges brought by representative groups. Consequently, the possibility 
of partially redressing the shortcomings of Plaumann through the medium of 
representative groups and the agency analogy, has been preempted by the 
reflection of the restrictive tests for individual concern to actions brought by 
151
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representative organizations. The ECJ's approach and the approaches of national 
courts towards representative groups and their right to initiate challenges are 
in state of divergence. The English legal system has managed to draw a 
dichotomy between fraudulent and unfounded claims that tend to reproduce 
litigation and aim to frustrate the formation and implementation of policies, 
from genuine and helpful challenges that fill in the gaps of accountability. The 
task is not simplistic, but it has proved to be beyond the ECJ that insists on the 
monolithic argument that there is a danger of creating a flood of cases that are 
unfounded and which take advantage of a liberal stand towards the standing of 
representative groups. The real concern of the ECJ seems to be the reluctance 
to create an exception to Plaumann that in effect grants broader rights to 
representative groups than individual applicants. This legitimacy concern has 
persistently influenced the ECJ to shed the shadow of Plaumann to the standing 
of interest groups. In the quest for a solution, this paper has examined the 
possibility of having a typology of claims and fields of activity that are treated 
more favorably by the ECJ. The conclusion reached states that the use by 
representative groups of arguments that are founded on human rights, like 
effective judicial protection and the protection of the environment, is not 
creating a positive framework that could facilitate the departure from the 
Plaumann yardstick. Moreover, there seem to be no strong thematic typology 
that is sympathetically treated by the ECJ since the exceptional relaxation of 
standing requirements for interest groups can not be identified in insulated 
areas. In this respect, even in the field of environmental protection the ECJ has 
refused to adopt a more liberal approach. 
Therefore, there is no clear thematic or argumentative typology that can be 
identified in the approach of the Court, but there seems to be a uniting thread 
that connects most of the cases where the ECJ relaxed its approach: participation. 
It is submitted that the only way to create positive conditions for standing rights 
is for the representative groups to engage in effective lobbying practices that 
target formal recognition of their role in the legislative process. The differentiating 
factor in recognising standing rights by the ECJ is the existence of documented 
participation, continuous involvement in the specific area and engagement with 
the institutions during the drafting stage. These features trigger procedural rights 
and create a legitimate expectation to be part of the review of legality process. 
Put differently, the only way to take the standing of representative groups 
away from the shadow of Plaumann, is for interest groups to be effective at 
what they are doing, namely lobbying. Whether that type of light is bright 
enough to remove the shadow entirely, it remains to be seen but it can be state 
with certainty that any light is better than the Plaumann darkness. 
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The policy of "proscription" or "designat ion" of groups and individuals as 
"terrorist" has been deployed as a crucial legal weapon in the global war on 
terrorism. Despite its serious human rights implications, judicial review is 
excluded from the highly politicised process of designating persons and legal 
entities as terrorists.1 Although proscription carries extremely serious conse-
quences,2 particularly for individuals subject to asset freezing, this policy has 
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been embraced uncritically by the international community and member states' 
domestic legal system. 
This essay aims to survey certain contradictions within legal regimes imposed 
by the UN Security Council, the EU and the Hungarian Government, aimed at 
freezing assets and financial transactions of terrorist organisations and organs 
associated with anti-democratic political regimes. Even though the examples 
are brought from Hungary, a new EU-member state that so far has not been 
directly affected by terrorism, arguably the scrutinized controversies point to 
general Rule of Law questions that presumably most European states are 
bound to face. 
While outlining the specific loopholes within the Hungarian legal regimes, 
the following general issue is raised: legal regimes that would serve the 
thorough implementation of anti-terrorist sanctions brought by the UN Security 
Council or the European Council' are extremely underdeveloped. In other words, 
the three normative levels of sanction measures-( l) legislation passed by the 
UN Security Council; (2) sui generis EU sanction-regulations; and (3) the 
implementing legislation of member states and the EU-are not harmonized. 
Several crucial questions remain unanswered with respect to sanctions that 
involve the curtailment of fundamental rights such as the freezing of assets of 
persons or legal entities. These questions include: 
1. How are sanctions passed? 
2. What is the legal nature of a UN Security Council resolution, especially 
if it involves sanctions against non-state actors and infringement on people's 
fundamental rights, such as freezing assets or deportation? 
ujCan such a resolution be rebutted 
aa) by the UN Sanctions Committee? 
ab) by the European Court of Justice? 
ac) by the European Court of Human Rights? 
b) Can it be contrary to national jus cogens? 
3. How should such a resolution be adopted or incorporated/transformed 
into national law? 
contact networks. Given these implications for fundamental rights, the failure to provide 
adequate mechanisms for appeal and redress for groups and individuals affected by 
proscription is extremely alarming." See above. As Iain Cameron notes: "The effect[s] of a 
freezing order, if it is effectively implemented, are devastating for the target, as he or she 
cannot use any of his or her assets, or receive pay or even, legally speaking, social 
security.", Cameron, I.: (2003) European Anti-Terrorist Blacklisting, in Human Rights Law 
Review 3 (2003) no. 2. 
3
 See for example Bohr, S.: Sanctions by the United Nations Security Council and the 
European Community, European Journal of International Law 4 (1993) 156-268. 
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a) How is it implemented? 
b) When does it take effect? 
4. What procedures should apply to the enforcement of such a resolution? 
a) Can a national court suspend the application of the resolution due to 
constitutional misgivings? 
£)What standards should be applied in the process of granting, say, an 
emergency exception from the sanctions? 
c) What practical standards can be applied in constructing the criminal 
sanctions applicable to those who provide material support to terrorist 
organisations? 
Can a national court award compensation for damages caused by 
such sanctions? 
Due to spatial constraints, I shall mostly limit my analysis to posing these 
questions as they arise in national law, leaving issues of international law out of 
the discussion. I wish to draw the reader's attention to a few points where 
institutional weaknesses, if not a degree of cynicism can be observed in the 
transformation or realization of international anti-terrorist measures. It seems as 
though states operate on the assumption that no cases would ever arise in which 
the lack of procedural guarantees or even the procedures themselves become 
substantive issues. The principle of rule of law is a recurrent mantra within UN 
and (especially) European documents,4 but its application has been subject to a 
double standard. On the one hand, accessing states' commitment to the rule of 
law is thoroughly monitored. On the other hand the EU failed to formulate strict 
procedural guarantees for anti-terrorist financial enforcement measures, and 
instead broadened their scope of application (to non-terrorist anti-democratic 
regimes)5 without paying attention to their potential human rights risks. As a 
4
 See for example the Guidelines on human rights and the fight against terrorism on 11 
July 2002 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe: "II. All 
measures taken by States to fight terrorism must respect human rights and the principle of 
the rule of law, while excluding any form of arbitrariness, as well as any discriminatory or 
racist treatment, and must be subject to appropriate supervision. ... IX. 1. A person accused 
of terrorist activities has the right to a fair hearing, within a reasonable time, by an 
independent, impartial tribunal established by law. 2. A person accused of terrorist activities 
benefits f rom the presumption of innocence. ... XIV. The use of the property of persons or 
organisations suspected of terrorist activities may be suspended or limited, notably by such 
measures as freezing orders or seizures, by the relevant authorities. The owners of the 
property have the possibility to challenge the lawfulness of such a decision before a court." 
5
 The EC and the EU is and has been adopting regulations aimed at implementing UN 
sanction resolutions, but also created its own unilateral Community sanction regimes. See 
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new member state, Hungary has only travelled a short distance on the road of 
rule of law constitutionalism, when a restrictive legal regime has been induced 
from the (highly valued) international organizations and the new regime has 
been taken for granted without due political (or even professional) debate. 
It is important to note that this is the context in which the Hungarian case 
study should be seen. Otherwise the debate over Islam or Muslim communities 
has not been a dominant issue in the Hungarian political discourse. Given the 
very small size of the Muslim community in Hungary (roughly 0.057 percent 
of the population), a fundamentalist terrorist threat is not considered a factor of 
significance, as the dominantly naturalised Muslim community lives integrated 
within Hungarian society.'1 There is no measurable public hostility towards the 
Muslim community, and, even after September 11 or March 11, Islamophobia 
appears to be an altogether marginal, if at all existent phenomenon or sentiment 
in Hungary. All in all, Hungary has had two unrelated incidents where indi-
viduals were accused of maintaining terrorist connections: one case involved a 
Muslim religious leader (2004), the other, a non-nationalised immigrant doctor 
(2003). These events received a considerable media attention but neither triggered 
a particularly long-lasting or prominent public debate. 
Following the structure laid out above, let us begin the analysis of the 
controversial legal regime of anti-terrorist financial sanctions. As I mentioned 
before, this paper is limited in its scope: it aims to raise questions and point to 
controversies without developing a full analytical framework or solutions to 
the issues raised. 
1. Conflicting constitutional obligations and the legal nature of UN 
Security Council sanctions 
It appears that the threat of weapons of mass destruction and recurring terrorist 
attacks have overpowered the previously dominant principle that it is better to 
have nine criminals go free than to have a single innocent person punished. In 
a world where "kill ten and keep thousands in a state of fear" is the operating 
for example Pavoni, R.: UN Sanctions in EU and National Law: The Centrocom Case. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 48 (1999) 582-612. 
6
 In the 2001 national census 5,777 persons identified themselves as Muslim, which is 
about 0.057 per cent of the Hungarian population. Taking into account non-citizen migrants 
and converted Hungar ians , media and academic es t imates occasionally refer to a larger 
Muslim population size, sometimes as large as 20 ,000-50 ,000 . http://www.mancs.hu/ 
index.php?gcPage=/public/hirek/hir.php&id= 10117 (11 April 2005). 
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principle of the social psychology of global terrorism, anti-terrorist measures 
obviously need to be strict and hit terrorist organisations where it hurts: their 
financial umbilical cord. Even if these measures involves unveiling legal 
entities and ordering financial organisations to identify their beneficiaries, or 
creating new, daring standards of criminal liability for those who donate to 
charities that might be involved in terrorist activities.7 
It also appears to be the case that the implementation of these political 
commitments does not always go hand in hand with the subsequent adjustment 
of the legal and constitutional system. Popularly supported and politically 
accepted as it is, legal execeptionalism does not always fit well with the tradi-
tional principles of constitutionalism. Take for example the case of proscription: 
The selection criteria and process for designation is fairly straightforward. 
"Intelligence", much of it secret, provides the basis for including groups and 
individuals on the various lists. The judiciary is excluded and parliaments play 
only a minimal role. In the EU and UN frameworks there is no democratic 
scrutiny whatsoever. None of the regimes provide for notification to the accused 
that designation is pending or opportunity for the accused to contest any allega-
tions before proscription: the normal judicial process is entirely discarded.8 
The UN Security Council is a political organ, created to make political 
decisions that bind member states. Recent anti-terrorist action plans have, how-
ever, actually given quasi-judicial authority to the Council for imposing 
sanctions on persons and legal entities without the proper guarantees habitually 
present in all national procedures that may end in imposing such sanctions. It 
was commonly held that the Security Council (as a political organ) is not and 
should not be bogged down by restraints like judicial independence, the 
presumption of innocence, fair trial etc., because initially, Council resolutions 
affected states only and the sanctions were political in nature. Needless to say, 
7 For more, see Pap, A.: Ethnic Discrimination and the War Against Terror ism-The 
Case of Hungary. In: Halmai, G. (ed): Hungary: Human Rights in the Face of Terrorism, 
Special English Edition of Fundamentum, Human Rights Quarterly, USA, 2006, also see at 
http://157.181.181.13/dokuk/05-eng-02.pdf (24 August 2006). 
8
 Together with the EU legislation allowing proscription, the first EU "terrorist" list 
was agreed by "written procedure" on the 27 December 2001. This meant that the four 
legal texts were simply faxed around to the foreign ministries of the 15 EU member states 
and adopted if none raised any objections, which two days after Christmas was surely 
unlikely. The various UN Security Council Resolutions have been adopted in similar 
fashion-at least in terms of the absolute lack of debate. Both the UN and EU lists have 
been amended so many times it is very difficult to keep track of the decisions being taken. 
See Statewatch Analysis, Terrorising the rule of law: the policy and practice of proscrip-
tion , http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/terrorlists.pdf. 
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this is hardly the case today, with financial and other sanctions pertaining to 
persons and organisations designated as terrorists. 
Because UN sanctions (qua non-self executing international rules) are 
formally only binding states and not, say, the financial institutions that will 
eventually freeze the accounts, it is obviously the state who is bound to 
simultaneously bear responsibility for keeping its international obligations 
and uphold internal rule of law.9 In other words, it may create conflicting 
responsibilities if a state receives a Security Council resolution which is based on 
mostly unrevealed sources of information and political deliberations (invariably 
lacking fair trial guarantees). The reason: the state will be under an obligation 
to a) enforce these sanctions under its jurisdiction, while b) it will not be exempt 
from the rule of law obligation to respect the "presumption of innocence" 
principle, for example.10 The first question (which will remain unanswered 
within the bounds of this paper) is thus the following: can an obligation under 
international law be contrary to national jus cogens? There is some literature 
that would support an affirmative answer to this question. For example, Derek 
Bowett argues that "...a Council decision is not a treaty obligation. The obligation 
to comply may be, but the decision per se is not. ... The Council decisions are 
binding only in so far as they are in accordance with the Charter."11 Michael 
Fraas considers the UN and, as its organ, the Security Council to be bound by 
general international law, in particular basic human rights guarantees and 
' According to Article 25 of the UN Charter, States have the obligation to implement 
enforcement measures adopted pursuant to Article 41, which obligation they perform in 
accordance with their national constitutional system. 
" 'The presumption of innocence is a fundamental right, laid down in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU). Article 6 of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides that the Union shall respect fundamental rights, 
as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result f r om the constitutional traditions common 
to Member States. The "presumption of innocence" is mentioned in Article 6(2) E C H R 
(The right to a fa i r trial): "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law" and Article 48 CFREU (Presumption of 
innocence and right of defence): "1. Everyone who has been charged shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law. 2. Respect for the rights of the defence of 
anyone who has been charged shall be guaranteed." For more, see. The Presumption of 
Innocence. Green Paper, Commission of The European Communities, Brussels, 26 April 
2006, COM(2006) 174 final. 
"Bowet t , D.: The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute Settlement 
Procedures. European Journal of International Law 5 (1996) 4-5. 
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norms of jus cogens.12 His reasoning about jus cogens is as follows: The 
constituent treaty of an international organization may not contradict jus 
cogens rules. "From this it follows that the organs of the organization may not 
be empowered to violate rules of jus cogens."13 
But let us assume that national law actually satisfyingly accommodates 
these sanctions, say, with an institution that resembles pre-trial detention. Let 
us also assume that satisfactory forums and procedures (that include judicial 
guarantees) are being created for people under these sanctions to prove their 
innocence and provide evidence for, say, an error that caused them to appear 
on a list of terrorists. However unlikely, for the purposes of the example, let us 
imagine that even though her bank accounts are frozen, a terrorist suspect 
manages to hire a competent attorney who finds out that she is indeed an 
exemplary patriot only her name happens to closely resemble that of a terrorist's 
and it had been misspelled or mistyped in one of the secret service files - a 
phenomenon not entirely unusual when transcribing Arabic names to English. 
The question is, even if such a simple factual error relating the UN Security 
Council's decision can be proved, what procedures would follow? Can such a 
resolution be rebutted?14 Or all the state can do is ask the Security Council to 
correct its decision?15 Should we opt for the second alternative, subsequent 
questions arise: can a national court order the state to file such a request to the 
Security Council? What happens if the Security Council is reluctant to change 
its resolution? Can a national court nevertheless order the suspension of such a 
sanction?16 
12
 Fraas, M.: Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen und Internationaler Gerichtshof: 
Die Rechtmässigkeitspriifung von Beschlüssen des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen 
im Rahmen des VII. Kapitels der Charta durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof. Frankfurt 
am Main, 1998. 82-84, 246. 
" Ibid. 77. For more, see Fassbender, В.: Quis judicabit? The Security Council, Its 
Powers and Its Legal Control, Review Essay, European Journal of International Law 11 
(2000) No. 1. 
14
 There is some literature that suggest this possibility. See Bowett, D.: The Impact of 
Security Council Decisions on Dispute Settlement Procedures. European Journal of Inter-
national Law 5 (1994) 1 -101 . 
15
 For example, Jochen Herbst argues that the judicial review of the legality of SC 
decisions is both possible under procedural law and permitted under UN constitutional law. 
The General Assembly and the SC have the right to request an advisory opinion of the ICJ 
on the legality of a SC decision. See Herkst, I.: Rechtskontrolle des UN-Sicherheitsrates. 
Frankfurt am Main, 1999. 
16
 Bowring, B.-Korff , D.: Terrorist Designation with Regard to European and Inter-
national Law: The Case of the PMOI, International Conference of Jurists, Paris, 10 
November 2004, http://www.cageprisoners.com/articles.php?id=7822. 
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According to a Statewatch Analysis: "The UN and EU lists make no 
provision for appeal to the courts whatsoever. Groups and individuals on the 
lists may make diplomatic representations to their government, or the govern-
ment that they believe proposed their proscription. An individual EU member 
state may grant a "specific authorisation" to unfreeze funds and resources after 
consultation with the other Member States, the Council of the EU and the 
European Commission (the issue of whether to continue to include someone on 
the EU list is decided by the Council). In the UN framework the requested 
member state may then make "diplomatic" representations to the Security 
Council Committee with a view to informal resolution of the issue17 (and failing 
this, resolution by the Security Council itself). As far as the courts are concerned, 
individuals and groups could challenge the application of the EU/UN measures 
in the national courts on the basis that they contravene human rights or consti-
tutional standards-though such appeals could well be denied on the grounds 
that international sanctions regimes are binding on member states. Groups and 
individuals have indirect recourse to the EU Courts and can seek annulment of 
the Council measures implementing the freezing regime, or damages for unlawful 
Council acts at the European Court of First Instance (and subsequently the full 
European Court of Justice). However, the proceedings in these courts would be 
directed at the EC/EU rules; they would not really concern the national measures 
implementing them."18 
A number of groups have taken case to the EU Courts and claimed sizeable 
damages. The composition and functioning of the CFI and ECJ as international 
courts, however, leaves them inadequately equipped to deal with the complex 
issues raised by proscription cases. In such a situation, they offer no real 
prospect of adequate judicial redress for groups and individuals proscribed as 
"errorist" by the EU. A vivid example for this can be seen in the Court of First 
Instance judgements in the case of T-306/01 and T-315/01, 21 September 2005-
'Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation14 and Yassin 
11
 In the Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation case (see below), 
the Swedish government actually resisted and argued on behalf of its named citizens. 
18
 Statewatch Analysis, Terrorising the rule of law: the policy and practice of proscrip-
tion http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/terrorlists.pdf. 
14
 Applicants argued that Articles 60 EC and 301 EC. on the basis of which that 
regulation had been adopted, authorise the Council solely to take measures against third 
countries and not, as it did in this case, against nationals of a Member State residing in that 
Member State. Applicants also denied the allegation that sanctions were imposed on them 
on account of their association with the regime of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In their view, 
the sanctions were not imposed on them because they maintained a link with that regime 
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Abdullah Kadi" v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities'. Here, the court held that the European Community is 
competent to order the freezing of individuals' funds in connection with the 
fight against international terrorism. However, insofar as they are required by 
the Security Council of the United Nations, for the most part, these measures 
fall outside the scope of judicial review. The Court of First Instance held that, 
according to international law, the obligations of the Member States of the 
United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations prevail over any other 
obligation, including their obligations under the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and under the EC 
Treaty and this paramountcy extends to decisions of the Security Council, as 
although it is not a member of the United Nations, the Community must also 
be considered to be bound by the obligations flowing from the Charter of the 
United Nations, in the same way as are its Member States, by virtue of the 
Treaty establishing it.21 The Court went on to state that any review of the 
internal lawfulness of the regulation would therefore involve the Court in 
examining, indirectly, the lawfulness of the decisions in question. Having regard 
to the rule of paramountcy set out above, those decisions fall, in principle, 
outside the ambit of the Court's judicial review and the Court has no authority 
to call into question, even indirectly, their lawfulness in the light of Community 
law or of fundamental rights as recognised in the Community legal order. 
In regards of the jus cogens issue, according to the Court of First Instance, 
it is nevertheless empowered to check the lawfulness of the contested regulation 
and, indirectly, the Security Council resolutions in the light of the higher rules 
of general international law falling within the scope of jus cogens, understood 
as a peremptory norm of public international law. However, after due scrutiny, 
the Court found that the freezing of funds provided for by the contested 
regulation does not infringe the applicants' fundamental rights as protected by 
jus cogens.22 On the other hand, the Court was on the opinion that it is not for 
but because of the Security Council 's desire to combat international terrorism, regarded as 
a threat to international peace and security. 
211
 In support of his claims, the applicant has put forward in his application three 
grounds of annulment alleging breaches of his fundamental rights. The first alleges breach 
of the right to a fair hearing, the second, breach of the right to respect for property and of 
the principle of proportionality, and the third, breach of the right to effective judicial review. 
21
 See Press Release No. 79/05. 
22
 The Court held that because the contested regulation makes express provision for 
possible derogations, at the request of interested persons, allowing access to funds necessary 
to cover basic expenses. It is therefore neither the purpose nor the effect of those measures 
to subject the applicants to inhuman or degrading treatment, nor have the applicants been 
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it to review indirectly whether the Security Council's resolutions are compatible 
with fundamental rights as protected by the Community legal order, or to 
verify that there has been no error of assessment of the facts and evidence 
relied on by the Security Council. The Court also pointed out that the right of 
access to the courts is not absolute. In this instance, it is curtailed by the 
immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by the Security Council.2' 
Once all avenues for appeal have been explored, proscription may be 
challenged at the European Court of Human Rights. The ECHR, however, has 
so far held that all judicial remedies-including the ECJ must be exhausted 
before it can consider any cases, and this leaves applicants facing severely 
lengthy procedures.24 
In conclusion, it is well to note that even though the EU has created a 
mechanism that is aimed at creating unified normativity, the EU is not a 
member of the UN and only national organs are regarded as addressees (and 
responsibility bearers) of sanction resolutions. National rules are therefore 
viable, indispensable and crucial elements in the process.25 
This way, the key to the above questions will lie within how the state inserts 
its international obligation (and domestic national security interest) into its 
constitutional system. Through the example of Hungary, I will show that very 
often neither the process of implementation, and thereby the source of law 
arbitrarily deprived of their right to property, in so far as that right is protected by jus 
cogens. Indeed, the freezing of funds constitutes one aspect of the United Nations' legitimate 
fight against international terrorism and is a precautionary measure which, unlike 
confiscation, does not affect the very substance of the right of the persons concerned to 
property in their financial assets but only the use thereof. Furthermore, the Court held, the 
resolutions of the Security Council provide for a means of reviewing, af ter certain periods, 
the overall system of sanctions and for a procedure enabling the persons concerned to present 
their case to the Sanctions Committee for review, through their State. As regards the rights 
of defence, the Court found that no rule of jus cogens appears to require a personal hearing 
of those individuals concerned by the Sanctions Committee. Since the regulation is a 
precautionary measure restricting the availability of property, observance of the fundamental 
rights of the persons concerned does not require the facts and evidence adduced against 
them to be communicated to them, where the Security Council was of the view that that 
there are grounds concerning the international community's security that militate against it. Id. 
23
 For more, see Vlcek, W.: The European Court of Justice and Acts to Combat the 
Financing of Terrorism by the European Community, Challenge Research Note Work 
Package 2-Securitization beyond borders: Exceptionalism inside the EU and impact on 
policing bevond borders, November 2005. 
24
 Id. 
25
 See Pavoni: op. cit. 610. 
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nature of the sanctions, nor the adjacent legislation that would integrate them 
into the nation's legal system are sufficiently coordinated. 
2. The implementation of resolutions imposing sanctions 
The best way to show the contradictory Hungarian practice of implementing 
sanction-type resolutions is to divide the question into three further sub-
questions: (1) how is a sanction-type resolution implemented? (2) when does it 
take effect?, and (3) when does it cease to be in effect? 
2.1. The form of implementation 
The Hungarian legislator does not take a clear stance on positioning itself in 
the monism versus dualism question. In a dualist legal system, international 
legal norms have no legal effect and are unenforceable without and prior to 
incorporation into national law. This implies that international norms them-
selves do not enjoy a special rank in the hierarchy of legal norms; their rank 
will correspond to that of the implementing instrument. According to modern 
theories, a legal system is said to be monist when it conforms to the idea that 
international law is automatically part of and superior to domestic law. 
In Hungary, some international documents are properly promulgated and 
transformed into the Hungarian legal system; some are only published in the 
Official Journal26 (which according to some authors27 suggests a monist direct 
effect). 
When it comes to sanction-type resolutions, some are promulgated in the 
form of acts of parliament. Such were for example the resolutions 827 (1993) 
establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY),28 or 955 (1994) establishing the Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).29 
Many other sanction-type resolutions, however, are promulgated in the form 
of a government decree such as for example 883 (1993) concerning The 
26
 "Magyar Közlöny". 
11
 See for example Kovács, P.: Nemzetközi szervezetek szankciós típusi) határozatai 
magyarországi érvényesíthetőségének alkotmányjogi gyakorlata és problémái (Constitutional 
Practice and Problems in Hungary During the Implementation of Sanction type Resolutions 
Taken In International Organizations). In: Bodnár, L. (ed.): EU-csatlakozás és alkotmányo-
zás (EU-Accession and Constitution-Making). Szeged, 2001. 
28
 Act 39 of 1996. 
29
 Act 101 of 1999. 
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Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.3" This is in itself a somewhat problematic scenario 
as Article 8 (2) of the Hungarian Constitution states that "in the Republic of 
Hungary, regulations pertaining to fundamental rights and obligations are 
determined by law [in this context meaning acts of parliament, ALP]; but 
the substance of fundamental rights cannot be restricted even by law." As 
sanction-type resolutions often carry severe restrictions on right to property, or 
even criminal liability, an act of parliament would be the desirable medium for 
implementation. 
Nevertheless, government decrees are still ranked second in the hierarchy 
of legal norms in Hungary. Very often, however, we will find government 
resolutions promulgating Security Council resolutions. (See, for example, 748 
(1992) concerning the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.)1' This is all the more worrisome 
given that these resolutions are not even proper legal norms according to the 
Hungarian legal system. It would be very difficult to detect any regularity 
within these practices: the two aforementioned sanctions against Libya were 
almost identical32 and one might wonder why such different forms of implemen-
tation were used.33 
What is more, some resolutions are only published as Foreign Ministry 
announcement-like documents, and to increase the chaos, some are published 
in English,34 others in Hungarian, yet others in both languages, but quite a few 
resolutions are only implemented as summaries with references to the original. 
Things can get even worse; a great number of resolutions are not implemented 
in any way.35 This is not an insignificant issue, as some resolutions frequently 
make reference to further ones and it might take a few turns until we actually 
get to the lists that contain the names of individuals or companies to be 
sanctioned. And it may easily happen that some parts of this chain will not be 
formally implemented in Hungarian law. 
Having said all this, it seems to be the least troubling element that when the 
UN Security Council resolutions are published in the Official Journal, they 
appear under the title "International Treaties"-which they clearly are not. 
3
" 164/1993 (XI. 30.) korm. r. (government resolution). 
31
 1020/1992 (IV. 15.) korm. h. (government resolution). 
33
 For another example see the respective government resolutions (2130/1999) and 
decrees (1 18/2000) implementing sanctions against 1999/206CFSP and 1298 (2000) on the 
situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
33
 For more see. Kovács: op. cit. 
34
 1996/16 Nemzetközi Szerződés a külügyminisztertől (Agreement International of the 
Foreign Ministry), for more see. Kovács: op. cit. 155. 
35
 See Kovács: op. cit. 162. 
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2.2. The time of implementation 
Besides the form of implementation, timing is another problematic issue: in 
particular, the starting and endpoint of the effect of the sanctions. Ideally and 
formally sanctions should take effect immediately. In reality, proper transfor-
mation (sometimes the mere translation), even if it takes the form of a summary 
released by the foreign minister, may take weeks or months. Nullum crimen 
sine lege is a fundamental rule of law requirement, which means that no criminal 
sanction (whether national or international in origin) may have retroactive 
effect. However this can indeed happen, if the original text (which obviously 
cannot be altered) contains a starting date that will pre-empt the time of 
promulgation.311 
2.3. The time of deregulation 
The next problem arises in the context of deregulation. The Hungarian practice 
again has been quite irregular regarding the implementation of resolutions 
lifting sanctions. The promulgation of such resolutions are often omitted, or 
done in sketchy summary documents issued by the Foreign Ministry.37 What is 
more, we can even see examples of promulgation with one type of legal norm 
and annulations of the exact same resolution with another type-sometimes 
using media that are positioned significantly lower in the hierarchy of legal 
norms. What a constitutional gem: an act of parliament annulled by a govern-
ment resolution! (This is unacceptable even in if the original source of law, the 
international sanction has been revoked, and the norm subsequently had been 
emptied.) 
This cacophony of solutions is not only questionable from the constitu-
tional point of view, but also creates a jungle of regulations which law 
enforcement agencies and private subjects (who are also bound to follow and 
enforce them) have difficulties following-and this runs against the principle of 
legal security. Péter Kovács, for example, refers to an incident in 1996 when 
apparently the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself has lost track and erred in 
establishing the applicable status of revoked and reinstalled sanctions against 
Yugoslavia.38 
36
 For a pre 9/11 example, see the sanctions concerning Eritrea and Etiópia. See supra 
note 10. 
37
 For example, to bring examples of resolutions regarding Yugoslavia, 943 (1994) was 
promulgated but 988 (1995) was only released as a summary. 
38
 Kovács: op. cit. 154. 
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3. National enforcement-Constitutional minsgivings and lack of 
efficiency 
So far, we have seen how sanction-type resolutions "make their way" into the 
Hungarian legal system. And this is the point where the real problems emerge; 
as the sanctions need to be integrated within the constitutional structure. We 
will now focus our attention to post-9/11 anti-terrorist sanctions, in particular 
financial sanctions on designated terrorist organisations and persons support-
ing their activities. 
As mentioned above, enforcement procedures pose a number of questions 
including these: can a national court suspend the application of an international 
sanction due to constitutional misgivings?; what standards ought to be applied 
in the process of granting for example an emergency exception from the 
sanctions?; what practical standards can be applied in constructing the criminal 
sanctions applicable for providing material support to terrorist organisations?; 
can a national court award compensation for damages caused by such 
sanctions?, etc. 
Answers to these and related questions should ideally be provided within 
national legislation incorporating the international sanctions. It they are not (as 
it is with Hungary), their absence indicates the substantial amount of work still 
awaiting legislators. This paper will do considerably less: it will bring attention 
to the omissions and describe deficiencies in the harmonizing attempts of the 
Hungarian legislators. 
The sanctions ordering the freezing of funds and other financial assets or 
economic resources against persons who commit, or attempt to commit terrorist 
acts or who participate in or facilitate the commission of such acts "arrived" in 
the Hungarian legal system with Act 83 of 2001, an anti-money laundering and 
anti-terrorism package which (motivated far more by the European Union 
integration process3'' than a fear of terrorism) contained a host of new measures 
and regulations intended to aid the global effort to combat terrorism, especially 
in the area of financial sanctions and restrictions towards organisations and 
persons supporting terrorism. The Act authorised the government to issue decrees 
which for 90 days can enforce and impose financial and economic sanctions 
posed by the UN Security Council or EU Council. The scope of this authorisa-
tion ran parallel with those in the EU and UNSC resolutions: freezing accounts, 
suspending contracts, imposing embargos and entry restrictions, etc. How-
ever, the Ministry of Justice was of the opinion that the application of this 
14
 It is especially noteworthy that in June 2001, Hungary was put on the FATF/OSCE 
black list of countries non-conforming in money laundering issues. 
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authorisation would carry the risk of violating fundamental constitutional 
principles, as the authorisation enables the government to curtail the exercise of 
fundamental rights, whereas according to the constitution, only acts of parliament 
can issue such provisions. Thus, until May 1, 2004 (Hungary's accession to 
the EU and the consequential "incorporation" of all directly effective EU law, 
inter alia the sanction-type regulations) only one such government decree was 
issued.40 
As EU regulations are directly enforceable and applicable in Hungary, the 
general legislative framework for preventing and combating money laundering 
and financing terrorism is in place, although Hungary has not done much to 
fine-tune EU regulations. For example, even Council Regulation (EC) No 
2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against 
certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism contained general 
guidelines and authorisations for exemptions from the sanctions41 and on 27 
March 2003 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 561/2003 amending, as 
regards exceptions to the freezing of funds and economic resources, Regulation 
(EC) No 881/2002f2 instead of setting forth standards and procedures, the 
40
 56/200 (HI. 29.) Decree. In line with UNSCR 1390 (2002) and 2001/931/CFSP. 
41
 According to Articles 5 - 6 : The competent authorities of the Member States under 
such conditions as they deem appropriate can defreeze accounts for the use of frozen funds 
for essential human needs of a natural person or a member of his family, including in 
particular payments for foodstuffs , medicines, the rent or mortgage for the family residence 
and fees and charges concerning medical treatment of members of that family. Also, 
certain payments can be made from frozen accounts for the purposes of: payment of taxes, 
compulsory insurance premiums and fees for public utility services such as gas, water, 
electricity and telecommunications, etc. 
42
 On 27 March 2003 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) N o 561/2003 amending, as 
regards exceptions to the freezing of funds and economic resources, Regulation (EC) No 
881/2002 (OJ 2003 L 82, 1). Under Article 1: 'The following Article shall be inserted in 
Regulation (EC) No 881/2002: "Article 2a 1. Article 2 shall not apply to funds or economic 
resources where: (a) any of the competent authorities of the Member States, as listed in 
Annex II, has determined, upon a request made by an interested natural or legal person, 
that these funds or economic resources are: (i) necessary to cover basic expenses, including 
payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, 
insurance premiums, and public utility charges; (ii) intended exclusively for payment of 
reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the 
provision of legal services; (iii) intended exclusively for payment of fees or service charges 
for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or f rozen economic resources; or 
(iv) necessary for extraordinary expenses; and (b) such determination has been notified to 
the Sanctions Committee; and (c)(i) in the case of a determination under point (a)(i), (ii) or 
(iii), the Sanctions Committee has not objected to the determination within 48 hours of 
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Hungarian government decree43 that was passed to implement and accomodate 
these procedures says almost nothing. All it contains is that the general rules of 
administrative procedure should apply in these procedures, where the National 
Police shall act as a first instance and the Ministry of Internal Affairs as an 
appeals authority; and the Foreign Ministry and the National Security Office 
should participate in the proceedings. Not a word about standards, equity, etc.... 
Besides human rights misgivings, one may also have serious efficiancy 
concerns, as, according to Hungarian law, a full fledged freezing of assets 
can only be ordered in the course of a criminal procedure,44 or as part of an 
operation induced by international criminal cooperation. The problem concerns 
the fact that no automatic criminal procedure is initiated against persons on the 
various EU and UNSCR lists, not to mention corporations and other legal 
entities, against which such procedures cannot even exist. Thus, not even the 
direct effect of EU regulations will solve these issues, if (as it is the case) no 
criminal procedure is underway, say, against Usama bin Laden. 
Also, directly effective EU law can only be applied to those assets which 
are somehow registered and processed by courts45 or financial institutions. In 
theory, however, assets should include real estate, corporate ownership, etc. 
Thus, even though since September 2005 the Criminal Code46 contains a 
notification; or (ii) in the case of a determination under point (a)( iv) , the Sanctions 
Committee has approved the determination. 2. Any person wishing to benefit from the 
provisions referred to in paragraph 1 shall address its request to the relevant competent 
authority of the Member State as listed in Annex II. The competent authority listed in 
Annex II shall promptly notify both the person that made the request, and any other person, 
body or entity known to be directly concerned, in writing, whether the request has been 
granted. The competent authority shall also inform other Member States whether the 
request for such an exception has been granted. 
43
 306/2004 (XI. 13.) Decree. 
44
 Articles 159-160 of Act 19 of 1998. 
45
 Act 127 of 2004 amended Act 145 of 1997 on corporate registration which authorises 
civil courts to suspend the activities of corporations and order the f reezing of assets and 
accounts. 
46
 Article 261/A of Act 4 of 1978. Section 261/A (1) The person who violates an 
economic, commercial or financial prohibition pronounced on the basis of an international 
law obligation of the Republic of Hungary, if a separate Act orders the punishment of the 
violation of the prohibition, commits a felony, and shall be punishable with imprisonment 
of up to five years. (2) The punishment shall be imprisonment from two years to eight 
years, if the violation of an international law duty is committed a) with violence; b) in the 
quality of an official person. (3) The punishment shall be imprisonment f rom five years to 
ten years, if the violation of an international law duty is committed a) in connection with 
the trade of fire arms, ammunition, explosives, blasting-agent or an apparatus serving for 
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provision that sanctions the violation of an international law-based economic, 
commercial or financial sanction, without proper implementation, it cannot be 
enforced. 
As the 2005 FATF Recommendations47 for Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism pointed out, even tough a comprehensive 
Act on the Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering has been adopted, 
some gaps remain in the legislative framework. Three points of particular 
concern were raised. 
The first regarded the following: while the EC Regulations 881/2002 and 
2580/2001 are self-executing in Hungary as an EU member state, there is no 
domestic legislation implementing the United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions (UNSCRs) 1267 and 1373, which is especially problematic in relation to the 
freezing of non-banking/financial assets. The second major criticism related to 
the criminal law framework. It was pointed out that the provisions regarding 
the financing of terrorism should include the financing of individual terrorists. 
The third point concerned the suspicious transaction reporting system. The 
current regulations seem over- and at the same time under-inclusive. On the 
one hand there is no legal obligation in the current legislative framework to 
report a transaction on the basis of a suspicion that the funds involved may be 
relevant to terrorism. On the other hand however, the system is producing a 
high volume of low quality reports from financial institutions and only a 
negligible number of reports f rom designated nonfinancial businesses and 
professions. The potential over-reporting from financial institutions could be 
linked to the criminal liability for both wilful and negligent non-reporting under 
the Criminal Code, which is also a concern for all service providers. This 
regime appears to have led to a large amount of "defensive reporting," rather 
than attempts to identify genuinely suspicious individuals, as very few of the 
reports have led to investigations and none to prosecutions. Out of 14,120 
reports received in 2004, only 20 cases turned into investigations and no 
the utilization thereof, or of any product designed for military utilization; b) in an armed 
manner. (4) The person who perpetrates the preparation of the violation of an international 
law duty, shall be punishable for a fe lony with imprisonment of up to three years. (5) The 
person who credibly learns that the violation of an international law duty is prepared and 
fails to report that to the authorities as soon as he can, commits a misdemeanour, and shall 
be punishable with imprisonment of up to two years. As the wording requires the proper 
promulgation (in an act of parliament or a government decree), in its present form it 
appears to be applicable only for EU-induced sanctions but not to those passed by the 
UNSC. 
47
 IMF Country Report No. 05/347. 
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prosecution was ever initiated out of an investigation arising from a suspicious 
transaction reporting. 
We see that over-zealousness is not unheard of in regulating financial insti-
tutions in Hungary. For example, a recommendation of the President of the 
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority48 on the prevention and impeding 
of terrorist financing and money laundering49 provides a vivid example for 
48
 No. 1/2004. See http://www.pszaf.hu/english/start.html. 
4
" Act 15 of 2003 on the prevention and impeding of money laundering states that the 
objective of the act is to combat the laundering of funds originating from crime, or 
financing terrorism through the money and capital market system, or making accessible for 
criminals, through financial service providers. Act 4 of 1978 on the Criminal Code, Section 
303 provides for the following definition of money laundering: (1) Any person who uses 
any item originating from the commitment of a criminal act punishable with imprisonment 
during his economic activities in order to conceal its origin, or perform any financial or 
banking transaction in relation to the item shall commit a crime and may be punished with 
imprisonment up to five years. (2) The punishment is imprisonment up to eight years if 
the money laundering is committed a) in a businesslike manner, b) involving especially 
large or even higher amounts, c) by an officer or employee of a financial organisation, 
investment enterprise, investment fund manager, clearing house, insurance company or an 
organisation involved in the organisation of gambling, d) by official persons, or e) attorneys 
at law. (3) Those who make an agreement on committing money laundering shall commit 
an offence and can be punished with imprisonment up to two years. (4) Those cannot be 
punished due to money laundering who voluntarily submit a report to the authority, or 
initiates such a report, providing that the action has not been detected at all, or it has only 
been detected in part. (5) The item specified in Paragraph (1) also includes documents and 
dematerialised securities representing a right to assets, which provide the right of 
disposal over the asset value or entitlement on their own or, in the ease of dematerialised 
securities, for the beneficiary of the securities account. Section 303/A (1) In case of items 
originating from a punishable action committed by a third party, a) those who use the item 
while exercising business activities, or b) perform any financial or banking transactions in 
relation to the item, and are not aware of the origin of the item due to negligence, may be 
punished with imprisonment up to two years, community work or may be imposed a fine. 
(2) The punishment for an offence is imprisonment up to three years if the action defined 
in Paragraph (1) is committed a) involving an especially large, or even higher value, b) by 
an officer or employee or a financial institution, investment enterprise, investment fund 
manager, clearing house, insurance company or organisation engaged in the organisation of 
gambling games, or c) by official persons. Section 303/B (1) Those who do not fulfil the 
reporting obligation specified in the Act on the prevention and hindering of money 
laundering shall commit a crime and may be punished with imprisonment up to three years. 
(2) Those who do not fulfil their reporting obligation specified in Paragraph (1) for 
negligence shall commit and offence, and may be punished with imprisonment up to two 
years, community work, or may be imposed a fine. For the legislative background also 
consider the following: Act 83 of 2001 on combating terrorism, aggravation of regulations on 
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singling out Arab and Muslim countries by the very formulation of its due 
diligence and reporting requirements:50 "The procedures aiming at the detection 
of money laundering intentions need to be used especially when.... Trans-
actions should primarily be examined in terms of whether they are related to 
individuals, countries!!) or organisations contained in the specific international 
lists. ... Raised attention needs to be paid to electronically sent and received 
amounts, which are unusual for certain reasons, including especially the size of 
the amount, the beneficiary target country(!), the country(!) of the customer 
placing the order, currency or the method of sending or receipt. ... If an activity 
does not fit in the registered and reported activities, if the origin of received 
funds is unclear, if an amount increases from unusual sources, the target 
country( !) or addressee raises a suspicion, the financial service provider needs 
to analyse and evaluate them with special care, and the transaction should be 
reported to the authority even if the smallest suspicion arises." 
4. Case law 
Both of the two Hungarian terrorism-related cases involved charges of providing 
financial support to terrorist organisations and in one way or another started 
off from bank reports. Also, both cases show the inconsistencies within criminal 
law and UNSCR or EU-induced anti-terrorist legislation. 
The first case involved Kinan Haddad, a Syrian physician who had been 
working in Hungary for several years and has been summarily expelled in 
2003 after he transferred money to a bank account for a charity that was linked 
to a terrorist organization. Following the bank's report to the National Security 
Office, Interior Ministry's Immigration and Citizenship Office summoned Dr 
Haddad, notified him that the account number to which he made his donation 
was linked to Hamas, extradited him and told him he could not return for 10 
years. Although he said he had not known who was behind the account, the 
National Security Office insisted that as the account belongs to one of the 
cover organizations of Hamas, in such cases, expulsion is the only possible 
reaction. Because the action was taken without a proper investigation and Dr 
Haddad has not been given an opportunity to defend himself and therefore was 
not afforded due process of law, Ferenc Kőszeg, chairman of the Helsinki 
the prevention of money laundering, and ordering certain restrictive measures, Act 101 of 
2000 on the announcement of the Strasbourg convention of November 1990 (on money 
laundering, and the detection, seizure and confiscation of items originating from crime). 
Id. See Part 1.4. Blocking the funds financing terrorism. 
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Commission claimed that the Hungarian expulsion process conflicts with 
general human rights principles and leaves no room to mount a legal defence. 
(Some argued that the fact that Dr Haddad was separated from his wife, with 
whom they got married according to Islamic law, constituted a breach of 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.) Mr István Diezig, Dr 
Haddad's lawyer, filed appeals with several government agencies but received 
no replies. Commentators draw attention to the following controversy: were 
the National Security charges well-founded, an ex-officio criminal procedure 
should have been initiated. As it was not done, the factual and legal basis for 
the extradition remains questionable.31 
The second case concerned a naturalized Jordanian-Hungarian dual citizen 
dentist, Saleh Tayseer who also worked as imam of a mosque in Hungary, 
which was expecting a donation of 470,000 euros from the Al-Haramein 
Foundation (Saudi-Arabia) as contribution to building a new mosque. According 
to media reports, US intelligence has been watching the movement of this 
foundation's alleged money laundering activities for years and believed that 
the foundation is closely linked to Bin Laden's Al-Quaeda and has cell groups 
in several countries. The media also reported that the location where Tayseer's 
mosque is registered is the same as for a company called FAB Ltd. owned by 
a Sudanese national by the name of Hassanein, who, according to The 
Washington Post, was involved in arms smuggling to Bosnian Muslims and 
associated with Usama bin Laden. The accounts were frozen but Mr Tayseer 
was detained and placed under preliminary arrest only in April 2004, after 
someone reported to the police that on the first day of Israeli President Mose 
Katsav's visit, he had attempted to blow up the Jewish Museum in Budapest. 
(The opening ceremony at the museum was part of the president's programme.) 
Although Katsav's spokesperson in Jerusalem claimed that the attack was 
planned against the president of Israel, Hungarian police denied any connection 
between the visit and Tayseer's arrest. Nevertheless, within a few weeks, due 
to the lack of evidence the Prosecutors Office dropped the case which was 
eventually based on just one finger-pointing allegation, by an accuser who has 
had a long police track record and had been extradited from Hungary on two 
occasions.52 
71
 For more, see for example Kovac, C.: Syrian doctor expelled f rom Hungary for 
al legedly suppor t ing Hamas. British Medical Journal 2003; 326 :1002 , ht tp: / /bmj. 
bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/326/7397/1002/b. 
7
" For more, see for example S Kiss, T.: Police release suspect Budapest Sun, 1 July 
2004, Vol. XII, Issue 27. or Szakacs, J.: Arrest Highlights Muslim Disunity, TOL, 23 
September 2004, Volume XII. Issue 39. 
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We can see that both (we might as well say, all) Hungarian cases show the 
inconsistent implementation and application of anti-terrorist legislation. 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that despite all the official commitment to the principles 
of rule of law and constitutionalism, much of the anti-terrorist legislation exists 
in a legal vacuum. Not only is the legal nature of UN Security Council resolutions 
ambiguous (a fact states may argue they cannot do much about) but in many 
countries (Hungary included) only half-hearted efforts are taken in national 
legislation to remedy this. 
Thus, the use of financial sanctions against individuals merely accused of 
supporting terrorism permits only a very limited recourse for rebuttal and 
restitution. Furthermore, the use of evidence that must be kept secret from the 
accused for security reasons is problematic for a jurisdiction governed by the 
rule of law.53 As noted by Piet Eeckhout, "In the absence of such [judicial! review, 
sanctions are pure executive acts, and no matter what type of foreign and 
security policy interests are at stake, it cannot be accepted in an organization 
based on the rule of law that executive acts which strongly affect people's lives 
are not subject to any effective judicial scrutiny".54 This is rather unfortunate, 
because, as Derek Bowett reminds us, it "needs to be pointed out that verbal 
support for the Rule of Law, coupled with a refusal to accept any legal control 
over executive decisions, is not a consistent position in an age pledged to 
uphold democratic values."'55 
53
 Vilcek: op. cit. 
54
 Eeckhout, P.: External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional 
Foundations. Oxford, 2004, 464. 
55
 Bowett: op. cit. 12. 
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It was three decades ago when Alfons Bürge analysed the Pro Mttrena by 
Marcus Tullius Cicero from a legal point of view in the professional literature 
of the last few decennia.1 Bürge closely examined the paragraphs dealing with 
the contentio dignitatis of the oratio, which he called Juristenkomik (Cic. Mur. 
22-30). After such an antecedent, it is no easy task to analyse the same speech 
from the perspective of legal history. After exploring the legal, historical and 
rhetorical background of the Pro Murena,2 the work of Tamás Nótári (associate 
professor of the Károli Gáspár University) aims to analyse paragraphs twenty-
six and twenty-seven, primarily from the aspect of legal history, and due to the 
character of the source, in light of religious history and the history of rhetoric 
as well. Because of the interdisciplinary nature of this study, its subject and 
aim-and therefore its methodological approach-are on the one hand made 
narrower, while on the other hand wider and more arborescent than Bürge's 
monography. It is narrower because after giving a more general overview of 
the historical and legal background of the Pro Murena in the first chapter, it 
outlines the career of the strategist, lawyer and orator, reviews the opinions 
appearing in the Corpus Ciceronianum and presents the theoretical and practical 
aspects of the Ciceronian sense humour, but does not analyse the whole oratio, 
not even the entire contentio dignitatis, focusing only on paragraphs 26 and 
27-i.e. the eleventh caput of the speech. It is wider since the analysis is not 
devoted strictly to textual content, but also takes into consideration the questions 
arising in connection with it. 
Following the historical, legal and rhetorical background outlined in the first 
chapter, the core issue dealt with in the second and third chapters concerning 
paragraphs twenty-six and twenty-seven is conservativism in the forms of law 
in the Archaic Age, which is described by Cicero-in accordance with the 
1
 Bürge, A.: Die Juristenkomik in Ciceros Rede Pro Murena. Zürich, 1974. 
2
 The Hungarian translation of the Pro Murena see Nótári, T. (ed.): Cicero-Négy 
védőbeszéd. (Cicero-Four speeches of defence.) Szeged, 2004. 73-132. 
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rhetoric situation rather than his own conviction-in a way that provokes a 
smile. More precisely, its austere and pragmatic adherence to the texts of legal 
acts, which sometimes opposes the real life situations and the ius, is designed to 
create the idea of justice. In searching for the source of this rigorousness-which 
deeply interpenetrates the whole of Roman intellectual life-and exploring 
Cicero's attitude to the literal interpretation of a statute or its interpretation 
based on equity, the thesis makes several side-tracks that do not belong to the 
survey of law, or legal history, but rather to the history of religion and literature. 
The analogies and the consequences that can be drawn from these, however, 
lead to a better understanding of the structure of different legal institutions 
(e.g. the legis actio sacramento in rem)2 and of how they are embedded in 
the antique world of thinking and belief, which explains the wide-ranging 
complexity of the subject matter and methodological approach in the present 
paper. As the survey progresses, these seemingly scattered threads meet in the 
end to form a concise, organic synthesis. The widely laid theme springs from 
and returns to the analysis of one single source-coherence assured by the 
source analysed, the two Ciceronian paragraphs. Naturally, the limits of this 
study do not allow for a full-length presentation of the antique sources related 
to each question and legal institution in addition to various opinions appearing 
in literature, nor do they allow to argue for or against these, which in many 
cases did not even seem to be necessary since our aim was not to exceed the 
limits of the dissertation by exploring every detail of these questions and legal 
institutions, but to create an overall picture from their structural outline-as the 
author confesses in his Preface.4 
In the first chapter, Nótári attempted to outline the historical background of 
the Pro Murena, comparing the opinions drawn up in other parts of the Corpus 
Ciceronianum in order to draw a line between the political-rhetorical situation 
and statements originating from personal conviction. During this process, the 
author tried to pay close attention to some of the means of the Ciceronian 
eloquentia. Lucius Licinius Murena and Decimus Iunius Silanus, brother-in-
law of Marcus Porcius Cato, won the elections for consul ship in 63 ВС. They 
also had two rivals: Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the most excellent jurist of the 
age, and the notorious Lucius Sergius Catilina. 63 ВС was one of the most 
critical periods of the Roman Republic, because it was the time of the second 
Catilinan conspiracy. As consul, Cicero could have been motivated to accept 
3
 Cf. Földi. A.-Hamza, G.: A római jog története és institúciói (History and Institutes 
of Roman Law). Budapest, 2005. 167. sqq. 
4
 Nótári: op. cit. 7. sqq. 
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the defense of Murena against his friend, Servius Sulpicius, primarily by the 
fact that in early 62 ВС it would have meant extreme danger to the state if only 
one consul had taken over control of state affairs.5 Elections were necessarily 
accompanied by ambitus, a form of corruption that was first sanctioned in 432 
ВС. Acceptance of the lex Tullia de ambitu was forced through by Cicero him-
self in 63-encouraged by Servius Sulpicius among others-in order to sharpen 
the sanctions. It penalized corruption during elections by banishing the guilty 
party from the senatus and denied his right to participate in future elections in 
addition to imposing ten years of exile.'' 
In the Pro Murena, Cicero gives primacy to Murena in opposition to both 
the iurisprudentia and the eloquentia. The question arises, however, as to what 
extent these statements reflect his own personal convictions. Therefore, after 
sketching the career of L. Licinus Murena, it seemed worthwhile to the author 
to have a quick look at the evaluation of the res militaris in the Corpus 
Ciceronianum. He concludes that Cicero generally did not find the gloria 
militaris more valuable or useful to the state than leading the peaceful life of a 
citizen and hence the heroic task of serving the public. The career of Servius 
Sulpicius Rufus is remarkable considering his far-reaching work and his 
pioneering methodological activities, not only from the point of view of the 
analysis of the Pro Murena, but also in terms of jurisprudence at the end of the 
republic. In the Pro Murena, the orator does not wish to degrade the merits and 
knowledge of Servius Sulpicius against Murena. Disconnecting this from the 
personality of the two candidates, he instead compares the merits of the 
general with those of the jurist and decides to the benefit of the former, not so 
much in keeping with his personal opinion but rather because the historical and 
rhetorical situation forces him to do so. The author had also a brief look at the 
"Cicero iuris consultus" or Cicero's relation to iurisprudentia.1 He concludes, 
that many of Cicero's works testify to his deep and overall legal knowledge, 
5
 Nótári: op. cit. 15. sqq. 
6
 Nótári, T.: Quaestio de ambitu. Collegei 2001. 5. 43. sqq. 
7
 Nótári: op. cit. 29-52. About the topic Cicero iuris consultus see also Hamza, G.: 
Das Vorbild des Rechtsgelehrten bei Cicero. Annales Universitas Scientiarum Buda-
pestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae Sectio Juridica 24. 1982. 57. sqq.; Hamza, G.: 
Ciceros Verhältnis zu seinen Quellen, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Darstellung der 
Staatslehre in De re publica. Klio 67. 1985. 492. sqq.; Hamza, G.: Riflessioni sulla tcoria 
ciceroniana dello Stato. II pensiero politico 29. 1996. 83. sqq.; Hamza, G.: Bemerkungen 
über den Begriff des Naturrechts bei Cicero. In: Nozione formazione e interpretazione del 
diritto dall 'e tà romana alle esperienze moderne. Ricerche dedicate al professore Filippo 
Gallo, vol. I. Napoli, 1997. 349. sqq. 
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and he was convinced that knowledge of iurisprudentia was a necessary tool 
for an orator? Given the fact that in the studiorum atque artium contentio 
Cicero applies the oratoral means of humour, Tamás Nótári also deemed it 
necessary to briefly examine humour and irony in light of antique rhetoric, and 
especially in theoretical works by Cicero." 
In connection with paragraph 26 of the Pro Murena as a source to be 
analysed, the author attempted to find an answer to problems related to the 
structure of the legis actio sacramento in rem in the second chapter. In view of 
the history of Roman religion and the field of ius sacrum, he tried to exploit 
the conclusions that could be drawn from these fields. As the height the Juris-
tenkomik, Cicero describes one version of the manum consere ceremony applied 
to the legis actio sacramento in rem plots of land. After placing the act of manum 
consertum within the organisational procedure of the legis actio, it seemed 
useful to the author to observe how, why, and to what extent the preoccupation 
with text so mocked by Cicero characterised Roman (legal) thinking. Beginning 
with the well-known fact that one lost a lawsuit if he made even a single verbal 
mistake in his speech during the process of the legis actio, the author has 
examined many examples to observe the power of verbality, more precisely 
that of the spoken word, to create reality, as manifest in the ius sacrum and in 
religious thinking. From these, one can gain a clear picture of the neuroticly 
rigorous connection between Roman religion and jurisprudence of the Archaic 
Age and the spoken word. While conducting research into the symbolic meaning 
behind use of the rod instead of the lance as the symbol of ownership in the 
legis actio sacramento in rem, the author observed many cases of the applica-
tion of the rod and lance and their relation to the dominium and the impérium, 
he paid special attention to the lituus of the augur, the commoetaculum of the 
flamen Dialis and the fasces of the lictores."1 
From all of this, it can clearly bee drawn the conclusion, that the rod and 
the lance served as generally accepted symbols of power in Roman culture, not 
only in rituals connected with the legis actio sacramento in rem ceremony, 
s
 Nótári. T.: De oratoris perfecti institutione. Collega 2003. 3. 47. sqq. 
4
 See also Nótári, T.: Studiorum atque artium contentio (Cic. Mur. 22-30). Aetas 1999. 
1-2. 224. sqq.; Nótári, T.: Jogtudomány és retorika - Cicero pro Murena 26. Jogtudományi 
Közlöny 2001. 12. 470. sqq. 
" 'See also Nótári, T.: On Some Aspects of the Roman Concept of Authority. Acta 
Juridica Hungarica 46 (2005) 95. sqq.; Nótári, T.: Festuca autem utebantur quasi hastae 
loco. Acta Facultattisi Politico-Iuridicae Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de 
Rolando Eötvös nominatae. 51. 2004. 133. sqq.; Nótári, T.: Remarks on the Origin of the 
legis actio sacramento in rem. Acta Juridica Hungarica 47 (2006) 133. sqq. 
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which belongs to the ius privatum, but also in the case of many procedures and 
institutions belonging to the ius publicum and the ius sacrum. The ius fetiale 
(the archaic law of war and peace) and the legis actio sacramento in rem 
offered many parallels, and there were many features common to the structure 
of the vindicatio and also to one of the plots in Plautus' comedy, Casina, in 
which the right of disposition over a slave girl was decided through battle 
accompanied by an ordeal. These examples and the accompanying arguments 
lead the author to the following-quite convincing-theory. Opinions formed in 
opposition to one another, and which search for the origin of the legis actio 
sacramento in rem either in the realm of private battle or in sacredness, serve 
to strengthen each other and reach the same conclusion, and can therefore be 
integrated into a single theory. The sacred element can be clearly traced in the 
procedure of the vindicatio, either from the oath, the sacramentum, or in the 
form of literal compliance with the carmen to be pronounced. One can find the 
motive for the battle either in the etymology of the vindicatio or in the appli-
cation of the lance, but it was the hasta that held an additional sacral content 
in the imagination of the Romans, which cannot be neglected in the case of 
archaic civil law either. Applying the rules of this genre, Plaute presents a sort 
of a property case, the result of which was determined by a supernatural 
decision,-meaning the outcome of the controlled and restricted private battle 
defined by sortio. On this basis, the author assumes that the procedure of the 
legis actio sacramento in rem as we know it today was originally an ordeal 
fought with arms." 
In the third chapter the author studied paragraph 27 of the Pro Murena, 
beginning with the notes related to marital law, after which he tried to find the 
place of the statement "in omni denique iure civili aequitatem relinquerunt, 
verba ipsa tenuerunt" in the context of legal history and Cicero's works. 
Observing the confarreatio among the acts that the manus originates from, and 
the marriage ceremonies, one could clearly see that in the example the orator 
cited, Cicero made an ironic reference to the sentence "ubi tu Gaius, ego Gaia "— 
which corresponds with the argumentation and translation of Gary Forsythe'2-
a sentence the author interpreted as meaning "where thou art happy, I am 
happy". In the course of these examinations, Nótári devoted some time to the 
presence of /7amen Dialis in the confarreatio, and concluded-with the help of 
the parallels drawn from the cult of Zeus Naios of Dodona-that part of the 
" Nótári: op. cit. 53. sqq. 
12
 Forsythe, G.: Ubi tu gaius, ego gaia. New Light on an Old Roman Legal Saw. História 
45 (1996) 240. sq. 
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instructions regarding the flamen and the flaminica Dialis hide hierogamic 
notions, which must have had a great significance in the ritual guarantees of 
fertility in marriage.11 When talking about the status of women Cicero 
mentions that women were generally placed under power. It seemed logical, 
therefore, to more thoroughly examine certain institutions of the manus marin 
and also of the patria potestas-because of the analogies based on the character 
of the sources." Regarding the question of whether the uxor in manu is a 
member of the agnatio, the author followed the observations of Robert Brósz 
and gave a negative answer.15 
In the second part of this chapter the author discussed at length the aspect 
that archaic law insisted on the precise order of the pronounced words 
regarding the clarification of Cicero's comment "in omni denique iure civili 
aequitatem relinquerunt, verba ipsa tenuerunt". Considering that Cicero placed 
emphasis on the contradiction between verba and aequitas, as a guideline 
Tamás Nótári tried to trace developments in the meaning of the expression 
interpretatio, during which the interpretatio merged aspects of the religious 
sphere and grammar and eventually reached the meaning of interpretation that 
was determinant in the Classic Age. The author then studied the proverb 
"Summum ius summa iniuria", which became known in Cicero's works and 
occupied a significant place among the maxims of the logic of law that 
functioned as a means of legal interpretation, by examining its appearance in 
antique literature, such as in the works of Terence, Columella and Cicero. The 
meaning of proverb crystallized in the writings of the latter, according to 
which it signifies the over-extended application and enforcement of law in bad 
faith within the process of the interpretatio iuris, playing off the word of the 
law against its meaning. The sentence "ius est ars boni et aequi", in harmony 
with the spirit of Cicero in the Pro Murena, formulates one of the most 
comprehensive fundamental principles of the interpretatio, which aims to offer 
protection against the extreme literal interpretation and application of the 
11
 Cf. Nótári, T.: The Function of the Flamen Dialis in the Marriage Ceremony. 
Annates Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae Juridica 
45. 2004. 57. sqq. 
14
 Nótári. T.: De iure vitae necisque et exponendi. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1998. 421. 
sqq.; Nótári, T.: De matrimonio cum manu. Jogtörténeti Szemle 2005. 2. 52. sqq.; Nótári, 
T.: Quelques remarques sur le ius vitae necisquc et le ius exponendi. Studio luridica 
Caroliensia I. 2006. 169. sqq. 
15
 Nótári: op. cit. 101. sqq. See also Brósz, R.; Ist die uxor in manu ein Agnat? Annales 
Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae Juridica 18. 
1976. 3. sqq. 
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summum ius. During the interpretation of this sentence, the author concluded 
that it became a significant means of legal development as an interaction of 
iurisprudentia and eloquentia.'6 
Finally, while examining the historical background of Pro Caecina, and 
some sources connected to the interdictum de vi armata, the interdiction uti 
possidetis and the deductio, the author studied the disposition used by Cicero 
in the oratio, which exploited the opposition between verba and aequitas, and 
between scriptum and sententia. The author observed the way in which Cicero 
regulated his argument according to the actual situation and the interest of the 
trial rather than according to abstract principles. In doing so, the orator 
managed-with unprecedented rhetorical genius-to make the literal interpre-
tation of law triumph by using tools of oratory that were created precisely for 
application against the literal interpretation of law.17 
At this stage, an explanation must be given for the title "Law, religion and 
rhetoric. Studia Mureniana". The speeches of Cicero had practical motivations. 
The lessons that can be drawn from them concerning law and order and the 
legal procedure of the given age are necessary consequences, and the legal 
themes outlined in them are the means rather than the aims of the orator. 
When examining these speeches, one cannot make a strict separation between 
legal and philological questions. Favouring one aspect exclusively to the 
detriment of the other would mean destroying the organic and structural unity 
of the source, and this approach would also oppose the thinking of Cicero, who 
always aimed at complexity. In Rome, especially the Rome of the Archaic 
Age, legal and sacred beliefs formed an organic unity. According to today's 
taxonomy, it would be justified to draw a distinction between the two, but the 
dangers present in the unjustified application of these modern categories in 
the Antique Age could hardly be avoided. If the author tries to accept this 
complexity, the reader might come nearer to the thinking of the Romans, who 
made almost no distinction between religion and politics. This is especially 
true in light of the fact that the examples cited in Cicero's Pro Murena-which 
refer to the moments of the legis actio sacramento and coemptio-originate 
from the organic unit of the ius and the sacrum. Tamás Nótári adjuncted the 
notes containing valuable informations at the end of the main part of his text,18 
16
 See also Nótár i , T.: S u m m u m ius summa in iur ia -Comments on the Historical 
Background of a Legal Maxim of Interpretation. Acta Juridica Hungarica 45 (2004) 
301. sqq. 
17
 Nótári: op. cit. 137. sqq. 
18
 Ibid. 155-233. 
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and encomplished his monography not only with lists of the abbreviated 
antique sources and modern bibliographical references, but also with two 
indices of quoted sources and subjects.14 On our part we would regard it as 
most desirable, if the author published the whole monography-useful both for 
historians and lawyers-in English. 
István Sándor 
19
 Ibid. 235. sqq. 
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